S. T. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition raises an interesting question and one of some importance relating to the interpretation of the expression debtor in section 2 (6) of the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1954 in the context of debts or debt incurred by an undivided Hindu family. ( 2 ) THE facts require to be stated in some detail. Takhatsing and Madhavsing were two girasdars who were members of an undivided Hindu family. On 24/10/1923 they mortgaged some of their properties with the firm of Mehta Dhanji Tejshi who are the second opponent before us. The mortgage was to secure a loan of Rs. 15 0 On 1/04/1927 they created a second mortgage on the same properties in favour Of the same creditors to secure a further advance of Rs. 2275. 00. Both the mortgages were created for joint family purpose. After the death of the two brothers an application was made by their sons for adjustment of their debts under the provisions of the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act to be referred to hereafter by us as the Act. That application was registered as No. 304 of 1955. In that application they stated () that the liability of the sons of both Takhatsing and Madhavsing was a joint liability. It is to be noted that the liability was not described as a joint and several liability or as a several liability. Two mortgage-creditor firms filed their claims in accordance with the provisions of the Act and set out the names of all the sons of Takhatsing and Madhavsing as debtors describing them as the heirs of Takhatsing and Madhavsing. In the column relating to the details of the debt they described the sons of the two brothers as () their debtors. ( 3 ) ANOTHER application for adjustment of debts under the Act was preferred only by the heirs of Takhatsing. That application related to the debts of the three brothers as heirs of Takhatsing. It is not disputed nor is it disputable that the aggregate amount of the debts there shown as Rs. 11 50 in respect of the debts of the sons of Takhatsing as members of an undivided Hindu family. The Court of first instance consolidated the two matters and framed a preliminary issue and the preliminary issue was whether the applicants in the two applications were debtors or not. 11 50 in respect of the debts of the sons of Takhatsing as members of an undivided Hindu family. The Court of first instance consolidated the two matters and framed a preliminary issue and the preliminary issue was whether the applicants in the two applications were debtors or not. That they were agriculturists was not in dispute but the dispute was whether the debts of the applicants exceeded Rs. 25 0 on the date of the filing of the two applications to the Board under section 4 of the Act. The trial Court reached the conclusion that the applicants in the two applications could be regarded as debtors within the ambit of the Act and that was on the ground that the aggregate amount of their debts did not exceed Rs. 25 0 In the view we take of the matter it is not necessary in this revision application to refer to one or two other contentions of the debtors which were considered by the Courts below. The trial Court having found that it had jurisdiction to adjust the debts of the applicants made an award and proceeded to take accounts for the purpose of scaling down the debts of the debtors. The creditors appealed against that decision and in appeal the learned District Judge Madhya Saurashtra took the view that the sons of Takhatsing were liable for the entire amount of the mortgages and also for the amount of Rs. 11 50 shown in the second application and therefore their total debts exceeded Rs. 25000. 00. Being of that view the learned Judge held that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to adjust the debts of the applicants and the applicants have come to this Court on this revision application. ( 4 ) IT has been firstly argued before us by Mr. Nanavati learned advocate for the petitioners who are the heirs of Takhatsing that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that the whole amount of debts due on the mortgages aggregating to Rs. 17 275 was a debt due from the sons of Takhatsing to the mortgagee-creditor firm. Nanavati learned advocate for the petitioners who are the heirs of Takhatsing that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that the whole amount of debts due on the mortgages aggregating to Rs. 17 275 was a debt due from the sons of Takhatsing to the mortgagee-creditor firm. The argument is that on a proper interpretation of section 2 (6) the aggregate amount of the two mortgages should have been divided into two parts and the heirs of Takhatsing should have been held to be debtors only in respect of a moiety of the aggregate amount of Rs. 17 275 It will be convenient to set out here the definitions of debt and debtor in the Act :-"2 (5) debt means any liability in cash or kind whether secured or unsecured due front a debtor whether payable under a decree or order of any Civil Court or otherwise and includes mortgage money the payment of which is secured by the usufructuary mortgage in the nature of PURA-CHHOOT of immoveable property but does not include arrears of wages payable in respect of agricultural or manual labour; (6) Debtor means an agriculturist i) whose debts do not exceed Rs. 25 0 on the date of filing an application to the Board under section 4; and ii) a) in the case of an individual whose annual income from sources other than agriculture and manual labour does not exceed 33 per cent of his total annual income or does not exceed Rs. 1 800 whichever is greater; c) in the case of an undivided Hindu family whose annual income from sources other than agriculture and manual labour does not exceed 40 per cent of its total annual income and the aggregate of such incomes of whose members does not exceed Rs. 5 400. Provided that a person whose debts of a commercial or industrial nature from a substantial part of his total debts shall not be considered to be a debtor. The decision of the Board whether debts of an industrial or commercial nature from a substantial part of the total debts shall be final. " ( 5 ) ON the other hand it has been argued by Mr. The decision of the Board whether debts of an industrial or commercial nature from a substantial part of the total debts shall be final. " ( 5 ) ON the other hand it has been argued by Mr. M. U. Shah learned Advocate for the opponents 2 and 3 that there is nothing in the definition of debt or debtor which may permit any such meaning being ascribed to the expression debtor. It is said that a debtor may be an individual or the debtor may be a unit consisting of members of an undivided Hindu family but whether an individual or of the nature of a unit in the form of an undivided Hindu family it is the entire debt which has to be taken into consideration while determining whether the aggregate amount of the debt exceeds Rs. 25 0 or not. ( 6 ) THERE is in our opinion substance in this argument urged on behalf of the opponents sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (ii) of section 2 (6) go clearly to indicate that a debtor may be an individual or a unit constituted by members of an undivided Hindu family in the case of undivided Hindu family in applying the test of annual income a different standard has been laid down by the Legislature in terms express and explicit. In the case of an individual he can be regarded as a debtor if his total annual income does not exceed Rs. 1800/or fulfills the other test of 33 per cent of the total income. In the case of an undivided Hindu family in order that it may be regarded as a debtor its aggregate income must not exceed Rs. 5400/or it must fulfill the test of 40 per cent of the total income. Now when we turn to clause (i) of section 2 (6) we do not find any such provision permitting of any different standard in the case of an individual and in the case of an undivided Hindu family. In our opinion therefore there is intrinsic evidence in the sub-section itself which throws a flood of light on the first question which is raised for our determination. In our opinion therefore there is intrinsic evidence in the sub-section itself which throws a flood of light on the first question which is raised for our determination. Reading the two sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 2 together we are led to the inevitable conclusion that under clause (i) a debtor can be an individual or an undivided Hindu family as a unit but in either case the total debts of the individual or the unit as the case may be must not exceed Rs. 25000/on the date of the filing of the application to the Board under section 4. To accede to the argument of Mr. Nanavati on his aspect of the case would be to wrest the language of the definition which of course it is not open to this Court to do. It may be that in a given case this interpretation may result in hardship or even some anomalous situation but that is not a consideration which can over-ride the plain natural and grammatical meaning of the language of sub-section (6) which as we read it is not capable of more than one meaning. There is nothing uncertain or ambiguous about the language of that part of the definition with which we are concerned. For all these reasons the present contention pressed for our acceptance by Mr. Nanavati must be negatived. ( 7 ) IT is next urged by learned advocate for the petitioners that the first petition was by the sons of Takhatsing and Madhavsing and that application can only be regarded as one by the unit constituted by members of the original family of the two deceased brothers. The other application it is said was by the sons of Takhasting and that could only be regarded as an application made by the three brothers as members of an undivided Hindu family constituting another unit. The argument has proceeded that the units in the two cases are Dot the same and the Court below was in error in regarding the two applications as if they were made by the same unit. ( 8 ) IT has been argued on the other hand by Mr. M. U. Shah that the applicants had described themselves as persons jointly and severally liable in case of both the applications. ( 8 ) IT has been argued on the other hand by Mr. M. U. Shah that the applicants had described themselves as persons jointly and severally liable in case of both the applications. It is true that there are some observations in the judgment of the appellate Court which may support this argument but as we have already pointed outs in the first application the applicants did not state that they were jointly and severally liable but what they stated was that they were jointly liable and that could only be on the footing of their being members of an undivided Hindu family. It is next urged by Mr. Shah that the definition of debtor states that a debt includes mortgage money any mortgage money would be the entire amount and one sum and the mortgagor it is said must also be regarded as one unit. We agree that such can be the position. It is then said that the heirs of Takhatsing must be regarded as one and the same unit in the case of both applications because they were liable as the heirs of Takhatsing in respect of the mortgage debts as well as the debts which are the subject matter of the second application. ( 9 ) THE submission is not well-founded. What we have to consider is not whether in both cases the applicants included the sons of Takhatsing but in what capacity were the applications made by them. The first application was by the sons of Takhatsing as well as Madhavsing and they all as we have already mentioned must be regarded as persons who had applied for adjustment of their debts as one unit. In the second case no doubt it was the sons of Takhatsing who as a unit applied for adjustment of their debts but that was a unit consisting of a joint Hindu family of which they alone were the members and could be regarded as debtors. The sons of Madhavsing had nothing to do with that debt. We are not really concerned on this revision application with the question of any separation or partition of jointness regarding the applications. The sons of Madhavsing had nothing to do with that debt. We are not really concerned on this revision application with the question of any separation or partition of jointness regarding the applications. What we are concerned with is the nature of the two applications and in our judgment the first application was made by the applicants as constituting one unit and the second application was made by some of them as constituting another unit. ( 10 ) FOR all these reasons we are of the opinion that the Court below was in error in allowing the appeal. That decision will be set aside. The decision on other points by the lower appellate Court will stand. The matter will go back to the Board for taking accounts in accordance with law. There will be no order for costs. Petition allowed. .