Chhangani, J.—This is an appeal by Amarsingh under Sec. 96 read with Sec. 47 C.P.C. against the order of the District Judge, Jaipur City, dismissing his objection in an execution sase. 2. The relevant facts are briefly as follows :— Seth Anantram Vijalal, the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondent obtained a decree for Rs. 19,080/7/3 against Thakur Kishan Singh of Patoda from the Dewani Adalat of the former Jaipur State on 5th November, 1948. After the death of the original judgement-debtor Kishan Singh one Jagatsingh, Jagirdar of Patoda was substituted as the legal representative of the original judgment-debtor on 10th of August, 1927. As the judgement-debtor was a Jagirdar, proceedings for satisfaction of the decree had to be taken in the Bachat department of the former Jaipur State. After the promulgation of the Code of Civil Procedure in the integrated State of Rajasthan, the proceeding in the Bachat department came to an end on 25th of January, 1950. Gulabchand respondent, the successor of the decree-holder, thereafter on 26th of may, 1951 took out execution proceedings against the appellant Amar Singh treating him as the legal representative of the judgmet-debtor. A notice under Order 41 r. 22 C. P. C. was served upon the appellant requiring him to show cause why the execution of the decree should not be directed against him. Amarsingh appeard in the execution court through one Sri Niranjan Dutt, Advocate and filed objections on 17th February, 1954. The only objection raised on his behalf was that the application for execution was time-barred. The objection of the appellant was, however], dismissed in default on 10th of July, 1954 and subsequently, on 12th of September, 1954, the execution application itself was dismissed on account of default on the part of the decree-holder to deposit postal expenses. 3. A second execution petition was filed by the decree-holder on 4th of April, 1955. In this execution case, the appellant raised an objection that as he was not the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor, the execution should not he directed against him. The objection was opposed by the decree-holder, amongst others, on the ground that the appellant was debarred from raising this objection on the principle of constructive res judicata;. The execution court dismissed the objections holding that the appellant was so debarred from raising the objection. Hence this appeal by Amar Singh. 4. The objection was opposed by the decree-holder, amongst others, on the ground that the appellant was debarred from raising this objection on the principle of constructive res judicata;. The execution court dismissed the objections holding that the appellant was so debarred from raising the objection. Hence this appeal by Amar Singh. 4. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata as embodied in sec. 11 C.P.C. arid the subsidiary principle of constructive res judicata are applicable to execution proceedings; vide Mohanlal Goenka vs. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee (1), and this is not disputed by the learned advocate of the appellant. His contention, however, is that in the earlier execution case, the specific objection that he was not the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor was not taken and adjudicated upon and as the execution petition was eventually dismissed without fructifying, the principle of constructive res judicata could not be applied to his case and he was not debarred from raising the objection in the second execution case. 5. On the question raised on behalf of the appellant, the trend of judicial decisions is not harmonious and there is a sharp conflict of opinion. The leading case in support of the contention of the appellant is Gendalal vs. Hazarilal (2). In that case. Chief Justice Sulaiman, after referring to the application of the principle of res judicata to findings in favour of the defendants in suits which were eventually dismissed and basing his conclusions on that analogy and referring to the language of sub-rules (1) and (2) of O. 21 r. 23 C.P.C., laid down the following propositions : — (1) Where there has been an express adjudication by the Court in the presence of parties then the question must be considered to have been finally decided, no matter whether it is raised again at a subsequent stage of the same proceeding, or in a subsequent execution proceeding. (2) Where an objection is taken but is dismissed or struck off, even though not on the merits, and the application for execution becomes fructuous, the judgment-debtor is debarred from raising the question of the invalidity of that application. (2) Where an objection is taken but is dismissed or struck off, even though not on the merits, and the application for execution becomes fructuous, the judgment-debtor is debarred from raising the question of the invalidity of that application. (3) Where an objection to execution is taken, but it is not dismissed on the merits or is dismissed for default and the application for execution does not become fructuous, the judgment-debtor is not debarred from subsequently raising the question that that application was not within limitation. (4) Where no objection to the execution is taken but the application becomes partly or wholly fructuous and such fructification necessarily involves the assumption that the application was made within limitation, then after such fructification the judgment-debtor is debarred by the principle of res judicata from raising the question that that application was not within limitation. (5) Where no objection is taken but the application for execution does not fructify, the judgment-debtor is not debarred by the principle of res judicata from raising the question of limitation later." 6. The propositions relevant for the present case are No. (3) and (5). 7. This Full Bench case came up for consideration in Desayi Venkatranga Reddi vs. Paraku Chinna Sithamma (3). In the "leading judgment, Patanjali Sastri J., as he was then, examined in a little detail the reasoning of the Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court and expressed his inability to concur with the conclusions of the Full Bench. Referring to the language of O.21 r.23 sub-rules (1) and (2) C. P. C. it was pointed out that "sub-rule (1) covers not only cases where the judgment-debtor does not offer any objection to execution, but also those where he appears and objects but fails to satisfy the court that the decree should not be executed. In all such cases, the Court is required to "order" the decree to be executed. That is to say, even in cases where the judgment-debtor appears and "offers any objection to the execution of the decree" and the Court "considers such objection," it has to act under sub-rule(l) if it is not satisfied that the objection is valid. Where such objection is found to be tenable, the court has to make, under sub-aule(2) "such order as it thinks fit" that is to say, according to the nature and scope of the objection upheld. Where such objection is found to be tenable, the court has to make, under sub-aule(2) "such order as it thinks fit" that is to say, according to the nature and scope of the objection upheld. There is thus no justification for the view that an order under sub-rule (]) "has to be automatic" and that an order under sub-rule (2) alone amounts to an adjudication such as would fall within the definition of a decree, and we are unable to see any such distinction as the learned Judge supposed to exist between these sub-rules." The learned Judge also found it difficult to see how fructification of a petition can have any bearing on the question of the binding character of an order passed upon it under sub-rule (1) of r. 23 C. P. C The analogy of a finding in favour of a defendant not operating as res judicata when the suit is dismissed, was thought mis-leading by the learned Judge. In this connection, it was observed that, "a mere adverse finding in a suit cannot be appealed against and got reversed as the decree, in spite of such finding, is in favour of the defendant,whereas an "order" directing execution to proceed can be appealed from irrespective of the application eventually proving fruitful or infructuous. Again, even an express adjudication on the objections raised by the judgment-debtor must, on the analogy, be held not to be res judicata if the application on which execution was ordered to proceed is ultimately dismissed, but this has never been suggested to be the case." It was also pointed out by the learned Judge that the point is practically concluded by a Privy Council decision in Mungul Per shad Dichit vs. Girija Kant Lahiri (4). 8. The Madras High Court, consequently, disagreeing with the Allahabad High Court held that an order for execution made after notice to. the judgment-debtor who does not appear and offer any objection precludes him from raising a plea of limitation or any other plea in bar in subsequent proceedings even though the application on which the order was passed does not fructify or is eventually struck off or dismissed. I follows as a natural corollary from the above decision that other similar pleas in bar cannot be allowed to be raised when they were not raised in an earlier execution case. 9. I follows as a natural corollary from the above decision that other similar pleas in bar cannot be allowed to be raised when they were not raised in an earlier execution case. 9. This view has been consistently followed by the Madras High Court, vide Adhilakshimi Ammal vs. Srinivasa Goundan (5) and S.T.M. Vyravan Chettair vs. R.M. Rayalu Ayyar Nagaswami Ayyar & Co.(6). 10. A single judge of the Madras High Court in Gummadi Appayya vs. Gavini Venkataratnam (7) has expressed some doubts about the correctness of the view taken in the earlier leading case(3) With great respect, I prefer to follow the Division Bench decision in preference to that of the Single Bench. 11. As for choosing between the Allahabad and the Madras decisions, after a careful consideration of the reasoning of both the cases, I have no hesitation in preferring and accepting the Madras view. I cannot appreciate, on a consideration of general principles of constructive res judicata, why a judgment-debtor who ignores the notice of a court requiring him to show cause why execution should not issue against him and omits to raise any objection should be permitted to ignore an adjudication directing execution at a later stagey. The effect of the order is that all pleas in bar, if any, go by the board. There is absolutely no justice or equity in his favour and it will be wholly undesirable to set a premium on default and contumacy. The consideration that a notice under O.21, r. 22 is not accompanied by a copy of the application for execution as also those relevant in connection with suits should not have much weight in execution cases which are concerned merely with the enforcement of decisions binding on parties. There is no reason why default on the part of the judgment-debtor in this connection should be seriously viewed. 12. The Allahabad Full Bench decision was also not followed in Sadashiv Busappa vs. Raja Kishtappa Naik{8). It was observed in that case that, "there are strong reasons against making fructification the criterion for judgment-debtor not being allowed to raise his objections......... If it be once conceded, that objection so raised and decided against, would operate as res judicata, then there are no reasons as to why order passed on failure of such appearance should not have similar effect. If it be once conceded, that objection so raised and decided against, would operate as res judicata, then there are no reasons as to why order passed on failure of such appearance should not have similar effect. Assigning different effects to orders passed under one sub-rule is hardly logical." 13. The Calcutta High Court in Aswini Kumar Das Gupta vs. Karamat Alt Khan(9) has also taken a similar view, 14. A similar view has also been consistently expressed by my lord the Chief Justice as a judge of the Patna High Court in several cases. It will be interesting in this connection to refer to Sham Sunder Singh vs. Dhirendra Nath Chandra(lO) In the leading judgment, his lordship, after an examination of a number of cases, quoted with approval the following observations of Wort J. in Mahadeo Prasad vs. Bhagwat Narain Singh (11) — "If objections to execution proceedings could be taken piecemeal one after the other, there will be no end to execution proceedings... when a plea in bar is not taken, or is overruled, the judgment-debtor is not at a later stage entitled to challenge the validity of the proceedings on that ground." 15. The learned Judge also referred to the Privy Council case, in Sadasiva Pillai vs. Ramalinga Piilai (12), wherein the Judicial Committee has in emphatic terms condemned the attitude of parties in lying by and raising a plea in bar not until at a very late stage of proceedings. 16. In another case, Harnath Rai Brijraj vs. Hirdai Narain Kumar (13), his lordship observed as follow:— "It is well-settled that the rule of res judicata applies to execution proceedings and even if a point, which ought to have been raised it not raised at the appropriate stage then it would be deemed to have been decided against the person who was entitled to raise it in the course of the execution proceedings." 17. With great respect, I entirely agree with the legal exposition in these two judgments of his lordship based as they ate on a balanced and realistic approach. 18. So far as this Court is concerned, the learned counsel for appellant relied upon a single bench decision in Surjan Singh vs. Gindorilal (14). It has followed the Allahabad view, but for reasons given above, I have preferred the Madras view to the Allahabad view. 18. So far as this Court is concerned, the learned counsel for appellant relied upon a single bench decision in Surjan Singh vs. Gindorilal (14). It has followed the Allahabad view, but for reasons given above, I have preferred the Madras view to the Allahabad view. Reference was also made to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Th. Vijai Singh vs. Smt. Govindi (15). That however, mainly relates to the interpretation of sec. 214 of the Indian Succession Act and has not much relevance to the controversy raised in this appeal. 19. In the light of the above discussion of the case-law, I have no alternative but to hold that the District Judge was correct in applying the principle of res judicata to the case and over-ruling the objections of the appellant. 20. In the end, it was pointed out that the Government of Jaipur, vide Councils Resolution No. 23 dated 13th May, 1940, had sanctioned as successor, one Sarjit Singh to the deceased Jagat Singh, who was in fact the legal representative of the original judgment debtor and that at some earlier stage, the decree-holder himself had applied for substituting Th. Sarjit Singh as the legal representative of the deceased Jagat Singh. On this basis, it was argued that the absence of the specific objection by the appellant in the earlier execution case was only under a mistaken advice and that I should accept the admi-sion of the decree-holder himself and should interfere in view of the peculiar facts of the case. I may observe at this stage that the execution of the decree against the appellant is taken out only in his capacity as the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor and that he will be liable only to the extent of the property which he inherited and received from the judgment debtor. The liability against him will not extend to his person or his personal properties or the properties which he had received from other persons, except in a case of his failure to account for the property which he had received from the judgment-debtor. It will be open to him to raise appropriate objections on this score before the execution court in case his personal property is proceeded against in the course of the execution and it will be the duty of the execution court to decide such objections, if any, on merits. It will be open to him to raise appropriate objections on this score before the execution court in case his personal property is proceeded against in the course of the execution and it will be the duty of the execution court to decide such objections, if any, on merits. In this view of the matter, the appellants grievance is not so real and substantial as it was alleged to be. Of course, he will be a party to the execution case and will have to raise and substantiate his objections, but that is his own creation due to omission on his part to raise the objection in the first execution case. 21. In these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this appeal, which has to be and is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.