JUDGMENT T.P. Naik, J. The judgment in this appeal shall also dispose of Criminal Appeals Nos. 262 of 1960, 263 of 1960 and 301 of 1960. The accused Puran, Sunderlal, Damru, Ramprasad and Balmukund were committed to the Court of Session to stand their trial for being members of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was, to commit the murder of one Hasmatmal Sindhi of Jabalpur, which murder was, in fact, committed by Puran by stabbing the deceased in the chest with a knife on the night of 12th October 1959 at about 9 P.M., at Madar Tekri. The accused Puran was charged under Section 302 as also under Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused Sunderlal was charged under Section 302 read with Section 149 and also under Section 148 ibid. The remaining three accused Damru, Ramprasad and Balmukund, were charged under Section 302 read with Section 149 and also under Section 147 ibid. The Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, by his judgment, dated 12th April 1960, convicted the accused Puran of culpable homicide in respect of the death of Hasmatmal under part two of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. He also held him guilty under Section 148 ibid and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. The accused Sunderlal and Damru were convicted under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each. The accused Sunderlal was also convicted under Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years; while the accused Damru was convicted under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The accused Ramprasad was convicted under Sections 323 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months on each count. All these sentences were to run concurrently. The accused Balmukund was convicted only under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. All these sentences were to run concurrently. The accused Balmukund was convicted only under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. The facts of the case, which have not been, nor can be, seriously disputed, are as follows: [Paras. 4 to 16 not being material, are not reported.] We now come to the question as to what offence had been committed by the accused Puran in stabbing the deceased on his chest at the back, which resulted in his death practically on the spot. The trial Court has convicted him under part two of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code because it seemed to it clear that 'Puran had no intention of causing such bodily injury with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death.' Before considering this question, we shall briefly recapitulate the circumstances under which the crime had been committed. These circumstances are: (1)The accused Puran was the member of an unlawful assembly which was engaged in committing various acts of hooliganism in the locality; (2)He came to the shop of the deceased Hasmatmal with the deliberate purpose of intimidating him to accede to the demand of a packet of cigarettes free of charge; (3)The persons who went to the shop of the deceased e.g., the accused Sunderlal and Puran, were both armed with knives; (4)The quarrel was deliberately provoked by the accused Sunderlal by unnecessarily dragging, pushing and assaulting Tarachand (P.W. 1), an innocent person sitting in the shop of the deceased. Though there is no evidence, that this act was the part of any design for committing the murder of the deceased, it was certainly a very reckless behavior without caring to bother what unfortunate consequences it might entail; (5) The act of the accused Puran in catching the deceased by the waist was quite unjustified and high-handed. The deceased had come out of the shop when he found that the accused Sunderlal had raised the knife to strike Tarachand (P.W. 1); (6)The deceased had slapped the accused Sunderlal which had made him fall down. The knife in his hand had also fallen on the ground. The deceased had come out of the shop when he found that the accused Sunderlal had raised the knife to strike Tarachand (P.W. 1); (6)The deceased had slapped the accused Sunderlal which had made him fall down. The knife in his hand had also fallen on the ground. The deceased had then extricated himself from the hold of the accused Puran and was going back to his shop, when he was stabbed by him (Puran) in the chest at the back; (7)There was no justification for the act, and the accused Puran has sought to give none; (8)The character of the wound as disclosed in the autopsy of the deceased (Ex. P-10), which was performed by Dr. Pandey (P.W.18), was as follows A penetrating wound, transversely over the back of the cheat, oval in shape, at the level of the 6th left rib in the mid scapular line penetrating the mucles, pleura and left lung lower lobe at 3" above the border in the mid scapular line upto 2 1/2" depth. Further, in the opinion of Dr. Pandey, the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. It was not disputed before us that the act of the accused fell within the definition of 'culpable homicide'. The trial Court has also held it to be culpable homicide, though in its opinion, under the circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the accused had either the intention to cause death or the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. All that could be said was that the accused had caused the injury with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death. In our opinion the case more appropriately falls within the second clause of Section 299 and not in the third. Though there is difference between the two clauses, it is only one of degree. The former requires a particular intent. The latter is satisfied with knowledge only. 'Intention' is the state of mind of a person with reference to certain consequences which result from his willed movements or omissions. An act is said to be intentional when it is done with a desire that certain consequences shall follow from a person's physical acts or omissions. Intention thus is a subjective consideration. 'Intention' is the state of mind of a person with reference to certain consequences which result from his willed movements or omissions. An act is said to be intentional when it is done with a desire that certain consequences shall follow from a person's physical acts or omissions. Intention thus is a subjective consideration. As it is not always possible to know what particular consequences a person desires, we often resort to approximations on the supposition that every person of level of culture and education there is a corresponding uniformity in human thought and action. So that when we know the surrounding data, we try to, infer intent by arguing from effect to cause and thereby ascertaining what possible desires could have prompted the alleged acts or omissions in any normal human being of that level of education and culture to bring about the given consequences. In so arguing, broadly speaking, three situations can arise: (a) The consequences can be the inevitable or substantially certain results of certain acts or omissions. (b) They can only be the possible results. (c) They can be the probable or likely result depending on the degree of probability of their happenings, which may range between absolute certainly on the one end and a bare possibility on the other. In each one of these situations, we have to infer desire of consequences from the surrounding circumstances. Where consequences are substantially certain or Inevitable, no difficulty arises because we can then deem a consequence to be intended though not desired, because we must credit every sane man with the knowledge that if the result was inevitable, he must have foreseen it. So that if a person pulls the trigger of a loaded gun which is pointed at another at point blank range and at his vital parts, the consequence that the bullet shall hit the victim and cause his death is substantially certain and we can hold him' guilty of the intention of causing death or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, according to the nature of the injury and the other surrounding circumstances, however much he may not have desired that consequence, where, however, the consequences are barely possible, we cannot credit him with the desire of consequences which actually resulted. For in ultimate analysis the question depends on the knowledge possessed by him as to how far he foresaw those consequences, and if the chances of their happening were very remote or only barely possible, we cannot credit him with the knowledge that he should have foreseen them. If, however, the ultimate consequences are neither substantially certain nor barely possible but only likely or probable the ascertainment of intention as a desire of consequences which actually resulted is always a task of some delicacy as well as of some difficulty. The criterion which the law has provided for such situations is that if the accused could reasonably foresee the consequences and avoid them, and has not avoided them, he must be held criminally responsible for his act or omissions. This is expressed by saying that the doing of an act with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death is culpable. Thus apart from a desire of consequences, which is a special characteristic of intention, foresight of consequences is the common factor in both intention and knowledge as used in the two clauses. Where consequences are substantially certain or inevitable, we credit the doer with knowledge of the foresight of those consequences and call the act intentional; but where consequences are not so certain, we attach criminality to those acts only where the accused could be credited with the knowledge of foresight of such consequences only which are likely, i. e. which he could reasonably have foreseen, though be may not have desired them. 'Likely' connotes a degree of probability varying between barest possibility and almost certainty; but used in the context of the Indian Penal Code, by 'likely' we usually mean a high chance or a high degree of probability of its occurring which our fictional normal man could have reasonably foreseen. How high that chance or probability is to be, to make it reasonably foreseeable depends on the facto of each case where various other considerations with which we are not concerned in this case, have to be taken into account. The third clause is thus only a species of the second clause, where the degree of probability of the result being death is only foreseen as 'likely' by the accused. The third clause is thus only a species of the second clause, where the degree of probability of the result being death is only foreseen as 'likely' by the accused. In the instant case the accused stabbed the deceased in the region of the cheat with a knife of sufficient dimensions and with sufficient force to penetrate the pleura and the left lung lower lobe. The injury was, therefore, likely to cause death, as the degree of probability of death being the result off the injury could reasonably be foreseen by the accused. The question then in whether he intended to cause such an injury. From the fact that the accused was striking the deceased in a very vulnerable part e.g., the region of the chest, with sufficient force and with a dangerous weapon, he can safely be credited with the knowledge that such an injury was substantially certain or inevitable and consequently he shall be deemed to have intended it. This is not a case therefore where it can be said that the foresight of consequences as to the injury on the chest was in the realm of 'likelihood' only and not substantially certain. We shall now determine whether, under the circumstances of the case, the culpable homicide amounted to murder. The Indian Penal Code defines the offence of murder as follows: Except in cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or- 2ndly-If it is done with the intention of causing suck bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or- 3rdly-If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or- 4thly-If the person committing the act knows that, it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or injury as aforesaid. We have not recited the exceptions as this is not a case where any of the exceptions applies, nor does the accused claim exemption under any of them. We have not recited the exceptions as this is not a case where any of the exceptions applies, nor does the accused claim exemption under any of them. We may, however, note the illustration appended to the section as they furnish some valuable clue to its correct understanding: (a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder. (b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of. a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing, that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death. (c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death. (d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder; although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual. Applying the provisions of the aforesaid section to the facts of this case, we agree with the trial Judge that this is not a case where the Appellant can be said to have intended to cause the death. He stabbed, but only once and at the back (though in a region of the chest) which cannot be conclusive of his intention to cause death as would have been the case if the stabbing had been repeated or in the front in the region of the heart. He stabbed, but only once and at the back (though in a region of the chest) which cannot be conclusive of his intention to cause death as would have been the case if the stabbing had been repeated or in the front in the region of the heart. The second clause will also not apply as there could not be any intention to cause the particular bodily, injury with the specific knowledge that death most necessarily be caused thereby. There is no evidence that the part of the body here the injury was caused has any specially vulnerable part of the body of the deceased to the knowledge of the Appellant of which he had taken advantage. The question then is whether the act of the Appellant falls in the third clause. This clause which comprises of two clauses which are disjunctive and separate, requires: (a) that the act is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person; and (b) that the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Examining the aforesaid clause in the light of the third illustration, it is clear that if the accused intentionally gave the deceased a forceful stab wound at his back in the region of his chest with a knife causing an injury of the dimensions and magnitude as disclosed in the post-mortem report, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and death resulted in consequence, he would be guilty of murder because both the ingredients of the third clause are fully satisfied. This clause has been exhaustively considered by the Supreme Court in Vina Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 wherein it has been laid down that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 'thirdly': First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Examining the facts of the case in the light of the aforesaid observations, it cannot be disputed that a bodily injury was present on the body of the deceased. The nature of the injury can be gathered from the evidence of Dr. Pande (P.W. 18) and the post-mortem report, and it has already been detailed in paragraph 18 above. The first two requirements are thus satisfied. We now come to the crucial requirement, e. g. whether there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury. We have no doubt that that was the intention. As observed by us earlier, when a consequence is seen as substantially certain, we can deem it to be intended, even though it was not desired. Thus, here when the accused struck at the deceased with a knife with sufficient force while he was in the act of re-entering his shop, the consequence that the knife would deeply penetrate his chest and cause a bodily injury in the region of the chest was inevitable and it must therefore be deemed to be intended unless there is material to negative this necessary inference. It is true, as pointed out by Lord Goddard C.J. in R. v. Steane (1947) 1 AllER 816 that if on the totality of evidence there is room for more than one view as to the intent of the prisoner, or that if on a review of the whole evidence the intent did not exist or is doubtful, the accused must be given the benefit of it. But, in this case, there is no room for doubt. But, in this case, there is no room for doubt. There are no circumstances to warrant any reasonable inference that the injury to the deceased could be accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. This brings to the last requirement, e. g. whether the injury of the type just described made of the three elements set out above was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. We have already detailed the injury in paragraph 18 above. In the opinion of Dr. Pande (P.W. 18) it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The injury was a deep wound which had penetrated the muscles, pleura and the left lung lower lobe at 3" above the lower border in the mid scapular line up to 2 1/2" depth, so that there can be no doubt that the opinion of the doctor was correct. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant did not challenge the opinion of the doctor on the point. We, therefore, hold that the injury inflicted on the deceased by the Appellant was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased. In our opinion the act of the accused amounted to an offence of murder as denned in Section 300, thirdly', of the Indian Penal Code. He would thus be guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We hold accordingly. In the result, we set aside the conviction of the accused Puran under Section 304, second part, and instead convict him under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. As regards the sentence, there are no extenuating circumstances. The accused had been behaving in the most provocative manner throughout the evening and the stabbing of the deceased by him had no justification whatsoever. In our opinion, such wanton lawlessness, which endangers the lives of peaceful law-abiding citizens, must call for the highest penalty of the law. We accordingly sentence the accused Puran to death. The appeal of the State Government so far as it relates to accused Puran, is, therefore, allowed. Appeal allowed