JUDGMENT : P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. 1. The short question which this appeal by special leave raises is whether the corrupt practice, which is proved to have been committed by Aditya Nath who was a polling agent of the respondent Rukmini Raman Pratap Singh, was so committed with the respondent's consent, under Section 100(1)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, (hereafter called "the Act"). The appeal arises out of an election petition filed by the appellant Sriniwas Tiwari in which he challenged the validity of the respondent's election. 2. The appellant, the respondent and five others had offered themselves as candidates for election to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Manganwan Constituency in the District of Rewa in the elections which took place on March 2, 1957. At the said election the appellant polled 3960 votes whereas the respondent secured 6835 votes; other candidates secured lesser number of votes. After the result of the election was thus declared the appellant filed an election petition alleging that the respondent had committed several corrupt practices as a result of which his election should be declared to be invalid. Para 20 of the election petition filed by the appellant contained the relevant allegations in respect of the said corrupt practices. As a result of these allegations 8 issues were framed by the Election Tribunal. On 7 out of these 8 issues findings were recorded in favour of the respondent. On Issue 5, however, the finding was in favour of the appellant, and it is with the corrupt practice in respect of which this issue was framed that we are concerned in the present appeal. Issue 5 was based on the allegations made by the appellant in para 20(c) of his election petition. This paragraph alleged that the respondent was guilty of a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the Act in that "he himself and through his agents and workers distributed a handbill on February 28 and March 1 and 2, 1957, falsely propagating that the petitioner has withdrawn his candidature". The said bulletins (Annexure 9) were distributed in all villages where the voters of the Constituency resided. They were also distributed during the prescribed hours of polling at the polling stations specified in the said paragraph. The said bulletins (Annexure 9) were distributed in all villages where the voters of the Constituency resided. They were also distributed during the prescribed hours of polling at the polling stations specified in the said paragraph. The said para further added that the agents of the petitioner reported the matter of the distribution of objectionable bulletins to the presiding officers concerned but no action was taken by them. Thus it was alleged the voters were misled. In this paragraph the petitioner named 13 persons who were responsible for the distribution of the pamphlets but it is clear that the precise time at which the pamphlets were distributed and the names of persons who distributed them at the specified places were not indicated. Para 21 further averred that the election of the returned candidate was void by virtue of the corrupt practices committed by him, his agents, workers and other persons with the consent of the respondent the particulars of which had been given therein. It will thus be seen that the allegations about the commission of corrupt practices in question are to be found in para 20(c) and Para 21 read together. 3. There is no doubt that the distribution of the bulletins amounted to a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the Act which provides, inter alia, for the publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other person of any statement of fact which is false in relation to the withdrawal or retirement from contest of any candidate being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. The respondent denied that the said alleged corrupt practice had been committed and the parties therefore went to a trial on the said issue amongst others. Both the Election Tribunal and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh have made a concurrent finding that Aditya Nath was a polling agent of the respondent and that he had published and distributed the offending bulletins which amounted to a corrupt practice under Section 123(4). The Tribunal further held that the said corrupt practice had been committed by the respondent's polling agent with his consent and so it set aside the election of the respondent under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act. The High Court has reversed this finding since it came to the conclusion that the respondent's consent to the commission of the said practice had not been proved. The High Court has reversed this finding since it came to the conclusion that the respondent's consent to the commission of the said practice had not been proved. In the result, the High Court has allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent before it and has dismissed the appellant's election petition. It is under these circumstances that the short question which arises for our decision is whether the respondent is guilty of having committed a corrupt practice under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act. 4. Before dealing with this narrow question it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary point raised by Mr. Pathak on behalf of the respondent. He contends that the question raised by the appellant is a question of fact, and this Court should be slow to interfere with the finding of the High Court on a question of fact. On the other hand, the learned Solicitor-General, who appears for the appellant, has urged that the High Court itself should have been slow to interfere with the relevant finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, because in dealing with questions of fact whose decision depends mainly on the appreciation of oral evidence the Tribunal had the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses in the witness box, and its conclusions based on the appreciation of evidence given by such witnesses should not be lightly disturbed. There is considerable force in both these contentions. This Court has repeatedly observed that under Section 116-A of the Act, though the High Court is entitled to consider the propriety or correctness of even the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal it should be slow to interfere with the said findings unless there are good reasons to do so; but, on the other hand, if there are good reasons which induce the High Court to the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal must be reversed there is no limitation prescribed by Section 116-A in that behalf, and like all courts of appeal which are authorised to entertain appeals on facts the High Court is not precluded from reversing the Tribunal's conclusion on facts. Similarly, though under Article 136 this Court is usually reluctant to interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the High Courts in their judgments, there are some cases in which it becomes necessary for this Court to re-appreciate evidences and decide for itself whether the conclusions of fact recorded by the High Court are valid and reasonable. It is not necessary or even expedient to state exhaustively the categories of cases where this Court's interference would become necessary on questions of fact. In the present case, what is urged by the appellant is that relevant and important documents on which the Election Tribunal had laid considerable emphasis in support of its conclusion that the corrupt practice in question had been committed by the respondent's polling agent with the respondent's consent have been completely ignored by the High Court in dealing with the said point. It is also urged that a part of the High Court's finding is based on obvious misreading of oral evidence, and that the High Court has failed to consider that the effect of its own findings judged in the light of probabilities would inevitably lead to the inference that the respondent had consented to the commission of the corrupt practice by his polling agent Aditya Nath. It is not seriously disputed by Mr Pathak that if these contentions are well- founded it would be necessary for this Court to examine the evidence and determine the relevant questions of fact for itself. In order to appreciate the contentions thus raised by the appellant it is necessary to set out in some detail the relevant facts and material findings recorded by the Tribunal and the High Court before we deal with the question ourselves. 5. We have already referred to the material allegations made by the appellant in respect of the corrupt practice in question in paras 20(c) and 21. It is true that the details as to which of the persons named made the said distribution at which time and place have not been mentioned in para 20(c); to that extent specific particulars have not been given by the appellant; but there is no doubt that both para 20(c) and para 21 expressly alleged that the distribution was made by the candidate himself and through his agent and workers on certain dates and in certain places and the names of agents and places were given. The High Court has taken the view that the use of the word "through" in para 20(c) does not amount to an allegation that the alleged distribution had been made by the respondent's agents and workers with his consent. In our opinion, this is a plain misreading of the material allegation. Besides, in coming to this conclusion the High Court has completely ignored the allegations made in para 21 which in turn and expressly avers that the corrupt practice specified in para 20 which necessarily includes para 20(c) had been committed with the consent of the respondent. That is why we think that the High Court was in error in approaching the consideration of the evidence adduced by the appellant with the basically wrong assumption that the appellant had not alleged that the distribution of the objectionable pamphlet had been made by the respondent's agents and workers with his consent. 6. Now, the case set up by the appellant in regard to the distribution was supported mainly by the evidence of Baldeo Prasad, who is the printer of the Martand Press, and Aditya Nath, who was the polling agent of the respondent himself. Baldeo Prasad stated on oath that the manuscript of the bulletin (P-47) which was published on February 26, 1957, had been given to him for printing by the respondent. The printing charges had been entered by him in the daily work diary (P-48), payment of the said charges was made to him on February 27, 1957, by the respondent through Aditya Nath; the charges were Rs. 30. This amount had been entered in the kachhi rokad (Ext P-49) as well as in the pakki rokad (Ext P-50). It had also been entered in the original khata (P-51). According to the witness Aditya Nath went to him with a letter written by the respondent (Ext P-52) in which the witness was asked to deliver the bulletins urgently to the bearer of the letter. Thereupon Aditya Nath signed in token of the receipt of 5000 copies of the bulletin, paid the charges and took the bulletins away. Aditya Nath substantially corroborated this evidence. He added that after receiving the bulletins he posted some of them to the workers, agents and voters of the respondent and arranged for their distribution at the polling booth on the day of the election. Aditya Nath substantially corroborated this evidence. He added that after receiving the bulletins he posted some of them to the workers, agents and voters of the respondent and arranged for their distribution at the polling booth on the day of the election. This witness said that the respondent had given him in all Rs. 30 to be paid to Baldeo Prasad. The Respondent had also given him postage stamps for posting the bulletins to several places. A list of the persons to whom the bulletins had to be sent had been prepared by the respondent and given to him; in other words, according to this witness, he was not paid any cash to meet the postage expenses because the respondent had supplied him with sufficient postage stamps. 7. Baldeo Prasad was cross-examined by the respondent on several points. The respondent's case was that he had got another bulletin printed at the Martand Press for which Rs. 12 had been paid by him as charges and a receipt had been passed in that behalf (Ext 33). The suggestion was that whenever charges were paid to the witness he passed a receipt, and since no receipt had been passed for the payment of Rs. 30 the endorsement made by Aditya Nath on Ext P-52 in that behalf was not genuine and the story that Ext P-52 was sent by the respondent in connection with the objectionable bulletin was also not true; that letter, according to the respondent, had been sent on January 7, 1957, with Balwant Singh who took delivery of the other bulletins which had been printed at the Martand Press. In other words, the respondent denied that Ext P-52 had any connection with the delivery of objectionable bulletins. 8. In order to rebut the evidence given by Aditya Nath the respondent suggested that Aditya Nath himself had written a letter (Ext D-41) in which he had expressly denied the distribution of any objectionable bulletin as alleged by the appellant, and when Aditya Nath was cross-examined the contents of this letter were put to him; Aditya Nath, however, denied that he had written any such letter. The respondent also led evidence of Hiramani Ram to show that Aditya Nath had written the said letter in his presence and asked him to deliver the said letter to Baijnath, and Baijnath stated that he had received the said letter. The respondent also led evidence of Hiramani Ram to show that Aditya Nath had written the said letter in his presence and asked him to deliver the said letter to Baijnath, and Baijnath stated that he had received the said letter. The object of leading this evidence was to show that Aditya Nath was not speaking the truth when he admitted that he received the objectionable bulletins from Baldeo Prasad and spoke about their distribution. That in brief is the nature of the evidence led by the parties on the relevant issue. 9. On the evidence the Tribunal recorded findings in favour of the appellant. It split up the issue into six subsidiary points, and it found, inter alia, (a) that the respondent had given the typed draft (P-47) to Baldeo Prasad for printing, (b) that the objectionable bulletin had been printed a few days before the date of the election, (c) that the respondent wrote Ext P-52 and sent Aditya Nath to Rewa to fetch the bulletins, (d) that Aditya Nath, with the consent of the respondent distributed the said bulletins before the election date by means of post office and by hand through the agents and workers of the respondent, and (e) that the distribution and publication of the bulletins was done by the respondent and also by his polling agents and workers with the consent of the respondent. In coming to this conclusion the Tribunal considered the oral evidence led by the parties, examined all the arguments urged by the respondent in support of his plea that the appellant's evidence should not be believed, and came to the conclusion that on the whole the appellant's evidence was satisfactory and reliable. In dealing with the evidence of Baldeo Prasad in particular the Tribunal has expressly observed that it examined very carefully the contemporaneous documents produced by him and it found that the said documents were genuine and reliable. The entries in the said documents substantially corroborated the oral evidence of Baldeo Prasad who, according to the Tribunal, was a disinterested witness, and so it came to the conclusion that the respondent had written Ext P-52 in regard to the delivery of the objectionable bulletin and was thus directly concerned with its printing. The entries in the said documents substantially corroborated the oral evidence of Baldeo Prasad who, according to the Tribunal, was a disinterested witness, and so it came to the conclusion that the respondent had written Ext P-52 in regard to the delivery of the objectionable bulletin and was thus directly concerned with its printing. Having reached the conclusion that the corrupt practice alleged had been committed by the respondent and by his agents with his consent the Tribunal set aside the respondent's election. 10. When the matter went to the High Court the High Court reversed these findings of the Tribunal. The High Court has held that particulars had not been sufficiently given by the appellant in his petition, and in fact he had not alleged that the corrupt practice had been committed with the consent of the respondent. The High Court thought that the failure to make these relevant allegations had to be borne in mind in appreciating the oral evidence led by the appellant. We have already pointed out that in assuming that the consent of the respondent had not been alleged in the petition the High Court was plainly in error. The High Court then considered the oral evidence and was inclined to disbelieve both Baldeo Prasad and Aditya Nath. In doing so, however, it has completely ignored the contemporaneous documents produced by Baldeo Prasad which had been scrutinised by the Tribunal and found to be genuine and reliable. It is impossible to suggest that the failure to examine the material documentary evidence adduced by Baldeo Prasad in support of his oral testimony does not introduce a serious infirmity in the decision of the High Court. 11. Besides, having found that Aditya Nath had distributed the objectionable bulletins the High Court refused to accept the finding of the Tribunal that Aditya Nath had done so with the consent of the respondent on the ground that Aditya Nath had not taken any money from the respondent for meeting the cost of the postage stamps "nor had he made a demand for the money spent by him' In other words, the finding made by the High Court on the question of consent by the respondent is based principally, if not solely, on the assumption that Aditya Nath did the work of distribution on his own account because he bore the expenses in that behalf himself. Now, the finding that Aditya Nath bore the expenses himself which, according to the High Court, is based on the evidence of Aditya Nath himself, is plainly the result of the misreading of his evidence. It is true that Aditya Nath had said that the respondent had given him no money for incurring the expenses of postage, but that is because he expressly stated that the requisite postage stamps had been given to him by the respondent. This statement of the witness appears to have been completely overlooked by the High Court. It is not as if the High Court disbelieved this statement. The High Court in fact has observed that "it would also appear from his evidence that he had not taken any money from the respondent"; that is to say, the High Court concentrated on this statement of the witness and completely excluded from its consideration the other statement made by the witness in the same breath that the respondent had given him the postage stamps. Such a clear misreading - not merely mis-appreciation of Aditya Nath's evidence - has introduced another serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. 12. Besides, having come to the conclusion that Aditya Nath was the polling agent of the respondent and that the objectionable bulletins had been printed in the Martand Press and had been distributed by Aditya Nath, the High Court did not consider at all the question of probabilities. The appellant's argument is that if only the High Court had considered the probabilities in the case it would have felt that without the consent of respondent Aditya Nath could not have done what he had been found to have done both by the Tribunal and the High Court. Aditya Nath may perhaps be not a reliable witness because he worked as a polling agent for the respondent and gave evidence for the appellant; but the finding that he distributed the objectionable bulletins is based not only on Aditya Nath's evidence; and it is a finding which has been affirmed by the High Court. Aditya Nath may perhaps be not a reliable witness because he worked as a polling agent for the respondent and gave evidence for the appellant; but the finding that he distributed the objectionable bulletins is based not only on Aditya Nath's evidence; and it is a finding which has been affirmed by the High Court. Therefore, unless it was alleged and shown to the satisfaction of the High Court that Aditya Nath committed the corrupt practice at the instigation of the appellant or other contesting candidates in order to prejudice the respondent's election, the High Court should have considered the probabilities and enquired whether Aditya Nath could have done this work without the consent of the respondent. That is another infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. Having regard to these infirmities in the judgment under appeal we have thought it necessary to examine the evidence ourselves. Indeed, we ought to add that Mr Pathak fairly conceded that a case has been made out by the appellant for reconsidering the evidence ourselves. 13. We will first consider the relation of P-52 with the receipt of the objectionable bulletins. This letter is admittedly written by the respondent and addressed to Baldeo Prasad. It says "my work is suffering a good deal. You will kindly send the bulletins positively through the bearer of this letter today in any event". It is signed by Rukmini Raman Singh the respondent. It bears the endorsement of Aditya Nath in which he acknowledges receipt of 5000 bulletins, the date being February 27, 1957. The respondent's explanation was that this letter had relation to another bulletin which was delivered to Balwant Singh at his instance on January 7, 1957; and so he suggested that the portion below his signature had been torn in order that the date which he had entered below his signature should be removed from the document. The witness also stated positively that after the word "Rukmini Raman" he made a line, below which he added his surname and below his surname he put the date. If this statement was true then of course the letter could have no connection with the objectionable bulletins. The witness also stated positively that after the word "Rukmini Raman" he made a line, below which he added his surname and below his surname he put the date. If this statement was true then of course the letter could have no connection with the objectionable bulletins. The High Court realised that the story about a line between "Rukmini Raman"and "Pratap Singh" was not very natural and the High Court thought that a part of the statement may be inaccurate owing to lapse of memory; but the High Court held that the date must have been put as alleged by the. witness and the tearing of a part of the paper was therefore deliberate. The Tribunal had come to a contrary conclusion. In our opinion, a bare look at the paper on which the letter is written is enough to show that the story of the full signature and the date is incredible. We have carefully looked at the paper which is torn just below the signature, and we feel no doubt whatever in coming to the conclusion that at the place where the respondent has put his name the torn portion is so small that it would have been physically impossible for him to put his surname Pratap Singh and date below it. The untrue character of this statement is thus physically demonstrable. If only the High Court had looked at this paper it would have come to the same conclusion. 14. Then again, the explanation given by the respondent that this letter had reference to another bulletin which was printed for publishing an announcement of a meeting which he wanted to hold in regard to social work is patently unbelievable. It is remarkable that the respondent was unable to give any detail about the place where the meeting was intended to be held or its date. Besides, the tone of urgency which the letter unambiguously discloses is wholly inconsistent with an ordinary meeting of social work with which the respondent seeks to connect this letter. His work was suffering and he wanted the bulletins that very day. This is consistent with the theory that the objectionable bulletins were wanted by the respondent urgently, and wholly inconsistent with the story that he wanted the bulletins for his social meeting. Unfortunately the High Court has not properly considered this aspect of the question also. His work was suffering and he wanted the bulletins that very day. This is consistent with the theory that the objectionable bulletins were wanted by the respondent urgently, and wholly inconsistent with the story that he wanted the bulletins for his social meeting. Unfortunately the High Court has not properly considered this aspect of the question also. That is why we feel no difficulty in holding that the respondent obtained the delivery of the objectionable bulletins through Aditya Nath and is therefore directly connected with its printing. 15. It is in this connection that the documents produced by Baldeo Prasad played an important part. It is true that the respondent had shown that in some cases Baldeo Prasad issued receipts for the payments made by his customers but it is not shown that the failure to issue a receipt necessarily disproves the truthfulness of Baldeo Prasad's oral evidence or impairs the effect of the entries made by him in contemporaneous documents. The documents in question were examined by the Tribunal carefully and they were found to be genuine. The High Court has completely ignored these documents. We have ourselves carefully examined the points brought out against Baldeo Prasad in respect of these documents, and we feel satisfied that the conclusion of the Tribunal is right and that nothing is shown which would discredit the entries made in the contemporaneous documents. If these documents are believed they show that the typed circular printed in the Martand Press had been received from the respondent, that Ext P-52 was addressed to Baldeo Prasad in response to which he delivered the copies of the bulletins to Aditya Nath and received from him Rs. 30 on behalf of the respondent. Our conclusion in regard to P-52 is thus strengthened by the evidence of Baldeo Prasad and his documents. It would thus be seen that in reaching this conclusion the evidence of Aditya Nath plays a very minor part. 16. It now remains to consider whether any prejudice had been caused to the respondent by the refusal of the Tribunal to recall Aditya Nath in order to confront him with D-41 which is a letter alleged to have been written by Aditya Nath and addressed to Baijnath. 16. It now remains to consider whether any prejudice had been caused to the respondent by the refusal of the Tribunal to recall Aditya Nath in order to confront him with D-41 which is a letter alleged to have been written by Aditya Nath and addressed to Baijnath. We have already seen that though the respondent knew about this lettef he was content merely with putting the contents of the letter to Aditya Nath who denied the same. It was clearly necessary for the respondent to have taken proper steps to put the said letter to Aditya Nath when he was in the witness box. It may be conceded that the Tribunal may well have allowed the respondent an opportunity to put the said letter to Aditya Nath by recalling him, but we do not see how this letter can make any difference to the decision of the issue. The Tribunal has carefully examined the letter and has found that it is a very doubtful document. The High Court has again not considered this aspect of the matter; but what is more significant is the fact that Aditya Nath had on oath denied that he had written such a letter, and though it is possible for the respondent to suggest hypothetically that Aditya Nath may have admitted his authorship of the letter if he was confronted with it such hypothesis must be regarded as highly improbable; but apart from it, even if Aditya Nath had admitted this letter his admission in that behalf would have merely shown that Aditya Nath was not a reliable witness; but it is clear from the record that the story about the respondent's connection with the objectionable bulletins as well as their distribution and posting does not rest solely or even principally on the evidence of Aditya Nath; and so, even if the respondent had succeeded in shaking Aditya Nath by wringing from him an admission that he wrote Ext D-41 that could not have helped him in any manner; but, as we have said, it is very difficult to assume that Aditya Nath would have admitted the authorship of this letter. Besides, the contents of this letter would not necessarily affect the story set up by the appellant in regard to the distribution of the bulletins. Besides, the contents of this letter would not necessarily affect the story set up by the appellant in regard to the distribution of the bulletins. We are, therefore, satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the respondent by the failure of the Tribunal to recall Aditya Nath. 17. It is then urged that sufficient particulars had not been stated in the election petition about which persons distributed the bulletins in which place and at what time. In our opinion, it is futile to raise this argument because the record shows that after the evidence was led by the appellant the respondent knew fully well what the appellant's case was, and he had ample opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal thereafter. When the first issues were framed as well as when they were recast the respondent could have effectively called upon the appellant to furnish the necessary particulars. In fact evidence has been led by the respondent on all the points covered by the evidence led by the appellant, and so it is both too late and futile to raise a technical objection that sufficient particulars had not been stated in the election petition in para 20(c). As has been observed by this Court in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, A.I.R. 1960 SC 770 "in considering whether material prejudice has resulted to a party from failure to state full particulars, his conduct at the time when the issues are framed would be relevant. If an objection is not raised and pressed about the absence of particulars before going to trial it would not be open to a party to raise that objection at a much later stage" As we have already seen the consent of the respondent to the commission of the corrupt practice was specifically alleged, and when evidence was given by the appellant all particulars were disclosed. The respondent had enough time thereafter to lead evidence, and in fact he attempted to lead such evidence. In the result there is no justification for the grievance now made before us that the course adopted by the Tribunal in framing the relevant issues and allowing the appellant to lead evidence on it had caused prejudice to him. The respondent had enough time thereafter to lead evidence, and in fact he attempted to lead such evidence. In the result there is no justification for the grievance now made before us that the course adopted by the Tribunal in framing the relevant issues and allowing the appellant to lead evidence on it had caused prejudice to him. After all, the question in controversy lies within a narrow compass; and if Ext P-52 is integrally connected with the receipt of the objectionable bulletins the rest of the appellant's case in regard to the commission of corrupt practice is very easily established. That being so, we must reverse the conclusion of the High Court and hold that the corrupt practice which, even according to the High Court, has been committed by Aditya Nath under Section 123(4) was so committed with the consent of the respondent under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act. In fact we have found that the respondent sent the typed manuscript of the objectionable bulletin to Martand Press, got it printed there, paid the printing charges through, and got it delivered to, his polling agent, paid the said agent posting charges whereupon they were posted and distributed by him. Thus there is no doubt that the respondent was directly concerned with the printing of the bulletins, and the posting and distribution of the same by his polling agent were done with the respondent's consent. Since we have reached this conclusion it is unnecessary for us to consider the question of law which the learned Solicitor-General wanted to argue in regard to the inter-relation of Section, 400(1)(b) and Section 100(2). The decision of the said interesting question must therefore await another occasion. 18. The result is the appeal is allowed, the decision of the High Court is set aside and that of the Tribunal restored with costs throughout.