Judgment :- 1. The petitioner herein is the owner of 81/2 cents of land in Fort Cochin in which stands a house built by the husband of the respondent about 50 years ago on the strength of an oral lease of the site on a rent of Rs. 3 a year. The house has since then been in the occupation of respondent's family. It occupies an area of 671/2 square yards or roughly 1.4 cents of land and apart from the occupation of the house, the respondent has admittedly no other interest in the land, the usufructs therefrom having always been enjoyed by the owner. (These facts appear from the report of the commissioner appointed in the case and from the evidence of the respondent herself). The respondent applied under S.34 of the Malabar Tenancy Act 1929, as amended by Madras Acts 33 of 1951, and 7 of 1954, for the purchase of the rights of the petitioner in the land, and that application having been allowed by the court below (the Munsiff's Court, Cochin) to the extent of 51/2 cents on the finding that this plot (being the site of the respondent's house and the additional land necessary for its convenient enjoyment) formed a Kudiyirippu and was not a kudikidappu, the petitioner has come up in revision. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken that this revision is not competent since an appeal lay. With regard to this objection I might, in the first place, observe that, if an appeal lay at all, it lay to the Subordinate Judge's Court, Cochin and not to this court so that this court's power of revision would not be excluded by the language of S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code which confers that power with regard to all cases in which no appeal lies to this court. Secondly, whereas under the original Malabar Tenancy Act of 1929, an appeal was provided by Sub-section (2) of S.50 from an order made under S.34 of that Act (which corresponds to S.34 of the present Act) as if the order were a decree in a suit, there is no such provision in the present Act which, by S.17, appears to provide for an appeal only from an order passed by the Rent Court under S.16. The first sub-section of the old S.50 which provided that the procedure with regard to suits in the Code of Civil Procedure shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings relating to applications under the Act, has been retained in the corresponding present section, S.49, but sub-section (2) of that section providing for appeals has been omitted. The intention seems to be clear that there should be no appeal from an order under S.34. 3. It is however argued on the strength of the decisions in Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara (AIR. 1948 Privy Council Page 12) and Samburajanadar and another v. Purushotham Ramji (1959 KLJ. page 378) that notwithstanding that the special Act namely, The Malabar Tenancy Act, does not provide for an appeal, in so far as the matter is decided by an ordinary Court, an appeal will lie under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Now, an appeal can lie under S.96 of the Code only if the order in question is a decree as defined by the Code. That it obviously is not, for, it is an order made in an application and not in a suit, so that the primary requisite that the adjudication should determine the rights of the parties in controversy in the suit is wanting. In both the cases relied upon, the order considered was an order made in a suit, and the only question that arose was whether it otherwise satisfied the requirements of a decree. In both the cases relied upon, the order considered was an order made in a suit, and the only question that arose was whether it otherwise satisfied the requirements of a decree. I might in this connection remark that, while S.34 of the Act only declares the Kudiyirippu holder's right to purchase his landlord's rights, and there is nothing in that section or in the Act to indicate how this right is to be enforced so that, ordinarily, it would be by way of suit (sub Section (1) of S.50 of the original Act by referring to applications under the Act, and sub-section (2) by saying that an order made under S.84 was appealable as if it were a decree in a suit, implied that the relief was obtainable by way of an application) R.4 of the rules made under S.57 of the Act provides for the particulars to be furnished in an application under S.34 of the Act so that it may be taken, as was assumed on all hands that the right given by S.34 can be enforced by a mere application. 4. The question is whether what the respondent holds as a tenant is a Kudiyirippu. S.3 (17) (a) defines "Kudiyirippu" thus: "'Kudiyirippu" means and includes the site of any residential building, the site or the sites of other buildings appurtenant thereto, such other lands as are necessary for the convenient enjoyment of such residential building, and the easements attached thereto but does not include an Ulkudi or Kudikidappu." So it is clear that if what the respondent holds is only a Kudikidappu she is not entitled to any right under S.34 which applies only to the holder of a'Kudiyirippu'.'Kudikidappu' is thus, defined in S.3 (28) (c): "'Kudikidappu' means a but in any portion of a land in Fort Cochin in the occupation of a person who has been permitted by the person entitled to possession of such land to occupy the but and who otherwise has no interest in such land." The court below comes to the conclusion that the respondent's holding was not a Kudikidappu for two reasons, the first that the house had not been built by the landlord, and the second that its cost of construction as estimated by the commissioner was about Rs. 1000 although by allowing for depreciation he brought its value down to Rs. 400. 1000 although by allowing for depreciation he brought its value down to Rs. 400. Therefore it found that the holding was a Kudiyirippu. 5. It seems to me that, in so deciding, the Court below was completely wrong Taking first the second reason it is to be noticed that the Malabar Tenancy Act does not define the word "hut" which has therefore to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning of, a "small or mean house: a small temporary dwelling or similar structure", and in holding that because its cost of construction was above Rs. 400/- the house in question was not a hut, the lower court seems to have imported the definition of a "hut" in Explanation II to Clause.3 of S.2 of Act I of 1957 as amended by Act 30 of 1958 a procedure for which there is no warrant. (Even so it seems to have been wrong. See Chaldean Syrian Church v. Lonappan,1960 KLT. 620) As well might we apply the definition of "hut" in S.2 (2) of that Act as meaning any building which is constructed principally of wood, mud, leaves, grass or thatch, a definition which would apply to the house now in question which, as the report of the commissioner shows has a plynth area of 671/2 square yards with the basement alone of stone and the superstructure and roof made of thatties, wooden planks and thatch. But as I have already said, the definition to apply is the ordinary dictionary definition of the word "hut" and, on that definition there can be little doubt that the house in question is a hut. 6. Turning next to the first reason, reading the definition of "Kudikidappu" in S. 3(28) (c) by itself, it might at first sight appear that there is some warrant for the conclusion reached by the lower court. For it says that the person in occupation of the but must have been permitted by the person entitled to the land to occupy the hut, and one ordinarily grants permission in respect of one's own property and not in respect of somebody else's. In particular, if the person in occupation is the person to whom the but belongs, he would not require anybody else's permission to occupy it. But, if the definition is carefully read, it will be seen that the permission is related to the but in view of the requirement that the person in occupation must have otherwise no interest in the land. The definition takes particular care to confine the permission giver's interest to the land, and the occupier's interest to the hut. So, all that the definition means is that there must be the permission of the owner of the land to occupy the but thereon, and it does not mean that the but must belong to him. This is abundantly clear from S.13 of the Act, the proviso whereto makes special provision for an addition to the fair rent where the but does not belong to the holder of the kudikidappu, and the section necessarily implies that ordinarily the but belongs to the holder of the kudikidappu. Moreover, the scheme of the Act is that buildings belonging to the landlord and the sites thereof should be saved from its operation (see S.2 (3), an exception being made in the case of a but belonging to a landlord in an Ulkudi or kudikidappu. This also shows that ordinarily the but constituting a kudikidappu belongs to the tenant, but unlike as in the case of a kudiyirippu it may also belong to the landlord. The essential requirement is that the building must be a but to make a kudikidappu, it does not matter whether it belongs to the landlord or to the tenant. Therefore, the fact that the house in this case belongs to the respondent does not prevent her holding from being a kudikidappu. It satisfies all the requirements of the definition of'Kudikidappu'; hence it follows that it is not a Kudiyirippu and that the respondent is not entitled to the benefits of S.34 of the Act. 7. I am reminded that it is not every error of law that attracts S.115 of the Code. But in this case by an error of law, the lower court has assumed jurisdiction to make an order under S.34 of the Act which it really does not possess and by such an error the petitioner is being compelled to sell her property against her will. This is eminently a case for revision under S.115 of the Code. 8. I allow the petition and dismiss the respondent's application with costs both here and in the court below. Allowed.