Raghavan Nair v. Balagopalan — 1960 DIGILAW 452 (KER)

JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, Mr. Kunhirama Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner, attacks the order of the Election Tribunal, Tellicherry, permitting an amendment of an Election Petition No. 7/60 filed by the respondent, challenging the election of the petitioner. 2. The circumstances under which this application is filed, are briefly as follows:- 3. The petitioner is an elected member of the Kerala Legislature from the Chevayoor Constitutency in Kozhikode District in the elections held in this State early in February of this year. 4. The respondent filed on 12-3-1960 an election petition No. 7 of 1960 for a declaration under Section 101 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 Central Act XLIII of 1951, as amended that the present writ petitioner's election is void and also for certain other reliefs. 5. In particular, the matters mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, in so far as they are relevant for the purpose of disposing of this application for an issue of a writ, relate to the matters contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the petition. 6. The respondent attacks in the main, the election of the petitioner herein substantially on 2 grounds of corrupt practices namely, of conveying the voters to the polling Stations in certain vehicles mentioned in paragraph 11 and also of corrupt practice of bribery referred to in paragraph 12 of the petition. 7. I am not concerned at this stage with the merits of those allegations. Paragraph 11 of the petition as it stood originally, stated that the present petitioner is guilty of corrupt practice under Section 123 (5) of the Act inasmuch as he has conveyed certain persons mentioned in the Schedule in Jeeps bearing numbers given therein. There is a Schedule 1 annexed to the petition, wherein the names of two persons are given. It is also stated in paragraph 11 that the list given therein is incomplete and therefore, the present respondent prayed that he may be allowed to supplement the list by supplying further instances of the same corrupt practice during the course of the trial of the petition. 8. It is also stated in paragraph 11 that the list given therein is incomplete and therefore, the present respondent prayed that he may be allowed to supplement the list by supplying further instances of the same corrupt practice during the course of the trial of the petition. 8. So far as the allegation of corrupt practice of bribery referred to in paragraph 12 of the petition is concerned, it was only an allegation that the present petitioner before me has committed also acts of bribery through his election agent and by others with this consent in order to persuade the electors to vote for the respondent and large sums of money were also distributed. Apart from that there is no schedule containing any list of persons, even that of a limited list, as was given in respect of allegation contained in paragraph 11 of the petition. 9. In the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner to the main Election Petition No. 7/60, leaving of all the other allegations, in paragraph 13 in particular, he denied the allegations contained in paragraph 12 in the main petition to the effect that they are irrelevant and also incompetent for want of definiteness and details. The present petitioner before me further stated that the respondent should not be allowed to rely on the said allegations. So far as the allegation contained in paragraph 11 in the affidavit of the main petition was concerned, those allegations were dealt with or controverted in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner. He has denied the various allegations of having conveyed the voters to the Polling booths in the Jeeps mentioned therein. Apart from that, it is also stated that the respondent should not be allowed to add to the list already given in the schedule to the Original Petition. 10. At this stage, after the Election Petition No. 7 of 1960 was filed on 12-3-1960 it is seen that the preliminary formalities were gone through and the matter came to the stage of adducing evidence. On 11-7-1960, it is seen and there is no controversy, that the petitioner in the Election Petition, viz, the respondent before me was examined in part as P. W. I and his evidence appears to have been continued also on 12-7-1960. On 11-7-1960, it is seen and there is no controversy, that the petitioner in the Election Petition, viz, the respondent before me was examined in part as P. W. I and his evidence appears to have been continued also on 12-7-1960. But on that date, an objection was raised by the petitioner before me to the effect that unless particulars or instances of corrupt practice of bribery alleged in paragraph 12 of the petition have been given, the respondent should not be allowed to go on trial on that point. There were also certain other objections, of what I may call of a minor nature, viz., the non-verification of the schedule contained therein and also the non-verification in the main application itself. These are minor matters and whatever it is, they have been dealt with by the Election Authority and disposed of by its order dated 13-7-1960. But the point to be mentioned at this stage is that one of the objections, as I have indicated earlier, was that the respondent herein should not be permitted to go to trial on the second allegation of corrupt practice namely, of bribery, when no particulars had been given. 11. It is seen that evidently because of this objection taken by the petitioner before me, the, respondent appears to have very promptly filed an application, which has given rise to the controversy before me. That is, he filed on 12-7-1960 an application. I. A. 16/60 for amending, in particular, the paragraphs 11 and 12 of his original petition by giving various details. So far as paragraph 11 of the original affidavit is concerned, the details sought to be amended were regarding the names of various persons who were transported in the vehicles employed by the present petitioner. The respondent as P. W. 1 states that his workers told him the number of the Jeeps, which he has mentioned in the petition and that he has no information about the persons who were conveyed in the other vehicles. The respondent as P. W. 1 states that his workers told him the number of the Jeeps, which he has mentioned in the petition and that he has no information about the persons who were conveyed in the other vehicles. The amendments asked for, in so far as it related to paragraph 12 of the original petition, was that the respondent sought to give a list of names of several persons who according to the respondent, have been given money as a bribe for the purpose of voting in favour of the present petitioner and he gave details as to who exactly gave money and also when and where. 12. This application, naturally, was very vehemently opposed by the petitioner before me on the ground that the Election Tribunal has no jurisdiction vested in it in law to allow an amendment and permit the respondent herein to give a list of particulars for the first time. On the merits, the objection that was taken was that the reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application, were totally different from that given by the party himself when he gave evidence as P. W. 1 will advert to this aspect, when I deal with the contention of Mr. Kunhirama Menon regarding the actual exercise of powers of the Election Tribunal in directing an amendment in the particular circumstances if this case. 13. Both these objections were over-ruled by the Election Tribunal. The Election Tribunal held that it has got ample authority under sub-sections 5 of Section 90 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as it stands at present to make suitable amendments regarding the list of particulars and it has got further jurisdiction to permit parties to give in the original application already filed. In this connection, the learned Judge has placed considerable reliances on the observations made by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444). The particular observation. I will have to advert to a little later. 14. In this connection, the learned Judge has placed considerable reliances on the observations made by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444). The particular observation. I will have to advert to a little later. 14. It is also the view of the Election Tribunal that the amendment effected by Act XXVII/1956 to the Representation of the People Act, 1951 does not, an any way, alter the position and that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, notwithstanding that was in connection with the section as it stood earlier, do not in any way, alter the legal position regarding the power of amendment in such matters vested in the Election Tribunal. It notes the contradiction, which is on the face of it, very clear regarding the reason given by him in the affidavit and the reason sought to be given when he was in the witness box. But taking into account all the circumstances and also the delay in filing this application for amendment, the Election Tribunal was of the view that the respondent should be permitted to make the necessary alterations, because that will not in any way, seriously embarrass or prejudice the lines of argument, if any, of the petitioner before me. On these grounds the Election Tribunal, over-ruling both the objections, that is, one of law, and one based on facts, has ultimately directed the amendments asked for by the respondent in I. A. 16/60. 15. It is this order of the Election Tribunal that is rather very strenuously attacked by Mr. K Kunhirama Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner. 16. The same contentions that were raised by the learned counsel on behalf of his client, before the Election Tribunal, have been again raised before me namely, that the Election Tribunal has no jurisdiction to permit the respondent to give fresh particulars regarding the corrupt practice of bribery, when no particulars whatsoever , have been given in the original petition itself and the learned counsel elaborated this contention by attempting to convince me that there is a radical difference between the sections of the Act as it stood before the amendment in 1956 and as it stands after the amendment effected therein by the Amending Act XXVII/1956. It will advert to this aspect a little later. 17. It will advert to this aspect a little later. 17. The second contention was again that even assuming that the Election Tribunal has got jurisdiction under sub-section (5) of section 90 of the Act, nevertheless, in the particular circumstances of this case, there is absolutely no jurisdiction for that power being exercised in favour of the present respondent. The facts necessary for that have been stated and I will have to consider that regarding the contention based upon the merits. That is in brief, Mr. Kunhirama Menon's contention is that even though the Election Tribunal may have jurisdiction, the exercise of that jurisdiction in the particular circumstances of this case, at any rate, is highly improper, uncalled for and illegal. 18. In this connection, Mr. Kunhirama Menon has drawn my attention to some of the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, where a party who had not alleged or given any particulars of the corrupt practice alleged in the petition, has not been given permission to go to trial on that allegation. Again, Mr. Kunhirama Menon, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Y. B. Chavan v. K. T. Mangalamuri (A. I. R. 1958 Bombay 397) where the High Court has interfered in such circumstances. 19. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Audesh Pratap Singh v. Brij Narain (A. I. R. 1954 All. 245) where the learned Judges have held that under Art. 226 of the constitution it is perfectly open to the High Court to interfere with an order of a subordinate Tribunal, if the later has over-reached the provisions of law. 20. On the other hand, Mr. P. K. Krishnanakutty Menon, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, supported the order of the Election Tribunal. The learned counsel contended that the amendments, effected by Act XXVII/1956 to the Representation of the people Act, 1951, have not in any way, altered the position and that the Election Tribunal has ample jurisdiction and power to order amendments by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of section 90 of the Act. 21. Quite naturally, Mr. The learned counsel contended that the amendments, effected by Act XXVII/1956 to the Representation of the people Act, 1951, have not in any way, altered the position and that the Election Tribunal has ample jurisdiction and power to order amendments by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of section 90 of the Act. 21. Quite naturally, Mr. P. K. Krishnankutty Menon placed considerable reliance upon the observations of their Lordhsips of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh (A. I. R.1957 S. C. 444) to the effect that it is open to a party not only to clarify particulars of corrupt practice already alleged, but also to give fresh and new particulars and in those circumstances, the amendments ought to be allowed. 22. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 770) where their Lordships have accepted the position that notwithstanding the changes effected in the Act, the Election Tribunal has got jurisdiction to make the necessary amendments, if the circumstances of the case required it. 23. Apart from all these, Mr. P. K. Krishnankutty Menon, based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Veluswami v Raja Nainar (A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 422), as well as two recent Division Bench rulings of this Court namely, in O. P. 1205/60 and A. s 729/60, (Since reported in 1960 K. L. J. 1519 and 1960 K. L. J. 1398 respectively) contended that this Court should not interfere under Article 226 at an interlocutory stage. The contention is that the matter will come up before this court ultimately in regular appeal, which is specifically provided for under section 116 A of the Act and all these points can be appropriately considered by this Court in that appeal as and when filed. 24. After considering the various contentions raised on both sides by the learned counsel, aswell as taking into account the reasons given by the Election Tribunal for allowing the amendment, in the circumstances of this case, in my opinion, I am not satisfied that any interference is called for at the hands of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 25. Before Ideal with the actual contentions of Mr. 25. Before Ideal with the actual contentions of Mr. Kunhirama Menon I may very well indicate the position of this court Art. 226 regarding interference on matters which are purely of an interlocutory character. 26. That such an interference should not be made is laid down by the Supreme Court in Veluswami v. Raja Nainar (A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 422). The relevant observation is to be found at page 429 which is as follows: As the question has also been raised as to the propriety of interfering in writ petition under Art. 226 with interlocutory orders passed in the course of any enquiry before the Election Tribunal, we shall expires our opinion thereon. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against orders of the Tribunal is undoubted but then, it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided, the court may properly exercise the discretion in declining to interfere under Art. 226. It should be remembered that under the election law, as it stood prior to the amendment in 1956. Election petitions were dismissed on preliminary grounds and the correctness of the decision was challenged in applications under Art. 226 and in further appeals to this Court, with the result that by the time the matter was finally decided, the life of the Legislature, for which the election was held, would have itself very nearly come to an end, thus rendering the proceedings infructuous. It is to remedy this defect that the Legislature has now amended the Law by providing a right to appeal against a decision of the Tribunal to the High Court under Section 116A, and its intention is obviously that proceedings before the Tribunal should go on with expedition and without interruption, and that any error in its decision should be set right in an appeal under that section. In this view; it would be a proper exercise of discretion under Art. 226 to decline, to interfere with interlocutory orders. I may also advert to another observation of their Lordshipas of the Supreme Court reported in S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna (A. I. R. 1960 S. C.368 at 375). Mr. In this view; it would be a proper exercise of discretion under Art. 226 to decline, to interfere with interlocutory orders. I may also advert to another observation of their Lordshipas of the Supreme Court reported in S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna (A. I. R. 1960 S. C.368 at 375). Mr. Justice Subba Rao delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench observes: Courts and Tribunals are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of statutory limitations, and undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp their powers, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted. We must make it clear that within the limits prescribed by the decisions of this court. The same well-settled principles laid down in the matter of amendments to the pleadings in a suit should also regulate the exercise of the power of amendment by a Tribunal. This aspect has not been ignored by this court in the aforesaid decision, and the court observed at page 456 in Harish Chandra v Tribunal (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444 at 456):- It is not doubt true that pleadings should not be too strictly construed, and that regard should ne had substance of the matter and not the form. These principles have been reiterated by the learned Chief Justice sitting with Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair in two decisions of our High Court namely, O. P.No. 1205 and A. S. 729/60. In A. S. 729/60, the learned Chief Justice observes:- It is further well-established that the writ is generally not issued where the orders asked to the vacated be on interlocutory applications before the lower tribunals. Again, the learned Chief Justice observes:- The question, however, for adjudication in this appeal is whether grounds have been established to justify our interference by writ of certiorari against an order on an interlocutory application: and in deciding the question the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Veluswamy v. Raja Nainar (A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 422 at p 429) is decisive. We are further fortified by A. Sanjeevi Reddi v. G. C. Kondayya A. I. R. 1960 A. P. 421), in the view we are taking. We are further fortified by A. Sanjeevi Reddi v. G. C. Kondayya A. I. R. 1960 A. P. 421), in the view we are taking. It follows that unless the order challenged before us goes to the very root of the election proceeding, as was held in Y. B. Chavan v. Mangalamurti ( A. I. R. 1958 Bom. 397), the writ should not be issued. Again, the learned Chief Justice reiterates the same position, if I may say so with respect, in O.P. 1205/60. The learned Chief Justice observes:- It is clear that interference by certiorari in interlocutory orders is rare and justified under extra-ordinary circumstances. The learned Chief Justice later on refers to certain passage from American Jurisprudence and also on Extraordinary Legal Remedies by Ferris. The learned Chief Justice again refers to the observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Veluswami v. Raja Nainar (A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 422 at p. 429), which I have already extracted earlier. Ultimately the learned Chief Justice after referring to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. Sanjeevi Reddy v. G. C. Kondayya (A. I. R. 1960 A. P. 421), comes to the conclusion that an interlocutory order passed by the Election Tribunal should not be interfered with and the decision on it should be left over for hearing during the appeal under Section 116-a of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 27. Though I would be perfectly justified in dismissing this application for the issue of a writ, in view of the very weightly pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as the learned Chief Justice of this Court referred to above, I will deal with the merits, more because out of defence to the contention raised before me by the learned counsel on both sides. 28. I will now consider the question as to whether an Election Tribunal, in circumstances like these, has got jurisdiction to allow an amendment. 29. As I mentioned earlier, the contention of Mr. 28. I will now consider the question as to whether an Election Tribunal, in circumstances like these, has got jurisdiction to allow an amendment. 29. As I mentioned earlier, the contention of Mr. Kunhirama Menon was that the observations of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v Triloki Singh (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444) which I will also advert to immediately must be more or less confined to the provisions of the Act as they stood at the relevant time and the position has radically changed after the amendment effected by the Representation of the People (second Amendment) Act, 1956-entral Act XXVII/1956. In my opinion, it is not possible for me to accept this contention of the learned counsel. So far as this aspect is concerned, I will immediately show, by a reference to the various amendments affected to the sections as they stood, as also by a reference to amendments effected to the Act that there is absolutely no material change in the position. 30. Section 83 of the Act prior to its amendment, deals with the contents of an election petition. Sub-section (1) provided for the election petition, containing a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and also provided for its being signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings. Sub-section (2) of Section 83 provided that the petition shall be accompanied by a list signed and verified in like manner setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the petitioner alleges including as full a statement as possible as to the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt or illegal practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice Sub-Section (3) of Section 83 provided: The Tribunal may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may direct at any time allow the particulars include in the said list to be amended or order such further and better particulars in regard to any matter referred to therein to be furnished as may in its opinion be necessary for the purpose of ensuring a fair and effectual trial of the petition. It is not necessary to refer to section 84. 31. It is not necessary to refer to section 84. 31. Section 85 provided that if the provisions of Sections 81, 83 or 117 are not complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the same. The said section also contained a proviso to the effect that the Election Commission may, in its discretion, condone the failure to present the petition within the time on its being satisfied. The Point to be noted here will be that under Section 85, power was given to the Election Commission to dismiss the petition for non0compliance with certain sections, which included Section 83 to which I have already adverted. 32. Sub-section (4) of section 90 of the original Act is as follows:- Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 85, the Tribunal may dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81, section 83, or section 117. That means, the same powers as were given to the Election Commission under Section 85, have been given also to the Tribunal under sub-section (4) of Section 90. That is, the non-compliance with matters covered by section 83 can be taken into account by a Tribunal for dismissing an election petition. That was the position under the Act as it stood originally. 33. The amendments that have been now effected, will be considered presently. Section 83 of the Act as it stands, deals with the contents of an election petition. Under sub-section (1) of section 83 there are three matters mentioned therein namely, that an election petition- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies: (b) Shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice and (c) Shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings. Sub-section (2) of section 83 provided that any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. Therefore, there is not much of a substantial difference between section 83 as it originally stood and as it now stands excepting for certain minor alterations. Sub-section (2) of section 83 provided that any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. Therefore, there is not much of a substantial difference between section 83 as it originally stood and as it now stands excepting for certain minor alterations. The only thing is that there is a new sub-section (2) added to section 83 which requires any schedule or annexure to the petition to be also signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. 34. One significant thing to be noted is that while old section 83 provided in sub-section (3) regarding the particulars to be amended or for making such orders, that is not to be found in the new section 83 itself. That has been carried over as sub-section (5) of section 90 of the new Act to which I will advert to after noting section 85 and section 90(3) of the Act. Section 85 provides that if the provision of section 81 or section 82 or section 117 have not been compiled with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition. It will be noted that whereas under Section 85 of the Original Act, non-compliance with the provisions contained in section 83 of the Act was also one of the grounds for giving jurisdiction to the Election Commission to dismiss the same, under the new section 85, no such powers on. Non-compliance with the provisions of section 83, for dismissing, have been to the Election Commission. 35. Again sub-section (3) of section 90 of the new Act gives power to the Election Tribunal to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81, section 82 or section 117 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under section 85. 36. It has been noted that under section 90(4) of the old Act. It was provided: Notwithstanding anything contained in section 85, the Tribunal may dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81, section 83 or section 117. But under sub-section (3) of section 90 of the Act as it stands at present, there is no power given to the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of section 83 of the Act. But under sub-section (3) of section 90 of the Act as it stands at present, there is no power given to the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of section 83 of the Act. Therefore, under the Act as it stands at present, neither the election commission, nor the Election Tribunal has got either power or jurisdiction to dismiss an election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of section 83 of the Act. 37. Then again section 90(5) of the Act is as follows:- The tribunal may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fir, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. It is on the particular phraseology of this sub-section, that Mr. Kunhirama Menon has placed considerable reliance to show that unless some particulars had already been given in the original petition as such, the party has no right to make amendment by way of new particulars. Nor has a Tribunal has got jurisdiction to allow such an amendment to be made. That will have to be considered later. 38. In My opinion, the provisions of the present sub-section (5) of section 90, are more or less substantially the same as that contained in the old sub-section of section 83. I am only mentioning this for this purpose to show that the observations of the Supreme Court to which I will refer immediately, will apply to the proceedings arising under the present sub-section (5) of section 90 also. So far s the question of amendment by allowing fresh particulars or further particulars being incorporated in the original petition is concerned, the position has been and continues to be the same both under the Act before the amendment and the Act after its amendments. So far s the question of amendment by allowing fresh particulars or further particulars being incorporated in the original petition is concerned, the position has been and continues to be the same both under the Act before the amendment and the Act after its amendments. The particular point to be noted by virtue of these amendments will be that whereas under the Act as it originally stood, power was given both to the Election Commission as well as to the Election Tribunal to dismiss an application, if it does not comply with any of the provisions contained in section 83, the new Act does not give any such power to either the Election Commission or to the Election Tribunal for dismissing an application for non-compliance with the provisions of section 83. 39. Mr. Kunhirama Menon contended that under section 83(3) of the Act as it stood, power is given to the Tribunal itself to ask for clarification or to direct suitable amendments to be made and there was also the question of the election petition itself being dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of section 83 and that power was given both to the Election Commission as well as to the Election Tribunal. The position under the Act prior to its amendment was very severe and therefore, the Supreme Court, taking into consideration the hardship that may be caused to a party by denying a right to add to the particulars or give particulars, have made very considerate observations about the powers of the Tribunal to effect necessary amendments. In my opinion, there is absolutely no basis for this interpretation to be placed, or that this was a circumstance which operated in the minds of their Lordships of the Supreme Court when they made the particular observations contained in Harish Chandra v Triloki Singh (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444). At page 452, their Lordships observe: Section 83(3), it is urged, allows first by an amendment of the particulars included in the list, and secondly further and better particulars in regard to any matters referred to therein and that, according to the appellants, means the particulars already given in the list. At page 452, their Lordships observe: Section 83(3), it is urged, allows first by an amendment of the particulars included in the list, and secondly further and better particulars in regard to any matters referred to therein and that, according to the appellants, means the particulars already given in the list. It is according contended that the power to allow further and better particulars can be exercised only in respect of particulars already furnished; whether they be contained in the body of the petition or in the list, and that therefore an order permitting inclusion of new instance is outside the purview of section 83(3). The assumption underlying this contention is that the word matter in section 83(3) means the same thing as particulars. We see no reason why we should put this narrow construction on the word matter. That word is, in our opinion, of wider import than particulars, and would also comprehend the grounds on which the election is sought to be set aside. If the construction contended for by the appellant is correct the relevant portion of section 83(3) will read as further ad better particulars in regard to any particulars referred to therein, and that does not appeal to us to be either a natural or a reasonable reading of the enactment. Having regard to the scheme of the Act stated above, we think that section 83 (3) is intended to clothe the Tribunal with a general power to allow not merely an amendment of particulars already given but also inclusion of fresh particulars, pleading new instances, subject to the condition that they are in respect of a ground set out in the petition. This is in accordance with the law and practice obtaining in the Election courts in England. Again, their Lordships summing up the position at page 455 observe as follows: The result of the foregoing discussion may thus be summed up: (1) Under S. 83(3) the Tribunal has power to allow particulars in respect of illegal or corrupt practices to be amended, provided he petition itself specifies he grounds or charges and this power extends to permitting new instances to be given. (2) The Tribunal has power under Order 6, Rule XVII to order amendment of a petition but that power cannot be exercised so as to permit new grounds or charges to be raised or to so alter its character as to make it in substance a new petition, if a fresh petition on those allegations will then be barred. If I may say so with respect, the emphasis that is laid by Their Lordships is that the original petition must contain the grounds or charges of attack and that it is open to a Tribunal to allow instances or particulars regarding the original grounds or charges of attack already made in the petition and Their Lordships also say that the aid power extends to permitting new instances to be given. 40. In this case, there cannot be any controversy that the two grounds of attack made in the election petition against the election of the petitioner before me are of corrupt practice namely (1) in conveying the voters in jeeps employed by the petitioner to the polling stations; and (2) corrupt practice by offering bribes to the voters for securing votes. So long as the original petition is based upon these corrupt practice, in my opinion, what is sought to be done in this case is to give particulars or instances or that corrupt practice. It is not as if that the respondent by asking for this amendment, is trying to add a third ground of attack, or a third ground of charge to sustain his election petition. 41. These observation of the Supreme Court clearly down that the Election Tribunal has got jurisdiction to allow a party to introduce new and fresh particulars also notwithstanding that those particulars have not been give in the original election petition. 42. It is not possible for me to accept the contention of Mr. Kunhirama Menon that the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 90, in any way, has curtailed the powers of the Tribunal, or has altered the situation so as to make the decision of the Supreme Court not applicable in respect of amendments ordered on the basis of section 90(5) of the Act. In my opinion, a reading of the original sub-section (3) of section 83 along with sub-section (5) of section 90 clearly gives the impression that substantially the wording in both the sub-sections are the same. In my opinion, a reading of the original sub-section (3) of section 83 along with sub-section (5) of section 90 clearly gives the impression that substantially the wording in both the sub-sections are the same. If that is so, I fail to see why the principles laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court to which I have already referred cannot apply to amendments ordered on the basis of section 90(5) of the Act, as it now stands. More or less, this position even under the new Act has been accepted by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 770). At page 774, their Lordships observe: By the Representation of the people Act, 1951 as amended by Act XXVII of 1956, a penalty of dismissal of a petition or the striking out of the plea of corrupt practice merely because particulars in that behalf are not set out is not imposed. By S. 90, cl. (5) of the Act the Tribunal is authorised to allow particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition, to be amended or amplified in such manner as may, in its opinion, be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition. By S. 90 (1) of the Act every election petition is, subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder to be tried as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of suits; and for failure to furnish particulars after being so ordered, but not before. The Tribunal may strike out a defective plea. The practice to be followed in cases where insufficient particulars of a corrupt practice are set forth in an election petition is this. An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of a corrupt practice alleged in the petition, are not set out. Whether an objection is raised by the respondent that a petition is defective because full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are not se out, the Tribunal is bound to decide whether the objection is well-founded. Whether an objection is raised by the respondent that a petition is defective because full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are not se out, the Tribunal is bound to decide whether the objection is well-founded. If the Tribunal upholds the objection, it should give an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged; and in the event on non compliance with that order the Tribunal may strike out the charges which remain vague. Insistence upon full particulars of corrupt practices is undoubtedly of paramount importance in the trial of an election petition, but of the parties go to trial despite the absence of full particulars of the corrupt practice alleged, and evidence of the contesting parties is led on the plea raised by the petition, the petition cannot thereafter be dismissed for want of particulars, because the defect is one of procedure and not one of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the plea in the absence of particulars. 43. Therefore, in my opinion, their Lordships of the Supreme Court again contemplate powers being vested in the Election Tribunal by virtue of section 90(5) of the Act for making necessary amendments as it may be found necessary in the particular circumstances of the case. In fact, their Lordships have laid down that where objection is raised by a respondent that a petition is defective because of lack of particulars of alleged corrupt practice, the Tribunal after coming to the conclusion that the objection is well-founded, should give an opportunity to the other party to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged and that if a party is prepared to go to trial without furnishing any particulars, he must be prepared to take the consequences for his own Act. Therefore, in my opinion, the principles laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Harish Chandra v Triloki Singh (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444) in particular, and also in Balwan Singh v. Lekshmi Narain (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 770) clearly show that in circumstances like these, he Election Tribunal has ample jurisdiction by virtue of powers vested in it under section 90(5) of the Act. 44 In view of these definite pronouncements by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, I do not think it really necessary to consider the decisions relied upon by Mr. Kunhirama Menon, or the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied on by Mr. P. K. Krishnankutty Menon, learned counsel for the respondent. These give only instances where a particular party has applied for an amendment and the High Court has declined to interfere with the order of a Tribunal granting an amendment, or in cases where a party, without even caring to ask for an amendment of his application, which suffers from lack of particulars, is prepared to go for trial on the original charge of a corrupt practice. 45. The decision relied upon by Mr. Kunhirama Menon reported in Y. B. Chavan v. K. T. Mangalamurti (A. I. R. 1958 Bombay 397) need not detain me long, because I have already shown that the learned Chief Justice ,in the two judgments of our High Court, that I have already referred to, adverts to this Bombay decision and holds that that was an extreme case where the objection raised, goes to the very root of the matter and therefore, interference may be necessary even at the interlocutory stage, especially when parties would be put to unnecessary hardship and expense. No such circumstances exist in this case before me. If the particulars had already been given in the election petition itself, the petitioner before me would have no grievance and cannot prevent the respondent from proceeding to trial and examining those parties on his side. Ultimately, in my opinion, the contention that the Election Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to allow an amendment when those particulars were not referred to at all in the original election petition, cannot be sustained and it has to be rejected. 46. Then the question arises as to whether the Tribunal has exercised its discretion properly. That is really an attack upon the exercise of power as such vested in the Election Tribunal. On this respect, Mr. Lunhirama Menon referred me to the following circumstances viz., that the election petition itself has been filed as early as 12-3-1960. It did not contain, at any rate, so far as the allegation of corrupt practice of bribery was concerned, any particulars or instance. On this respect, Mr. Lunhirama Menon referred me to the following circumstances viz., that the election petition itself has been filed as early as 12-3-1960. It did not contain, at any rate, so far as the allegation of corrupt practice of bribery was concerned, any particulars or instance. Objection was taken in the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner regarding lack of particulars on this aspect. Nevertheless, the respondent kept quiet. Again, when the respondent was examined in court as P. W. 1 on 11-6-60, objections was taken by the petitioner in this court that the respondent cannot go to trial on the cases of corrupt practice of bribery, because no particulars had been given. It was after such an objection was taken that the respondent has filed the present application on 12-7-60. Even, here Mr. Kunhiraman Menon contended that the respondent is prepared to swear to an affidavit that he was not aware of the various particulars which he has mentioned by way of an amendment at the time when he filed the original petition on 12-3-1960. But when the respondent was in the witness box, he has clearly admitted that he was aware of the various instances of bribery and he was also further aware as to when the amounts were paid by the present petitioner, and to whom, at what time, and what place. Mr. Kunhirama Menon, learned counsel contended that there was, at any rate an improper or illegal exercise if discretion by the Election Tribunal. 47. In this connection, Mr. Kunhirama Menon alo adverted to the findings of the Election Tribunal itself on this aspect to the effect that the reason given in the respondent's statement in the amendment application is different from what he deposited to in his evidence and therefore, it naturally follows that the application is not made in good faith and is a pure after thought. If I am sitting as a court of appeal reviewing the amendment actually made, in the circumstances, it may be that I may come to quite a different conclusion and the amendment may not have been allowed. But the question is, can it be stated that the exercise of that discretion is so improper, perverse, or illegal, that it requires interference at the hands of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution? But the question is, can it be stated that the exercise of that discretion is so improper, perverse, or illegal, that it requires interference at the hands of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution? In this connection, it is desirable to bear inmind the observations of His Lordship Mr. Justice Subba Rao in S. M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 368). The learned Judge, even in considering the right of an appellate court to interfere with an order of amendment made by an Election Tribunal, observes as follows at page 377: That apart, could it be said that the High Court was justified in the circumstances of this case to interfere with the discretion of the Tribunal? An appellate court has no doubt an unquestioned right to review or modify the order made by a subordinate court, but it is undesirable to do so when the subordinate court made an order in the exercise of its discretion without exceeding the limits of its power, unless it acted perversely or unless the view taken by it is clearly wrong. 48. If the Election Tribunal probably had not adverted to any of these circumstances, or has entered a perverse finding on that matter, probably, that may be an extreme case which may provide some justification for interference. But in this case, it is seen that the Election Tribunal has adverted to all these circumstances namely, the fact that these particulars were not given in the original petition; the fact that an amendment application was filed only after an objection was taken; and the further fact of the difference in the versions given by the respondent in the affidavit as well as in the evidence before the court. It was also considered the question of delay. But considering all these aspects when it has got jurisdiction to exercise its powers in one way or the other, the Election Tribunal has decided to exercise that discretion in favour of granting the amendments asked for. 49. It may be that, as I indicated earlier, this Court may come to a different conclusion. But that by itself will not justify this court in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Election Tribunal in favour of the respondent. 50. There is another circumstance which has also to be taken into account. 49. It may be that, as I indicated earlier, this Court may come to a different conclusion. But that by itself will not justify this court in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Election Tribunal in favour of the respondent. 50. There is another circumstance which has also to be taken into account. That is, after a consideration of the various circumstances for and against the respondent in the matter of asking for an amendment, the Election Tribunal has really restricted his right only to calling in evidence those witnesses whose names have already been given in a list furnished long before the date of the amendment. That list, I find, has been given as early as 13-6-1960. Therefore, the Election Tribunal has really considered also the hardship that may be caused to the petitioner by allowing an inquiry regarding the evidence of very many persons and therefore, in exercising the discretion in favour of the respondent, it has also put him on terms regarding the operation of the order of amendment. Therefore, in the circumstances, I do not think that there is any scope for interference with the order under attack in these proceedings. 51. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed with cost.