This is an application by the Chief Commissioner of Tripura and the Union Territory of Tripura for the issue of a certificate for preferr­ing an appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4 of 1059 dated 15-1-60" by which this Court directed a Writ of Certiorari to issue quashing the order of dismissal passed on the respondent, a constable by the Superintendent of Police, Tripura. (2) The respondent was a temporary Police constable appointed as such on 18-4-1954 by the Superintendent of Police, Tripura. He had been appointed once before as a constable on 22-5-51 and was dismissed from service on 9-11-51 on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge after his appointment. But he was re-appointed later by the Superintendent of Police, Tripura on 18-4-1954 fully knowing of his earlier conviction in the criminal Court and his dismissal from service on that ground. It may be mentioned here that the condonation of his earlier conviction and dismissal and his re-appointment were due to the reason that he happen­ed to be one of the best foot-bailers in Tripura. On 6-1-58 he was discharged from the service by the Superintendent of Police under Rule 5, Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1949. But it turned out from his subsequent appeals to the Chief Commissioner that he was not merely discharged, but actually dismissed from service because he hap­pened to be an ex-convict in a case of theft and "That the Tripura Administration had decided that he could not be re-employed in any of the departments of the Government. (3) In the Writ petition I held that the termina­tion of service of this temporary servant under such circumstances amounted to a dismissal as a punish­ment visiting him with the evil consequence of debarment from future employment and I followed the well-known Dhingra's case (Parshotam Lai Dhingra v. Union of India) reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 in holding that under such circumstances the respondent was entitled to the protection afforded under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. (4) It was then pointed out that even if he was entitled to the protection under Art. 311(2), proviso (a) of the said Article was an exception to the applica­tion of Article 311(2) and that as the respondent was dismissed from service on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, Article 311(2) will not apply in his case. But my interpretation of Proviso (a) was that it would apply only when a person while in service was convicted on a criminal charge and not in a case where the appointing authority knew full well of his conviction prior to the appointment and did not then consider it a bar to his appointment and that the said prior conviction should not be allowed to be kept in re­serve and to be used against him during his entire subsequent career as a public servant. (5) Now it is argued for the petitioners that the above two findings of mine are substantial ques­tions of law relating to the interpretation of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and that I should Issue a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. (6) With regard to the first question decided by me as to whether the termination of the respon­dent's temporary service amounted to dismissal from service as a punishment visiting the respondent with the evil consequence of debarment from future em­ployment, I do not think that 'a question of law involving an interpretation of the Constitution arises for decision of the Supreme Court. I have only followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhingra's case, AIR 1958 SC 36 . Thus it would at best involve a further interpretation of that decision. I do not think that for that purpose a certificate can be granted. (7) But it was pointed out that a different in­terpretation of that decision was given by the Bom­bay High Court in their decision Kamalakar Shankar Kate v. Principal, Training College for Men, AIR 1960 Bom 9 which I have referred to in my judg­ment. Actually that decision of the Bombay High Court has not given any different interpretation of that decision. The Bombay case also held that where termination of service is accompanied by punish­ment and will foe an obstacle in the way of his gett­ing other employment, it will amount to a dismissal. Actually that decision of the Bombay High Court has not given any different interpretation of that decision. The Bombay case also held that where termination of service is accompanied by punish­ment and will foe an obstacle in the way of his gett­ing other employment, it will amount to a dismissal. Thus that aspect of the Supreme Court decision in Dhingra's case, AIR 1958 SC 36 did not have to-be interpreted by the Bombay High Court. The test which I applied following Dhingra's case, AIR 1958 SC 36 was that in the case of a temporary servant it was not the motive of the authority in terminating his service but the consequences which follow from the order of termination which mattered. I do not think, therefore, that a further interpretation of Dhingra's case, AIR 1958 SC 36 by the Supreme Court is called for and I do not consider that a certi­ficate should be issued for that purpose. (8) The second question decided by me regard­ing Proviso (a) of Article 311(2) no doubt involves an interpretation of the said Proviso. I held that the Proviso would apply only in respect of a con­viction on a criminal charge after the entry of a public servant in service. It was pointed out that the Proviso as it stood did not contain any such qualification. It has to be conceded that such a qualification is not there in actual words. But I interpreted it to mean so, because the dis­missal or termination of service can take place only after an appointment into such service and hence it was the conduct of a person as a public servant after his appointment which can be taken into account for dismissing or removing him from service and hence even though the words were not actually in the Proviso they have to be read into the Proviso by necessary implication. No decisions were brought to my notice for the petitioners or for the respon­dent at the time. (9) But in the course of the arguments on this petition Mr. M. R. Choudhury for the respondent very correctly brought to my notice the decision of the Assam High Court in Jagadindra Nath Gupta v. Inspector General of Assam Rifles reported in AIR 1959 Assam 134. This decision had already been published when I heard the main Writ petition, but neither party then brought it to my notice. M. R. Choudhury for the respondent very correctly brought to my notice the decision of the Assam High Court in Jagadindra Nath Gupta v. Inspector General of Assam Rifles reported in AIR 1959 Assam 134. This decision had already been published when I heard the main Writ petition, but neither party then brought it to my notice. It has been held in the said decision that the ground of conduct mentioned in Proviso (a) to Article 311(2) would refer to a conviction on a criminal charge both before and after the appointment. Thus the interpretation of the Assam High Court would on the face of it run counter to my interpretation of Proviso (a). (10) The facts in the two cases were consider­ably different. In the Assam case the public servant concerned who was convicted before his appointment did not bring the fact of his conviction to the notice of the Government and the Government were quite unaware of such conviction at the time of such appointment. But in the case before me the Govern­ment knew fully well about the said conviction, had once before dismissed him on the ground of con­duct which led to such conviction and again with -the full knowledge of this fact still chose to appoint him. The question of condonation by the Govern­ment of the conduct which led to his conviction would also arise in the case before me. (11) Even after studying the Assam decision, I am still of the view that Proviso (a) would relate only to conduct which led to conviction on a cri­minal charge after entry into service. It is not neces­sary to discuss the matter fully, but only to indicate it. There are indications in the Proviso itself which lead to such a conclusion. Article 311 deals with the case of a person who is a member of the Civil service and the Proviso also deals with the case of such a person. Where the Proviso, therefore, refers to "his" conviction it means the conviction of such a person who is a member of the service. It would mean from this that the conviction must be after he became a member of the service and not before. I must also lay emphasis on the words "has led" in the Proviso. Where the Proviso, therefore, refers to "his" conviction it means the conviction of such a person who is a member of the service. It would mean from this that the conviction must be after he became a member of the service and not before. I must also lay emphasis on the words "has led" in the Proviso. The use of the word "has" again would point to the fact that the conviction must be during his employ­ment and not before. (12) If we give the other interpretation it will lead to difficulties. In the case of a conviction prior to his entry into Government service the question will naturally arise whether the fact of conviction had been brought to the notice of the appointing authority at the time of the appointment. The ques­tion in such a case would really amount to the fact of knowledge of the Government of such conviction at the time of the appointment or of suppression of the fact by the appointee and not the fact of actual conviction. The Government may say that the fact was sup­pressed and the appointee may say that the appoint­ing authority had knowledge and condoned it. Hence an opportunity will have to be given to the person concerned to show that there was no suppression. This can be done only by framing a charge against him for such suppression and by giving him an op­portunity to meet it. In other words, Article 311(2) ought to apply in such cases and the Proviso cannot apply because the question concerned will not be the conviction, but the suppression of such conviction at the time of such appointment. If the appointing authority has condoned the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction at the time of the appointment, I con­sider that Proviso (a) will not apply. (13) Thus a substantial question of law involv­ing the interpretation of Proviso (a) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution arises for the decision of the Supreme Court. It is a question which is of general importance and it is likely to crop up often. An authoritative pronouncement is therefore required. A certificate will therefore issue. (13) Thus a substantial question of law involv­ing the interpretation of Proviso (a) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution arises for the decision of the Supreme Court. It is a question which is of general importance and it is likely to crop up often. An authoritative pronouncement is therefore required. A certificate will therefore issue. (14) It was pointed out for the respondent that as a poor dismissed class IV employee of the Govern­ment he has been starving, that the issue of a certi­ficate would further delay his reinstatement and that he would not be in a position to contest the appeal before the Supreme Court. But these are not considerations to be taken into account by me un­der Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution. It is my duty to issue such a certificate where a substantial ques­tion of law as to the interpretation of the Constitu­tion is involved. Application allowed,