ORDER P.V. Dixit, C.J. The petitioner, Radhey Lal Maheshwari, is a student of the Previous LL. B. class of the University of Saugar. On 10th March 1960 the opponent No. 1, who is the Vice-Chancellor of the University, made an order debarring the applicant from appearing at any examination of the University held in 1960 and 1961. The Vice-Chancellor also ordered that the applicant's name should be struck off the rolls of the University. It was mentioned in the order that it was passed by the Vice-Chancellor under section 14(5) of the University of Saugar Act, 1946, read with paras 5 and 8 of Ordinances Nos. 12 and 13 respectively. The applicant challenges the validity of this order. According to him, he incurred the displeasure of the Vice-Chancellor as he had defeated the Vice-Chancellor's candidate at the presidential election to the University Students' Union; that since then the Vice-Chancellor had persistently adopted towards him a hostile attitude; and that the impugned order was made against him as he had refused to identify himself with any party criticising the management of the affairs of the University or with any controversy regarding the mis-management of the University affairs. The petitioner further states that on the evening of 28th November 1959 a public meeting was held under the auspices of a body known as "Vishwa-Vidyalaya Bachao Samiti" where several speakers levelled charges of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, mis-management etc. The petitioner further states that on the evening of 28th November 1959 a public meeting was held under the auspices of a body known as "Vishwa-Vidyalaya Bachao Samiti" where several speakers levelled charges of corruption, favouritism, nepotism, mis-management etc. against the University authorities, that earlier in the day on 28th November 1959 the Registrar of the University (opponent No. 2) called him in his office and asked him to oppose, in his capacity as the President of the Union, the speakers at the meeting; that he refused to do so as in his opinion it was not proper for the Union to associate itself with such a controversial matter; that on the same day a printed pamphlet was distributed by some students at the instigation of the University authorities opposing the public meeting called by the Vishwa-Vidyalaya Bachao Samiti and criticising the election of the petitioner as President of the Union; that the signatories of the said pamphlet held a public meeting on 6th December 1959 for counteracting the propaganda of the Vishwa-Vidyalaya Bachao Samiti, and at this meeting charges were levelled against the applicant also; and that consequently he made an announcement that he would reply to those charges at a public meeting on 8th December 1959. On 7th December 1959 the Vice-Chancellor issued an order saying that it had come to his notice that some students were identifying themselves with the propaganda which was being carried on by the outsiders for or against the University, and adding that it was the duty of the students "to confine themselves to their studies" and that they should "not resort to any propaganda whether journalistic or by word of mouth". The order also contained a warning that if these activities on the part of the students did not stop, disciplinary action would be taken against the students concerned and that it would not constitute a valid defence for such activities that "they were being carried on to defend the University against the outsiders". Copies of this order were sent to the Deans of all the Faculties, the Heads of all teaching Departments, as well as to the applicant. The meeting called by the petitioner on 8th December 1959 was actually held. Copies of this order were sent to the Deans of all the Faculties, the Heads of all teaching Departments, as well as to the applicant. The meeting called by the petitioner on 8th December 1959 was actually held. It has been stated by the applicant that at this meeting that he only replied to the criticism that had been levelled against him by some students at the meeting held on 6th December 1959 and that he made it clear that he or the Union had nothing to do with the meeting held on 28th November 1959 or with any propaganda for or against the University authorities. On 19th December 1959 the Registrar addressed a letter to the applicant enquiring whether he had convened and presided over a meeting on 8th December 1959 in contravention of the order of the Vice-Chancellor issued on 7th December 1959 and whether the meeting was convened by him on behalf of the Students' Union. The inquiry in the letter was pursuant to a resolution of the Discipline Committee. In his reply dated the 11th January 1960 to the Registrar, the applicant stated that the meeting did not contravene the Vice-Chancellor's order of 7th December 1959 and that it had not been convened on behalf of the Students' Union. Thereafter on 10th March 1960 the Vice-chancellor passed the impugned order. The petitioner assails the validity of the order dated the 10th March 1960 of the Vice-Chancellor on the grounds that under the University of Saugar Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, the Vice-Chancellor had no power to make the order that be did; that the order was passed against him without giving him an opportunity of submitting his explanation about his conduct in calling the meeting on 8th December 1959 and was thus in violation of the rules of natural justice; and that the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor was mala fide as it was passed on account of personal animosity and antipathy. The applicant prays that the order of the Vice-Chancellor debarring him from appearing at any examination of 1960 and 1961 and striking off his name from the rolls of the University be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari, and that a direction compelling the respondents to restore the petitioner's name on the rolls of the University and permitting him to appear at the examinations be issued. In the return filed on behalf of the respondents it has been vehemently denied that the order in question was mala fide or that it was passed by the Vice-Chancellor on account of any personal animosity towards the petitioner or that the Vice-Chancellor did not like the election of the petitioner as President of the Union. In regard to the circumstances in which the order debarring the applicant from appearing at any examination of 1960 and 1961 and striking off his name from the rolls of the University was made, it has been averred that the Vice-Chancellor did not take any notice of the activities of the Vishwa-Vidyalaya Bachao Samiti as the body consisted of persons who had no connection whatsoever with the University but when on 6th December 1959 the Vice-Chancellor himself noticed a public meeting being addressed by some students of the University he felt it necessary, for the maintenance of discipline and for avoiding breach of peace amongst the students to issue an order on 7th December 1959 prohibiting the students from participating in public meeting called to support or criticise any action of the University authorities. The respondents further averred that the applicant's attention was drawn by the Dean of the Faculty of Arts to the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated the 7th December 1959 and he was asked to abandon the meeting but that he disobeyed the suggestion and convened a meeting on 8th December 1959 and also presided over it and addressed it; that at this meeting there was some disturbance which resulted in a student lodging a report with the Police about an assault on him by an outsider; and that on 16th December 1959 the Vice-Chancellor ordered an enquiry to be made into the matter by a committee consisting of the Deans of the faculties of Arts and Science, the Joint Proctor, the Proctor, the Chairman of the Youth Welfare Board, the Warden and the Registrar. This committee called upon the petitioner to explain whether he held a meeting on 8th December 1959 in contravention of the Vice-Chancellor's order dated the 7th December 1959 and whether the meeting was convened by him on behalf of the Students' Union. The petitioner sent his reply on 11th January 1960 after being reminded once. The Committee considered the reply and asked the applicant to appear before it on 3rd February 1960. The petitioner sent his reply on 11th January 1960 after being reminded once. The Committee considered the reply and asked the applicant to appear before it on 3rd February 1960. The applicant appeared before the Committee on this date and was given a personal hearing. The Committee came to the conclusion that in holding and addressing under his presidentship a meeting on 8th December 1959 the petitioner violated the Vice-Chancellor's order dated the 7th December 1959 and was guilty of gross misconduct. The Committee, therefore, recommended that the applicant's name be struck off the University rolls and he should be debarred from appearing at any examination in the years 1960 and 1961. It was on the basis of this enquiry and the report that the Vice-Chancellor passed the order the validity of which the applicant has questioned. At the conclusion of the hearing of this petition judgment was reserved in this case. On 14th November 1960 Shri Seth, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, intimated to us in writing that the Vice-Chancellor had rescinded the order made by him on 10th March 1960 striking off the petitioner's name from the rolls of the University. A copy of the Vice-Chancellors subsequent order has also been filed. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to consider the question whether under the University of Saugar Act or the Statutes and Ordinances made thereunder the Vice-Chancellor has the power of removing the name of any person from the rolls of the students of the University. The only question that remains for determination is whether it was within the power of the Vice-chancellor to debar the applicant from appearing at the University examinations of 1960 and 1961. Shri Sen, learned counsel for the applicant, argued that in debarring the petitioner the Vice-chancellor purported to act under section 14(6) of the Act read with paragraphs 5 and 8 of Ordinances Nos. 12 and 13 respectively but that these provisions did not confer any power on the Vice-Chancellor to debar the petitioner from any examination. Shri Sen, learned counsel for the applicant, argued that in debarring the petitioner the Vice-chancellor purported to act under section 14(6) of the Act read with paragraphs 5 and 8 of Ordinances Nos. 12 and 13 respectively but that these provisions did not confer any power on the Vice-Chancellor to debar the petitioner from any examination. It was said that under section 31 of the Act the "discipline of students" could be regulated by an appropriate statute; that no statute for the discipline of students was ever made by the University; that no disciplinary action could be taken against a student by virtue of any provisions contained in an Ordinance; that if paragraphs 5 and 8 of Ordinances Nos. 12 and 13 respectively governed the matter of disciplinary action against the students in the teaching departments of the University, then under para. 8 of Ordinance No. 13 a student guilty of gross misconduct could be disqualified from being a candidate only at the next ensuing University examination and that too after informing his guardian; and that consequently the order made by the Vice-Chancellor debarring the petitioner from appearing at the examinations in two successive years and without giving any information to his guardian was invalid. It was further contended that under Ordinance No. 6 disciplinary action against students in teaching departments of the University could not be taken by the Proctor; that the Proctor is empowered to deliver a formal caution or impose a fine up to Rs. 10 and to recommend to the Vice-Chancellor the rustication or expulsion of a student from the University; that the Committee before which the petitioner was given a personal hearing was not the committee contemplated by Statute No 26; and that, therefore, it could not be said that the applicant was in law given a legal hearing. Learned counsel urged that any enquiry held by an University authority into allegations of misconduct against a student was a quasi judicial inquiry and the authority was bound to give to the student concerned an opportunity of submitting his representation on the charge or charges of misconduct levelled against him and it was also bound to follow the rules of natural justice, and that no student could be debarred from appearing at any examination without being heard. Learned counsel relied on Ex parte Spackman 1942 (2) AELR 150, Ghanshyam Das v. Board of H.S. and I.E. AIR 1956 All 539 and Ramesh Chandra v. N. Padhy AIR 1959 Ori 196. With his usual fairness he also drew our attention to the decisions in Ram Chander v. Allahabad University AIR 1956 All 45, Jogendra Raj v. University of Allahabad AIR 1956 All 503 , G.D. Sekkilar v. Krishnamoorthy AIR 1952 Mad 151 and N.D. Vazirani v. Maharaja Sayajirao University AIR 1957 Bom 246 , holding that in matters of discipline the Head of an educational institution does not act as a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal, and that when an order is passed by the Head for the purpose of maintaining discipline in an institution it is not necessary to give an opportunity to the person proceeded against to explain his conduct before taking any action against him. Before considering the tenability of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, it is necessary to refer to the material provisions of the University of Saugar Act, 1946. Section 14(5) of the Act says inter alia that the Vice-Chancellor "shall exercise general control over the affairs of the University and shall be responsible for the discipline of the University in accordance with this Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations". Section 31 gives to the University the power to frame Statutes for the "discipline of students". In addition to the matters which by the Act or the Statutes can be provided for by the Ordinances, Ordinances can also be made for all or any of the matters enumerated in section 32. The "discipline of students" is not enumerated in section 32. It must be noted that there is a difference between the making of a Statute and of an Ordinance. Section 30 deals with the initiation and making of the Statutes, and section 33 deals with the framing of the Ordinances. The important distinction between the two is that a Statute is initiated by the Executive Council and is placed before the Court for consideration, Consideration. A Statute has to be passed by the Court and assented to by the Chancellor. An Ordinance is made by the Executive Council and takes effect from the date the Council nominates. The important distinction between the two is that a Statute is initiated by the Executive Council and is placed before the Court for consideration, Consideration. A Statute has to be passed by the Court and assented to by the Chancellor. An Ordinance is made by the Executive Council and takes effect from the date the Council nominates. Every Ordinance made by the Executive Council is required to be submitted to the Chancellor and the Court as soon as possible after the making of it. The Court has the power to cancel any Ordinance made by the Executive Council. Statute No. 26 provides for the constitution of a 'Board of Residence, Health and Discipline' consisting of the dignitaries mentioned therein. The Board has the power to frame rules and regulations affecting the discipline of students. It appears that no such Board has been constituted by the University. Ordinance No. 6 provides for the appointment of a Proctor and defines his powers and duties. The Proctor has the power to take disciplinary action in the case of students of the Teaching Departments of the University when they are guilty of misbehaviour of improper conduct. He exercises disciplinary power subject to the control of the Vice-Chancellor. The Proctor's power of punishment is limited to the delivery of a formal caution and imposition of a fine up to Rs. 10. He can, however, recommend to the Vice-Chancellor rustication or expulsion of a student from the University. Ordinance No. 12 contains provisions for the admission of students to the courses in the Teaching Department. Paragraph 5 of this Ordinance runs as follows- Unless provided otherwise the provisions of the Ordinance (No. 13) relating to admission of students to colleges shall mutatis mutandis apply to the admission of students to the courses is the Teaching Departments of the University. Ordinance No. 13 deals with the admission of students in affiliated colleges. The eighth paragraph of this Ordinance lays down that when a student has been guilty of grave misconduct or of persistent idleness, the Principal of the College at which such student is studying may after informing his guardian and according to the seriousness of the offence compel, rusticate or disqualify the student from being a candidate at the next ensuing University examination. Now, it cannot be denied that the question whether a student of the University has committed a breach of any rules, regulations, code of the University or orders made by the University authorities and of the punishment for the breach is a matter falling within the description "the discipline of students". Section 31 of the Act makes it very clear that the discipline of students is to be regulated by a Statute and not by an Ordinance. Therefore, the provisions of Ordinances Nos. 12 and 13 in so far as they purport to deal with the maintenance of discipline amongst the students would appear to be ineffective. The same criticism applies to Ordinance No. 6 dealing with the powers and duties of the Proctors. Even if it be taken that the matter of discipline of students can be regulated by an Ordinance, the justification for the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor cannot be found in the aforesaid Ordinances. Paragraph 5 of Ordinance No. 12 expressly says that "unless provided otherwise the provisions of the Ordinance (No. 13).........shall mutatis mutandis apply to the admission of students to the courses in the Teaching Departments of the University". Now, Ordinance No. 6 specifically gives to the Proctor the power to take disciplinary action against students of the Teaching Departments in cases of misbehaviour or improper conduct. That being so, paragraph 8 of Ordinance No. 13 read with paragraph 5 of Ordinance No. 12 has no applicability to cases of misconduct on the part of the students of the Teaching Departments of the University. The validity of the Vice-Chancellor's order dated the 10th March 1960 cannot, therefore, be determined with reference to paragraph 8 of Ordinance No. 13. Now, the limited disciplinary powers which the Proctor exercises are subject to the control of the Vice-Chancellor. There is nothing in Ordinance No. 6 or section 14(5) of the Act to show that disciplinary action against a student in a Teaching Department of the University can be initiated by the Proctor alone and that the Vice-Chancellor cannot on his own initiative take any disciplinary action. The fact that the Proctor exercises powers subject to the control of the Vice-Chancellor and that there is no limit to this control in effect preserves the right of the Vice-Chancellor to initiate and take disciplinary action against a student. Ordinances Nos. The fact that the Proctor exercises powers subject to the control of the Vice-Chancellor and that there is no limit to this control in effect preserves the right of the Vice-Chancellor to initiate and take disciplinary action against a student. Ordinances Nos. 6, 12 and 13 are, therefore, of no assistance either to the petitioner or to the respondents. Indeed Shri Dabir, learned counsel for the respondents, did not invoke before us these provisions to support the validity of the order in question of the Vice-Chancellor. He based himself solely on section 14(5) of the Act. The question, therefore, resolves itself into this: whether it was within the competence of the Vice-Chancellor to make the order that he did on 10th March 1960 in exercise of his powers under section 14(5) of the Act. The answer to this question seems to us to be very clear on the plain language of section 14(5) of the Act. Under that provision the Vice-Chancellor has been made responsible for discipline in the University in accordance with the Act, the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations. If the Vice-Chancellor is to discharge adequately his responsibility for the maintenance of discipline in the University, he must necessarily have all the powers required for that purpose. This would include the power to debar a student from appearing at an examination on account of some misconduct or breach of an order of the Vice-Chancellor. As the Head of the University the Vice-Chancellor is in a position to understand and appreciate what constitutes a breach of discipline as between the teacher and the taught and to judge the punishment that should be given to the offending student for a breach of discipline. After all the object of the University education is not merely to teach facts to the students. Apart from imparting of knowledge by means of lectures, University education aims at turning out men who are educated not only in letters but who have also a well equipped and disciplined mind, who have the ability to assess values and distinguish the true from the false, and who have a sense of responsibility. The University education is for making the students ideal citizens of the Republic-men who are conscious of their rights and are also alive to their duties and obligations. The University education is for making the students ideal citizens of the Republic-men who are conscious of their rights and are also alive to their duties and obligations. From the point of the University teachers, it is, therefore, essential that the students must recognise that the teachers know more about their subjects than they do and that when they enter any University they subject themselves to the authority and discipline of those persons who have been duly placed in authority in the University. It would seriously undermine the whole object and aim of University education if the authority of the Vice-Chancellor to exercise disciplinary powers over the students, which is implicit in his responsibility for the maintenance of discipline in the University, were to be questioned or fettered in any manner. We are clearly of the opinion that under section 14(5) of the Act, it was within the power of the Vice-Chancellor to make the impugned order. The question as to whether in matters of discipline the Vice-Chancellor acts as a quasi judicial authority presents no difficulty. Judged by the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Radheshyam v. State of M.P. AIR 1959 SC 107 , and by this Court in Moti Miyan v. Commissioner Indore Division 1960 MPLJ 100 : AIR 1960 MP 157 , there can be no doubt that in making any order for the maintenance of discipline under section 14(5); the Vice-chancellor discharges an administrative function. When the Vice-Chancellor takes action against a student under section 14(5), there is no question of two contending parties. There is also nothing in that provision which imposes on him any duty to act judicially. There is no provision in the Act or in any University Statute from which such a duty could be inferred. There can, therefore, be no question of a well ordered procedure involving notice, opportunity of hearing and an enquiry being followed before the taking of any action under section 14(5) of the Act. Disciplinary action is very often one of urgency and immediate action is necessary. That being so, the very object of disciplinary action would be defeated if in such cases the giving of a notice, an opportunity of hearing and a regular enquiry is held to be essential before the taking of any action. Disciplinary action is very often one of urgency and immediate action is necessary. That being so, the very object of disciplinary action would be defeated if in such cases the giving of a notice, an opportunity of hearing and a regular enquiry is held to be essential before the taking of any action. No doubt, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Radheshyam v. State of M.P. AIR 1959 SC 107 , in some cases it may be necessary to give an opportunity to a party to have his say before an administrative action is taken against him; but this is quite different from an enquiry and hearing necessary in the case of a quasi judicial action which can be corrected by a superior Court by means of a writ of certiorari. Where an administrative action affects the fundamental right of a person, an opportunity to the person affected by the administrative action to explain his conduct may he necessary. But here there is no question of any infringement of a fundamental right of the petitioner. The applicant cannot contend that he has a fundamental right of not being subjected to any disciplinary rules and regulations imposed by the University. When be joined the University he became a "disciple" and the relationship between the University authorities and him became one of the teacher and the taught. In that relationship it became his duty to learn, submit and obey the rules, regulations and orders of the University authorities for the maintenance of discipline. By becoming a disciple of the University, he admitted the superiority of the University authorities for certain limited purposes, to within the matter of teaching and development of character and of a sense of discipline and responsibility. The contention, therefore, that the Vice-Chancellor was not competent to take any action without holding a proper enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the applicant in the matter of discipline cannot be accepted. In fact, the applicant was given an opportunity to explain his conduct before the order dated the 10th March 1960 was passed by the Vice-Chancellor. Much was said by the learned counsel for the petitioner about rules of natural justice. In fact, the applicant was given an opportunity to explain his conduct before the order dated the 10th March 1960 was passed by the Vice-Chancellor. Much was said by the learned counsel for the petitioner about rules of natural justice. But the rules of natural justice vary with the circumstances of the case, the nature of the urgency, the rules under which the statutory authority acts, and the subject-matter that is being dealt with [see Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division AIR 1958 SC 398 ]. The Vice-Chancellor ordered an enquiry against the petitioner on 16th November 1959 by a Committee; the petitioner was asked to give his explanation about the meeting he addressed on 8th December 1959; and he was heard by the Committee constituted by the Vice-Chancellor. No doubt, the Committee formed by the Vice-Chancellor was not the Board contemplated by Statute No. 26. But our attention has not been drawn to any provision in the Act showing that the Vice-Chancellor could not take any action under section 14(5) of the Act until and unless such a Board came into existence and began functioning, and without any enquiry by such a Board. It cannot, therefore, be urged that the enquiry held by the Committee constituted by the Vice-Chancellor was no enquiry at all. The question whether in making the impugned order against the petitioner the Vice-Chancellor acted with a good or bad motive ceases to be of any importance when the applicant admits that he convened and addressed a meeting on 8th December 1959 and that on the previous day the Vice-Chancellor had issued an order prohibiting the students from participating in any public meeting called to support or criticise any action of the University authorities. If the petitioner did address a meeting, then he clearly contravened the order of the Vice-Chancellor, who then had a right to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. This action does not become illegal because of any supposed bad motive on the part of the Vice-Chancellor. Turning now to the authorities, the decision in Ex parte Spackman (1942) 2 AELR 150, turned on section 29 of the Medical Act, 1858, which expressly provided for the holding of a "due enquiry" before the name of a registered medical practitioner could be erased from the register. Turning now to the authorities, the decision in Ex parte Spackman (1942) 2 AELR 150, turned on section 29 of the Medical Act, 1858, which expressly provided for the holding of a "due enquiry" before the name of a registered medical practitioner could be erased from the register. In the University of Saugar Act, 1946, there is no provision as regards any "due enquiry" before the taking of any disciplinary action. The case reported in Ghanshyam Das v. Board of H.S. and I.E. AIR 1956 All 539 related to an action taken against a student using unfair means at an examination. In that case, Justice Agarwala, before whom the matter went up on a difference of opinion arising between two other Judges of the Allahabad High Court, held that the requirements of natural justice demanded that the examinees should be afforded an opportunity to explain the charge against them. The learned Judge, however, recognised that where action is taken for the maintenance of discipline, no notice or hearing would be necessary. In Ramesh Chandra v. N. Padhy AIR 1959 Ori 196, the order that was considered by the Orissa High Court was one made by the Principal of a College expelling a student from the College for misbehaviour towards lady students. It was held that even if it be taken that the Head of an institution acts administratively in passing an order of expulsion or rustication, the student concerned is entitled to an opportunity of being heard and of establishing his innocence on the rules of natural justice. In that case, it was observed that in disciplinary matters the Head of an institution has no absolute discretionary power and that he must act reasonably and the aggrieved student must get an opportunity of being heard and of establishing his innocence. This observation is based on the view that the action of the Head of an institution in disciplinary matters is a quasi judicial action. With respect, we are unable to agree with this view of 'disciplinary action'. This observation is based on the view that the action of the Head of an institution in disciplinary matters is a quasi judicial action. With respect, we are unable to agree with this view of 'disciplinary action'. It may be mentioned that in Ex Parte Fry (1954) 2 AELR 118, Lord Goddard, while dealing with the matter of disciplinary authority of the Chief Officer of a Fire Brigade over the members of the Force, observed that in exercising disciplinary authority over a member of the Force the Chief Officer is no more acting judicially or quasi judicially than a school-master who is exercising disciplinary powers over his pupils. In citing the illustration of a school-master exercising disciplinary powers over his pupils, Lord Goddard clearly indicated that a schoolmaster did not act in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity. It seems to us unnecessary to consider many other cases dealing with the action taken against students for misconduct at examinations. There seems to be a divergence of view as to whether action in such cases against the offending students is a quasi judicial action or purely administrative action. The question whether a valid distinction can be made between the case of a student such as the one before us and of the misconduct of an examinee at an examination does not arise here. But even if in cases dealing with the examinees misconducting themselves, it has been held that in matters of discipline the action of the Head of an institution is an administrative action and that no notice need be given where action is taken for the maintenance of discipline. The view we have taken is supported by the decisions in Ram Chander v. Allahabad University AIR 1956 All 46, Jogendra Rai v. University of Allahabad AIR 1956 All 503 , N.D. Vazirani v. Maharaja Sayajirao University AIR 1957 Bom 246 and C.D. Sekkilar v. Krishnamoorthy AIR 1952 Mad 151 . For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that there can be no interference in the order of the Vice-Chancellor validly made on 10th March 1960 debarring the petitioner from appearing at the examinations of 1960 and 1961. In the result, this petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed