Judgment :- 1. This appeal by special leave is by the plaintiff in a suit for redemption. The plaint property originally belonged to Vadasseril tarwad and was mortgaged on 3-4-1052 M.E. to one Narayanan with a term of twelve years as per Ext. P. A further charge was created on 23-3-1072 as per Ext. G, puravaipa with a term of eighteen years. On 16-5-1082 a superior mortgage Ext. A was executed by the tarwad in favour of the plaintiff's father, the rights under which later devolved on the plaintiff. The period under the superior mortgage was thirtysix years from the date of redemption of Exts. F and G. Though the period under Ext. G expired on 23-3-1090, the plaintiff sued for redemption only on 29-7-1120, that is, some thirty years after the expiry of the period. In the meanwhile the mortgagor tarwad sold the equity of redemption to one Govinda Pillai on 17-3-1104 who redeemed Exts. F and G on 25-9-1106. Govinda Pillai sold his rights to one Gopala Pillai who in turn transferred the same to the 4th defendant who is now in possession of the property. The contention of the 4th defendant is that since the plaintiff had slept over his rights for a period of thirty years and her predecessors-in-interest had redeemed the property in the bona fide belief that the plaintiff had given up his rights under Ext. A, the plaintiff should not now be permitted to redeem. 2. The trial court decreed the suit, but the decree was modified by the lower appellate court which held that in view of the belated nature of the suit, the plaintiff though entitled to redeem can do so only if the defendants do not deposit the mortgage amount. A Single Bench of this Court upheld the judgment of the lower appellate court and it is against that judgment that the plaintiff has now appealed. 3. The learned Single Judge in upholding the lower appellate court judgment relied on the decision in George v. Oonnoonni reported in 1949 TLR. 221. A Single Bench of this Court upheld the judgment of the lower appellate court and it is against that judgment that the plaintiff has now appealed. 3. The learned Single Judge in upholding the lower appellate court judgment relied on the decision in George v. Oonnoonni reported in 1949 TLR. 221. That case laid down the principle that where there is evidence to show that time was of the essence of the contract the failure of the puisne mortgagee to exercise his right to redeem the earlier mortgage within a reasonable time after that right became available to him, would result in rendering the contract relating to the period voidable at the option of the mortgagor under S.55 of the Contract Act. 4. The main grounds taken by the learned counsel for the appellant are that the above decision has no application to the facts of this case and that S.55 of the Contract Act cannot be applied to mortgage transactions. 5. A reading of the judgment will show that the first objection is not valid. In the case George v. Oonnoonni there was a prior mortgage, term of which was to expire in 1108. Meanwhile in 1103 a puisne mortgage was executed for a term of 12 years commencing from the date of redemption of the prior mortgage. The puisne mortgagee sued to redeem the prior mortgage in 1119 and obtained possession of the property in 1121. A purchaser from the mortgagor sued in 1121 to redeem the puisne mortgagee and the latter contended that as the term of his mortgage has not expired the suit was premature. This contention was repelled. Though in the above case the puisne mortgagee had already redeemed the property while in the case before us he is only suing for redemption, the point in issue is the same, viz., whether a puisne mortgagee who has failed to redeem the earlier mortgage within a reasonable time can enforce the stipulation regarding the period of his mortgage. Though in the above case the puisne mortgagee had already redeemed the property while in the case before us he is only suing for redemption, the point in issue is the same, viz., whether a puisne mortgagee who has failed to redeem the earlier mortgage within a reasonable time can enforce the stipulation regarding the period of his mortgage. It should be noted here that what the lower appellate court decided in the present case was not that the plaintiff has lost his right to redeem the property, but only that having slept over his right to redeem for thirty years he has lost the right to hold the property for the thirty-six years specified in the mortgage and as such he may redeem the earlier mortgage only if the defendant failed to deposit the amount due under the mortgage. 6. The other point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the application of the principle of S.55 of the Contract Act to mortgage transactions is wrong. S.55 of the Contract Act reads thus: "When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of essence of the contract." Before dealing with the learned counsel's arguments we will consider whether the parties here intended that time should be the essence of their contract. The finding of the lower appellate court is that the intention of the parties to Ext. A mortgage was that the earlier mortgage was to be redeemed on its expiry. This finding has been upheld by the learned Single Judge and we do not find our way to take a different view. The wording of Ext. A clearly shows that the parties intended the plaintiff to redeem the earlier mortgage when the period expired and to be in possession of the property for thirty-six years. This finding has been upheld by the learned Single Judge and we do not find our way to take a different view. The wording of Ext. A clearly shows that the parties intended the plaintiff to redeem the earlier mortgage when the period expired and to be in possession of the property for thirty-six years. However, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that whatever be the intention of the parties time can never be the essence of the contract in a mortgage and to apply the principle of S.55 of the Contract Act to mortgage transactions would be to clog the equity of redemption. The learned counsel cited a passage from Ghose on Law of Mortgage in India in support of his position. The learned author in considering the maxim "once a mortgage always, a mortgage" says (Law of Mortgage in India by R. Ghose, Vol. I, page 221): "the maxim'once a mortgage always a mortgage' may be said to be a logical corollary from the doctrine, which is the very foundation of the law of mortgages, that time is not of the essence of the contract in such transactions; for the protection which the law throws round the mortgagor might be rendered wholly illusory, if the right to redeem could be limited by contract between the parties. It is also stated there (Page 220) that: "The doctrine was originally intended to protect the impecunious landowners from the wiles or oppression of crafty and unscrupulous money-lenders. It must be stated here that most of the arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant seem to be based on the wrong assumption that the plaintiff has been held to have lost his right to redeem. His right to redeem and his right to enforce the stipulation regarding the period of the mortgage are distinct and we do not think that the doctrine that time is not the essence of the contract in mortgages, whatever be its validity as a general principle can be applied with regard to latter right. If the reason for the creation of the doctrine is to protect the land owner, then clearly it must not be applied here where such application can only result in affecting his interests adversely. If the reason for the creation of the doctrine is to protect the land owner, then clearly it must not be applied here where such application can only result in affecting his interests adversely. If the principle is applied here the result would be that the plaintiff can postpone redemption at his will till the end of the period of limitation and then bold on to the property for thirty-six years thereafter and the owner will have to wait well nigh a century before he can hope to exercise his right of redemption, a result not at all beneficial to him. We are therefore in respectful agreement with the principle laid down by His Lordship Sankaran, J., in George v. Oonnoonni. 7. Another argument put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant is that even if the contract relating to the period of the mortgage becomes voidable the right to avoid will be available only to the mortgagor and not to the respondent who is only an assignee of the equity of redemption. This contention also has to fail as the right to avoid the contract is not a personal right but one that is available to him as the mortgagor and when his interests in the property are assigned the right to avoid must also pass to the assignee. 8. In the result the judgment in S. A. No. 463 of 1953 is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.