JUDGMENT K.L. Pandey, J. This appeal raises the question whether to the suit, out of which it arises, Article 12 of the Limitation Act or any other Article, including Article 95, of that Act is applicable. By a sale deed dated 24th June 1953, the plaintiff acquired for a sum of Rs. 1,000 the western half share of occupancy plot khasra No. 80 area 13.57 acres, rental Rs. 49-8-0, of village Basadehi from the defendant and his brothers, who continued to be the holders of the other half share. Even so, the plaintiff was not shown in the annual papers for 1954-55 as a co-holder of the plot. The second instalment of rent due in respect of the plot for 1954-55 remained unpaid. The village Patwari submitted a list of defaulters to the Naib-Tahsildar, who, having registered case No. 79 of 1954-55, started proceedings for recovery of the arrear due in respect of the plot against Jiwanlal, a brother of the defendant. At his instance, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Narsimhapur, sanctioned on 6th August 1955 attachment and sale of khasra No. 80 of village Mahal pura. The proclamation for sale of that plot was published in Mahalpura as well as in Basadehi and it was sold on 3rd March 1956. The defendant's bid of Rs. 250 was accepted and the sale was subsequently confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 24th April 1956. The plaintiff's belated application for setting it aside on the ground that it was illegal was rejected on 8th August 1957. The two Courts below accepted the plaintiff's claim and declared that the sale was null and void on the ground that there were material irregularities in publishing and conducting the sale which was also brought about by the defendant by his fraud. In this appeal by the defendant, only the question of limitation was argued by his learned counsel. My attention was drawn to section 149 of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917, and it was urged that, all claims on the ground of irregularity were barred. Since the sale was published and held after the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, came into force on 1st October 1955, the matter must be regarded as governed by rule 33 of the Second Schedule to that Code, which, however, re-enacts the relevant provision under the repealed Act. Since the sale was published and held after the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, came into force on 1st October 1955, the matter must be regarded as governed by rule 33 of the Second Schedule to that Code, which, however, re-enacts the relevant provision under the repealed Act. Rule 33 ibid reads as follows: (1) If no application under rule 29 is made within the time allowed therefor, all claims on the grounds of irregularity or mistake shall be barred. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall bar the institution of a suit in the civil Court to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud or on the ground that the arrear for which the property is sold is not due or on the ground that the defaulter had no saleable interest in the property sold. In my opinion, sub-rule (1) of rule 33 does not bar all claims but only those grounded on irregularity or mistake and, even in such cases, when the irregularity or mistake is brought about by fraud or when the mistake lies in assuming that the defaulter had a saleable interest in the property or that the arrear for which the property sold was due when in fact it was not due, it is permissible to file a suit to set aside the sale. Except as above indicated, sub-rule (2) should be regarded as enacted ex abundanti cautela without affecting other claims not founded on irregularity or mistake. For example, when a sale is void, it need not be set aside. Article 12 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes one year's limitation for setting aside a sale made in pursuance of an order of a Revenue Officer, does not apply to such a case: Motilal v. Karrabuldin ILR 25 Cal. 179 (PC), Khirajmal v. Daim ILR 32 Cal. 296 (PC), Purna Chandra Chatterjee v. Dinabhandhu Mukerjee ILR 34 Cal. 811 (FB), Lakshmadu v. Ramudu AIR 1939 Mad. 867 : ILR 1940 Mad. 123, Karashiddayya Shiddayya v. Shree Gajanan Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. AIR 1943 Bom. 288 : ILR 1943 Bom. 400 and Fazlar Rahim v. Khorsed Alam ILR (1944) 1 Cal. 339. The Privy Council pointed out in Motilal's case ILR 25 Cal. 811 (FB), Lakshmadu v. Ramudu AIR 1939 Mad. 867 : ILR 1940 Mad. 123, Karashiddayya Shiddayya v. Shree Gajanan Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. AIR 1943 Bom. 288 : ILR 1943 Bom. 400 and Fazlar Rahim v. Khorsed Alam ILR (1944) 1 Cal. 339. The Privy Council pointed out in Motilal's case ILR 25 Cal. 179 (PC) that there was a wide difference between setting aside a sale and holding that the plaintiff's rights were unaffected by it and held in Khirajmal's case ILR 32 Cal. 296 (PC), distinguishing the case of Malkarjun v. Narhari ILR 25 Bom. 337 (PC), that the observations therein made did not apply to a case where the sale was null and void. It is not that this is, in form, a suit for setting aside a sale. The relief claimed is a declaration that the sale is illegal, null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. However, the question is one of substance and not merely one of form. As I will show in the sequel, the grounds on which the plaintiff seeks relief, must, if accepted, lead to the conclusion that there could be no valid sale. As indicated earlier, the plaintiff was not shown in the annual papers as a co-holder of the plot, was not a party to the proceedings for recovery of the arrear due and no notice was therefore issued to him at any stage. It is well established that there is no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons who were not parties to the proceedings or properly represented on the record: Khirajmal v. Daim ILR 32 Cal. 296 (PC). Such a sale is illegal and does not bind those persons: Kanhayalal v. Reginald 1951 NLJ 440 : ILR 1951 Nag. 422 which was approved by the Supreme Court in Kanhaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji AIR 1958 SC 725 . The further question whether a person like the present plaintiff should not be allowed to take advantage of this principle because, by his inaction, he failed to get his name recorded in the annual papers as a co-holder of the plot and thereby prevented the revenue authorities from acquiring knowledge of his interest in the plot need not be considered because it was not raised. In this case, the very plot situate in village Basadehi, in respect of which rent was in arrear, was actually put to sale. In this case, the very plot situate in village Basadehi, in respect of which rent was in arrear, was actually put to sale. If so, it was governed by clause (f) of section 128 of the Land Revenue Act, 1917. Under rule XIV of the Rules framed under section 227 read with sections 127 and 128 of the Land Revenue Act, personal sanction of the Deputy Commissioner (subsequently Sub-Divisional Officer) was necessary for such a sale which did not require prior attachment. But sanction was sought and obtained for attachment and sale of the Khasra No. 80 of village Mahalpura under clause (g) of section 128 and Rule XV of the aforesaid Rules and the sale proclamation was accordingly issued in Form No. X prescribed by those Rules. Even so, on 3rd March 1956, khasra No. 80 of village Basadehi was sold by auction and that sale was subsequently confirmed. From these facts, it would appear that the disputed plot was sold without any proclamation having been issued for its sale. There are two views about a sale made without any proclamation. One is that the omission is a mere irregularity : Nripati Nath v. Jatindra Kumar AIR 1926 Cal. 577. The other is that, in such cases, there is no valid sale: Srikakula Chinni Venkatanarayana v. Pannapati Elias ILR 1955 Mad. 149 : AIR 1954 Mad. 1024 . Even if the first view be regarded as correct, the defect in this case goes deeper and vitiates the sale of the disputed plot. That plot could not be sold without the sanction required under the Rules already referred to. There was no sanction for selling it. Therefore, the sale without the requisite previous sanction was illegal and was not rendered valid on account of the subsequent confirmation thereof by the authority whose previous sanction was essential: Maharajah Mitterjeet Sing v. The Heirs of the Ranee, Widow of Rajah Juswantsingh 3 MIA 42. The emerging position is that, having regard to the nature of the suit and the relief claimed, it cannot be regarded as one for setting aside a sale and Article 12 of the Limitation Act does not apply to it. It is, in form as well as in substance, a suit for a declaration that the sale is void and not binding on the plaintiff. To such a suit, Article 120 of the Limitation Act applies. It is, in form as well as in substance, a suit for a declaration that the sale is void and not binding on the plaintiff. To such a suit, Article 120 of the Limitation Act applies. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff relied upon the defendant's fraud as one of the grounds for the relief claimed by him. Even if that were the only ground in support of the claim, the suit would be governed by the specific Article 95 and not by the general Article 12 of the Limitation Act: Syamlal Mandal v. Nilmony Das ILR 34 Cal. 241 and Jago v. Narayan 1948 NLJ 65 : AIR 1948 Nag. 150 : ILR 1947 Nag. 985. The learned counsel for the defendant relied upon Malkarjun v. Narhari ILR 25 Bom. 337 (PC) and Raja Baldev Das Birla v. Lal Nilmaninath Sahi Deo AIR 1928 Pat. 615 : ILR 8 Pat. 122 for the contrary view. The first case was based upon what was held to be a material irregularity and, in the second case, there was no serious allegation of fraud. Both these cases are, therefore, distinguishable and do not support the contention that Article 95 does not apply to a suit to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud. Since this suit falls under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, it must be regarded as having been filed in good time. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The defendant shall bear his own costs and pay those of the plaintiff throughout. Counsel's fee here Rs. 75. Appeal dismissed