ORDER The facts of the case are not in dispute. They are that the applicant Raigarh Jute Mills wanted to extend a part of its building and obtained the approval of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the extension on 22-1-1949. Subsequently the plans and specifications of the extention were approved by the Chief Inspector of Factories and the applicant started construction. On 9-2-51 the President of the Municipal Committee served a notice on the applicant for having started construction without obtaining the approval of the Municipal Committee (non-applicant). Some correspondence ensued between the President, Municipal Committee (non-applicant) and the applicant. On 4-4-51 the President enquired of the applicant whether he was willing to compound the case, since he had started construction without the previous sanction of the Committee. In this communication no amount was indicated as the composition fee. The applicant agreed to compound the offence and on 26-6-51, the President asked the applicant to pay a composition fee of Rs. 5,000 by 15-7-51 failing which he stated that the Committee reserved the right to itself ordering the demolition of the building. An appeal was filed to the Municipal Committee under section 172A of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the Act) against the order of the President asking the applicant to pay a composition fee of Rs. 5,000. This appeal was rejected by the Committee and the President's order was confirmed. The applicant then filed an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner under section 173 in which he advanced two grounds for challenging the appellate order of the Municipal Committee. The first ground was that the amount of composition fee could not exceed Rs. 50 which is the limit fixed by the rules framed by Government under section 219(5) for compounding offences and the second ground was that, even if the first ground is negatived, the composition fee of Rs. 5,000 was excessive and unreasonable and should, therefore, be reduced. The learned Deputy Commissioner held that section 219(5) did not apply to the case and further that the proviso to section 103, under which the composition sum of Rs. 5,000 was fixed by the President, conferred an unfettered discretion on the President and, therefore, could not be modified in the appeal. The present revision which has been filed under section 58 of the Act is against this appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner. 5,000 was fixed by the President, conferred an unfettered discretion on the President and, therefore, could not be modified in the appeal. The present revision which has been filed under section 58 of the Act is against this appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner. In the revision petition as modified by the additional grounds filed subsequent to the original petition, apart from the two grounds urged before the Deputy Commissioner, a further ground was taken that the appellate order of the Municipal Committee imposing a composition sum of Rs. 5,000 violates Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India because it amounts to the imposition of unreasonable restrictions on the applicant's right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. When arguing the case before us, however, the learned counsel for the applicant gave up this ground. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to deal with it. The entire argument on behalf of the applicant was, therefore, directed towards establishing the two contentions advanced before the Deputy Commissioner. The first of these was that the power of the President under the proviso to section 103 to accept a sum by way of composition is limited by section 219 and since under the rules framed under this section the maximum amount which can be accepted as composition fee for an offence is Rs. 50. The President's order confirmed by the Committee fixing the sum of composition at Rs. 5,000 is not maintainable. We are unable to agree with this contention. Sub-section (1) of section 219 refers to the composition of offences by the Committee or with its authorisation, by its President, Vice-President or other officers of the Committee. The limit of Rs. 50 fixed by the rules framed under sub-section (5) of this section refers to the amount which a person empowered under section 219(1) can accept by way of composition. It is only if the action of the President in the present case can be said to be an action taken by him by virtue of the authorisation given in his favour by the Committee under section 210(1) that the limit fixed by the rule for the sum of composition will be applicable. The proviso to section 103, however, authorises the President himself to accept such sum by way of composition as he may deem reasonable. The proviso to section 103, however, authorises the President himself to accept such sum by way of composition as he may deem reasonable. It is clear, therefore, that the power conferred on the President by this proviso is not a power derived by him from the committee by any authorisation given by it but a power conferred on him by the Act itself. It follows, therefore, that the limit for the amount of composition fixed by the rules framed under section 219 cannot apply to a sum accepted by way of composition by the President in the exercise of his powers under the proviso to section 103. The second ground on which the President's order, which was confirmed by the Municipal Committee in appeal, was attacked was that the proviso to section 103 prescribes that the sum which may be fixed for compounding the offence shall be such as is considered by the President to be reasonable and fixing a sum of Rs. 5,000 for the unauthorised construction which was only a technical breach of the provisions of the Act, is excessive and, therefore, unreasonable. The learned Deputy Commissioner did not accept this ground because in his opinion the reasonableness of the sum was to be decided by the President himself and it was not open to the Deputy Commissioner to question the President's discretion. We are unable to agree with this view of the learned Deputy Commissioner. When any Act lays down that something done by a person acting under the Act should be reasonable, the question whether what was actually done was reasonable or not can certainly be considered in appeal. It follows from this that the discretion vested by the proviso to section 10 is not an unfettered discretion but one which should satisfy the condition of reasonableness. What is reasonable will have to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. Because of his erroneous interpretation of the law the learned Deputy Commissioner did not apply his mind to the question whether Rs. 5,000 was a reasonable composition fee in the circumstances of this case and if it was not, what would be the reasonable sum. We think that this case should be remanded to him for examining and deciding this aspect of the case after hearing the parties. The case is, therefore, remanded to the Deputy Commissioner (Collector), district Raigarh. 5,000 was a reasonable composition fee in the circumstances of this case and if it was not, what would be the reasonable sum. We think that this case should be remanded to him for examining and deciding this aspect of the case after hearing the parties. The case is, therefore, remanded to the Deputy Commissioner (Collector), district Raigarh. The revision is allowed accordingly. Petition allowed