Judgment :- 1. This seems to be a case where there is no evidence at all to prove the charge of wife-murder levelled against the accused so that if his commitment on the charge of murder were under S.213 of the Criminal Procedure Code there would have been a point of law justifying the quashing of that commitment under S.215. The commitment in this case is, however, under S.207A and since the legislature forgot to put that section in S.215 when it made special provision in the shape of S.207A for commitment in proceedings instituted on a police report thus taking such commitments out of the scope of S.213, it might be that S.215 does not in terms apply. That being so S.561A would at once be attracted - see Pavalappa v. State of Mysore [AIR. 1957 Mysore 61] and Tirbeni Kahar v. State of Bihar [AIR. 1960 Patna 131] and the unintended result might well be that the quashing of a commitment made under S.207A is not subject to the limitation in S.215 that it can be only on a point of law, and that the High Court can quash a commitment under S.561 A so long as it considers that necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, a requirement which might in some respects be wider and in some respects narrower than a point of law within the meaning of S.215. However, having regard to what I think was a mere accident, namely, the omission to mame S.207A also in S.215, I am prepared to import into interference under S.561 A in respect of a commitment under S.207A, the further requirement thai there must be a point of law. That, as I have already said, there is in this case; and, I should think, that if a man is to go before Sessions to be tried on a charge of murder when there is no evidence at all against him, that would be a grave miscarriage of justice so that a quashing of the commitment would be necessary to secure the ends of justice. Thus it seems to me that the requirements of both S.561A and 215 are satisfied in this case. 2. Thus it seems to me that the requirements of both S.561A and 215 are satisfied in this case. 2. The sum total of the evidence against the accused is this: He was married to the deceased about a year before her death, and their married life was not without the attendant quarrels and, what is fortunately rarer, but perhaps not altogether uncommon in people of their station, occasional wife-beatings. On one or two occasions after bad quarrels she had gone home to her people and the accused had gone and fetched her back. On the afternoon of the 16th January 1960 the deceased appears to have acted in a disobedient manner and the accused, it is seen from the evidence of his mother, Pw. 1, beat her with a twig. Then he went out of the house on some business returning only in the morning after accompanying a Communist Jatha to Tellicherry, about five miles away, for attending some election meeting there. Soon after the accused left the house, the deceased who seems to have been none the worse, at any rate physically, for the flogging she had received, also left the house paying no heed to her mother-in-law who asked her to stay. Two days later, on 18-1-1960, her body was found in a pond some distance from the accused's house but only about sixty yards from the house of his aunt, Pw. 5. It was in a state of decomposition. It was bloated and blebs had formed in many parts. An autopsy revealed no broken bones and no injury to any of the internal organs, but there were swellings over the eyes, the right side of the face and the iliac region, as also petty abrasions on the right elbow and the left hand, indicative of violence. The doctor who conducted the autopsy was not examined at the preliminary enquiry, but the opinion given by him in his post-mortem certificate that the deceased would appear to have died of shock due to violence appears to be hardly borne out by the injuries described therein. 3. However, that might be, the only evidence that in any way serves to connect the accused with the death of his wife is that of Pws. 2 and 3 who, I might say, seem to have discovered that they knew anything relevant to the case otty a month after the deceased's death. Pw. 3. However, that might be, the only evidence that in any way serves to connect the accused with the death of his wife is that of Pws. 2 and 3 who, I might say, seem to have discovered that they knew anything relevant to the case otty a month after the deceased's death. Pw. 2's evidence is that, as he was passing by Pw. 5's house on the afternoon in question, he saw Pw. 5 taking the deceased to her house and that, a little later, when he reached the road where the Communist Jatha was being formed, the accused who was taunted by some women members of the jatha with not having brought his wife to join them, left the place and went to Pw. 5's house. The evidence of Pw. 3 is that as he was passing by Pw. 5's house that afternoon after a vain search for a physician (who he was not prepared to deny was dead more than three years) he heard a woman's cries and that, a little later, the accused came out of the house and when asked by him what the cries were about went away without making a reply. 4. Obviously the belated evidence of Pws. 2 and 3 has to be received with great caution, but accepting all the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution to be true - and it is purely circumstantial - it can by no stretch of imagination or ingenuity forge a chain of guilt. That being so the case is, as I said at the very beginning, a case of no evidence at all. 5. I allow the petition and quash the commitment of the accused. Allowed.