JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. This is a traffic case of a mother killing her new born illegitimate female child by throttling her and then secretly burying the dead body. The appellant is the daughter of P. W. 4. She was married to P. W. 2, but under a deed Ext. P. 4 the marriage was dissolved on 4-3-1958. The accused had 4 children by P. W. 2 and all the children were living with the father. The appellant was living alone in a portion of Melathil house. In another portion of the same house her mother P. W. 4 was living. P. Ws. 1 and 3 are persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the accused's house. While living alone, due to illicit connections, the appellant became pregnant. On 7-12-59, P. Ws. 3 and 4 say that they heard cries of a new born babe from the room of the accused. P. W. 4, the mother was the first to reach the room. She found the door closed and bolted from inside. P. W. 3, the other neighbour also came to the house and found the door closed. Several other neighbours gathered by that time and after an hour the accused opened the door. The mother P. W. 4 got inside and she saw the child lying on the floor of the kitchen. It was a female child. The child was then not crying and traces of blood on the body of the child was noticed by her. The accused then closed the door and all people left the place. 2. P. W. 1 on getting information about this from some of the persons gathered there went to the Fort police station and gave Ext. P. 1 before P. W. 10 the Head constable, who was then in charge of the police station. P. W. 11 the Sub-Inspector was on leave. He was given information and the next day he filed a report before P. W. 6, the Executive First Class Magistrate. They reached the scene at 10. 30 a. m., on 8-12-59. P. W. 6 caused the body of the child to be disinterred from the south-eastern corner of the kitchen room. The place was pointed out by the accused herself. After the body was taken, the Executive First Class Magistrate held the inquest and questioned the witnesses. They reached the scene at 10. 30 a. m., on 8-12-59. P. W. 6 caused the body of the child to be disinterred from the south-eastern corner of the kitchen room. The place was pointed out by the accused herself. After the body was taken, the Executive First Class Magistrate held the inquest and questioned the witnesses. The body of the child was identified by P. W. 4. The accused was then sent to the Women and Childrens' Hospital for examination. P. W. 5, the Assistant Surgeon attached to the General Hospital, Trivandrum conducted the autopsy and after completing the investigation, the accused was charge sheeted for offence under S.302 and 318 I. P. C. 3. In the committing Magistrate's court, the accused stated that she had not committed any offence and stated that somebody else might have killed her child. According to her, immediately after the delivery, she became unconscious. Ext. P. 14 is her statement. In the Sessions Court, she admitted that her marriage with P. W. 2 had been dissolved under Ext. P. 4 and when her attention was drawn to the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 that she was living alone in the western room of the Melathil house, after the dissolution of the marriage and that she became pregnant, the accused admitted the evidence of the witnesses as true. She also admitted that she delivered a child on 7-12-59. According to her she fell unconscious and regained consciousness only by about 3. 30 p. m. and then she found the doors of her room lying open and her new born babe missing. She admitted that the dead body was disinterred by P. W. 6 from her kitchen and that thereafter she was sent for treatment to the hospital. 4. The evidence of P. W. 5 and the post mortem certificate Ext. P. 5 make it abundantly clear that the child was born alive and that death was due to throttling. The doctor noticed one injury in front of the neck. It was an ecchymosis of the size of 1 1/2" x 1/2" on the anterior aspect of the middle of the neck. On dissection of the part, the doctor found dark red coloured blood in the subcutaneous tissue. The doctor noticed one injury in front of the neck. It was an ecchymosis of the size of 1 1/2" x 1/2" on the anterior aspect of the middle of the neck. On dissection of the part, the doctor found dark red coloured blood in the subcutaneous tissue. The doctor says that the wound was antemortem and the injury in the neck noticed by him could be caused by throttling and that the injury noticed could be caused by pressing with the thumb. The doctor is of opinion that such an injury may cause death to a child of the age seen by him. On internal examination, he found on the right side of the heart, dark fluid blood and left side was empty. Both lungs were congested and mottled with rose patches. All symptoms which he noticed have been correctly recorded by him in Ext. P. 5. These symptoms would indicate that the child was born alive and that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of strangulation. Neither the doctor's evidence, nor Modi's Criminal Jurisprudence to which reference was made by the learned counsel for the accused would help him in showing that death must have been caused some other way and not by throttling. On a careful consideration of the doctor's evidence, we are satisfied that the child was born alive and that it died only by being throttled. 5. The next question is whether the prosecution has proved that it was the accused who caused the child's death by throttling. There is no direct evidence and the whole case rests on circumstantial evidence. We are aware that in such a case the circumstantial evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused, but should be consistent with the innocence of the accused. Bearing this well settled principle in mind we will now consider the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The first circumstance is that the accused had a sufficient motive for causing the death of the child. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 show that the accused was divorced by P. W. 2 long before the occurrence under a dissolution deed Ext. P. 4 dated 4-3-58. This is admitted by the accused. She has no case that even after the dissolution, P. W. 2 was having access to her and she was impregnated by him. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 show that the accused was divorced by P. W. 2 long before the occurrence under a dissolution deed Ext. P. 4 dated 4-3-58. This is admitted by the accused. She has no case that even after the dissolution, P. W. 2 was having access to her and she was impregnated by him. It is seen that she was living alone in a portion of Melathil house. As a result of illicit connections, she became pregnant and gave birth to a child in her room, where she was alone living. That she gave birth to a living female child on that day and that the child died on that day itself is practically admitted by the accused in her 342 statement. All her other children were being maintained by P. W. 2, their father. She had no property or any other means of livelihood. She must have got desperate when the child was born alive and thinking that it would be impossible for her to maintain the child and that the child would be a burden on her, she would have thought of putting an end to the life of the child. Pangs of misery and shame must have, therefore, driven the unfortunate woman to take away the life of her child. 6. P. W. 4 is the mother of the accused. Her evidence shows that the accused was pregnant and at the time of the delivery the accused had kept all the doors and windows closed without giving access to anybody to get inside the room. She says she heard the cries of a new born babe, that she came and stood at the door and that it was not opened. She has also explained why she did not knock at the door and call her. After an hour the accused opened the room and P. W. 4 saw the accused sitting on a mat. P. W. 4 is definite that the accused alone was present inside the room when the door was opened. A little later the door of the kitchen was opened by the accused and P. W. 4 says that she saw the child lying on the floor of the kitchen. She then saw traces of blood on the body of the child. The child was not crying. A little later the door of the kitchen was opened by the accused and P. W. 4 says that she saw the child lying on the floor of the kitchen. She then saw traces of blood on the body of the child. The child was not crying. Immediately afterwards the accused got inside the kitchen and bolted the door. No convincing reasons are given as to why P. W. 4, her own mother should have come forward to perjure in the witness box, in such a serious case entailing even capital sentence. If her evidence is accepted there can be no doubt that the child was born alive and the subsequent death of the child have been caused only by the accused. 7. P. W. 3 lives only 20 feet away from the accused's house. She also speaks to the fact that the accused was living alone in the house and that she heard the cries of a new born babe, not once but twice. She says that on hearing the cry she went to the room where the accused was residing and found both the doors bolted from inside. She also states that she waited there for some time, but the door was not opened and so she left the place. The cross examination of this witness also does not reveal any bias or any motive for this disinterested witness to come and give false evidence. We have been taken through the evidence of these two witnesses and we do not find any reason to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge that they are witnesses of truth and that their evidence could be accepted. The evidence therefore shows that if there was anybody who could have done the act both in regard to the capacity as well as the opportunity of so doing, the appellant was the only person who could have done the act. 8. Then we have the evidence of the Executive First Class Magistrate, P. W. 6. He is a responsible officer. He has categorically stated that the place where from the dead body was disinterred was pointed out to him by the accused herself. The place where the dead body was lying buried was in the kitchen of the accused at the place where the hearth is situated. The place is not accessible to any outsider. He is a responsible officer. He has categorically stated that the place where from the dead body was disinterred was pointed out to him by the accused herself. The place where the dead body was lying buried was in the kitchen of the accused at the place where the hearth is situated. The place is not accessible to any outsider. This conduct on the part of the accused is a strong circumstance connecting the accused with the crime. 9. The statement of the accused that immediately after the delivery, she became unconscious and that the doors of the room were found open is false and incredible and cannot be accepted. It is impossible to believe that some unknown person would have got inside and caused the death of the child. There was no explanation offered by her as to why she buried the dead body inside the kitchen. Her subsequent conduct in not making any complaint to the authorities or to the neighbours about the missing of the child when she regained consciousness also would go to show that the case set up by her is false. If really her story is true and the child had been killed by somebody, she would have created a scene and made a complaint to the Executive First Class Magistrate, P. W. 6 when he came to the house. All these circumstances constitute very strong links in the chain of circumstantial evidence which conclusively show that it was the accused and accused alone who would have caused the death of her new born babe and buried its dead body in her kitchen room. After a careful scrutiny of the entire evidence led on behalf of the prosecution we agree with the conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge that it was the appellant who was responsible for causing the death of the child and burying the dead body. Her conviction under S.302, I. P. C. is correct and has to be upheld. The sentence of imprisonment for life is the minimum that could be passed for the offence of murder. 10. The learned Sessions Judge has convicted the accused under S.318, I. P. C. also and sentenced her to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The conviction is clearly unsustainable and has to be set aside. The sentence of imprisonment for life is the minimum that could be passed for the offence of murder. 10. The learned Sessions Judge has convicted the accused under S.318, I. P. C. also and sentenced her to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The conviction is clearly unsustainable and has to be set aside. S.318 of the Penal Code punishes a person for secretly burying or otherwise disposing of the dead body of a child and so intentionally concealing or endeavouring to conceal the birth of such a child. On the facts of this case it could not be said that there was any concealment of the birth. The birth took place in her room and people gathered on hearing the cry of the new born babe and the accused opened the door and the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 go to show that all the people became aware of the birth of the child. There was then no scope for concealment of the birth of such a child and the complaint Ext. P. 1 given by P.W. 1 shows that all the villagers had known about the birth of the child. 11. In Reg. v. Morris ((1860)2 Cox CC 489) Coltman J. stated that concealment sought to be checked by this type of legislation is that which would keep the world at large in ignorance of the birth of a child. While therefore the offence may on the one hand be committed, even though the pregnancy and delivery be made known to a confidant, so on the other hand, it is not an offence within the section if the endeavour to conceal proceeds from a desire to escape individual observation or anger. It is clear from the evidence in this case that the birth was not concealed from the world at large. S.318 is designed to punish a person for intentionally concealing the birth of the child from the public. 12. Relying on the above case in Sailabala Dasi v. Emperor (AIR 1935 Cal. 489) the Calcutta High Court in a similar case held that an offence under S.318 is not made out when people were aware of the birth of the child. 13. To the same effect is the decision in State v. Kehari Singh (AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat 124). Relying on the above case in Sailabala Dasi v. Emperor (AIR 1935 Cal. 489) the Calcutta High Court in a similar case held that an offence under S.318 is not made out when people were aware of the birth of the child. 13. To the same effect is the decision in State v. Kehari Singh (AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat 124). In that case a Rajput widow was tried for an offence under S.302, and 318, I. P. C. and her uncle was charged for abetment of the offences. Both the accused were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. The State appealed under S.417, Cr. P. C. against the acquittal of the uncle on the charge of the offence under S.318, on the ground that he had admitted that his niece had given birth to a child and that he disposed of the body by throwing it into a well. On the facts, the court held that the birth of the child was known to most of the villagers and no inference could be drawn that the disposing of the dead body of the child was with the intention of concealing the birth of a child within the meaning of the expression in S.318, I. P. C. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these decisions. The question is whether the secret disposal of the dead body of the child was with the intention of concealing the birth of the child. It is important to note that it is the act of secretly disposing of the dead body with the intention of concealment of the birth of the child and not with the intention of concealing the death of the child that is made punishable under S.318, I. P. C. The conviction under S.318 I. P. C. cannot, therefore, be sustained and it is set aside. 14. Criminal Rules of Practice, Rule 207 makes it obligatory on the Sessions Judge in all cases where women are convicted for the murder of their infant children to make a reference through the High Court to the Government with an expression of his opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of reducing the sentence. The learned Sessions Judge, has however omitted to make such a reference. We therefore do it. The learned Sessions Judge, has however omitted to make such a reference. We therefore do it. From the circumstances revealed in the case, we feel that it is a proper case in which the State Government may exercise the powers under S.401, Cr. P. C. and give a substantial reduction of the sentence that has been awarded to the accused. In the result, we confirm the conviction and sentence passed under S.302 I. P. C., but set aside the conviction and sentence passed under S.318 I. P. C. With this modification the appeal is dismissed.