This is an appeal against the appellate order of the Commissioner, Ajmer dated 7th Feb., 1959 by which he has set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector, Udaipurwati dated 2.5.56 dismissing the suit of the respondents for declaration and injunction and remanded the case for retrial after allowing an amendment of the plaint. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record also. The merits of the case are not disputed before us. The appeal has been filed only against the order allowing the amendment of the plaint, and it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the amendment having been sought after the dismissal of the suit by the trial court and at a very late stage, although the respondents knew that they had been dispossessed from the suit land and had proceeded for their reinstatement in the court of the Anti-Ejectment Officer and had not been successful there, the amendment, which would also change the nature of suit, should not have been allowed. The amendment sought is not only for adding the relief for possession, but also for adding one more plaintiff as well as making the change in the area of the land in dispute. All the facts sought to be brought in by amendment of the plaint now had been contested by the appellants in their written statement itself and it is a fact that the respondents did not care to have their plaint amended immediately after that. It is also a fact that after two or three months of the institution of the present suit the respondents applied to the Anti-Ejectment Officer for their reinstatement on the ground that they had been wrongfully dispossessed. The proceeding in that application were ordered to be closed by the learned Anti-Ejectment Officer with the observation that a regular suit had been going on between the parties. This order was passed on 6.10.54; whereas the present suit was decided by the trial court on 2.5.56. Even during this interval the respondents did not care to have the plaint amended. This order was passed on 6.10.54; whereas the present suit was decided by the trial court on 2.5.56. Even during this interval the respondents did not care to have the plaint amended. It was only in the first appellate court for the first time, when they had lost the suit in the trial court on the ground that there were other share-holders also in the well in dispute and that they were not in possession of the portion of the well over which they wanted to have a declaration of their title and injunction, that they made a prayer for the permission to amend the plaint. The learned Commr. has allowed this amendment and ordered the retrial of the whole suit on the ground that the respondent had been dispossessed from the suit land after the filing of the suit and that the amendment sought was necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties and to find out as to who was the person entitled to possession. 3. Now, the law on the subject is described in O.6, R.17 of C.P.C., which may be reproduced as below— "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties." The powers of the courts to allow amendment of pleadings as such are very wide and they can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings. Rather, it has been held that all such amendments as may be necessary to determine the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be allowed to be made. This grants the court a very wide power of discretion, which, of course, has to be exercised judicially. But at the same time, as observed by Bowen, L.J., in Cropper vs. Smith, it has to be remembered that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for the mistake they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. But at the same time, as observed by Bowen, L.J., in Cropper vs. Smith, it has to be remembered that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for the mistake they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. The main principle that should guide the discretion of the court in such matters is that it should not be allowed if it causes injustice to either party. It has also, however, to be remembered as a cardinal rule that there is no injustice caused to any party if it can be compensated by costs. At the same time it has to be remembered in the words of P.B. Mukherji, J., of the Calcutta High Court in A.I.R. 1953, Cal., 15 that "the primary duty of a court in deciding an application for amendment is not discharged by laying unction to its conscience with the thought that the order will not prejudice any party. The Court has the more positive duty to see whether the proposed amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy between the parties. Nor is the primary consideration, in such an application,, to award costs against the amending party. The Courts do not exist for so commercial a purpose as to be mere institutions for dispensing costs without deciding the merits. They exist primarily for the justice of determining the genuine and real disputes between the parties and incidentally for awarding costs. The real controversy test is he basic test which governs the Courts unchartered powers of amendment of pleadings." An amendment of pleadings can thus be allowed even in a first appeal as in this case and even after the dismissal of the suit by the trial court, if the appellant can be compensated by payment of costs and the real controversy between the parties is enabled to be determined thereby. 4. The learned counsel for the parties have submitted a number of rulings in support of their contentions. 4. The learned counsel for the parties have submitted a number of rulings in support of their contentions. The cases cited on behalf of the appellants go to show that delay in making the prayer for amendment should not be encouraged and when amendment has not been made even when objections had been taken by the other side at a very early stage, the amendments sought on that basis after the decision of the trial court and in cases where the amendments would amount to a retrial and the equity did not require such a course to be adopted should not be allowed. As against it, the rulings cited on behalf of the respondents go to show that the amendment can be allowed at any stage for the purpose of determining the real controversy and by compensating the other party by payment of costs. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1960, S.C. 195, although in different context but still materially relevant to this case, decisions cannot always serve as precedents. "Decisions even of the highest court on questions which are essentially questions of fact, cannot be cited as precedents governing the decision of other cases which must rest in the ultimate analysis upon their own particular facts. ............The more difficult question is one of applying those principles to the facts and circumstances of a particular case." The cases cited by the learned counsel for the parties are not on all fours with the present case in which the respondents first came forward with the plea that the appellants were trying to take possession of the crop sown by the respondents over about 14 bighas of the land over the disputed well, and did not care to amend the plaint even when the appellants gave out in their written statement that the total land under the well was not only 14 odd Bighas, but 35 odd Bighas and that the western half thereof had been always in their own possession and cultivation, and that the respondents had along with one other Surja Gujar (who is now proposed to be impleaded as plaintiff) had started cultivating the other half only from a year before. They could have very well amended the suit immediately thereafter and in any case when they had been dispossessed, according to their own allegation, after two months of the institution of thereof or at least when their application for their reinstatement as a consequence thereof had been stopped from being provided with by the court concerned. Only cases that could be called to be nearer the instant case are A.I.R. 1944 Bom., 245 wherein even though the point for amendment was not directly under issue, the learned Judge deciding the case observed by way of obiter that "the objection to the amendment of the suit was taken at the very beginning and I should not be prepared at this stage to allow an amendment of the plaint, even if. I had been asked to do so. "The other case in which such a matter came for fuller examination was AIR 1955 Hyderabad. In this case the question of amendment was directly at issue and one of the pleas raised in a suit for declaration and injunction was that the plaintiff-respondent being out of possession could not bring a suit for mere declaration. The plaintiff applied for amendment immediately thereafter alleging that he had been dispossessed sometime after the institution of the suit and should, therefore, be allowed to add a prayer for possession also. This prayer was disallowed by the trial court, but in appeal the first appellate court allowed the same. The case went in appeal against this order of the first appellate court. After examining a number of authorities on the subject and holding that when there were no mala fides of the party applying for amendment proved, even though he might have been negligent or careless and however late the amendment might have been proposed, the amendment should be allowed. The instant case is different from this only in the respect that the amendment had been proposed to be sought in the first appeal and even the name of the plaintiff Surja had been proposed to be added notwithstanding a clear reference to him in the written statement filed by the appellants nothing had been done even to add him as a party in the trial court. The only bar against the amendment in view of the decisions referred to above, can be, as has been held recently in 1960 Patna, 54 that an amendment of plaint at the stage of appeal changing the basis of suit and necessitating fresh trial cannot be allowed. This was, however, held in a case when the suit for possession by a purchaser of a share of a coparcener in a certain family was sought to be amended to one for the suit of partition of the same property. The amendment in the present case as described above, neither changes the nature and character of the suit, nor necessitates a fresh trial on that account, even though it would require a retrial on the ground that a new plaintiff was being added as well as the plea for possession was being made. Notwithstanding this, the suit has been decided as yet only by the trial court. The stages of two, appeals even after the decision of the suit as it is without being amended remain to be undergone by the parties. Without having all the necessary parties on the record and even without deciding the prayer for possession, the real controversy between the parties about the possession of the land under dispute and a peaceful enjoyment thereof would remain alive even when this suit has undergone all the remaining two stages and the parties would have to go over once again, if necessary, into a fresh suit and all the consequences, procedure of its trial and appeals against the decision of the trial court. This would add to the multiplicity of proceedings besides being an unnecessary harassment to the parties and would certainly go against the spirit of the wordings of the R. 17, C.P.C. referred to above that all amendments which may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties, shall be allowed. No doubt the appellants will have to undergo the whole procedure of retrial as a result of this amendment, but still this would save them from all further prolonged proceedings described above, and the present inconvenience caused to them can be very well compensated by payment of costs. Thus applying all the three tests, viz. No doubt the appellants will have to undergo the whole procedure of retrial as a result of this amendment, but still this would save them from all further prolonged proceedings described above, and the present inconvenience caused to them can be very well compensated by payment of costs. Thus applying all the three tests, viz. (1) no injustice is caused to the other party, (2) if any injustice is caused it is compensated by costs, and (3) the real controversy between the parties is enabled to be finally decided, are fulfilled in the instant case and there is, even though the application has been made at a very very late stage, a necessity for granting the permission to amend the plaint as has been done by the learned lower appellate court. The learned Commissioner has, however, erred in awarding no costs to the appellants to compensate them. This was very necessary. 5. We, therefore, accept this appeal only to the extent that the appellants would get a Cost of Rs. 100/- (one hundred) from the respondents before the amendment and retrial of the plaint as ordered by the learned Commissioner would proceed. With this modification; we uphold the orders under appeal.