S. T. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a rule taken out at the instance of the petitioner against the respondent the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation for an appropriate writ order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution quashing and setting aside several notices issued by the respondent calling upon the petitioner to demolish and remove that portion of his property coming within the roadline within seven days of the receipt of the notices and to keep the land underneath open. The petition gives rise to a contention which lies in a narrow compass but our decision we are informed and verily believe will affect some other cases of the same nature. The petitioner is the owner of property bearing survey numbers 4225 4225 4224 4224 4224 4222 and 4223 situate in Jamalpur Ward of the city of Ahmedabad. The property is a four-storied building and the petitioner and the members of his family reside in the same. There are four shops on the ground floor of the building. On 22/06/1956 the respondent Corporation issued a notice under sec. 212 (1) (b) of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 to be referred to by us hereafter as the Act calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the land bearing the stated survey numbers should not be acquired and removing the structure thereon as the said structure was within the roadline demarcated by the respondent. The petitioner filed his objections to the same challenging inter alia the legality of the notice and the legality of the position of the alleged roadline. Nothing appears to have been done by the Corporation till 20/06/1960 when it issued notices calling upon the petitioner to remove the structure within seven days of the receipt of the same and to clear the space. These latter are the notices which are challenged on this petition. Various contentions have been raised by the petitioner in his petition. His principal contention and one which has been passed before us is that the Commissioner of the respondent Corporation has imposed and demarcated the roadline relied on by the respondent without following the proper procedure laid down in section 210 (1) (b) of the Act. The contention is that the proper procedure required the Commissioner to obtain approval of the Standing Committee of the Corporation before making any change in the existing roadline. The contention is that the proper procedure required the Commissioner to obtain approval of the Standing Committee of the Corporation before making any change in the existing roadline. It is said that no public notice of the proposal to impose the change in the roadline was issued by the Commissioner by advertising in local newspaper nor was any notice of the proposed change in the roadline put in the street or part of street for which the change in the roadline was proposed to be prescribed. It is further said that no objections were invited to the proposed change in the roadline as required by section 210. Succinctly stated the case of the petitioner is that the Commissioner had no power to impose the change in the roadline complained of by the petitioner and as he admittedly failed to obtain the previous approval of the Standing Committee to the proposed change the notices served on the petitioner are void and inoperative in law and should therefore be quashed by an appropriate writ or order of this Court. It is also the case of the petitioner in the petition that sections 211 and 212 of the Act are ultra vires Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to give a resume of the petitioners case on this aspect since Mr. A. H. Mehta learned Advocate for the petitioner has not pressed the same before us. ( 2 ) IN opposition to the rule the Commissioner of the respondent Corporation has filed an affidavit in which he has denied the correctness of the contention raised in the petition. According to him the notices issued under section 212 were legal. He has stated in his affidavit that there was and is a roadline upon the building of the petitioner and that the same is legal. To his affidavit he has annexed a sketch to which we shall turn a little latter. Another affidavit has been put in on behalf of the respondent Corporation for the purpose of giving the Court a clear and complete idea of the roadline of the Gandhi Road formerly known as Richey Road. That road it is common ground proceeds from Panchkuva Gate to Bhadra. To the latter affidavit is annexed a plan of the roadline to use the terminology of the Act itself the regular line of the street. That road it is common ground proceeds from Panchkuva Gate to Bhadra. To the latter affidavit is annexed a plan of the roadline to use the terminology of the Act itself the regular line of the street. The plan relates to the entire roadline demarcated under the Act of 1925 and is in four sections. There was a roadline for Gandhi Road (Richey Road) prescribed under section 111 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 and as we shall presently point out section 210 has the effect of laying down that that roadline is to be deemed to be a street line for the purpose of the Act of 1959. In his affidavit the Commissioner has stated that there was roadline already prescribed it was not necessary to inform the petitioner or to give a notice to him or any opportunity to him of filing any objections when the change or alteration in the roadline was made. In paragraph 5 of his affidavit he has stated I state that a roadline was formerly prescribed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The said roadline have been shown in red in the Ferrow Plan No. 234 annexed to the order No. E. R. L. 234 passed by the former Municipal Commissioner of the respondent to hereinafter stated. He has also stated in affidavit that is was found that on account of heavy traffic it was necessary to widen the traffic circles or islands and for that purpose to revise the roadline crossing inter alia the survey numbers of the petitioner. There is not doubt and in course of arguments before us it has not been disputed that the purpose of the change made by the Commissioner was to widen me traffic circle for the purpose of helping and controlling traffic at the crossing of Gandhi Road and Danapith Road which proceeds from Danapith towards Delhi Gate. A look at the map before us clearly shows the necessity for the proposed changes in the roadline since it is clear that the proposed changes if effect be given to them will open up the bottle-necks mentioned in the affidavit of the Commissioner. But we are not concerned on this petition with the necessity and propriety of effecting changes in the roadline. But we are not concerned on this petition with the necessity and propriety of effecting changes in the roadline. What we are concerned with is whether the Commissioner in prescribing the change in the roadline challenged on this petition was acting within the scope and ambit of his powers. It is of significance to mention that in his affidavit the Commissioner has accepted that he did not obtain the approval of the Standing Committee before prescribing the changes in the roadline which is of the crux of the matter. His case however is that in demarcating that change or alteration in the roadline he was acting within the scope of his authority and that he was not bound under the Act to obtain the previous approval of the Standing Committee before doing so. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the arguments advanced before us it will be convenient to set out here the material and relevant part of section 210:-210 (1) The Commissioner may a) prescribe a line on one both sides of any public street; provided that every regular line of a public street operative under any law for the time being in force in any part of the City on the day immediately preceding the appointed day shall be deemed to be a street line for the purpose of this Act until a street line is prescribed by the Commissioner under this clause; b) from time to time but subject in each case to the previous approval of the Standing Committee prescribe a fresh line substitution for any line so prescribed or for any part thereof Provided that such approval shall not be accorded unless at least one month before the meeting of the Standing Committee at which the matter is decided public notice of the proposal has been given by the Commissioner by advertisement in the local newspapers and special notice thereof signed by the Commissioner has also been put up in the street or part of the street for which such fresh line is proposed to be prescribed and until the Standing Committee has considered all objections to the said proposal made in writing and delivered at the office of the Municipal Secretary not less than three clear days before the day of such meeting. (2) The line for the time being prescribed shall be called the regular line of the street. (2) The line for the time being prescribed shall be called the regular line of the street. 3) A register with plans attached shall be kept by the Commissioner showing all public streets in respect of which a regular line of the street has been prescribed and such register shall contain such particulars as to the Commissioner may appear to be necessary and shall be open to inspection by any person upon payment of such fee as may from time to time be prescribed by the Standing Committee. 4) (a) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) no person shall construct or reconstruct any portion of any building on land within the regular line of the street except with the written permission of the Commissioner and in accordance with the conditions imposed therein and the Commissioner shall in every case in which he gives such permission at the same time report his reasons in writing to the Standing Committee. (b) No person shall construct or reconstruct any boundary all or a portion of a boundary wall within the regular line of the street except with the written permission of the Commissioner:- provided that if within sixty days after the receipt of an application from any person for permission to construct or reconstruct a boundary wall or a portion thereof the commissioner fails to acquire the land within the regular line of the street under section 213 the said person may subject to any other provision of this Act or the rules or bye-laws proceed with the work of construction or reconstruction of such boundary wall or a portion thereof as the case may be. ( 4 ) THE short argument of Mr. A. H. Mehta here is that it was not within the competence of the Commissioner to make any change in the roadline without obtaining the prior sanction of the Standing Committee. He has in the main relied on clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 210. It will be convenient here to state briefly what the Commissioner did in the matter of the change in the roadline complained of by the petitioner. He has in the main relied on clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 210. It will be convenient here to state briefly what the Commissioner did in the matter of the change in the roadline complained of by the petitioner. There was a roadline prescribed under section 118 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 The Commissioner passed an order under section 210 (1) (a) on 21/02/1955 as under:-SANCTION is hereby accorded under section 210 (1) (a) of the B. P. M C. Act 1949 to prescribe a line of public street in substitution of the line of public street prescribed under the Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 at Ward Raikhad and Kalupur 3 Street No. 38 s. Nos. 4219 4220 4225 to 4229 as shown by Yellow line in the accompanied Ferro Plan No. 234 signed by me. ( 5 ) ESTATE and City Improvement Officer is requested to arrange to show this line in the original roadline tracings and take my initials on the same. ( 6 ) THIS order is annexed as Exhibit A to the affidavit of the Commissioner. The survey numbers mentioned in this order relate to the property of the petitioner and some other structures on the Danapith corner on the crossing of Gandhi Road and the Danapith-Pankornaka road shown in the plan annexed to the affidavit. The change is shown by yellow line on that plan. There is another change shown in yellow line at the other corner of the crossing. The survey numbers of the structures affected by that other yellow line are not those mentioned in the order mentioned above. It is not disputed that the above order does not touch the other yellow line. Apparently another order must have been passed in respect of that other change in the roadline. It may be mentioned at this stage that Mr. Vakil who appears for the Commissioner has stated before us that the Commissioner has made a number of changes in the roadline demarcated under the Act of 1925 without the previous approval of the Standing Committee on the footing that it was competent to him to do so under clause (a) of section 210 (1) of the Act of 1949. The argument urged on behalf of the petitioner disputes the authority of the Commissioner to make any change in the roadline of the nature before us. The argument urged on behalf of the petitioner disputes the authority of the Commissioner to make any change in the roadline of the nature before us. ( 7 ) THE argument on behalf of the petitioner has proceeded that it is not competent to the Commissioner to prescribe any change in a street line once the street line is prescribed. It is said that the substantive part of clause (a) only authorises the Commissioner to prescribe a line on one or both sides of any public street. This line or lines it is said can be only one unit and one entire single line or two entire lines one on either side of the road or one entire double line. The proviso to clause (a) it is said only lays down that until a street line is prescribed by the Commissioner under clause (a) the old line prescribed under the Act of 1925 is to be deemed to be the street line for the purposes of the Act. The proviso says Mr. Mehta only authorises the Commissioner if he so desires to demarcate on his own in place of the old deemed line a street line which may be a single line or two lines one on either side of the road or a double line in respect of any public street. It does not empower him to make any partial alteration in any old line which is to be deemed to be a street line for the purpose of the Act of 1949. In support of this argument he relies on the language of both clauses (a) and (b) and particularly the language of clause (b) The argument is that once a street line is demarcated either originally or in place of a deemed line the Commissioner cannot make any change in it or in any part of it without obtaining the approval of the Standing Committee and satisfying the requirements of the proviso to clause (b) relating to notices objections etc. ( 8 ) IT has been argued on the other hand by Mr. S. B. Vakil learned advocate for the Corporation that the Commissioner of the respondent Corporation acted under clause (a) of sec. ( 8 ) IT has been argued on the other hand by Mr. S. B. Vakil learned advocate for the Corporation that the Commissioner of the respondent Corporation acted under clause (a) of sec. 210 (1) in the matter of passing the order whereby a change was made in the existing roadline and it was not necessary for him to obtain the approval of the Standing Committee before bringing about that change in the roadline. It is urged that clause (a) of section 210 does not speak of any entire line nor does it refer to the whole line of the street. It is said that it will be illogical and a strange result if the Commissioner who is authorized to prescribe the entire line on one or both sides of any public street should not have the power under clause (a) to make any change in the existing deemed roadline by demarcating the same on the existing deemed roadline. The whole burden of Mr. Vakils argument is that clause (a) permits the Commissioner to prescribe a line for a part of a public street. He can do so the argument ran as often as he likes without going to the Standing Committee. In referring to sub-section (2) of section 210 which rules that the line for the time being prescribed shall be the regular line of the street the assertion is that the street line does not mean a line extending the entire length of the street. ( 9 ) THE argument is ill-founded. The scheme and object of section 210 as we understand it is to define and lay down the powers of the Commissioner to prescribe the regular line of the street. The line may be on one side of any public street or it may be on both sides of any public street meaning thereby it may re single line or two single lines one on either side of the road or a double line. But whether single or double it is the regular line of the street and it makes no difference whatever whether it is called roadline or street line. The expressions line of the street and street line are to be found in sub-section (2) itself and the proviso to clause (a) of section 210 (1 ). But whether single or double it is the regular line of the street and it makes no difference whatever whether it is called roadline or street line. The expressions line of the street and street line are to be found in sub-section (2) itself and the proviso to clause (a) of section 210 (1 ). We have to read clauses (a) and (b) together and must see that as far as possible the interpretation we put on them makes a consistent enactment of whole provision. Clause (a) is not a detached enactment but one forming part of one single connected scheme. ( 10 ) MR. Vakil has strongly relied on a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Shankar Dattataya v. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay (1946) 48 Bom. L. R. 434 The facts of that case were materially different and so also was different the dispute which arose for the determination of the Court in that case. It is true that in the judgment in that case their Lordships have made mention of sections 289 291 296 297 298 and 299 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 Section 298 of that Act to which reference was made by their Lordships is as under:-297 (1) The Commissioner may:- (a) prescribe a line on each side of any public street; (b) (b) from time to time but subject in each case to his receiving the authority of the corporation in that behalf. prescribe a fresh line in substitution for any line so prescribed or for any part thereof provided that such authority shall not be accorded (i) Unless at least one month before the meeting of the corporation at which the matter is decided public notice of the proposal has been given by the Commissioner by advertisement in local newspapers as well as in the Official Gazette and special notice thereof signed by the Commissioner has also been put up in the street or part of the street for which such fresh line is proposed to be prescribed and (ii) until the Corporation have considered all objections to the said proposal made in writing and delivered at the office of the municipal secretary not less than three clear days before the day of such meeting. (2) The line for the time being prescribed shall be called the regular line on the street. (2) The line for the time being prescribed shall be called the regular line on the street. (3) No person shall construct any portion of any building within the regular line of the street except with the written permission of the Commissioner who shall in every case in which he gives such permission at the same time report his reasons in writing to the Standing Committee. ( 11 ) IT will be seen that this section though not in pari materia with section 210 of the District Municipal Act of 1948 is on similar lines and contains similar provisions. It is hardly necessary to stress that observations made in the context of an enactment which is not in pari materia when relied upon us furnishing a guide to another similar enactment must be read with great care and caution. The doctrine of pari materia does not depend upon similarity in the two enactments under consideration but the language of the two provisions being materially on par i. e. on their being in pari materia. The observations of their Lordships which we shall immediately set out and on which Mr. Vakil leans heavily are as under:-THEIR Lordships agree with the opinion of all the learned Judges of the High Court that a consideration of the terms of sec. 297 and of its setting in the Act shows conclusively that sec. 297 is dealing with the building line of a public street as distinguished from the boundary line or intended boundary line of a public street. In the first place the definition of public street in sec. 3 (x) relates to a street that is already in existence and this definition applies in sec. 297 this may be contrasted with sec. 296 (1) (b) which shows that the expression intended is used when appropriate. In short the boundary line of a street is fixed prior to actual construction and the regular line of the street is prescribed after it has come into existence. ( 12 ) WE are dutifully bound to follow any expression of opinion of their Lordships of Privy Council prior to the Constitution and also bound to follow even an obiter of their Lordships. But it is difficult to see how these observations made in a wholly different context can be instructive or afford any guidance to us in interpreting sec. 210 of the Act of 1949. But it is difficult to see how these observations made in a wholly different context can be instructive or afford any guidance to us in interpreting sec. 210 of the Act of 1949. Moreover the observations have to be read in the context of the facts of that case and bearing in mind that the distinction drawn by their Lordships was not between a building line and a street line or a roadline. The distinction drawn was between a building line and a boundary line of a street. In that case the scheme of the Municipal Corporation relating to Shivaji park had as a part of that scheme under contemplation a sixty feet road on which the appellant was under an agreement with the Municipal Corporation entitled to have a frontage for his property. In clear terms their Lordships have pointed out in the above observations that the boundary line that was under consideration was one which had been fixed prior to the actual construction of the street and the regular line of the street had been prescribed after the public road had come into existence. We are not in this case concerned with any boundary line of the Gandhi Road (Richey Road ). We are concerned with the regular line of the street or to put the same thing differently the street line of the road. There is nothing in the view we take of the matter or the observations which we have made which can be said to depart in any way from the opinion expressed by their Lordships in the case of Shankar v. The Bombay Municipality. ( 13 ) WE would like to preface what follows with some brief general observations and that before we examine the language of the two clauses of sec. 210 of the Act. The language of the two clauses is plain and simple There is no ellipsis and no redundance. Nor is there anything vague ambiguous or uncertain about that language. That being so we have to read the two clauses in their natural and ordinary sense. They express a meaning which is single and sensible and we see no reason why the precise words used by the lawmaker in the two clauses and the deeming provision is clause (a) should not be given their full meaning and effect. That being so we have to read the two clauses in their natural and ordinary sense. They express a meaning which is single and sensible and we see no reason why the precise words used by the lawmaker in the two clauses and the deeming provision is clause (a) should not be given their full meaning and effect. The exact colour and shape of the meaning of any words in any enactment is not to be ascertained by reading them in isolation. They must be read structurally and in their context for their signification must vary with their contextual setting. Of course when we speak of the context we understand it in a wide sense in a sense which requires that all provisions which bear upon the same subject matter must be read as whole and in their entirety. For that affords a salutary safeguard against the effect of an asserted construction producing inequality injustice absurdity or repugnance or other objectionable consequences. ( 14 ) IT is in the light of these observations that we turn to examine the language of the relevant provisions of sec. 210. Clause (a) of sec. 210 (1) authorises the Commissioner to prescribe a line on one or both sides of any public street. The line is referred to in the proviso to that clause as a street line. In ordinary parlance it is referred to as roadline. This street line which may be demarcated by the Commissioner on one side or both sides of the street must in our judgment be in relation to be the whole public street. It cannot be in respect of any part or section or segment of that street. We shall be adverting to this aspect of the matter again a little later in our judgment. ( 15 ) THE Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act of 1949 was applied to the City of Ahmedabad in 1950. Before that the municipal administration of the city was carried on under the Boroughs Act of 1925. It is common ground that a roadline-a double street line-had been prescribed for the whole of Gandhi Road (Richey Road) under the relevant provisions of that Act. That is evident from the map in four sections which is annexed to the affidavit made by the Commissioner. It is common ground that a roadline-a double street line-had been prescribed for the whole of Gandhi Road (Richey Road) under the relevant provisions of that Act. That is evident from the map in four sections which is annexed to the affidavit made by the Commissioner. It is clear from that map that the roadline that was shown on the four sections of the map was a double street line that is a line on both sides of the street and it was there delineated in red. It was unitized and unitary. Clause (a) of sec. 210 (1) of the Act of 1950 empowers the Commissioner to prescribe a line on one or both sides of any public street. An important proviso was engrafted upon clause (a) because it would take some time before a line on one or both sides of any public street could be prescribed by the Commissioner under section 210 (a) of the new Act. It could also be that the Commissioner may not want to demarcate a new line in substitution of the old line. The power to prescribe a line on one or both sides of any public street having already been conferred on the Commissioner by clause (a) the proviso took care to see that that power remained unimpaired and it was obviously for that purpose that the latter part of the proviso stated that the regular line of a public street operative under the previous law for the time being in force should be deemed to be a street line for the purpose of the new Act until a street line is prescribed by the Commissioner under clause (a ). These latter words in our opinion relate to a point of time and to the exercise by the Commissioner of the power conferred on him by the substantive part of clause (a ). Till that stage it is the old line which is to be deemed to be the street line for the purpose of the new Act and operates as such. ( 16 ) IT is by this factio juris that the line prescribed and operative under the Act of 1925 is to be regarded as the street line operation for the purposes of the new Act. ( 16 ) IT is by this factio juris that the line prescribed and operative under the Act of 1925 is to be regarded as the street line operation for the purposes of the new Act. When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to exist which would not have been so but for the enactment the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for purpose the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to it and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. The following statement of the principle by Lord Asquith in the decision of the House of Lords East End Dwellings Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council (1952) A. C. 109 has been quoted with approval in numerous decisions and by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Pandurang (1953) S. C. R 773 778 779;"if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real you must surely unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. . . . . . . . . The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. " ( 17 ) THE putative state of affairs affecting the roadline and the inevitable corollary to the same requires that the deemed street line must be regarded as having been demarcated and prescribed under clause (a) though in fact the Commissioner had not so demarcated and prescribed it under the power vested in him by that clause. The consequences and incidents of that line which must have flowed from or accompanied it must also be regarded as flowing from and accompanying that deemed line which for the purposes of the new Act is to be regarded as actually demarcated and prescribed by the Commissioner under the Act though in fact he did not prescribe the same. This putative state of the roadline is to continue until a street line is prescribed by the Commissioner under this clause (a ). This putative state of the roadline is to continue until a street line is prescribed by the Commissioner under this clause (a ). There is nothing in the language of the substantive part of clause (a) to authorise or permit the Commissioner to prescribe the regular line of the street in parts or sections for this regular line can only be for the whole street. Of course it may from time to time be altered or modified and even substituted by an entirely fresh line but that would not be under clause (a) but could only be under and in accordance with clause (b ). Nor is there anything in the language of clause (a) or the proviso to it which authorises or permits the Commissioner to make any change in any line prescribed by him on his own or in any line which having been prescribed under the Boroughs Act was to be deemed to be a street line for the purpose of the new Act. Of course the latter part of the proviso as we have already mentioned does authorise the Commissioner to prescribed a new street line on his own in place of and in substitution of the deemed line. ( 18 ) THE matter however does not rest there. When we turn to sub-section (b) there is abundant intrinsic evidence which shows the intention of the Legislature. In terms this clause relates to any change which the Commissioner may effect with the previous approval of the Standing Committee by prescribing a fresh line in substitution for any line so prescribed. The words so prescribed it is not seriously disputed must apply to a line prescribed by the Commissioner himself in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (a) as also a line prescribed under the Boroughs Act and deemed to be operative for the purposes of the new Act. The words so prescribed it is not seriously disputed must apply to a line prescribed by the Commissioner himself in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (a) as also a line prescribed under the Boroughs Act and deemed to be operative for the purposes of the new Act. The language of the substantive part of clause (b) makes it abundantly clear that the Commissioners power to prescribe a street line on his own under clause (a) is circumscribed to the extent that if any change is to be made in any line prescribed by him in respect of any public street or in any deemed line which is operative for the purposes of the new Act he must go to the Standing Committee and seek the approval of the Standing Committee before effecting any such change. ( 19 ) BUT that is not all. The words at the end of clause (b) leave no scope for any doubt as to the construction of the material part of section 210 with which we are here concerned. Clause (a) says nothing about any change in any part of the street line whereas clause (b) in terms speaks of changes from time to time being made in any street line prescribed under clause (a) or in any part of that line prescribed under clause (a ). All these considerations. in our judgment are sufficient to lead inevitably to the conclusion that it was without the competence and authority of the Commissioner to pass an order making a change in a part of the street line which had been prescribed under the Boroughs Act of 1925 for Gandhi Road and which remained operative for the purposes of the new Act even after the coming into force of the Act of 1949. It was necessary for him before making any such change to obtain the previous approval of the Standing Committee and it was also necessary that before such approval could be accorded to him the procedure laid down in the proviso to clause (b) relating to notices and objections should have been complied with. Admittedly that procedure was not followed at all. Admittedly that procedure was not followed at all. In our judgment it was incumbent on him to follow that procedure and seek that approval before making the change complained of by the petitioner and he having failed to do so it was not within his competence to effect that change. That being the position the notices issued by him under section 212 were void as not being in accordance with the provisions of the Act. ( 20 ) NOTICE was served in this matter on the Advocate General as the petitioner in his petition had impugned the validity of certain section of the Act The petitioner as we have already pointed out has not passed his contention relating to the wires of those sections. The learned Advocate General who appears before us in pursuance of the notice served on him has made his submissions before us on the meaning and effect of section 210. His submissions lend support to the contentions of the petitioner and accord with the view we have taken as to the scope and ambit of the powers of the Commissioner under section 210. . ( 21 ) IN the result the petition succeeds. The rule will be made absolute and an order will issue in terms of prayer A of the petition. The respondent will pay the petitioners costs of the petition fixed at Rs. 250. 00. The petitioner will pay cost of the Advocate General fixed at Rs. 250. 00. Petition allowed. .