Judgment.- This Second Appeal by defendant 7 arises out of a suit instituted by the late husband of the first respondent for a mandatory injunction directing him to remove an encroachment consisting of a portion of a pucca building and a compound wall on a part of the land in T. S. No. 1551 and for other reliefs. The plaintiff claimed he had in June, 1947, purchased the land covered by T.S. Nos. 1552 and 1553 and was, therefore, entitled in common with defendants 1 to 6 to the exclusive use of the lane. He further maintained that defendant 7 had wrongfully encroached upon a part of the lane and was bound to remove the offending structure. Defendant 7 alone resisted the suit, defendants 1 to 6 remaining ex parte. He denied the encroachment and the plaintiff’s right to the lane. He also pleaded that in any case there was no case to direct removal of the encroachment. The following facts as found by the Courts below are no longer in dispute before me. The encroachment was true but the compound wall occupied only a width of 5 inches on a margin of the lane while the encroachment by the building covered a little longer space on the same margin of the lane. The land comprised in T. S. No. 1551 belonged to the plaintiff as well as defendants 1 to 7 in common. The encroachment had come into existence even before June, 1947 and neither the plaintiff’s vendor nor defendants 1 to 6 appeared to have objected to it. The encroachment did not cause material or substantial injury or inconvenience to the co-owners in the use of the lane as a passage. On these findings the trial Court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court agreed with it so far as the compound wall was concerned as it encroached upon a width of only 5 inches. But it disagreed with the trial Court and ordered removal of the encroachment by a part of the building on the ground that it occupied a wider space on the lane. Hence this Second Appeal by defendant 7. The question, therefore, is whether the lower appellate Court was justified in granting a mandatory injunction to the extent mentioned above. But it disagreed with the trial Court and ordered removal of the encroachment by a part of the building on the ground that it occupied a wider space on the lane. Hence this Second Appeal by defendant 7. The question, therefore, is whether the lower appellate Court was justified in granting a mandatory injunction to the extent mentioned above. Sri R. Ramamurthi Ayyar, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended that this is not a case of a trespasser putting up a construction upon the land of another, but a case of a co-owner exceeding his rights, if at all, in putting up a construction over a portion of the land owned in common. He argued that in such cases, unless it was established by the co-owners aggrieved against the encroachment by another co-owner of a portion of the common property that the encroachment caused material and substantial injury to them in relation to their right to use the lane as a common passage and that the encroachment, when it was being built, was objected to by the complaining co-owners, no mandatory injunction could be granted for the demolition of the encroachment. In support of his contention the learned counsel cited a number of authorities. But it is not necessary to refer to all of them. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Krishna Kumar v. Padum Singh1, held that the plaintiff who complained of the building of a permanent structure on the joint property by his co-owner, could not obtain a decree for its demolition or for joint possession, unless he established that he had sustained some substantial injury by reason of the act and that he took reasonable steps in time to prevent the erection. In that case the defendant who was a co-owner had put up a substantial structure on a portion of what was admittedly a joint property. As the plaintiff there failed to establish those elements, mandatory injunction to remove the encroachment was refused. In that case the defendant who was a co-owner had put up a substantial structure on a portion of what was admittedly a joint property. As the plaintiff there failed to establish those elements, mandatory injunction to remove the encroachment was refused. In so doing, the learned Judges, after referring to a number of decided cases, quoted from and relied on Ananda Chandra v. Parbati Nath2, as laying down the correct principles of law applicable to such cases: “I am not prepared to hold that an exclusive appropriation by one co-owner of a part of the joint land to his own use by the erection of a permanent structure, is necessarily evidence of an ouster........ The rule is well-settled that the plaintiff who complains of the Act of his co-owner, cannot obtain a decree for demolition of buildings or for joint possession unless he can establish that he has sustained some substnatial injury by reason of the act of which he complains. See Shamugger Jute Factory Co., Ltd. v. Rama Narain3; Joy Chunder v. Bippro Churn4; Atarjan v. Ashak5; Madan Mohan v. Rajab Ali; Soshi Bhusan v. Ganesh Chundder1and Fasilatunnessa v. Ijaraz Hassan8. These cases show that the Court will not interfere, unless it is proved that the injury has accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the erection of the building, and that he took reasonable steps in time to prevent the erection.” Reference was also made in the Patna case to the following passage in the Tagore Law Lectures of 1895-96 on the Law of Joint Property and Partition in British India by R.C. Mitra: “The result of the above discussion is, that in no case should the Courts, at the instance of a co-sharer, order demolition of pucca buildings on a joint land, after the same have been erected by another co-sharer, unless it be shown (1) that injury would otherwise accrue to the co-sharer-plaintiff and (2) that before the buildings were started objection was taken to their erection; Nocurry Lall v. Brindabun Chunder9. In short it is only where a co-sharer cannot be adequately compensated otherwise than by the demolition of a building that a Court of Equity should order such demolition.” The Principles of law as expounded in the above extracts were accepted by the Patna High Court as those governing the grant of a mandatory injunction in circumstances such as in this case. In Akshay Kumar Shaha v. Bhajagobindo Shaha10and Manilal v. Nanubai11, which were also cases of encroachment, actual or threatened, by co-owners upon joint property and for either a mandatory injunction, for demolition or an injunction to prevent the proposed encroachment, the principles as stated above, were recognised as settled law applicable to such cases. With due respect, I adopt these principles as sound and equitable. In the case of co-owners, no one of them can claim an exclusive right to any particular part of the property owned in common. Manifestly, therefore, a co-owner who has encroached upon a portion of the common property cannot be regarded in the same way as a trespasser would be. So then, it seems to me that when a co-owner has encroached upon a portion of the common property, unless the encroachment is shown to have been objected to by the other co-owners at the earliest time and also shown to cause material and substantial injury to the other co-owners, it cannot be viewed as just and equitable to grant a mandatory injunction to remove the encroach- merit. I think that a co-owner who watches with silence the progress and completion by another co-owner of a substantial building which is an encroachment upon the land owned in common comes to Court, in the absence of justifying reasons, too late for an injunction for its removal. A purchaser from such a complainant co-owner of his interest in the common property can obviously claim no better right. In this case the plaintiff’s vendor does not appear to have objected to the raising and completion of the offending structures. Neither has it been proved that it caused material or substantial injury to the plaintiff. Actually the finding is that it does not. This finding is also supported by the fact that the other co-owners, defendants 1 to 6, have not raised any objection at any time. The only ground on which the lower appellate Court took a different view in respect of the encroachment marked A, B, C, F in the plaint plan was that it occupied a wider space than the compound wall. I fail to see how that fact by itself made a difference to the principles applicable to the case. In the above circumstances the Second Appeal is allowed. I fail to see how that fact by itself made a difference to the principles applicable to the case. In the above circumstances the Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, in so far as they are against the appellant, are set aside. The decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is restored. But there will be no order as to costs throughout. No leave. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.