JUDGMENT Shivdayal, J. 1. The Appellants were convicted by the Additional District Magistrate Gwalior of the offence under Section 124-A of the Penal Code, Gangadhar was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or instead to suffer simple imprisonment for 3 months and the other two Appellants to a pay a fine of Rs. 100 each or to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. They were also tried under Section 505 I. P. C. but were acquitted. The state has not preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal. 2. When this came before me sitting singly, Shri Inamdar challenged the vires of Section 124 A. The question was referred to a larger Bench which has now held that the provision of Section 124-A are protected by Article 19 (5) of the Constitution. 3. The case for the prosect on was that on November 15, 1953, the Appellants conducted a rally of about 75 persons, took out a procession on bicycles and shouted the following slogans: (1) Godse Apte Zindabad. (2) Bhagwan Godse ki Jai. (3) Desh ke Neta Savarkar ki Jai. (4) Dr. Parchure ki Jai. (5) Ambala se Ai Awaz vir Godse zindabad (6) Hindu Sabha ki jai. The procession was taken out through all the important streets in the City of Lashkar from 8:30 A. M. to 10-50 A. M. It was also stated that in the evening from 6 30 to 1 in the night they offered respects to a photograph of Godse. All these caused a commotion in the City because Godse and Apte had been convicted and sentenced to death for the assasination of Mahatma Gandhi, and these acts aroused a grave apprehension of disturbance of public peace and tranquillity. Not only that people strongly condemned their acts, but some meetings were held in protest of the act of the accused. 3. The learned. Magistrate found these facts fully proved by the evidence of Atma Ram P. W. 1, Jainath Pandey P. W. 2, Sheo Prasad P. W. 3, Banshidhar P. W. 4, Gangaram P. W. 5, Vishnudutt P. W. 6, Sumer Singh P. W. 7, Jahmanlal P. W. 9, Ram Niwas P. W. 11, Premchand P. W. 12. There is no doubt that the evidence is overwhelming to prove the prosecution case, and on behalf of the Appellants the findings of fact have not been challenged before me. There is no doubt that the evidence is overwhelming to prove the prosecution case, and on behalf of the Appellants the findings of fact have not been challenged before me. The question for determination is what offence is constituted by these acts of the Appellants. The learned trial Magistrate found that slogans 3, 4 and 6 did not constitute any offence but as for the other three slogans he convict d the Appellants of the offence of sedition as defined in S. 124-A of the Penal Code. 4. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 124 A, it must be proved: (1) That the accused spoke the words in question. (2) That he thereby brought or attempted to being into hatred or contempt or excite or attempted to excite disaffection. (3) That such disaffection was towards the Government established by law in India. It seems to me obvious that the third ingredient was absent in this case. Mahatma Gandhiji has been accepted as the Father of our Nation and as one of the greatest man of the world of his time. But to shout slogans of glory for a murderer even of such a great personality cannot be said to be causing disaffection towards the "Government". Mahatma Gandhiji was not the Government within the acceptation against the Government established by law. 5. It is argued by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that since the Government was instrumental to the prosecution of Godse and Apte, the slogans excited hatred, contempt and disaffection towards the Government, when Godse was styled by the processionists as ' Bhagwan". In my opinion, the argument is far fetched. The Government is everyday prosecuting murderers and if some murderer is called Bhagwan. It does not constitute the offence of sedition, whatever else it may be. Moreover the Government is only a prosecuting agency Godse and Apte were convicted for murder and sentenced to death by competent Courts. That being so, criticism or ridicule of a conviction does not by any means cause an aspersion on the Government; if at all, it is the Court which is blamed. But condemnation of judgment of a Court is not sedition. For these reasons. I am unable to maintain the conviction of the Appellants of the offence under Section 126-A. 6. That being so, criticism or ridicule of a conviction does not by any means cause an aspersion on the Government; if at all, it is the Court which is blamed. But condemnation of judgment of a Court is not sedition. For these reasons. I am unable to maintain the conviction of the Appellants of the offence under Section 126-A. 6. Alternatively it is argued by the learned Counsel for the state that the conviction of the Appellants may be altered to one under Section 505 or to one under Section 153-A of the Penal Code. Having given an anxious thought, I am clearly of the view that this contention must be accepted. Offence (under Section 505 (c) is constituted when: (1) The accused published or circulated the statement in question; (2) He did so with the intent to incite or it was likely to incite some class or community of persons to commit some offence against some class or community against any other class or community. Here, the word "class" is significant. It is not necessary that the class may be divided on recial of religious grounds; any definite or ascertainable class of citizens of India will come within this section. 7. On the findings reached by the trial Magistrate, which findings I have already upheld, there can be no doubt that the Appellants shouted the above mentioned slogans Nos. 1, 2 and 5 and that this was likely to invite innumerable citizens who held great reverence for Mahatma Gandhiji and, at least Congressman, to commit some offence against the Hindu Sabhaits including those who formed the rally. Before I alter the conviction from S. 124-A to the other. I have first to consider whether it is permissible to do so. In my judgment, Section 423(1)(b) (2) empowers me to adopt that course, namely, to alter the finding maintaining the sentence, inspite of the fact that the State Government has not preferred an appeal from the order of acquittal of the accused under Section 505 of the Penal Code. There are no limitations in Section 423 for which I cannot exercise that power. Nor is the power limited to cases to which Sections 236, 237 and 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. It was held in Zamir quasim v. Emperor, AIR 1944 All 137. There are no limitations in Section 423 for which I cannot exercise that power. Nor is the power limited to cases to which Sections 236, 237 and 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. It was held in Zamir quasim v. Emperor, AIR 1944 All 137. An appellate Court is, subject to the other provisions contained in Code of Criminal Procedure empowered under Section 423 (1)(b)(2) to alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction even though no appeal has been preferred by the Provincial Government. This power is, however, subject to the condition that the appellate Court cannot enhance the sentence imposed by the trial Court. The same view is taken in AIR 1951 Pat 296 and AIR 1952 Madras 101, among other decisions. My view that Section 423 is not governed by Sections 236 to 238 Cr. P. C. is supported by the decision in the State v. Karugupa, AIR 1054 Pat. 131 and Darei Sethi v. Udi Behera, AIR 1954 Ori 145 . 8. For these reasons the convictions of the Appellants are altered to those of the offence under Section 505 of the Penal Code and the sentences passed by the Trial Magistrate are maintained.