JUDGMENT P.R. Sharma, J. 1. This Second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs whose suit for redemption of a mortgage has been dismissed. 2. The facts necessary for the purpose of the present appeal are that a mortgage was executed by the ancestors of the plaintiffs in favour of the ancestors of respondents Nos. 1 to 6. The suit for redemption was filed some-time in 1956. One of the contentions raised by the defendants was that under Art. 63 of the Gwalior State Limitation Act the period of limitation for filing a suit for redemption or for recovery of possession of mortgaged property was 30 years. This period of limitation expired in the year 1937 and in view of the provisions of S. 26 of the Gwalior State Limitation Act which corresponds to S. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act the right of the mortgagor to the mortgaged property had itself became extinguished. This contention has been upheld by the Courts below. 3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the present appeal that limitation is a procedural law and must, therefore, be given retrospective effect According to him the period of limitation for filing of a suit for appeal or application must be determined by reference to the law which is in force on the date of the filing of the suit appeal or appeals. It is no doubt true that a statute of limitation being a law of procedure is as a rule retrospective in its operation and governs all proceedings from the moment of its enactment.;-See AIR 1939 Bom 394: Radhi Kathari vs. Namedas Dhaku; AIR 1945 Pat. 388 Balashwar Prasad vs. Latafat Karim AIR 1949 Ori 64, Pitambar vs. Lakshmidhar AIR 1943 Mad. 370 Ananthanarayan vs. Sivramakrishna):.There is however, no provisions in the Indian Limitation Act which can have the effect of reviving or making effect to a right which has already become barred. See Sachindra Natha Ray vs. Maharaj Bahdursingh (ILR 49 Cal. 203; and M. Krishnaswami vs. Thiruvengada; AIR 1935 Mad. 245 ......), It would thus follow that on the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 63 of the Gwalior State Limitation Act right to redeem the mortgaged property or to recover its possession had already become barred in the year 1937. 203; and M. Krishnaswami vs. Thiruvengada; AIR 1935 Mad. 245 ......), It would thus follow that on the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 63 of the Gwalior State Limitation Act right to redeem the mortgaged property or to recover its possession had already become barred in the year 1937. Such a right could not in my opinion be revived on the coming into force of the Indian Limitation Act in the year 1949. 4. In the case of Induraj vs. Shivlal A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 339) a suit was filed in the year 1916 to redeem and recover possesson of property said to have been mortgaged by a mortgage-deed dated June 8, 1761. The plaintiffs relied upon an acknowledgement said to have been made by the descendants of the mortgagee in 1858. It was held that the acknowledgement having been made after sixty years after the date of the mortgage the remedy had become barred by virtue of S. 29 of the Act of 1971. It was further held following the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Fatimatulnissa Begum vs Sundar Das I. L. R 27 Cal. 1004) that at the expiration of the period granted to any person for institution of a suit for possession of any property the right to such property should be deemed to have been extinguished. 5. I am for the reasons stated above of the opinion that the mortgagors right to property itself had been extinguished by virtue of S. 26 of the Gwalior State Limitation Act in the year 1937. That being so the right could not be revived on the coming into force of the Indian Limitation Act in the year 1949. 6. This appeal, therefore, has no force and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances I shall make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed