JUDGMENT P.R. Sharma, J. 1. This is a defendant's Second appeal against the judgment and decree dated the 23rd of April, 1960 passed by the II Addl. District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1959. 2. The facts giving rise to the suit out of which the present appeal arises may briefly be stated as follows: The defendant is in occupation of premises comprising of a non-residential and residential portion at a total rent of Rs. 60 p. m. under two separate rent deeds dated 1-3-1955. The lease was for a period of three years. The plaintiff-respondent terminated the tenancy by serving a notice of eviction on the ground that he required the premises for his own residential as well as business purposes. 3. The appellant resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the plaintiff was already in occupation of a shop in the same locality and was as such not entitled to evict the appellant from the non-residential portion. In respect of the residential portion the defendant contended that the plaintiff's requirement was not genuine and that the plaintiff had purchased properly in the name of his wife and was seeking eviction of the tenants occupying the same for his own residential purposes. The defendant also objected that the notice of ejectment was not valid under the law. 4. The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit for eviction and also awarded mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 60- p. m. plus compensation in the sum of Rs. 720 to the defendant for eviction from the non-residential portion. 5. The defendant went up in appeal against the decision of the trial Court; whereas the plaintiff filed cross-objections. The lower appellate court dismissed both the appeals as also the cross-objections and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. The defendant has now come up in second appeal before this court. 6. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the notices dated the 5th and 6th of December, 1957 were received by the defendant on 12-12-57. The term of the tenancy was to expire by 19-1-1958. It was contended that the lease was expressed as commencing from a particular day and, therefore, that day ought to have been excluded. The term of the tenancy was to expire by 19-1-1958. It was contended that the lease was expressed as commencing from a particular day and, therefore, that day ought to have been excluded. Reliance was placed in this conception on the provisions of para (1) of Sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, I do not find any force in this contention. The notices in question did not mention any date on which the possession should be delivered. They merely mention that possession should be handed over on termination of the lease. The lease having been expressed as commencing from the 19th of January, 1955 would expire on the 19th of January, 1958. (See Beney Krishna Das vs. Salsiecioni, 95 IA 414). The notices were received by the defendant more than a month prior to the date of expiry of the lease. They were, therefore, legally valid. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to go into the further question whether in the case of a lease for a fixed term any notice of termination of tenancy is necessary. 7. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff is in possession of a shop in which he carries on business in partnership with two other persons. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the case of Rajniklal & Co. vs. Vithal Pandurang Kewade AIR 1952 Nag. 312) for the proposition that a business which a landlord carries on in partnership with other persons can be said to be a business of his own within the meaning of Cl. 13 (3) (VI) (c) of the C.P. & Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order. I am of the opinion that this decision can have no application to the facts of the present case. In Rajniklal's case (Supra) the landlord wanted the premises under the occupation of a tenant to be vacated on the ground that he needed the same for running therein a business of which he was a partner. It was held that a partnership business in which the landlord had pecuniary interest should be deemed to be a business of his own. It was held that a partnership business in which the landlord had pecuniary interest should be deemed to be a business of his own. This decision is no authority for the proposition that if a landlord is in occupation of premises in which he is running a partnership business he cannot start a business of his own and for that purpose claim eviction of his tenant from certain other premises. The landlord is free to run an independent business of his own alongwith his partnership business and there is no law which lays down that if the landlord is in possession of premises in which a partnership business is carried on he must if he wants to start an independent business of his own carry on that business in the same premises in which the partnership business is carried on. 8. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the lower courts have rightly held that the fact that the plaintiff was in possession of certain premises in which he carried on business in partnership with others was no ground for holding that he did not need the premises occupied by the defendant for starting therein his own separate business. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Damodar Naridas Sharma vs. Nandram Deviram ( 1960 JLJ 473 ) that a tenant is liable to be ejected from a shop in his occupation on the ground that the landlord requires it for continuing or starting his own business therein unless it can be shown that any other non-residential accommodation in occupation of the landlord is suitable for the purpose of continuing or starting the landlord's own business. There is no evidence on the record of this case to show that the premises in which the partnership business is carried on by the landlord is suitable for starting therein his business in addition to the partnership business and that the other partners shall have no objection to his doing so. 9. Lastly it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff had admitted that he had purchased a house in the name of his wife and that the latter had sued for ejectment of the tenants in occupation of the same. It was, therefore, contended that the plaintiff did not genuinely require the premises in question for his residential purposes. It was, therefore, contended that the plaintiff did not genuinely require the premises in question for his residential purposes. This contention appears to me to be equally untenable. It is not disputed that the tenants are yet in occupation of the house purchased by the plaintiff's wife. Till they have been ejected therefrom it cannot be said that there is another suitable accommodation available to the plaintiff for his residential purposes. This contention cannot, therefore be accepted. 10. No other contention was advanced in support of this appeal. 11. In the result this appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed