JUDGMENT Abdul Hakim Khan, J. 1. This second appeal was filed before the Rajasthan High Court. On the recoganisation of the States, this case was transferred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, where it is being decided now. 2. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs sued the defendant on the allegation that their father, Bholasingh had pawned some ornaments with the defendant Gulabchand in year 1920. It was, therefore, a suit for the redemption of the pawned articles. 3. In the written statement, the defendant Gulabchand said that in 1925, he had filed a suit against the present plaintiffs (who were minors then) and also against plaintiff's three other brothers, who were majors, for the sale of pawned articles and the repayment of the debt, that in that case a compromise was effected, whereby the defendant was allowed to keep the ornaments : in lieu of payment of debt and interest, and thus the debt arising out of the pledge was liquidated. The defendant took his stand on the plea of res-judicata and said that the present plaintiffs could not file the suit. Defendant also stated that there was an agreement between him and Sabha Chand, one of the defendants in that suit and that the present plaintiffs are estopped from bringing the suit. They also pleaded limitation. 4. The trial Court, Munsiff of Sironj, dismissed the suit as time-barred and also held that the decision in the suit of 1925 filed by defendant Gulabchand operated as res-judicata. On appeal the first appellate Court held that the suit was not time-barred nor was it hit by res-judicata and therefore sent it back to the trial Court. Against this decision, an appeal was filed before the Rajasthan High Court, and the High Court upheld the judgment of the District Judge. The case eventually went back to the Munsiff's Court at Sironj for decision of questions that were not decided. After remand, the Munsiff, Sironj decreed the plaintiff's suit and on appeal this decision was upheld. Now the defendant has filed this second appeal. 5. It appears from the record that no decree was passed in the suit filed by the defendant Gulabchand for the sale of pawned articles. What happened in that suit was that in the course of trial, a compromise was arrived at between the parties, and it was presented to the Court. Now the defendant has filed this second appeal. 5. It appears from the record that no decree was passed in the suit filed by the defendant Gulabchand for the sale of pawned articles. What happened in that suit was that in the course of trial, a compromise was arrived at between the parties, and it was presented to the Court. The Munsiff instead of passing a decree according to the compromise, dismissed the suit, saying the parties had arrived at a settlement. It is obvious that in the circumstances that agreement would not operate as res-judicata. 6. But the learned counsel for the appellant contends that although the agreement cannot operate as res-judicata, yet it estops the plaintiffs from suing for the recovery of the pledged articles. 7. On this point the trial Court framed issue No. 7 which runs as follows :- 8. Its finding was that Sabha Chand who signed the agreement was the 'Karta' of the family, but because he had not obtained the permission of the court under Order 32, Rule 7 of the C. P. Code, this agreement had no force. In fact the trial court missed the point which the defendant had urged. What the defendant in fact had said was that the agreement between the defendant and Sabha Chand in 1925 as Karta of the family was binding upon the minors and that they are now estopped. There is no dispute about the fact that Sabha Chand was the Karta of the family. This finding by the trial Court has not been challenged so far. 9. Mr. Bhagwan Swaroop, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has referred me to A.I.R. 1950 All. 121 (Lal Somnath Singh and others Vs. Ambika Prasad Dubey and others). In this decision on the authority of Bawer on Estoppel, it has been said that "where the representation was made on behalf of the infant by his guardian or next friend or other person legally competent to bind him by such representation, the infant on attaining his majority or the person who made such representation, as the case may be, is liable to be estopped thereby." I find myself in respectful agreement with this view. As a general proposition the position of law is that a representation made by a minor would not operate as an estoppel. As a general proposition the position of law is that a representation made by a minor would not operate as an estoppel. But where his guardian or a person legally competent to bind him makes a representation (in the instant case, the Karta of a Joint Hindu Family is such a person) on behalf of the minor and himself then both the minor and the person legally competent to bind the minor, are estopped from challenging it In the instant case the agreement between the Karta and the defendant was to the effect that the defendant Gulab Chand who was then the plaintiff, would withdraw his suit and that defendant Sabha Chand would relinquish all claim in respect of the pawned articles. 10. The plaintiffs who were minors in 1925 are bound by what the Karta has done and they are estopped from challenging the transaction concluded between the Karta and defendant Gulabchand. It is true that in the agreement Sabha Chand has not been described himself as the Karta of the family, but, it is also significant that out of five defendants, in that case he alone had entered into this agreement. In the present case evidence has been led that Gulabchand was the eldest (member of the family, but because he was blind he could not perform the duties) of the Karta, and, as Sabha Chand became the Karta. 11. Mr. Munnalal Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the agreement of a Karta would not bind the minor unless the agreement is entered into with the permission of the Court under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. This argument is wide of the mark. The present case does not involve the consideration or the question of a decree based on a compromise. In fact no decree has been passed in that case and reference to Order 32, Rule 7, C.P.C. is not to the point. If the decree had been passed in the earlier case by the Munsiff of Sironj on the basis of the compromise, this argument no doubt would have had force. 12. Mr. Munnalal Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent has referred me to A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 358 (Mohammad Amin and others Vs. Vakil Ahmad and others), but I am afraid that the principles laid down in that case cannot be applied to the present case. 12. Mr. Munnalal Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent has referred me to A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 358 (Mohammad Amin and others Vs. Vakil Ahmad and others), but I am afraid that the principles laid down in that case cannot be applied to the present case. The question involved in the Supreme Court case was whether the defecto guardian under the Mohammedan Law could transfer minor's property by way of family settlement or not. In the present case, the agreement of the Karta has to be respected and the Karta has legal Authority to enter into an agreement in respect of family property. In the Mohammedan case a defecto guardian did not possess any legal authority. 13. Mr. Munnalal has also referred me to A.I.R. 1956 Mad 89. But I am afraid that this case too is not of any help in deciding the present case, because throughout the discussion in the cited case was about Order 32, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. 14. For reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and setting aside the decisions of both the Courts below, the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed