JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. On a consideration of the Audit Reports of the Travancore Devaswom Board for the years 1953-'54, 1954-'55, and 1955-'56, we issued notice under S.32(9) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (Travancore-Cochin Act XV/1950) to the Board and also to the members of the Board to show cause why an order of surcharge should not be passed against them, in respect of the various items mentioned in our order. 2. In response to the said notice, the members of the Board have filed a detailed explanatory statement regarding the various matters mentioned in the Audit Report as also in our order, and they have pleaded that they are not guilty of misappropriation or wilful waste of funds of the institutions, or of gross neglect which has resulted in a loss to the institutions under the management of the Board. 3. Apart from taking this plea, they have also raised the question that the provisions of S.32(9) of the Travancore-Cochin Act XV/1950 is void as being opposed to Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore before going into the various irregularities and other matters mentioned in the Auditor's Report, as also the various objections raised by the Board and its members on merits, we decided to hear contentions of the learned counsel on the vires of S.32(9) of the Act. Accordingly, we issued notice to the learned Advocate General. 4. We have heard Mr. T.K. Narayana Pillai, learned counsel for the members of the Board, Mr. V. G. Sankaranarayana Pillai, learned counsel for the Travancore Devaswom Board, and also the learned Government pleader, on the validity of the provisions contained in S.32(9) of the Act. Excepting sub-section 9 of S.32, no other sub-section in the said section, nor any other provision of the Act has been challenged before us by Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, learned counsel for the members of the Board. Therefore, the only question that arises now for decision is as regards the vires of S.32(9) of the Act. Before we deal with the contentions of Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, it is desirable to set out the provisions of S.32 of the Act in extenso:- "Sec. 32 (1) The Board shall keep regular accounts of all receipts and disbursements in respect of the institutions under its administration. (2) The accounts of the Board shall be audited annually. Before we deal with the contentions of Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, it is desirable to set out the provisions of S.32 of the Act in extenso:- "Sec. 32 (1) The Board shall keep regular accounts of all receipts and disbursements in respect of the institutions under its administration. (2) The accounts of the Board shall be audited annually. (3) The audit shall be made by auditors appointed by the High Court. (4) Every auditor appointed under this section shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of S.15 of the Travancore Penal Code. (5) After completing the audit for any year or for any shorter period or for any transaction or series of transactions, as the case may be, the auditor shall send a report to the High Court. (6) The auditor shall specify in his report, all cases of irregular, illegal or improper expenditure or of failure to recover moneys or other property due to the Board or to the institutions under their management or of loss or waste of money or other property thereof caused by neglect or misconduct. (7) The auditor shall also report on any other matter relating to the accounts, as may be prescribed, or on which the High Court may require him to report. (8) The High Court shall send to the Board, a copy of every audit report, and it shall be the duty of the Board to remedy any defects or irregularities pointed out by the auditor and report the same to the High Court. (9) If, on a consideration of the report of the auditor or otherwise, the High Court thinks that the Board or any member thereof was guilty of misappropriation or wilful waste of the funds of the institutions or of gross neglect resulting in a loss to the institutions under the management of the Board, the High Court may, after giving notice to the Board or the member as the case may be, to show cause why an order of surcharge should not be passed against the Board or the member, and after considering the explanation, if any, pass an order of surcharge against the Board or the member, as the case may be. (10) The order of surcharge may be executed against the member or members concerned of the Board as if it were a personal decree passed against them by the High Court. (11) An order of surcharge under this section shall not bar a suit for accounts against the Board or the member concerned, except in respect of the matter finally dealt with by such order. (12) A copy of the audit report shall be supplied to any person who duly applies for the same." The general scheme of the Act will be adverted to later. It will be seen that under this provision, the auditors are to send their audit reports to the High Court and in the said report the auditors have to specify all cases of irregular, illegal or improper expenditure or failure to recover monies or other property due to the Board or to the institutions under their management as also loss or waste of money or other property caused by neglect or misconduct. Under sub-section 9 of S.32, the High Court is given the power to pass an order of surcharge against the Board or the member after giving notice to show cause, if the High Court thinks that the Board or any member is guilty of misappropriation, wilful waste of funds or of gross neglect which has resulted in loss to the institutions under the management of the Board. 5. According to Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, the ordinary procedure that will be otherwise available to a trustee of an institution, if a suit is filed, namely, of taking the appropriate defence in a written statement, filing documentary evidence, adducing oral evidence, examining and cross examining witnesses and taking the matter in appeal from the decision of a subordinate court, are all denied to the members of the Travancore Devaswom Board and as such, there has been a denial of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. In this connection, Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai drew our attention to S.105 of the same Act, contained in Part II relating to the Cochin area. The particular part of S.105 on which Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai bases an argument about his clients' being discriminated against, is sub-section 2 of S.105. In this connection, Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai drew our attention to S.105 of the same Act, contained in Part II relating to the Cochin area. The particular part of S.105 on which Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai bases an argument about his clients' being discriminated against, is sub-section 2 of S.105. The other parts of the said section are more or less analogous to the provisions contained in S.32 sub-sections 1 to 8 and 10 to 12. S.105(2) is as follows:- "If, on a consideration of the report of the auditor or otherwise, the High Court thinks that the Board or any member thereof was guilty of misappropriation or wilful waste of the fund or of gross neglect resulting in a loss to the incorporated or unincorporated Devaswoms or institutions under the management of the Board, the High Court may, after giving notice to the Board or the member, as the case may be, to show cause why an order of surcharge should not be passed against the Board or the member and after considering the explanation, if any, after taking such evidence as the High Court deems necessary, pass an order of surcharge against the Board or member, as the case may be." According to Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, S.105(2) provides for the High Court, if it considers necessary, to take evidence which has to be considered along with the explanation, before an order of surcharge is to be passed. But so far as the Travancore Devaswom Board is concerned, which is dealt with under Part 1 of the Act, there is no provision in S.32(9) of the Act which, either gives a right to a party in the position of his clients to adduce evidence, nor is there a power given to the High Court to take evidence even if it considers it necessary. Therefore, there has been a very serious discrimination practised as against his clients, inasmuch as that they have not only been deprived of the ordinary procedure available to them in law in a suit in a subordinate court, but even in the matter of adducing evidence before the High Court, his clients' rights have not been safeguarded. 6. Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai further contended that the High Court, functioning on the basis of S.32(9) of the Act, has no powers, apart from those specifically given to it under the said sub-section. 6. Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai further contended that the High Court, functioning on the basis of S.32(9) of the Act, has no powers, apart from those specifically given to it under the said sub-section. Therefore, even if the High Court is otherwise inclined to show indulgence, by way of permitting the members of the Board to adduce evidence, the High Court will really be acting without jurisdiction. 7. Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai also contended that there is no right of appeal provided by the Statute against the order of surcharge that may be passed by the High Court. If a suit is instituted in the ordinary way against his clients for recovery of any amounts, and in spite of their defence a decree is passed, they can avail themselves of the right of appeal, that they will get against, the decrees of the subordinate courts. But by giving powers to the highest court in the State even in the first instance, there has been a deprivation of the right of appeal and as such, there is also discrimination practised against his clients. On the other hand, the learned Government pleader contended that the principles that have to be applied before striking down a Statute or any of its provisions on the ground that it is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, have, been laid down in a series of decisions by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The learned Government pleader also contended that it is necessary to ascertain the policy of the Statute and the object sought to be achieved by the same. A reference to the preamble to Act XV/1950 clearly shows that it was found necessary to make provision for the proper administration, supervision, and control of incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and other Hindu Religious Endowments and Funds. A perusal of the relevant sections, according to the learned Government pleader will also show that considerable powers have been vested in the Devaswom Board and therefore, the Legislature thought that the Board and its members must be classified separately and it is his further contention that the classification is rational and based on intelligible differentia. It is also his contention that the basis of differentiation has rational nexus with the avowed policy and the object of the Act. It is also his contention that the basis of differentiation has rational nexus with the avowed policy and the object of the Act. These are the tests which have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, and these two tests are amply satisfied in this case and therefore, there is no question of S.32(9) of the Act violating the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 8. The learned Government pleader further contended that a perusal of the various sub-sections and in particular, sub-section 9 of S.32 of the Act will clearly show that the functioning authority therein is the High Court which is the highest court in the State. Therefore, it cannot certainly be stated that access to a court as such has been negatived in this case to the Board or to its members. When the High Court is functioning as a court, it has got all the powers of a court and it is open to the High Court when exercising its powers to adopt such procedure as it thinks necessary before arriving at a conclusion on this matter. According to the Government pleader, the manner and the mode of arriving at a decision in respect of this matter is entirely left to the High Court which functions as a court. When jurisdiction is conferred on a court, and not on its Judges as persona designata, it follows that it has got all the powers of a court, which includes also a power to permit the parties to adduce evidence, if the High Court thinks fit. 9. On this basis, the learned Government pleader contended that the fact that there is an additional provision "for taking such evidence as the High Court thinks it necessary" in S.105(2) does not in any way alter the situation. Even without any such provision, S.32(9), as it stands, does not in any way take away the powers of this court to take evidence, if it thinks otherwise necessary. 10. The learned Government Pleader further contended that it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the Board or trustees will have a right of appeal against an order of surcharge passed by this court under S.32(9) of the Act. 10. The learned Government Pleader further contended that it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the Board or trustees will have a right of appeal against an order of surcharge passed by this court under S.32(9) of the Act. A right of appeal is the creation of the Statute and even assuming that there is no right of appeal, that does not in any way, affect the vires of S.32(9) of the Act. Ultimately, the learned Government pleader contended that applying the various tests and principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the sub-section 9 of S.32 of the Act is not in any way, hit by the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 11. After hearing the learned counsel on both sides, we are satisfied that it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, that sub-section 9 of S.32 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (T. C. Act XV/1950) is hit in any way, by Art. 14 of the Constitution. Though Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai referred us to various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, in some of which a particular Statute or a part of a Statute has been struck down as being hit by the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it may not be necessary for us to go into the earlier decisions in view of the fact that the position has been reiterated in a later decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ), and more recently in the decision reported in Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1960 SC 457 ). In both these judgments the earlier decisions dealing with Art. 14 of the Constitution, have been dealt with and the effect of those decisions have also been summarised. Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, no doubt, laid particular emphasis on certain observations contained in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sirkar ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ); Ameerunnissa v. Mahboob Begum (AIR 1953 S. C. 91); and Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar (AIR 1953 S. C. 215) where the particular enactments in question therein were held to be hit by the provisions of Art. 14. Mr. Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai contended, that if the object of the Legislature, in enacting S.32(9) is a speedy disposal of the question of surcharge which if the normal procedure of a suit, etc. is followed will entail considerable delay, then it will not furnish a basis for a reasonable classification so as to deny his clients' rights available under the ordinary law. In this connection, Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai referred to the following observations of Mr. Justice Mahajan in the decision reported in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (AIR 1952 S. C. 75 at page 86): "Speedier trial of offences may be the reason and motive for the legislation but it does not amount either to a classification of offence or of cases. As pointed out by Chakravarthi J. the necessity of a speedy trial is too vague and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a valid and reasonable classification. In the words of Das Gupta J. it is too indefinite as there can hardly be any definite objective test to determine it. In my opinion, it is no classification at all in the real sense of the term as it is not based on any characteristics which are peculiar to persons or to cases which are to be subject to the special procedure prescribed by the Act. The mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of Art. 14. To get out of its reach it must appear that not only a classification has been made but also that it is one based upon a reasonable ground on some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification and is not a mere arbitrary selection." 12. No doubt, the Supreme Court held in that case that the provisions of S.5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act X/1950 are ultra vires the Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with Art. 14 of the Constitution. 13. But so far as the guiding factors in such matters are concerned, Mr. Justice Mahajan in the same decision at page 85 observes as follows: "By the process of classification the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of the legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. But so far as the guiding factors in such matters are concerned, Mr. Justice Mahajan in the same decision at page 85 observes as follows: "By the process of classification the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of the legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. The classification permissible, however, must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis." 14. Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai again placed some reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ameemnnissa v. Mahboob Begum ( AIR 1953 SC 91 ) where the provisions of the Waliuddowala Succession Act of 1950 violate the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It will be seen that the purpose of this legislation as appeared from the preamble to that Act, was to end certain private dispute and the learned Judges, after an elaborate discussion of the whole matter, observed at page 94 as follow : "The dispute regarding succession to the estate of the Nawab was a legal dispute pure and simple and without determination of the points in issue by a properly constituted judicial tribunal a legislation based upon the report of a non judicial authority and made applicable to specific individuals, who are deprived thereby of valuable rights which are enjoyed by all other persons occupying the same position as themselves, does, in our opinion, plainly come within the constitutional inhibition of Art. 14." Though their Lordships held that the particular enactment has to be struck down as being hit by Art. 14, the learned Judges also observed at page 94 as follow:- "The nature and scope of the guarantee that is implied in the equal protection clause of the Constitution have been explained and discussed in more than one decision of this court and do not require repetition. It is well settled that a Legislature which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must, of necessity, have the power of making special laws to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it must have large power of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not 'per se' amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause, it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the legislature has in view;" Again, some support was sought to be derived by Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1953 SC 215 ) where their Lordships held that the Bihar Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act -- Act XXXIV/1950 is invalid. The particular passage relied upon by Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai is that contained in the judgment of Mr. Justice Mukherjea at page 220 of the reports: "The dispute here, is a legal dispute pure and simple between two private parties. What the Legislature has done is to single out these two individuals and deny them the right, which every Indian citizen possesses, to have his rights adjudicated upon by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law which applies to his case. The meanest of citizens has a right of access to a court of law for the redress of his just grievances and it is from this right that the appellants have been deprived, by this Act. It is impossible to conceive of a worse form of discrimination than the one which differentiates a particular individual from all his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon anybody else and against which even the right of complaint is taken away. 15. But here again, Mr. Justice Mukherjea has laid down the tests applicable under Art. 14. 15. But here again, Mr. Justice Mukherjea has laid down the tests applicable under Art. 14. Those observations are to be found at page 219 of the report: "There have been a number of decisions by this court where the question regarding the nature and scope of the guarantee implied in the equal protection clause of the Constitution came up for consideration and the general principles can be taken to be fairly well settled. What this clause aims at is to strike down hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality. As the guarantee applies to all persons similarly situated, it is certainly open to the Legislature to classify persons and things to achieve particular legislative objects; but such selection or differentiation must not be arbitrary and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to the object which the Legislature has in view;" In our opinion, the ultimate reasons for striking down the provisions given as such in the various cases referred to above and relied upon by Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai will not assist him in this matter. On the other hand, in our opinion the vires of S.32(9) of the Act will have to be considered by applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, even in the above decisions and which have been reiterated in subsequent decisions also. We will deal with the later decisions of the Supreme Court presently and we will also advert to the general scheme of the Act itself. 16. But before we advert to the points mentioned above, we can dispose of the contentions of Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai on the ground that his clients have no right to adduce evidence in this court in cases when the High Court proposes to take action under S.32(9) of the Act. Such a position is very clear, according to Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, when we refer to the analogous section in the same Act namely, S.105(2) which deals with the powers of the High Court, when dealing with Cochin Devaswoms. Such a position is very clear, according to Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, when we refer to the analogous section in the same Act namely, S.105(2) which deals with the powers of the High Court, when dealing with Cochin Devaswoms. We are in full agreement with the contentions of the learned Government pleader that when jurisdiction, has been given to a court and that to the High Court, it has got all the powers of a court and the manner or procedure for arriving at a finding regarding surcharge one way or the other is entirely a matter for the High Court. In consequence of this, it also follows that the High Court, if it considers it necessary, can also take evidence, before passing final orders regarding the proceedings contemplated under S.32(9) of the Act. The fact that S.105(2) also provides for taking such evidence as it deems necessary and the absence of such provision in S.32(9) of the Act do not, in our opinion, in any way affect or take away the powers of the High Court, to take evidence if it deems necessary. In fact, so far as we could see, we have not really rejected any request from Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai's clients for taking evidence on the ground that we have no powers under S.32(9) of the Act. Though Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai was at considerable pains to satisfy us that we have no powers to take evidence and that his clients also have no right to adduce evidence in proceedings under S.32(9) of the Act, we are satisfied that this contention of Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai cannot be accepted. On the other hand, in a proper case and if the High Court thinks it necessary, it has got ample powers and jurisdiction to take such evidence that it thinks necessary in proceedings commenced under S.32(9) of the Act. 17. It may now be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Khem Chand v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 300 ). No doubt, their Lordships were dealing with a case under Art. 311 of the Constitution and their Lordships had also to consider what all is included in the expression "reasonable opportunity" occurring in Art. 311(2). No doubt, their Lordships were dealing with a case under Art. 311 of the Constitution and their Lordships had also to consider what all is included in the expression "reasonable opportunity" occurring in Art. 311(2). According to their Lordships, the "reasonable opportunity" envisaged by Art. 311(2) includes "an opportunity to defend himself by cross examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or by any other witness in support of his defence." When that is the case under Art. 311, in our opinion, the proceedings before a court are on a stronger basis. 18. It is not really necessary for us to consider whether there is a right of appeal against an order passed under sec. 32(9) of the Act. After all, a right of appeal is the creation of a statute. Assuming that there is no right of appeal in this case, that by itself is not sufficient to hold that the provisions under consideration, are hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution. 19. The learned Government pleader has referred us to two later decisions of the Supreme Court namely, Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ); and Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1960 SC 457 ). No doubt, there was also a reference at the Bar to the test of reasonableness laid down in some decisions of the Supreme Court under Art. 19; but we do not think it necessary to refer to those decisions, most of which deal with reasonable restriction of the rights of a trustee or otherwise. 20. According to the learned Government pleader, the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved, could be clearly gathered from the preamble and also the various sections of the statute under which very large powers to deal with the funds and properties have been given to the Board and its members. The learned Government pleader also contended that the dual test laid down by the Supreme Court are amply satisfied in this case and therefore, S.32(9) is not in any way, violative of Art. 14. We will now advert to some of the provisions in the enactment, from which could be gathered the policy underlying the Statute and the object that is intended to be achieved by it. We will now advert to some of the provisions in the enactment, from which could be gathered the policy underlying the Statute and the object that is intended to be achieved by it. In the preamble it is stated that it is necessary to make provision for the administration, supervision and control of incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and all other Hindu Religious Endowments and Funds. Part I of the Act extends to Travancore, Part II to Cochin, and Part III to the whole of Travancore-Cochin. 21. The 'Board' is defined in S.2(a) as meaning Travancore Devaswom Board constituted under Chapter II of this Act in accordance with the Covenant. Then there is the definition of "Hindu Religious Endowment". Section 3, in Chapter II vests the administration of the properties and funds of the incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and of Hindu Religious Endowments as well as certain other funds and surplus funds in the Travancore Devaswom Board. Section 4(2) provides for the Board being a body corporate with power to hold and acquire properties in respect of the various Devaswoms and Institutions and Endowments under its management. Section 9 gives power to the High Court to remove any member of the Board on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity on an application made to it. Sub-section 9 provides that such an application is to be heard by a single Judge in the first instance, and if the single Judge feels that there is a prima facie case, the matter is to be referred to a Division Bench who are to pass final orders after making such enquiry as they deem fit. Section 16 gives power to the Board to exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all officers and servants of the Board and of the Devaswom Department. Section 24 casts a duty on the Board to maintain and administer the Devaswom in a state of good repair and make contributions to the Devaswom in or outside the State and meet the necessary expenditure for the customary religious ceremonies, etc. Section 25 deals with Devaswom fund. Section 26 deals with the Devaswom surplus fund and it is also specifically stated that such fund shall be administered by the Devaswom Commissioner appointed by the Board, subject to the direction and control of the Board. Section 25 deals with Devaswom fund. Section 26 deals with the Devaswom surplus fund and it is also specifically stated that such fund shall be administered by the Devaswom Commissioner appointed by the Board, subject to the direction and control of the Board. Sub-section 2 of S.26 permits the Devaswom Commissioner to incur certain expenses, with the special sanction of the Board. Section 29(2) provides that the Devaswom Department shall be under the Devaswom Commissioner, who is appointed by the Board and it will be subject to the supervision, direction and control of the Board. Section 31 provides for the management and affairs of the Devaswoms as well as the daily worships, ceremonies and other festivals under the management of the Board. Section 32(1) provides for the Board keeping regular accounts of receipts and expenses. Section 32(2) provides for the accounts being audited. The report of the auditor is to be sent to the High Court under S.32(5). The various defects mentioned in S.32(6) are to be pointed out by the auditor in the report that he sends to the High Court. Under sub-section 8 of S.32, the High Court is to send to the Board a copy of the audit report and it is the duty of the Board to remedy the defects pointed out by the auditor and also report the same to the High Court. Sub-section 10 of S.32 deals with the execution of the order of surcharge and sub-section 11 provides that an order of surcharge shall not bar a suit for accounts against the Board or the member except in respect of the matter finally dealt with by the order. 22. At this stage, we may mention that Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai was prepared to proceed on the basis that the Board and its members can be considered to be a class by itself but that it does not rest on any rational basis. In view of this, we will be pointing out presently that one of the two tests laid down by the Supreme Court will be satisfied. Then the only other question will be whether the basis or differentiation of the Board and the members of the Board has any rational nexus with the policy and object of the Act. 23. In view of this, we will be pointing out presently that one of the two tests laid down by the Supreme Court will be satisfied. Then the only other question will be whether the basis or differentiation of the Board and the members of the Board has any rational nexus with the policy and object of the Act. 23. From the preamble and the various provisions referred to above, it will be seen that the Board and the members are placed in charge of large amounts of cash and property and large powers are also given to them to deal with the properties in connection with their management of the various trusts and institutions. The object of the Enactment is to make provision for the proper administration, supervision and control of the Devaswoms and other Hindu Religious Endowments and Funds. S.32, in our opinion, is really an essential step, in safe-guarding the trust and the properties and funds, to see that the Board and its members, who are put in charge of the management and administration, discharge their duties properly and are kept under proper check and control from misappropriating or from committing wilful waste of funds or of being guilty of gross neglect which has resulted in a loss to the institution. After all, the main object of those provisions is to see that the interest of the trust is properly safeguarded by taking appropriate action against the members of the Board for recovery of the amounts which has been lost to the trust by the conduct of the guilty Board or the members. The jurisdiction is given to the highest court in the land, and the Legislature, quite rightly has complete confidence that the powers of the High Court will be exercised in a manner which does justice to all parties. In our opinion, in order to see that the amounts lost to the trust is made good as quickly as possible so that the Trust can properly function the provisions of S.32(9) have been designed and those provisions are really for the purposes of safeguarding the interest of the trust. The Board or its members will have ample opportunity to place before the High Court any material that they desire to place to escape any liability for which proceedings have been taken under S.32(9). The Board or its members will have ample opportunity to place before the High Court any material that they desire to place to escape any liability for which proceedings have been taken under S.32(9). It is enough if we advert to the two later decisions of the Supreme Court in this connection namely, those reported in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ) and Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1960 SC 457 ). In the decision reported in Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ), their Lordships had to consider the validity of a notification issued by the Central Government appointing an Inquiry Commission under S.3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. If we may say so with respect there is a very exhaustive discussion about the various principles deducible from the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. Their Lordships quoted the observations of the Supreme Court in Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar ( AIR 1955 SC 191 at 193) to the following effect which is found at page 547 of the reports :-- "...........It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely : (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration..........." At page 547, the learned Chief Justice who spoke for the Bench observes : "The decisions of this Court further establish” (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws." 24. The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws." 24. We may also state that in the above decision, the learned Chief Justice refers to 5 classes of cases under one or other of which a statute, coming up for consideration on the question of its validity, under Art. 14 of the Constitution, may be placed. We may omit classes 3 to 5 enumerated by the learned Chief Justice as they are not relevant for our present purpose. In our opinion, classes 1 and 2, referred to by the learned Chief Justice have to be considered, because according to the learned Government pleader, the present statute comes under class (1) whereas according to Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai, it comes under class 2. Classes 1 and 2 enumerated by the learned Chief Justice are as follows :- (i) "A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a [statute the Court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the Court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjitlal v. Union of India ( AIR 1951 SC 41 ); State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara ( AIR 1951 SC 318 ); Kedarnath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 S. C. 404); V. M. Syed Mohammad & Company v. State of Andhra ( AIR 1954 SC 314 ); and Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1955 SC 191 ). (ii) "A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the Court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum ( AIR 1953 SC 91 ); and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1953 SC 215 )." 25. It will be seen that two of the Supreme Court decisions already referred to, and relied upon by Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai have been referred to by the learned Chief Justice as the type of cases coming under class 2 and that is why the particular statute, concerned in those cases were struck down as an instance of naked discrimination. Though Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai contended that S.32(9) of the Act in question before us comes under class 2, because there is no reasonable basis, appearing in the statute and as such it has to be struck down, we are not able to accept the said contention. On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, in this case the matter will come under class 1 enumerated by the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The statute itself in our opinion, indicates the persons to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons also appears from the preamble as also the various other sections of the statute, already referred to by us. We have already pointed out that Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai has not taken up the position that the Board or its members cannot be considered to be a class by themselves. We have already pointed out that Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai has not taken up the position that the Board or its members cannot be considered to be a class by themselves. Even otherwise, we are satisfied that there has been a rational classification based on an intelligible differentia of the Board and its members as a class. There is no question in this case of any person, coming within the same group or class being left out of the group. The only other question will be whether such differentiation has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. We have already indicated that the preamble to the Act, as well as the various other sections already referred will clearly show that the object sought to be achieved by the Statute is the safe-guarding of the trust by proper administration, supervision and control of the Devaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments and Funds, and for having effective control and check over the Board and its members, who are given very large powers of administration of the properties of the trust. The further object, so far as we could see, is also to see that the loss suffered by a trust by the action or conduct of the Board or the members must be brought back to the trust, the carrying on of which will be absolutely impossible, if funds lost to the trust are not brought back and made available for the carrying on of the trust. Therefore, the making of provisions for surcharging the Board or the members concerned in appropriate cases by virtue of action being taken under S.32(9) of the Act, and in the manner specified, has in our opinion, also a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. 26. The same position has again been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the recent decision reported in Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1960 SC 457 ). Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar, delivering the majority judgment in that case has referred to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court. After a review of the earlier decisions, the learned Judge observes at page 459 as follows :- "The challenge to the vires of the impugned provisions is based on the ground that they violate the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. After a review of the earlier decisions, the learned Judge observes at page 459 as follows :- "The challenge to the vires of the impugned provisions is based on the ground that they violate the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. The scope and effect of the provisions of Art. 14 have been considered by this court on several occasions, and the matter has been clarified beyond all doubt. The equality before law which is guaranteed by Art. 14 no doubt prohibits class legislation but it does not prohibit the Legislature from legislating on the basis of a reasonable classification. If the classification is reasonable and is founded on intelligible differentia and the said differentia have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute based on such reasonable classification the validity of the statute cannot be successfully challenged under Art. 14. These propositions have been repeated so may times during the past few years that they now sound almost platitudinous. Thus the enunciation of the principles which flow from the fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 14 now presents no difficulty ; it is, however, in the application of the said principles that difficulties often arise. In applying the said principles to the different sets of facts presented by different cases, emphasis may shift and the approach may not always be identical; but it is inevitable, that the final decision about the vires of any impugned provision, must depend upon the decision which the court reaches having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, the general scheme of the impugned Act and the nature and effect of the provisions the vires of which are under examination." Again, the learned Judge observes at page 464 as follows: "The result of these decisions appears to be this. In considering the validity of the impugned statute on the ground that it violates Art. 14, it would first be necessary to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it. In this process the preamble to the Act and its material provisions can and must be considered. In considering the validity of the impugned statute on the ground that it violates Art. 14, it would first be necessary to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it. In this process the preamble to the Act and its material provisions can and must be considered. Having thus ascertained the policy and the object of the Act, the court should apply the dual test in examining its validity ; Is the classification rational and based on intelligible differentia ; and, has the basis of differentiation any rational nexus with its avowed policy and object ? If both these tests are satisfied, the statute must be held to be valid ; and in such a case the consideration as to whether the same result could not have been better achieved by adopting a different classification, would be foreign to the scope of the judicial enquiry. If either of the two tests is not satisfied the statute must be struck down as violative of Art. 14." 27. It is clear from the observations of the learned Judge extracted above, that the following matters will have to be considered in deciding the question of the vires of a statute under Art. 14 of the Constitution, namely, (1) ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it. For this purpose, the preamble to the Act and its material provisions can and must be considered. (2) After ascertaining the policy and object of the Act, courts should apply the dual test in examining its validity- (a) Is the classification rational and based on intelligible differentia ? (b) Has the basis of differentia any rational nexus with its avowed policy and objects? (3) If both the tests in requirement No. (2) are satisfied, the statute must be held to be valid : (4) As to whether the same result could not have been better achieved by adopting a different classification is not a matter to be considered, as it is foreign to the scope of the Judicial enquiry; and (5) If either of the two tests in requirement No. (2) is not satisfied, the statute must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 28. 28. We have already indicated the policy and purpose underlying the statute and in particular, the provisions that is attacked namely, sub-section 9 of S.32 of the Act and that decision has been arrived at by having reference to the preamble and also the various other sections of the Act relating to Travancore Devaswoms. 29. We are also satisfied that having in view the policy, object, and purpose of the Act, the classification of the Devaswom Board and its members, as a class or a group, is reasonable and rational. Such differentia, in our opinion, has also a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. That is, in other words, the classification is rational and it is based on intelligible differentia; and the basis of differentiation has a rational nexus with the avowed policy and object of the Act. Therefore the 2 tests laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court are satisfied and the provisions of S.32(9) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950 - T. C. Act XV/1950 - have to be held valid and not, in any way, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 30. The fact that the Legislature could have also allowed these matters to be gone into by way of other proceedings, and even assuming that by adopting such a different procedure, the object of the statute could have been better achieved, is not a matter at all to be considered by us in this connection as pointed out by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above. It may also be pointed out that in that decision, though the Supreme Court was of the view that the procedure prescribed for the trial of cases under the enactment that was challenged, differed in material particulars from the procedure prescribed by the Cr. P. C. and such difference also can be viewed as amounting to discrimination prejudicial to the accused nevertheless, the Supreme Court by its majority view, upheld the validity of the said Act inasmuch as it satisfied the two tests referred to earlier. Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, we are of opinion that the impugned provisions contained in S.32(9) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (T. C. Act XV/1950), cannot be said to contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution. Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, we are of opinion that the impugned provisions contained in S.32(9) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (T. C. Act XV/1950), cannot be said to contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the objections raised on that ground by Mr. T. K. Narayana Pillai are overruled. 31. All these matters will be posted for further consideration 2 weeks from today.