JUDGMENT 1. THIS application has been made by 96 persons as petitioners and relates to the affairs of the municipality known as the Garden Reach Municipality, situated in the suburbs of Calcutta. Originally, this municipality was a part of the Corporation of Calcutta, but was separated sometime in the year 1935. On or about the 16th May, 1955 the municipality was superseded by an order of the Government and an Administrator was appointed and he is functioning ever since. The Government has announced the next general election to be held, and the date for the election has been fixed for the 14th February, 1960. In working out the programme for the ensuing election, the Administrator prepared and published a preliminary roll, including Ward No. 5 on or about the 14th September, 1959. The petitioners Nos. 5 to 98 ore members of joint families, who claimed to be entitled to vote at the ensuing election, on the ground that their joint families pay rates to the municipality. The petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 claim to be co-owners of certain holdings, and they have also the requisite qualifications for voting. In the preliminary electoral roll, the petitioners' names were not included. Thereupon they preferred a claim before the registering authority, that is, the Administrator in this case, claiming to be included in the electoral roll. The registering authority being satisfied about their status and qualifications, included them in the final electoral roll, which was published on the 14th November, 1959, Thereupon, the respondent No. 6 preferred an appeal under Section 529-A of the Bengal Municipal Act (hereinafter referred to as the "act") against the inclusion of the petitioners' names by the registering authority in the final electoral roll. The ground taken was that the petitioners had not complied with Rule 4 of the Election Rules, not having sent a letter within the time specified in terms of the said Rule. The learned Magistrate upheld this contention and passed a summary order to the effect that, inasmuch as the provisions of Rule 4 were not complied with, the names of the petitioners should be struck out from the final electoral roll It is from this order that the petitioners have come up to this Court. 2. THE question, therefore, is as to whether on the facts and circumstances of this case. Rule 4 has any application. 2. THE question, therefore, is as to whether on the facts and circumstances of this case. Rule 4 has any application. It is admitted that if it does apply, no letter in accordance with it was ever sent to the registering authority within thirty days of the announcement of the general election or at all. The relevant provision in the said Act is section 23. Sub-section (2) of section 23 lays down the qualifications which a voter should have, in order to be entitled to vote at an election. So far as the joint family is concerned, the appropriate sub-section is sub-section (5). In order that this sub-section should apply, the unit must be a joint family, that is to say, it is the joint family which must be making payments of the municipal rates etc. Clause (i) of sub-section (5) provides that where such a joint family has been paying municipal rates of the kind contemplated in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 123, or the consolidated rates under the Calcutta Municipal Act as extended to the municipality of Howrah, then the individual members thereof would be entitled to be shown separately in the electoral roll and would thus be able to vote separately. Also in such a case, where a member has been assessed to income tax during the preceding financial year, he is entitled to be separately enrolled in the electoral roll. I might mention here that Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 128 relates to the payment of a rate on holdings situated within the municipality, assessed at their annual value. Clause (ii) of subsection (5) deals with the case where the joint family as a unit had been paying municipal fees and taxes. Of course the word "taxes" might include rates in the larger sense, but inasmuch as it has been separately treated, one must presume that this clause deals with the payment of fees and taxes other than the headings enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (1) of Section 123. In such a case, the question is whether the share of fees and taxes paid by the individual members exceed the minimum prescribed. In this case, the minimum has been prescribed by Government Notification and it amounts to eight annas per year. In such a case, the question is whether the share of fees and taxes paid by the individual members exceed the minimum prescribed. In this case, the minimum has been prescribed by Government Notification and it amounts to eight annas per year. If the share of each member exceeds that sum, then he is entitled to individual representation. If it does not amount to such a sum, then the proviso appended to Clause (ii) of sub-section (5) comes into operation. This is important for our purpose and it is set out below:- "provided that where the total amount paid by a joint family does not equal or exceed the amount necessary to entitle every member of the joint family to vote, one of the members of such joint family as its representative shall be entitled to vote except in case where any member of such joint family is enrolled to vote separately and individually in respect of his share in the joint property." The meaning of the proviso is as follows: Where the joint family pays any of the amounts levied by the Commissioners but where the total amount does not equal or exceed the amount necessary to entitle every member to vote, then individual representation is not permitted but common representation. In such a case, only one member can represent the joint family. But there is an exception. It sometimes happens that although a joint family is the unit of payment, one member without dissolution of the family, might choose to pay only his own share of the amounts to be paid and he may apply to the municipality and get his name separately recorded. In such a case, his separate representation is not to be disturbed, even though the rest of the joint family are entitled only to a common representation. That being the state of law with regard to the joint families, we now come to the Election Rules relevant to the preparation and publication of the electoral rolls. In such a case, his separate representation is not to be disturbed, even though the rest of the joint family are entitled only to a common representation. That being the state of law with regard to the joint families, we now come to the Election Rules relevant to the preparation and publication of the electoral rolls. Rule 4 is a rule with which we are concerned in this case and it runs as follows:- "within 30 days after the announcement of the date of a general election within a municipality any company, body corporate, firm or other association of individuals or any joint family, entitled to vote through one of its members as its representative, shall send a letter to the Registering Authority stating the qualification entitling it to vote and the name of the person who will vote on its behalf." 3. IF more than one member of a joint family are entitled to vote the names of such members shall be included in such letter. Any person entitled to vote under clauses (b) and (c) of section 23 (2) (iii) shall also send a letter to the Registering Authority stating his qualification. " 4. AS I have mentioned above, the learned Magistrate struck out the names of the petitioners on the ground that Rule 4 has not been observed inasmuch as the necessary letter was not written to the Registering Authority within thirty days, after announcement of the date of the general election. The question is whether and to what extent Rule 4 applies to the facts of this case. The first part of Rule 4 makes it clear that a joint family entitled to vote through one of its members as its representative shall send a letter to the Registering Authority. I have mentioned above that in the case of a joint family, the members may have the right to individual representation or common representation. They are liable to common representation if they come within the proviso above-mentioned. Until they come within it, and there has to be common representation, the first part of Rule 4 does not apply. I have mentioned above that in the case of a joint family, the members may have the right to individual representation or common representation. They are liable to common representation if they come within the proviso above-mentioned. Until they come within it, and there has to be common representation, the first part of Rule 4 does not apply. It is nobody's case here, and it is conceded that it has never been the case, that all the petitioners are entitled only to common representation or that they come within the proviso, or that the amount payable by way of fees and taxes do not come up to the prescribed amount. In fact, the petitioners are all rate-payers and base their claim on the payment of rates as visualised under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 123. There is no question of the payment of fees and taxes. Amongst them there is also no person who can be said to have recorded himself for convenience of payment of such rates, in his own share only. I now come to the second part of Rule 4. It is stated there, that if such a letter has to be written, then if more than one member of a joint family are entitled to vote, their names should be included therein. It is argued that this is in general terms and, therefore, in every case, where there is a joint family each member should write a letter in terms of the first part of Rule In my opinion, this argument must be rejected as untenable. Attention must be drawn to the use of the word "such." It is only where a letter has to be written in terms of the first part of Rule 4, that the contingency contemplated in the second part comes into operation. It has already been pointed out that the first part of Rule 4 comes into operation only where there is going to be common representation and not where there is going to be individual representation. The question arises then as to how, more than one name should have to be mentioned, when under the proviso to Clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of section 23, there is provision for a joint family being represented by one person and by one person only. The question arises then as to how, more than one name should have to be mentioned, when under the proviso to Clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of section 23, there is provision for a joint family being represented by one person and by one person only. This certainly is a difficult point to answer, but I think that the answer lies in the last part of the proviso. It will be remembered that while providing for a common representation, an exception has been engrafted. Where a member of a joint family separately pays his dues, he is not bound to have a common representation. It is this aspect of the matter which is referred to in the second part of Rule 4. In other words, a letter is required to be sent only if there is a common representation. But where such a letter is being sent, and it is found that one or more members of such a joint family is entitled to vote separately because he or they has or have been enrolled separately and individually in respect of his or their share or shares in the joint property, then in such a case, such names should also be mentioned in the letter. The learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents have tried to argue that I should ignore the word "such", or at least not put any emphasis on it. In my opinion, this would be a wrong method of interpretation. When that word has been used, I must infer that it has been used by the framers of the Rules deliberately, and I can neither ignore it, nor strike it out from the Rules. With regard to some of the petitioners, it is not a question of a joint family at all, but joint ownership and this distinction has not at all been noticed by the learned District Magistrate. In view of this interpretation of the law, it must be held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, Rule 4 has no application and it was not necessary to send any letter and, therefore, there arises no question of such a letter not being sent within time. In view of this interpretation of the law, it must be held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, Rule 4 has no application and it was not necessary to send any letter and, therefore, there arises no question of such a letter not being sent within time. The decision of the learned District Magistrate is erroneous on the face of the proceedings and, therefore, the Rule must be made absolute and the order of the learned District Magistrate canceling the names of the petitioners from the final electoral roll must be set aside and quashed by a writ in the nature of Certiorari. The result is that the petitioners must be considered as having been included in the final electoral roll as published. There will be no order as to costs.