Kailasam, J.- This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff against the appellants herein for setting aside a registered release deed dated 25th February, 1952 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants and for declaring that the same is void and inoperative, and for directing the defendants to deliver possession of the properties and for accounts. The appellants (defendants) are the grandsons of one A. S. Ponnuswamy Chettiar by his son Kannappa Chettiar. One Kannammal’s father, Kumaraswamy Chettiar and the said Ponnuswamy Chettiar’s father Subbaraya Chettiar and one Arunachala Chettiar were brothers. Arunachala Chettiar died without leaving any issues. Kumaraswamy Chettiar had one son Sonachala Chettiar and two daughters Bagiammal and Kannammal. Bagiammal died issueless during the lifetime of Kumaraswamy Chettiar. Sonachala Chettiar was insane and died unmarried. Kannammal became a widow at an early age and she also had no issues. The plaintiff claims the suit property through Kannammal, who is his father’s brother’s wife. Kannammal died issueless on 1st February, 1952 and the plaintiff being the nearest heir became entitled to the properties. At the time of her death O.S. No. 24 of 1953, a suit filed by the defendants in January, in the Sub-Court, Vellore, for recovery of the suit properties from Kannammal, who was impleaded as one of the defendants, was also pending. The plea of the appellants (plaintiffs in O.S. No. 24 of 1953) was that the properties now in dispute were bequeathed by their grandfather Ponnuswami Chettiar in favour of Kannammal on 9th August, 1931 with a view to save the properties from the wasteful habits of his son Kannappa Chettiar and that the bequest was not binding on them. On 25th February, 1952 a registered release deed, Exhibit B-1 was executed by the plaintiff herein in favour of the defendants. In the release deed Exhibit B-1 it is recited that the properties were given to Kannammal by Ponnuswamy Chettiar, that as the properties were not given from the plaintiff’s family and as the plaintiff did not want any properties, which were not given from his family, though he was the nearest reversioner, he was releasing all his rights. This document was registered on 26th February, 1952. This document was registered on 26th February, 1952. On 26th February, 1952 the defendants herein (appellants in O.S. No. 24 of 1953) filed I.A. No. 144 of 1952 stating that they have obtained a release deed from the plaintiff and that therefore the properties that belonged to Kannammal might be removed from the scope of the suit and that the plaint might be modified accordingly. The defendants filed O.S. No. 174 of 1953 on the file of the District Munsif Court of Tiruvannamalai against a debtor of the estate of Kannammal impleading the plaintiff herein as the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff (defendant in O.S. No. 174 of 1953) filed a written statement which is marked as Exhibit B-2 in this suit. The plaintiff contended that the release deed Exhibit B-1 was not a family settlement but was only a release deed and that the release deed was not supported by consideration. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed on 31st January, 1955. The contention of the plaintiff is that he executed Exhibit B-1 on the representation that it was a document which merely clothed the defendants with the authority to manage and consolidate the estate on his behalf, that he never intended to relinquish his rights in the properties, that he had never entertained even to the remotest degree any such idea, that the document was obtained by the defendants fraudulently by false representations and deceit, that at the time he subscribed his signature to the document he was not aware that the document was a deed of release but he believed the representations of the defendant that it was a mere document empowering the defendants to manage his estate, that the release deed was not a voluntary document executed by the plaintiff of his free will and consent but was executed as a result of fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit practised by the defendants and their father. The case for the defendants is that the properties originally belonged to their grandfather Ponnuswamy Chettiar, that he with a view to save them from the wasteful habits of his son Kannappa Chettiar, father of the defendants, executed a will in favour of Kannammal of the suit properties and that that bequest was sham and nominal. The case for the defendants is that the properties originally belonged to their grandfather Ponnuswamy Chettiar, that he with a view to save them from the wasteful habits of his son Kannappa Chettiar, father of the defendants, executed a will in favour of Kannammal of the suit properties and that that bequest was sham and nominal. According to the defendants, after the death of Kannammal at the time of her karumadhi there was a Panchayat and panchayatdars settled the disputes by deciding that the defendants should get all the properties given to Kannammal under the will and that the defendants should pay a sum of Rs. 1,500 to one Kumaraswamy Chettiar by way of grace, a release deed was executed by the plaintiff in pursuance of the panchayat, and, it is false to state that the document was obtained fraudulently or by false representation. The defendants also contend that in pursuance of this release deed they paid Rs. 1,500 to Kumaraswamy Chettiar and the release deed was acted upon. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiff was able to make out a case of misrepresentation and held that the plaintiff did not relinquish his rights. He also found that Exhibit B-1 was not acted upon and decreed the suit. In the appeal before us the learned counsel for the appellants contends that Exhibit B-1, the registered release deed, is a valid document, that it was executed and registered by the plaintiff with the full knowledge of its contents, that it was acted upon and that it is binding. The 1st defendant has examined himself as D.W. 1. The defendants have also examined D.Ws. 2 to 5 in support of their case. The 1st defendant as D.W. 1 deposes that the panchayat decided that the plaintiff should execute a release deed and that the defendants should pay Rs. 1,500 to Kannuswamy Chettiar. He also deposes to his filing a petition, Exhibit B-4 for removal of the properties belonging to Kannammal from the suit O.S. No. 24 of 1953. He states that in pursuance of the release deed he paid Kannuswami Chetti. 1,500 to Kannuswamy Chettiar. He also deposes to his filing a petition, Exhibit B-4 for removal of the properties belonging to Kannammal from the suit O.S. No. 24 of 1953. He states that in pursuance of the release deed he paid Kannuswami Chetti. He deposes that after the panchayat a draft was prepared by vakil Nagaswamy Iyer, that he, the plaintiff, P.W. 2 and others went to the vakil and got a draft from the vakil, that the plaintiff and P.W. 2 took the draft to Tindivanam Vakil, that after some amendment the release deed was executed and that it was registered. D.Ws. 2 to 5 state that they attested Exhibit B-1. They depose that Exhibit B-1 is a release deed and that the plaintiff knew it to be a release deed. D.W. 3 was also one of the panchayatdars. He stated that he attended Kannammal’s funeral and karumadhi, that the plaintiff was also present, that he settled their litigation, that they all went to the vakil to write a document at Tiruvannamalai, that a draft was written and given to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff took it to Tindivanam to consult his lawyer, that the plaintiff came on the next day to Tiruvannamalai and signed it and that the plaintiff knew it to be a release deed. We do not find anything in the cross-examination which discredits the testimony of this witness. He was asked whether he would give his properties to any one and he stated that he would not give his properties to any one. He stated in cross-examination that though they talked that the defendants have filed a suit against others and the plaintiff, they did not refer to it in the document. The credibility of this witness is in no way affected in cross-examination. As already stated, D.Ws. 2, 4 and 5 are the attestors. D.W. 4 identified the plaintiff before the Sub-Registrar. They speak to the execution of the document by the plaintiff and the fact that the document is a release deed. We do not find any grounds for discrediting their testimony. On the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff has examined himself as P.W. 1. He has examined P.W. 2 in support of his case. P.W. 2 is an attestor of Exhibit B-1. We do not find any grounds for discrediting their testimony. On the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff has examined himself as P.W. 1. He has examined P.W. 2 in support of his case. P.W. 2 is an attestor of Exhibit B-1. He deposes that as he was passing along the street Kannappa and Vasudeva Chetty called him to attest Exhibit B-1, that he asked them why he should attest, that they replied that it was a power document and that he did not read Exhibit B-1. In cross-examination this witness stated that he did not know what was meant by power, that the two persons (obviously meaning Kannappa and Vasudeva Chetty) said power, that four or five other persons who were also present, said so. The evidence of this witness does not impress us very much. The plaintiff as P.W. 1 states that Kannammal died on 1st February, 1952 and that he came for her karumadhi. According to him, the defendants, their father Balu Chetty and Gopala Chetty stated that the properties should be managed and wanted a document, he agreed to give a power document and he did not release his rights. The plaintiff admits his signature in Exhibits B-1 and states that Exhibit B-1 was written on 25th February, 1952 and registered on 26th February, 1952, that he signed the document, Exhibit B-1 believing that it was a power document and that only after getting the summons in O.S. No. 174 of 1953 he came to know that the defendants got a release deed executed from him. In cross-examination he has admitted that he pays income-tax, that he filed suits in Cuddalore Sub-Court and in Tindivanam District Munsif’s Court, that he has properties in seven or eight villages, that he rides a motor cycle and that he had a licence for working as Pawn Broker. When questioned about Exhibit B-2, the written statement he filed in O.S. No. 174 of 1953, he stated that he instructed his vakil that Exhibit B-1 was taken from him by fraud and that he did not observe if he has mentioned in the written statement. He denied any panchayat or his going to Vakil Nagaswamy Iyer. On the evidence it is very clear that plaintiff is a man owning considerable properties and is capable of managing his own affairs. He denied any panchayat or his going to Vakil Nagaswamy Iyer. On the evidence it is very clear that plaintiff is a man owning considerable properties and is capable of managing his own affairs. He is an income-tax assessee and has filed several suits in Cuddalore Sub-Court and Tindivanam Munsif’s Court. He has a licence for working as a Pawn Broker. With such considerable experience of the world the burden is very heavily on him to explain how he signed and got registered Exhibit B-1 without knowing its contents. The attestors and one of the panchayatdars support the defendant’s case that the plaintiff executed the document Exhibit B-1 knowing it to be a release deed. On the very same day, i.e., on 26th February, 1952 the defendants have filed Exhibit B-4, exhibited in LA. No. 144 of 1952 in O.S. No. 24 of 1953 stating that they have obtained the release deed from the reversioner of Kannammal, who claimed title to the properties and prayed for the release of the properties of Kannammal from the plaint. In the written statement filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 174 of 1953 he states that Exhibit B-1 is not a family settlement but a release deed and that the release deed is not supported by consideration. In the written statement he does not allege that he executed Exhibit B-1 thinking that it was a power document and that he did not know the contents of the document. Apart from his own interested evidence and that of P.W. 2, there is nothing to prove that he executed the document Exhibit B-1 thinking that he was executing a power document. It is no doubt strange that the plaintiff should relinquish his rights to property worth about Rs. 20,000 or Rs. 25,000 without any consideration ; but that one circumstance cannot by itself establish that the plaintiff did not know that Exhibit B-1 was a release deed when he signed. As it is recited in Exhibit B-1, the plaintiff might have released the rights in the properties, because originally the properties did not belong to his family. The plaintiff himself was very rich. As it is recited in Exhibit B-1, the plaintiff might have released the rights in the properties, because originally the properties did not belong to his family. The plaintiff himself was very rich. The suit in O.S. No. 24 of 1953 in which the will in favour of Kannammal was questioned was The learned Subordinate Judge observes that the defendants cannot explain why the plaintiff released his rights to the properties and that there is no reference to the panchayat and its decision in the recitals in Exhibit B-1. The absence of recitals about the panchayat in Exhibit B-1 by itself cannot disprove the panchayat. It may be that at the time of drafting the release deed they did not think it necessary to include these recitals. The learned Subordinate Judge posed the question whether it was a fair document and proceeded on the basis that the defendants should prove that the transanction was above board. We are of the view that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that when he executed the document he did not know that it was a release deed. The learned Subordinate Judge finds that the plaintiff is a person capable of managing his own affairs and is able to follow his vocation in life, and if he executed Exhibit B-1, it should have been only for the management and not for relinquishing his rights. We agree with the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff is a person capable of managing his own affairs and to follow his vocation in life, but we do not agree with his conclusion that Exhibit B-1 should have been executed only for the management and not for relinquishing his rights. The learned Subordinate Judge was in error in attaching undue importance to the fact that the release deed was not supported by consideration and that there is no convincing explanation as to why the plaintiff should release his interest in substantial properties. As pointed out by us earlier, it is necessary to establish that the plaintiff signed Exhibit B-1 without knowing its contents. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent contends that even if Exhibit B-1 is held to have been executed by the plaintiff knowing its contents it will not be valid as a release deed. As pointed out by us earlier, it is necessary to establish that the plaintiff signed Exhibit B-1 without knowing its contents. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent contends that even if Exhibit B-1 is held to have been executed by the plaintiff knowing its contents it will not be valid as a release deed. He submits that the release deed is not supported by any consideration and a release to be effective must be in favour of a person who has already a right and that the effect of a release should be to enlarge the already existing right and will not have the effect of transferring title. The learned counsel relied on a decision of a Bench of this Court reported in S.P. Chinnathambiar v. V.R.P. Chinnathambiar1 . The case was an appeal from the Special Tribunal under section 51 of Madras Act XXVI of 1948. The Zamindar of Sivagiri relinquished the impartible zamindari of Sivagiri in favour of his two sons. The relinquishment deed provided that the zamindar relinquished the zamindari and his right in favour of the remaining members of the coparcenary and declared that the eldest son would become presently the holder and proprietor of the said impartible zamindari and that he had no further right in the said impartible estate. Their Lordships at page 391 of the judgment observe as follows:- “If therefore the first appellant had no title to the property at the time of the renunciation except the off-chance of succeeding by survivorship to the estate after the death of his father, the renunciation or relinquishment under the deed would not clothe him with any title to the property. Renunciation must be in favour of a person, who had already title to the estate, the effect of which is only to enlarge the right. Renunciation does not vest in a person a title where it did not exist and therefore the deed would be inoperative to make the first appellant the owner of the impartible estate of Sivagiri.” Their Lordships were considering the case of a relinquishment of an impartible estate. The relinquishment of an impartible estate is prohibited under the Court of Wards Act. Their Lordships further observe: “If on the other hand the document conveys or transfers property, it will be hit at by section 34 of the Court of Wards Act. The relinquishment of an impartible estate is prohibited under the Court of Wards Act. Their Lordships further observe: “If on the other hand the document conveys or transfers property, it will be hit at by section 34 of the Court of Wards Act. The learned counsel for the first appellant therefore did not contend that the document constitutes a deed of transfer though it was the view taken by the Tribunal. It is unnecessary for use to express any opinion whether the document in fact conveys any title as the first appellant did not contend before us that it did convey title to him.” It is very clear from the decision that their Lordships were not considering the release deed as a deed of transfer and as such cannot be an authority for this case. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on a decision reported in Hutchi Gowder v. Bheema Gowder1 . The facts of the case are: The plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement on 13th September, 1946, that the vendor will execute and register a proper and valid conveyance. In July, 1949, the plaintiff-vendee and the defendant-vendor agreed that in the place of the conveyance he would execute a release deed. On 30th October, 1949, the vendor executed a release deed but he defaulted in getting the deed registered. The release deed contained a clause “the releasor hereby assures and declares that, whenever called upon by the releasee the releasor will do sign and execute the deeds and writings for better securing the estate.” The vendee filed a suit on 30th October, 1952, praying for a decree directing the vendor to execute and register a deed of release or in the alternative an instrument of conveyance. At page 337 their Lordships observe: “The plaintiff’s learned counsel in the lower Court appears unfortunately to have failed to tell the learned Subordinate Judge that a release deed would not be effective to transfer title........ Title to that share could hence be acquired only by a proper deed of conveyance or by adverse possession........In order that title to the estate might be secured to him, it was necessary that he should have a proper deed of conveyance.” These observations are relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent to support his case. The release deed in that case was invalid as it was not registered. The release deed in that case was invalid as it was not registered. What would have been its effect if it had been registered, did not arise for consideration. Exhibit B-1 specifically states that the plaintiff has no right at all in the properties as well as outstandings belonging to Kannammal and that the defendants will be entitled to enjoy the properties without any objection whatsoever and with all rights. The effect of this deed is to operate as transfer of whatever rights the plaintiff had to the defendants. In Doraiswami Pilla: v. Chinnia Goundan2, their Lordships observed that a document, though styled as a release deed, can be treated as a conveyance if it appears clearly that the intention of the executant of the document was to transfer his rights. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit for redemption of a mortgage executed by the widow of the last male owner, alleging that he was the son of a person adopted by the widow. The defendants in their written statement questioned the legality of the adoption of the plaintiff’s father, whereupon the plaintiff obtained a conveyance of all his rights from the person who, but for the adoption, would be the heir of the last male owner on the death of the widow in the year 1902. The release deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff by the person who was the heir of the last male owner on the death of the junior widow in 1902, if there was no adoption of the plaintiff’s father. That document was entered into between the plaintiff who with his father before him, had been in possession of the estate for a great many years on the footing of the adoption and the person who was entitled to succeed in 1902 if there was no adoption. By that document the heir released all his rights in favour of the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge held that the release deed does not purport to be and is not a conveyance. By that document the heir released all his rights in favour of the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge held that the release deed does not purport to be and is not a conveyance. Their Lordships at page 261 of their judgment observe as follows: “The word used is ‘release ‘but the intention to transfer any rights which the executant of the document has is clear and we see no sufficient reason why it should not be treated as a conveyance.” We respectfully agree with the above decision which is an authority for the proposition that even though the word ‘release’ may be used, if the intention to transfer any rights which the executant of the document had is clear, the document can be treated as a conveyance. Therefore, we find there can be no objection to treat Exhibit B-1 as a deed of conveyance effectively transferring title to the first and second defendants. Further, we are of opinion that the plaintiff after executing Exhibit B-1 is disentitled to sue, having given up his rights in the property. In the circumstances we set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and allow the appeal with costs throughout. R.M. ---------------- Appeal allowed.