ORDER SHIVDAYAL, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Umrao Beg and Afzal Beg (Respondents 2 and 3) were Maurusi Kashtkaras. They became Pucca tenants on the abolition of Zamindari. The Petitioner was their sub-tenant. 2. On October 13, 1953, by a registered sale-deed Respondents 2 and 3 sold seven Khasara numbers for Rs.700 to the Petitioner. The price of the land was paid before the Registrar. 3. Since the vendors had not obtained a previous permission of the Collector as require red by Section 70(1) of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act, the Petitioner applied to the Collector under Section 70(2) of that Act for validating the sale. Permission was refused on the ground that atleast 15 acres of non-irrigated land was not still left in the possession of the vendors for the maintenance of himself and his family as required under Sub-section (3) of that section. 4. The Petitioner went in appeal before the Commissioner, but his appeal was dismissed. He filed a revision petition to the Board of Revenue but to no avail. 5. It is first contended by Shri Patankar that Sub-section (6) of Section 70 of the Tenancy Act applies to this case as the Petitioner was a sub tenant. And in Sub-section (6) there is no reference to Sub-section (3) although the other foregoing Sub-sections are applied even to the case of a sub-tenant. That being so, the Petitioner's application, under Section 70(2) could not be disallowed because of Sub-section (3). In my opinion this contention is devoid of substance. Sub-section (6) merely gives a prior claim to purchase the land on a voluntary sale of a holding to (a) a co-tenant; (b) a sub-tenant; and (c) a registered co-operative farming society. That Sub-section does not confer any other right. The prior claim to purchase is made subject to the provisions contained in Sub-sections (1), (2), (4) and (5). Now, Sub-section (1) requires an intending vendor to obtain the sanction of the Collector before he transfers his rights in the whole or part of the holding; Sub-section (2) empowers the Collector to validate a sale on payment of the prescribed penalty if the transfer by sale has already been effected without his previous sanction. Now, Sub-section (1) requires an intending vendor to obtain the sanction of the Collector before he transfers his rights in the whole or part of the holding; Sub-section (2) empowers the Collector to validate a sale on payment of the prescribed penalty if the transfer by sale has already been effected without his previous sanction. The power of the Collector to be exercised under either of the two Sub-sections is regulated by Sub-section (3), which directs the Collector to grant such permission or to validate such sale only when one of the two conditions enumerated therein as (a) or (b) is fulfilled. If both those condition remains unsatisfied, the Collector has no power to grant such permission or to validate such sale. From this it necessarily follows that as soon as Sub-section (1) or (2) is made applicable to a case under Sub-section (6), the third Sub-section ipso facto comes into play. That is why it was unnecessary to mention Sub-section (3) among those named in Sub-section (6). Therefore, as the vendors were left with only 10 acres of non-irrigated land and it is nobody's case that this was all their holding in the Pargana, the Petitioner's application under Sub-section (2) was bound to be dismissed. 6. It is then urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the conditions imposed in Section 70 are ultra vires as they offend against the fundamental rights to property under Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the decision in Atma Ram and Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1959 SC 519 ). The argument is that such a provision abridges the fundamental right under Article 19 and in that case the enactment was saved under Article 31-A, but here the assent of the President under the last mentioned Article was not obtained. This contention too must be rejected. No fundamental right of an intending vendee is infringed by the impugned Section 70. As regards the fundamental right of the vender to dispose of his property, in my opinion the restrictions imposed in that section were reasonable in the interests of the general public. Fragmentation of holdings beyond ascertain limit may be prevented on ground of public policy. Moreover, the impugned section aimed at reserving at least five acres of irrigated or 15 acres of non-irrigated land for the maintenance of the vender tenant and his family. Fragmentation of holdings beyond ascertain limit may be prevented on ground of public policy. Moreover, the impugned section aimed at reserving at least five acres of irrigated or 15 acres of non-irrigated land for the maintenance of the vender tenant and his family. However, if the tenant wanted to sell the entire holding in the Pargana he was enabled to do so without any restriction so as not to be tied down to that Pargana. In my opinion, all these constituted a reasonable restraint within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The applicability of Article 31 is out of the question as there was no compulsory acquisition or requisition within the meaning of that Article. It is then urged on behalf of the Petitioner that an agreement of sale is itself "property" and the decision in the second Sholapur case AIR 1954 SC 119 ) is relied upon. I am unable to see how that point is of any relevance here. 7. Lastly, the validity of Section 70 is assailed on the ground that there is no assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution while it abridges the right of the citizen, viz., to sell one's property as one pleases, under the Transfer of Property Act which is a Union law The argument appears to be misconceived. Article 254(1) deals with repugnancy between Union and State laws. The question of repugnancy can arise only in connection with a subject of the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule. Although the words 'competent to enact' in Clause (1) are rather wide and may be read so as to include laws made under List 1 as well, the scope of that clause is circumscribed by the words "subject to the provisions of Clause (2)", which contemplate only a State law pertaining to the Concurrent List. It follows from this that Clause (1) speaks of repugnancy between a Union Law and State law relating to a matter falling within the Concurrent List, but it does not include a subject on which a State legislature is competent to legislate under List II. Therefore, Clause (1) does not apply if the Stale law, in its pith and substance, relates to a matter contained in List II. Therefore, Clause (1) does not apply if the Stale law, in its pith and substance, relates to a matter contained in List II. In Megraj v. Allah Rakhya, 74 IA 12, the Privy Council considered the validity of the Punjab Restitution of Mortgage Lands Act which enabled a mortgagor to redeem a usufructuary mortgage of lands without payment of the mortgage debt. That law was challenged as repugnant to the Contract Act. It was held, negativing the contention, that the Act in its pith and substance fell entirely within Entry 21 of Second List-"land"-and there was no need for the Provincial Legislature to rely on any powers conferred on it by the Concurrent List. Their Lordships said that Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 had no application in a case where the Province could show that it was acting wholly within its powers under the Provincial List and that in such a case there was no room for the exercise by the Governer General of his reserved power under Section 104. See also Maharaj Bikaram Kishore v. Tafazzal Hossain, AIR 1942 Cal 557, where it is emphasised that the two Sub-sections of Section 107 must be read together. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 107 of the Government of India Act were substantially the same as Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. Since the Impugned legislation falls within the purview of Entry 18 in List II of the Schedule Seventh, which entry includes "transfer and alienation of agricultural land", Art 254 is not attracted. 8. It is true that the vendors, after having received the entire price and after having executed the sale-deed and getting it registered, resiled from their obligations. But the Petitioner also should have seen that the mandatory requirements of the law had been complied with before he parted with this money. He has to thank himself and to seek such other remedy as may be appropriate. 9. This petition is dismissed. No order for costs. Petition dismissed