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1960 DIGILAW 400 (MAD)

The Madurai Municipality, having its office at Madurai, through its Executive Authority, the Commissioner, having its office at the Palace Road, Madurai v. The State of Madras represented by the Collector of Madurai holding office at Tallakulam, Madurai

1960-12-16

P.V.RAJAMANNAR, VENKATADRI

body1960
Rajamannar, C.J.- This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Madurai in O.S. No. 75 of 1955 on his file. The suit was filed by the Madurai Municipality through its Executive Authority, the Commissioner, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 20,966-15-9 from either or both of the two defendants, namely, the State of Madras, represented by the Collector of Madurai, and T.S. Jayarama Ayyar. The facts, regarding which there is no dispute, are the following. The second defendant, Jayarama Ayyar, was a member of the Madras Local Authorities Electrical Engineers’ Service. His appointment and conditions of service are regulated by the rules relating to the said service. The second defendant was posted as the Electrical Engineer of the plaintiff-Municipality by an order of the Government and he took charge of his office on 19th February, 1946. While the second defendant was in the employment of the plaintiff-Municipality, there-were several complaints against him, charging him with corruption and other acts of misconduct. These complaints were brought to the notice of the Government by the Municipal authorities. On 22nd October, 1948, the Chairman of the Madurai Municipal Council addressed a letter to the Minister for Local Administration, enclosing a report of the Commissioner of the Municipality relating to the misconduct of the second defendant for necessary action. On 29th October, 1948, the Chairman, in continuation of his letter of 22nd October, forwarded to the Minister for Local Administration a copy of the latest demi-official letter sent by the Commissioner to the Chief Electrical Inspector to the Government with enclosures. The Chairman added: "I feel that the Electrical Engineer should be removed from the scene of his operations before a regular enquiry begins." The second defendant was accordingly transferred on 15th November, 1948 to the Tanjore Municipality to facilitate investigation into the complaints against him. The several charges made against the second defendant were investigated by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Government of Madras, and the Superintendent of Police of X-Branch addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, requesting that necessary sanction to prosecute the second defendant might be accorded. On 22nd April, 1949, the Government passed the following Order (G.O. Ms. On 22nd April, 1949, the Government passed the following Order (G.O. Ms. No. 857, Local Administration): "Whereas information has been received that Sri T. S. Jayarama Ayyar, Municipal Electrical Engineer, Tanjore, while working as Municipal Electrical Engineer, Madurai, between the dates. 18th February, 1946, and 6th November, 1948, accepted illegal gratification from certain individuals, to wit, Sri Narasimhalu Naidu, Sri J. R. Ramachari and Sri Pandian Chettiar of Maduari, as a reward for giving electrical service connections to the said individuals and thereby committed offence punishable under section 161, Indian Penal Code and section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,. 1947 (Central Act II of 1947) read with section 5 (1) (d) thereof: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act V of 1898) and section 6 (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947), His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby sanctions the prosecution of the said Sri T. S. Jayarama Ayyar, in respect of the said offence." On 19th May, 1949, the Government passed another order, placing the second defendant under suspension with effect from 11th May, 1949 afternoon till the criminal complaint filed against him by the Criminal Investigation Department before the Sub-Magistrate, Madurai, was disposed of. By a subsequent G.O., dated 15th July, 1949, the Government directed that the second defendant be granted during the period of suspension a subsistence grant of Rs. 258-14-0 per mensem and a dearness allowance of Rs. 51 per mensem and the Chief Electrical Inspector to Government was requested to pay him the said subsistence grant and dearness allowance with effect from 12th May, 1949 forenoon. The Chief Electrical Inspector to Government was also requested to suggest suitable amendments to the regulations governing the Madras Local Authorities Electrical Engineers’ Service, so as to provide for the payment of subsistence grant and dearness allowance from the Central Fund in cases like this. The prosecution launched against the second defendant ended in a conviction by the Sessions Judge, Madurai. But, on appeal to this Court, he was. acquitted on 29th November, 1950. Consequent on his acquittal, the second defendant was reinstated to the Madras Local Authorities Electrical Engineers’ Service with effect from 26th April, 1951 forenoon. The prosecution launched against the second defendant ended in a conviction by the Sessions Judge, Madurai. But, on appeal to this Court, he was. acquitted on 29th November, 1950. Consequent on his acquittal, the second defendant was reinstated to the Madras Local Authorities Electrical Engineers’ Service with effect from 26th April, 1951 forenoon. Thereafter, on 3rd October, 1951, the Government passed the order, the validity of which is the subject-matter of this appeal. The order (Exhibit A-2), in so far as it is material for this appeal, runs thus: "As the Engineer has been honourably acquitted of the charges, the period of his absence from 11th May, 1949 afternoon to 26th April, 1951 forenoon is treated as duty under Fundamental Rule 54. The Commissioner, Madurai Municipality, is therefore directed: (i) to pay the entire salary of the Engineer from 12th May, 1949 to 25th April, 1951 (both days inclusive), inclusive of increments after deducting the subsistence allowance already drawn by him; (ii) to refund to the Central Fund maintained by the Chief Electrical Inspector to Government the subsistence grant paid from it; and (iii) to debit the expenditure to the funds of the Electric Licence Scheme of the Muncipality. “The Engineer is eligible to subscribe to the Provident Fund for the period of suspension and the Provident Fund bonus due thereon should be paid by the Madurai Municipality.” Though the second defendant was thus reinstated, disciplinary proceedings were taken against him ; and, after enquiry, on the recommendation of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, the Government, by its order dated 13th April, 1954 directed that the second defendant be compulsorily retired from service. Long after the Government Order dated 3rd October, 1951 referred to above, the Government published, by notification in the Gazette, a new regulation, purporting to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 76-A (d) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920. Long after the Government Order dated 3rd October, 1951 referred to above, the Government published, by notification in the Gazette, a new regulation, purporting to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 76-A (d) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920. The regulation is as follows:- “When a municipal engineer, municipal electrical engineer or assistant electrical engineer or municipal health officer who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated and the period of absence is treated as leave or as duty, as the case may be, the pay and allowances and the contributions towards leave salary and pension or provident fund of the officer concerned shall be recovered either in whole or in part thereof from such of the municipal council or municipal councils concerned as the Government may determine.” It was further notified that this regulation shall be deemed to have come into force on 1st April, 1951. Before this regulation was made, the plaintiff-Municipality had paid the amounts directed by the Government Order dated 3rd October, 1951 under protest. On 16th April, 1955, the plaintiff-Municipality filed the suit for the recovery of the amount paid by them with interest thereon. Several grounds were taken in the plaint in support of the plaintiff’s case that the plaintiff-Municipality would not be liable to pay the amounts in question. The State of Madras denied the tenability of these grounds. The second defendant filed a separate written statement. It is not necessary to set out at length the various allegations in the plaint and the pleas contained in the two written statements, as the arguments in appeal before us were confined within a narrow range. The learned Subordinate Judge found on the material issues against the plaintiff-Municipality and dismissed the suit with costs. Hence, this appeal by the Municipality. Before we deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provision, namely, section 76-A, of the Madras District Municipalities Act, as amended by the Third Amendment Act, 1933. Hence, this appeal by the Municipality. Before we deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provision, namely, section 76-A, of the Madras District Municipalities Act, as amended by the Third Amendment Act, 1933. That section runs as follows:- “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act- (a) the State Government may, by notification, take power to appoint the health officer, (the municipal engineer, the municipal electrical engineer or the assistant municipal electrical engineer) in the case of any municipality or class of municipalities; (b) the State Government may recover from the municipal council concerned the whole or such proportion of the salary and allowances paid to any such health officer, (engineer, electrical engineer or assistant electrical engineer) and such contribution towards his leave allowances, pension and provident fund as the State Government may, by general or special order, determine; (c) the State Government may, at any time, withdraw any such health officer, (engineer, electrical engineer or assistant electrical engineer) and appoint another in his place; and (d) the State Government shall have power to regulate the methods of recruitment, conditions of service, pay and allowances and discipline and conduct of the health officers, (engineers, electrical engineers and assistant electrical engineers) appointed under clause (a)”. The main question which falls for decision in this appeal is: Did the Government have power and authority to pass the order dated 3rd October, 1951 (Exhibit A-2) directing the Municipality to pay the entire salary of the second defendant from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement and other amounts mentioned therein ? The learned Government Pleader, if we understood him aright, relied on the regulation (Exhibit B-1) made subsequently in 1953, as conferring such power. Though the regulation was actually notified in 1953, as we mentioned above, it was expressly given retrospective effect on and from 1st April, 1951. Mr. M. K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the appellant-Municipality, contended that there was no statutory authority which enabled the Government to pass the order dated 3rd October, 1951, and even if retrospective effect is given to the later regulation, that would not cure the earlier G.O. of its defects. He further contended that the regulation, which purported to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by section 76-A (d), could not fall within the scope of that provision. He further contended that the regulation, which purported to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by section 76-A (d), could not fall within the scope of that provision. He also contended that, in any event, the appellant-Municipality could not be deemed to be the Municipality “concerned” within the meaning of that expression occurring in the Regulation of 1953. The second defendant was a member of the special category of service called the Madras Local Authorities Electrical Engineers’ Service. The members of this Service are not per se Government servants, though it is open to the Government to appoint an officer in Government service to hold a post borne on the cadre of this special service. Regulations have been made by the State Government, presumably under the powers vested in them, under section 76-A (d) of the District Municipalities Act, providing for the methods of recruitment, conditions of service, pay and allowances, and discipline and conduct of the officers belonging to this service. The appointments are made by the Government. Postings and transfers are made by the Government, generally on the recommendation of the Chief Electrical Inspector. Under Regulation 21, the transit pay, and travelling allowance, when a member of the service is transferred from one Municipality to another Municipality shall be regulated by the Madras Travelling Allowance Rules. That regulation further provides that the transit pay and travelling allowance of the member shall be paid from the funds of the Municipality or Local Board to which he is posted, and, in cases of reversion to his permanent post, by the Municipality or Local Board, of which he is the permanent servant. Regulation 24 deals with leave and leave salary, and it runs thus:- “(1) The leave and leave salary of the members of the Service shall be regulated- (i) by the Fundamental Rules if, at the time of their appointment, being in Government, municipal or local board service, they were or shall be governed by the Fundamental Rules and had not elected or shall not have elected to be governed by the Madras Leave Rules, 1933; and (ii) in all other cases by the Madras Leave Rules, 1933. (2) The Government may grant leave to the members of the service under the Fundamental Rules or the Madras Leave Rules, 1933, as the case may be. (2) The Government may grant leave to the members of the service under the Fundamental Rules or the Madras Leave Rules, 1933, as the case may be. (3) (a) There shall be a Central Fund to provide for the payment of leave salary and contribution to Provident Fund during leave of the members of the Service. The Fund shall be administered by the Chief Electrical Inspector to Government. (b) Every municipal council or local board to whose service a member of the Service is posted shall pay to the Central Fund every month- (i) a contribution towards his leave salary at the rate of 12½% of his pay if he is governed by the Fundamental Rules or at 11% of his pay if he is governed by the Madras Leave Rules, 1933; and (ii) a contribution calculated at 3 1/3 per cent. of the contribution towards the leave salary in order to provide for the payment of contribution to this Provident Fund during leave.” Regulation 25 is concerned with disciplinary proceedings. Sub-clause (e) of that Regulation provides for a member of the service being placed under suspension from service pending enquiry into grave charges where such suspension is necessary in the public interest; and, during the period of suspension, he shall be paid subsistence grant and dearness allowance from the Central Fund. Regulation 26 runs thus: “Except to the extent expressly provided in these regulations, the Fundamental Rules issued from time to time under the authority of the Government shall apply to the members of the service.” When a member of the Madras Local Authorities Electrical Engineers’ Service is appointed by the State Government as the Municipal Electrical Engineer of a Municipality, under section 76-A (b) the State Government may recover from the municipal council concerned the whole or such proportion of the salary and allowances paid to such Electrical Engineer and such contribution towards his leave allowances, pension and provident fund as the State Government may, by general or special order, determine. It is this provision which is embodied in Regulation 15 of the regulations referred to above, which inter alia, says that the pay of a member of the service shall be met by the municipality or local board in which he is employed. It is this provision which is embodied in Regulation 15 of the regulations referred to above, which inter alia, says that the pay of a member of the service shall be met by the municipality or local board in which he is employed. The expression “municipal council concerned”, which occurs in clause (b) of section 76-A, is practically the same as the expression “the municipality in which he is employed”, which occurs in Regulation 15. The second defendant was admittedly employed in the plaintiff-Municipality as Electrical Engineer from 19th February, 1946 till 15th November, 1948. It follows, therefore, that from 15th November, 1948 the plaintiff-Municipality will not be the municipal council concerned, from which the salary and allowances payable to the second defendant can be recovered under section 76-A (b) of the Act. Once the second defendant left the service of the plaintiff-Municipality, it was no longer under any obligation to pay the salary of the second defendant under Regulation 15. The Government placed the second defendant under suspension from nth May, 1949. This was when the second defendant was the Electrical Engineer employed in the Tanjore Municipality. Earlier on in this judgment, we have mentioned the events subsequent to his suspension, namely the prosecution of the second defendant and his final acquittal by this Court on 29th November, 1959. During this period, he was not employed in any municipality ; indeed, he could not even be deemed to be a member of the service. Consequent on his acquittal, the second defendant was reinstated to the service with effect from 26th April, 1951. Fundamental Rule 54 at the material time was in the following terms: “54. (1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order- (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Where the authority mentioned in clause (1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated , or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be. (3) In other cases, the Government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may prescribe: Provided that the payment of allowances under clause (2) or clause (3) shall be subject to alt other conditions under which such allowances are admissible. (4) In a case falling under clause (2), the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In a case falling under clause (3), the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose.” There can be no doubt whatever that the second defendant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of this rule. It was further open to the Government to treat the period of his absence from 11th May, 1949 afternoon to 26th April, 1951 forenoon as on duty. The question then arises,-which is the question to be decided in this appeal as to who is liable to pay the second defendant his salary for the aforesaid period. Admittedly, there was nothing in the regulations relating to the concerned service which provided for this contingency. Obviously, section 76-A (b) of the District Municipalities Act would not cover the case, because that clause must be read with clause (a). When the State Government appoints a Municipal Electrical Engineer for a municipality, that municipality will be liable to pay the salary and allowances payable to such officer. Actually, during the period from nth May, 1949 to 26th April, 1951, the second defendant was not in service anywhere. Under rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, it is open to the Government to subsequently treat this period as a period when the second defendant was on duty. Actually, during the period from nth May, 1949 to 26th April, 1951, the second defendant was not in service anywhere. Under rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, it is open to the Government to subsequently treat this period as a period when the second defendant was on duty. But then there is no indication anywhere as to the municipality in which he is supposed to be on duty during that period When he was suspended, the second defendant was the Municipal Electrical Engineer of the Tanjore Municipality. He was not in the service of the plaintiff-Municipality If retrospectively the second defendant should be deemed to be in service during the period, logically, he must be deemed to be in the service only of the Tanjore Municipality, though actually that Municipality did not have the benefit of his service. The learned Government Pleader had to concede this position. He therefore rested his whole case on the new regulation made in April, 1953 (Exhibit B-1), which we have quoted above. Though the regulation was made in 1953, it was expressly declared that it shall be deemed to have come into force on 1st April, 1951. Though Mr. Nambiar, during the course of the arguments, raised a contention that, if the original order of the Government in 1951 directing the plaintiff-Municipality to pay the salary of the second defendant is void on the date when it was passed, the subsequent regulation could not give it validity by reason of its retrospective operation, he did not press it,-and we think, rightly. It was certainly open to the Government to give retrospective effect to the regulation made in 1953. Mr. Nambiar’s contentions regarding this regulation were (1) that the Government had no power to make such a regulation under section 76-A (d) of the District Municipalities Act, and (2) that in any event, the plaintiff-Municipality will not be the municipality concerned within the meaning of the regulation. We are not inclined to agree with the first contention of Mr. Nambiar. In our opinion, section 76-A (d) is wide enough to cover the regulation providing for the payment of salary in a contingency such as has happened in this case. We have already noticed how the regulations contained a provision for transit pay and allowances. We are not inclined to agree with the first contention of Mr. Nambiar. In our opinion, section 76-A (d) is wide enough to cover the regulation providing for the payment of salary in a contingency such as has happened in this case. We have already noticed how the regulations contained a provision for transit pay and allowances. If the Government has the power to regulate the pay and allowances of a Municipal Electrical Engineer, such power should include the power to provide for payment when an officer is suspended for a time and thereafter reinstated and the period of suspension is treated as if the officer was on duty during that period. But we think there is substance in Mr. Nambiar’s second contention. The Regulation of 1953 (Exhibit B-1), no doubt, provides for the recovery of the pay and allowances and contribution towards leave salary and pension or provident fund of an officer who has been dismissed, removed or suspended and is subsequently reinstated and the period of absence is treated as leave or as on duty, as the case may be. All that the regulation says is that it “shall be recovered either in whole or in part from such of the municipal council or municipal councils concerned as the Government may determine.” The learned Government Pleader strongly relied on this provision. His contention was that it was entirely for the Government to determine which municipal council should bear the burden. To a certain extent, this is correct. But the municipal council or councils should be “concerned.” It would not be open to the Government, for instance, in this case, to direct that the pay and allowances of the second defendant should be recovered from the Chingleput Municipality. In fact, he was not serving any municipality during the period he was under suspension. It is only notionally that he is treated as if he was on duty. Logically, as we once before pointed out, if an officer is suspended when he was in a service under a particular municipality and he is reinstated, notionally he may be deemed to have been in service in that Municipality which he was serving on the date of suspension. In the present case, the plaintiff-Municipality was not the Municipality which the second defendant was serving when he was suspended. In the present case, the plaintiff-Municipality was not the Municipality which the second defendant was serving when he was suspended. The learned Government Pleader urged that it was at the instance of the plaintiff-Municipality that the second defendant was prosecuted criminally and that therefore it should be regarded as the concerned Municipality. It is true that the second defendant was charged with offences alleged to have been committed by him when he was an officer of the plaintiff-Municipality. But it would not be correct to say that the prosecution was at the instance of the plaintiff-Municipality. All that the plaintiff did was to bring to the notice of the Government the complaints against the second defendant. The Chief Electrical Inspector to the Government examined the allegations and sent up a report. That report and all relevant records were forwarded to the Superintendent, X-Branch, C.I.D., Madras, for further investigation. The Superintendent, X-Branch, recommended a prosecution and sought the sanction of the Government for such prosecution. It was the Government which sanctioned the prosecution and conducted it. In our opinion, the fact that the prosecution was in respect of acts done by the second defendant while he was serving the plaintiff-Municipality would not make it the Municipality concerned within the meaning of the Regulation. That sthe plaintiff-Municipality acted in public interests in bringing to the notice of the Government the misdeeds of the second defendant is manifest from subsequent events. The Government, after the acquittal of the second defendant by the High Court, commenced disciplinary proceedings against him, and, eventually, passed an order, compelling him to retire. We therefore hold that the order of the Government, Exhibit A-2, dated 3rd October, 1951, was not valid not only on the date on which it was passed, but even after the making of the Regulation of 1953 with retrospective effect. The suit as framed was for the recovery of the amount which the plaintiff-Municipality was compelled to pay, from both the defendants or either of them. So far as the second defendant is concerned, he was entitled to be paid under rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, and it is not equitable that he should be directed to pay back the amount received by him. So far as the second defendant is concerned, he was entitled to be paid under rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, and it is not equitable that he should be directed to pay back the amount received by him. As the Municipality was compelled to make the payment by the Government and the loss was sustained by the Municipality on account of the invalid action of the Government, the plaintiff will be entitled to a decree against the State of Madras, the first defendant, for the recovery of the amounts paid by them under protest ; but the plaintiff-Municipality w ill not be entitled to any interest on the amounts except from the date of the decree. The appeal is allowed to this extent, and there will be a decree in favour of the appellant in accordance with this judgment. The appeal will stand dismissed as against the second respondent. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Time for payment: Three months. In a matter like this, we cannot refrain from observing that the best provision for a contingency like that which has happened in this case would be a regulation providing for the payment of the salary, etc., of the reinstated officer from the Central Fund. There is already a provision for the payment of leave salary from the Central Fund and also for the payment of subsistence grant and dearness allowance during the period of suspension from the same Fund. We think that it is just and equitable that the payment of salary, etc., under rule 54 should also be paid from the same fund. This is only a suggestion which we are making for examination by the Government. V.S. ------------- Appeal allowed in part.