JUDGMENT K.L. Pandey, J. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the reversing decree of the lower appeal Court by which his claim for possession of certain malik-makbuza plots specified in the plaint was dismissed. Rani Mankunwarbai was the proprietor of Pandaria Zamindari. Pritram (defendant) held Patharra, a village in that Zamindari, as a thekadar with protected status. In that capacity, he was also in possession of 128.16 acres of home-farm land of the village. Under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act), the proprietary rights vested in the State with effect from 31st March 1951. Thereupon, by an order dated 3rd September 1951, the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, Bilaspur, reserved to Pritram the rights of an occupancy tenant in 95.48 acres of the home-farm land. By the same order, the remaining home-farm land was reserved to Rani Mankunwarbai, who was treated as malik-makbuza of the land which was accordingly assessed to land revenue under section 42 of the Act. It is no longer disputed, though it was contested in the Court of first instance, that, by a sale deed dated 9th May 1953, Rani Mankunwarbai sold to the plaintiff 15.49 acres out of her malik-makbuza land of village Patharra. It has also been found that the plaintiff was placed in possession of the land sold to him and that, between November 1953 and February 1954, the defendant dispossessed him from that land. The plaintiff's claim for possession of the land was resisted on several other grounds only two of which were accepted by the lower appeal Court. In this appeal, the controversy is restricted to these two grounds. Differing from the Court of first instance, it was held by the lower appeal Court that, before passing the impugned order dated 3rd September 1951, the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, did not issue any notice to the defendant as required by rule 4 of the Rules framed under section 91(2)(i), read with section 38 of the Act, that the order did not, therefore, bind the defendant and that he was entitled to resist the plaintiff's claim for possession founded upon it. In my opinion, this contention, which the lower appeal Court was persuaded to accept, proceeds upon a misconception. In my opinion, this contention, which the lower appeal Court was persuaded to accept, proceeds upon a misconception. Sub-section (2) of section 38 of the Act was not a provision which, by itself, gave any right in sir and khudkasht land to any one. It must be read in the light of the sections 4(2) and 38(1) of the Act which were as follows: 4(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the proprietor shall continue to retain the possession of his home-stead, home-farm land, and in the Central Provinces also of land brought under cultivation by him after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before the date of vesting. 38(1). Every proprietor who is divested of his proprietary rights in an Estate or Mahal shall, with effect from the date of vesting, be a malik-makbuza of the home-farm land in his possession. Sub-section (2) of section 38 merely provides for partition of sir and khudkasht land retained by the proprietor under section 4(2), which, by the operation of section 38(1), became malik-makbuza land. The condition essential for a partition under section 38(2) was the continuance of the right existing before the date of vesting to a share in such sir and khudkasht land. The expression "If there are more persons than one having interest in land held as sir or khudkasht immediately before the date of vesting" employed in section 38(2) referred to co-sharers and this was made clear when it was therein provided that such partition could be made "after hearing the objection of the co-sharers" and it was enacted in section 38(3) that all persons having, before the date of vesting, shares in the Estate or Mahal could be joined as parties to the partition proceedings. A person like the defendant here, who was not a co-sharer and who also ceased to have from the date of vesting any interest in 32.68 acres of home-farm land, which was subsequently reserved to Rani Mankunwarbai, could not avail of the aforesaid provision relating to partition. That being so, the lower appeal Court's view that the order passed under section 39 of the Act amounted to partition under section 38(2) of the Act and a notice to the defendant was, therefore, obligatory is clearly incorrect. That being so, the lower appeal Court's view that the order passed under section 39 of the Act amounted to partition under section 38(2) of the Act and a notice to the defendant was, therefore, obligatory is clearly incorrect. The main ground on which the plaintiff's claim was dismissed was that, in view of Ghassukhan v. Diwan Najaf Ali 1956 NLJ 299 : ILR 1956 Nag 433, the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, was, in so far as it reserved to Rani Mankunwarbai 32.68 acres of the home-farm land of village Patharra, without jurisdiction. It has to be remembered that, in Ghassukhan's case 1956 NLJ 299 : ILR 1956 Nag. 433, a Division Bench of this Court, acting under its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, quashed an order of the Board of Revenue "as not warranted by the statute" because the Board was of the view that under sections 38(1) and 39(1) of the Act a division of the home-farm land had to be made between the proprietor and the thekadar. It may be that the order passed in Ghassukhan's case 1956 NLJ 299 : ILR 1956 Nag. 433 has been challenged in the Supreme Court but, until a different view is expressed by the Supreme Court, it must be regarded as a binding precedent. That being so, it is not necessary to consider the arguments of the plaintiff's counsel which run counter to the view taken in that case. However, what has to be considered here is the effect of the decision in Ghassukhan's case 1956 NLJ 299 : ILR 1956 Nag. 133 upon the present case. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court controls all inferior tribunals, including the Board of Revenue, not in an appellate capacity but in a supervisory capacity. The control so exercised extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction but also to seeing that they observe the law. When a decision of any tribunal offends against the law, this Court exercises control by quashing it and then, without substituting its own decision for that of the tribunal, by leaving it to hear and decide the case again. A tribunal may often decide a point of law wrongly while keeping well within its jurisdiction. When a decision of any tribunal offends against the law, this Court exercises control by quashing it and then, without substituting its own decision for that of the tribunal, by leaving it to hear and decide the case again. A tribunal may often decide a point of law wrongly while keeping well within its jurisdiction. When this Court interferes by quashing the decision which offends against the law, it cannot be inferred that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter or that any other like decision of the tribunal, which was not corrected either in the manner provided by the relevant Act or by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, could be collaterally disregarded as a decision without jurisdiction. In the instant case, the Deputy Commissioner was the only authority who could pass an order under section 39(1) of the Act. Without such an order or in disregard of an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner thereunder, neither the defendant-thekadar nor the civil Court could, in a collateral proceeding, treat the entire home farm land as reserved to the thekadar. If the civil Court were to purport so to do, it would amount to an unwarranted usurpation of jurisdiction which it did not possess. I am clearly of opinion that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, even though it was a wrong order according to the view in Ghassukhan's case 1956 NLJ 299 : ILR 1956 Nag. 133, was nonetheless an order passed with jurisdiction and was binding on the defendant who did not get it corrected in the manner indicated at the end of the last paragraph. The result is that this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decision of the lower appeal Court is set aside and that of the Court of first instance is restored. The defendant shall bear his own costs and pay those of the plaintiff throughout. Counsel's fee here is Rs. 50. Appeal allowed