JUDGMENT SHIVDAYAL, J. 1. This is defendants' second appeal from a decree for possession of a house passed against them. The plaintiff alleged that by a registered sale-deed dated November 17, 1906, the suit house was purchased by the plaintiff's father, Moolchand; that it was let out to one Bajranglal on January 4, 1933; that subsequently Bajranglal introduced Dhannalal, defendant No. 1 as his sub-tenant; that they continued to pay rent until 1947; that a suit for ejectment was instituted against Bajranglal and Dhannalal, but it was dismissed as regards ejectment; that in that suit Dhannalal denied the plaintiff's title and claimed his own. In the present suit he claimed a declaration of his title and prayed for possession on that basis. Dhannalal's sons were also joined as defendants. Dhannalal died during the pendency of the suit. The sons are appellants here. 2. The suit was resisted by the defendants, denying the plaintiff's title They alleged that they had always denied the plaintiff's title and that they were in possession of the house in their own right; bar of limitation and of res judicata were also pleaded. The trial Judge found that the plaintiff's title was fully established and that the suit was within limitation. He, however, held that the finding in the previous suit that Dhannalal was not a tenant was res judicata. The first appellate Court has upheld these findings of the trial Judge. 3. Some endeavour is made by Shri Inamdar to contend before me that the concurrent finding of fact as regards the plaintiff's title is erroneous. I have perused the judgment of both the Courts. The judgment of the learned trial Judge has impressed me as precise and convincing. It appears from his judgment that he fully applied his mind to the evidence on record. Likewise, the first appellate Court has discussed and applied its mind fully to the points raised before it. I see no ground for which the defendants can be heard in second appeal on that question of fact. Some stress was laid by the defendants on the identity of this house and they tried to differentiate it from the house purchased by the sale-deed of 1906 This point too has been fully considered and, being a question of fact, it cannot be re-agitated in second appeal. 4. The main contention of Shri Inamdar is that the suit was barred by time. 4. The main contention of Shri Inamdar is that the suit was barred by time. According to him it is Article 142 of the Limitation Act which applies to this case and as the defendants had been in possession since 1934, while this suit was brought on December 21, 1955 it was beyond the prescribed time. Learned counsel relies on AIR 1946 All. 389, AIR 1934 All. 993, AIR 1940 Mad 798 , AIR 1954 T.C 449 and 1960 MPLJ 1146 . 5. When there is a dispute of this nature it must be first decided whether Art. 142 applies to it or not. If it does not apply, the residuary Article 144 necessarily applies. It is very clear from the language of Article 142 that it applies only where the plaintiff while in possession "has been dispossessed" or "has discontinued his possession." 6. It has been held in some cases that the test for dispossession is to ascertain whether the defendant entered on the property while the plaintiff was in possession. In order to ascertain this, it is necessary to consider the facts and circumstances admitted or proved in the case. In determining whether there has been discontinuance of possession, intention cannot altogether be left out of account. It is necessary to constitute a discontinuance of possession that the termination of one man's possession must be followed by the actual possession by a wrong doer (Mohd. Hashim vs. Iffat Ara Hamidi Begum AIR 1942 Cal. 180). To constitute discontinuance, there must be both deriliction by the person who has the right, and actual possession, whether adverse or not, to be protected. See [ M. Dnonel vs. M. Kinty I.L.R (1847) 514, cited in the Order of Reference Krishnaji vs. Madhusa AIR Bom, 207(F.B.) ]. In order to constitute dispossession or discontinuance of possession it is necessary that the possession of the newcomer must be adverse to the former possessor because otherwise the possession of the new comer would be consistent with the right of the former possesser and would, therefore, furnish no cause of action to him in respect of which time can run against him. Where the plaintiff himself alleges dispossession or discontinuance of possession, that may generally be sufficient to apply Article 142. It has been held in Kanchan Teli vs. Moga AIR 1934 Pat. Where the plaintiff himself alleges dispossession or discontinuance of possession, that may generally be sufficient to apply Article 142. It has been held in Kanchan Teli vs. Moga AIR 1934 Pat. 593, that Article 142 does not apply to a case where the defendant denies that the plaintiff was ever in possession. 7. In Chandel vs. Hiralal AIR 1952 Nag 188, it is observed that where there is no allegation either of dispossession or discontinuance of possession in the plaint, Art. 142 does not apply. In Meharban vs. Usuf Khan, AIR 1939 Nag 7, it is laid down: "Where in a suit for possession of property, the title of the plaintiff, as well as the possession of the defendant for more than 12 years before suit are established and the plaintiff pleads that he has let the defendant-in-possession as a tenant but that has not been proved and the defendant pleads adverse possession, the burden of proof, in such a case, is on the defendant, and if he does not establish adverse possession, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession. "In a case which falls under Art. 142, the plaintiff must prove not only title but also possession within 12 years of suit. But before that Article can apply, it must be shown, either that the plaintiff was dispossessed, or that he discontinued the possession. This can be established either by the : facts admitted in the plaint of pleadings, or if not admitted there, then by the facts actually found. But unless that is done the case cannot come under Art. 142 and so the residuary Art. 144 would apply. The term dispossession applies when a person comes in and drives out others from the possession. It imports ouster, a driving out of possession against the will or the person in actual possession. This driving out cannot be said to have occurred when according to the case of both sides the transfer of possession was voluntary, not against the will of the person in possession but in accordance with his wishes and active consent. The term 'discontinuance' however implies a voluntary act, and abandonment of possession followed by the actual possession of another. It implies that the person discontinuing has given up the land and left it to be possessed by any one choosing to come in. The term 'discontinuance' however implies a voluntary act, and abandonment of possession followed by the actual possession of another. It implies that the person discontinuing has given up the land and left it to be possessed by any one choosing to come in. There must be an intention to abandon title before there can be said to be a discontinuance in possession. But this cannot be assumed. It must be either admitted or proved." These observations made by Mr. Justice Vivian Bose are very definite and emphatic. 8. In the case in hand the plaintiff did not allege either that he discontinued possession, or that he was dispossessed. Positively his case was that he let out the house to Bajranglal. Letting a property to a tenant is not discontinuance of possession within the meaning of Art 142. It is noteworthy that the defendants also did not allege either a discontinuance of possession by the plaintiff or that they at any time dispossessed the plaintiff. I would prefer to, as I am bound to, apply the dicta of above Nagpur decisions. Now, it is remarkable that the plaintiff's name has all along been entered in the registers of the Municipality and that he has always been paying house-tax. At no stage of this litigation did the defendants allege that they paid the house-tax at any time. Then again, the plaintiff obtained in his own name water connection for this house from the Water Works and continued to pay the water charges at all times. The defendants never alleged that they had paid water-tax at any time. All these facts lead to an inescapable conclusion that the plaintiff never discontinued his possession and never entertained an intention of abandoning his title. It must, therefore, be held that this is not a case of 'discontinuance' of possession by the plaintiff. Again, since the plaintiff, nor the defendant, alleged that the plaintiff was 'dispossessed', this is not a case of 'dispossession' within the meaning of Art. 142. On a careful perusal of the written statement it is quite clear to me that the defendants really pleaded adverse possession, although they avoided to use that expression. Indeed, it is not the wording or the form of the pleadings but it is their substance which is material. On a careful perusal of the written statement it is quite clear to me that the defendants really pleaded adverse possession, although they avoided to use that expression. Indeed, it is not the wording or the form of the pleadings but it is their substance which is material. There is not even a whisper in the written statement when and how the defendants stepped into the suit house and in what right. This omission is as conspicuous as it was studious. 9. In Beni Madhav Prasad vs. Rasklal 1958 JLJ 831 , the defendants allowed the house to stand in the name of the plaintiff in the Cantonment Register and they did not pay any municipal rates or taxes, that liability was discharged by the plaintiff himself. When the plaintiff made a claim far possession in 1939 the defendants denied his title and the suit was filed in 1947. That suit was hold within time. It is unnecessary to go into the other facts of that case as they were not similar to those of this case. 10. I am referred to a decision of my learned brother Nevaskar J. in Daryao Singh vs Kalma Nihala 1960 MPLJ 1146 . That was a suit for possession of an agricultural land situated in a village. It was based on plaintiff's title simpliciter and there was no allegation as to when and how the defendant came into possession and by what right. The cause of action was stated to be demand for possession made by the plaintiff by means of registered notice and its non-compliance. The suit was resisted by the defendants who denied the plaintiff's title to the land and asserted their own title and possession for generations. In his statement at the trial the plaintiff stated that the defendant had been in possession under an oral agreement that the land should be returned whenever the plaintiff would claim in back. On those facts it was held that it was a question of fact whether a person's possession was permissive in origin and character, and the plaintiff seeking to eject the defendant, relying on such fact, has to assert and prove it. To those peculiar facts Art. 142 was applied by the learned Judge. Obviously enough, that case has no application here. To those peculiar facts Art. 142 was applied by the learned Judge. Obviously enough, that case has no application here. Moreover, in my opinion, the learned Judge has not dissented from the earlier Nagpur view on which I am relying. 11. Shri Inamdar strongly relies on Sangamlal vs. Gangadin AIR 1946 All 178. In that case the plaintiff filed a suit for possession of a certain house in 1940. It was alleged in the plaint that the defendants had been in the occupation of the house as plaintiff's tenants and that they had not paid rent since June 1939. It was further alleged that in a previous suit for possession the defendants had falsely alleged that they and not the plaintiff were the owners of the house and that they were never tenants of the plaintiff. The trial Court found that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving his title to the house. There was also a finding that the defendants had been in uninterrupted possession of the house since 1918 and that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants had ever paid rent to him was false. The Court also found on evidence that the defendants were not tenants of the plaintiff as the house was never let out to the defendants by the plaintiff or by his father. It was held that the plaint allegations amounted to an allegation that the plaintiff had been dispossessed, and Article 142 was applied. It is true that that case is very near the one in hand but it must be noted that there the averments in the plaint were deemed to amount to an allegation of dispossession and, further, it was found that the house had not been let out by the plaintiff. 12. Another case relied on by the learned counsel is Bindhyachal vs. Ram Gharib AIR 1934 All. 993. There also dispossession was admitted in the plaint. 13. In Kishan Pillai vs. Kumar a Pillai AIR 1954 T.C 449 , it was alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff's possession of the property discontinued. The necessary averments to attract Article 142 being already there it was held that it was for the plaintiff to make out and establish his possession within 12 years prior to the date of the suit. In Official Receiver vs. Govindaraya, AIR 1940 Mad. The necessary averments to attract Article 142 being already there it was held that it was for the plaintiff to make out and establish his possession within 12 years prior to the date of the suit. In Official Receiver vs. Govindaraya, AIR 1940 Mad. 798 , it was observed: "It cannot be maintained that a person who proves title in a suit for ejectment has the right to the decree sought unless the defendant proves adverse possession for 12 years. The plaintiff is not entitled to succeed unless he shows, in addition to title, that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit." In this Madras case the decision in Dharani Kanta vs. Gabar Ali Khan, 18 I.C. (P. C.), was followed, it was observed: "It lay upon the plaintiffs to prove not only a title as against the defendants to the possession; but to prove that the plaintiffs had been dispossessed or had discontinued to be in possession of the lands within 12 years immediately preceding the commencement of the suit. There Lordships find that the plaintiffs failed to prove a title against the defendants to the possession of the lands in dispute or any part of them; they failed to prove that the land, the possession of which they claimed were not the lands covered by the sahad and they failed to prove that they had been dispossessed or that their possession had been discontinued within 12 years before suit." Clearly, the Privy Council case does not apply to the facts of the present case. So numerous are the varieties of observations made in the decisions of the High Courts which are cited in Rustomji on Limitation and in Chitale's Commentary on Article 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act that any endeavour to connect them and reconcile them would only produce a labyrinth. There cart be no denial that with every Judge who had an occasion to consider the applicability of Art. 142 weighed the facts of each case. I strongly feel that it is high time that the first schedule of our Limitation Act is simplified. There cart be no denial that with every Judge who had an occasion to consider the applicability of Art. 142 weighed the facts of each case. I strongly feel that it is high time that the first schedule of our Limitation Act is simplified. While it is incontestible that statute of limitation aims at securing the quiet of the community, to supress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression and that it is a statute of repose, it does not follow that the Articles in the schedule should be so complicated as they are. 14. It seems vital to me that Art. 142 is limited in scope and must be strictly applied. If to a case Art. 142 does not apply in terms, it must be governed by the residuary Art. 144. If I may say so with utmost respect, a very thoughtful solution in found in Meherban's case (supra). It is difficult to add anything useful to it. The observations that before Article 142 can apply it must be shown either that the plaintiff was dispossessed or that he discontinued the possession and that this can be established either by the facts admitted in the plaint or pleadings, or if not admitted there then by the facts actually found, are weighty. Then it is laid down that for discontinuance of possession there must be an intention to abandon title and this cannot be assumed, but must be either admitted or proved Applying these observations to the present case there is no doubt that neither discontinuance nor dispossession has been admitted in the plain nor is there any cogent evidence on the record on which such a finding can be arrived at. Both the Courts below were, therefore, justified in refusing to apply Article 142. 15. Shri Inamdar strenuously relies on my decision in the Khilchipur Club case (Second appeal No. 65 of 1958 decided on October 15, 1960). In my opinion, that case was poles apart from this. There, admittedly the plaintiff's father had discontinued possesrsion. Both the Courts below were, therefore, justified in refusing to apply Article 142. 15. Shri Inamdar strenuously relies on my decision in the Khilchipur Club case (Second appeal No. 65 of 1958 decided on October 15, 1960). In my opinion, that case was poles apart from this. There, admittedly the plaintiff's father had discontinued possesrsion. A Club was established on the premises, which was not only inaugurated by the Ruler of Khilchipur in the year 1925 and ever since the property openly remained in the continuous possession of the members of the Club for all those long years, but also that there was a mention of it in the Administration Reports of Khilchipur State for the years 1925, 1926, 1941 and 1944-45. To that case the principle of implied dedication could be well applied, but I did not develop that point as it was not necessary in view of the admission in the plaint and overwheling evidence on the record. There I distinguished Meherban's case and Chandel Ranjit's case. 16. It may be recalled that prior to the present suit, Suganchand had brought an earlier suit for ejectment against Bajranglal, as his tenant, and Dhannalal, as sub-tenant of Bajranglal. There it was no doubt held that Dhannalal was not a sub-tenant. And since that suit was founded purely on relationship of landlord and tenant, no other finding could be given about the real position of Dhannalal in the eye of law. On the question whether Bajranglal was the plaintiff's tenant or not, it is remarkable that a decree for Rs. 48-4-6 on account of arrears of rent was claimed by Suganchand in that suit and the trial Judge in fact passed an exparte decree against Bajranglal for Rs. 48-4-6 and proportionate costs. It is impossible to reconcile this decree with the contention of the defendants in the present suit that in the ejectment suit Bajranglal was held not to be a tenant of the plaintiff. A money decree could not be passed unless Bajranglal was held to be a tenant of the plaintiff. It being a suit based only on the relationship of landlord and tenant, the decree for Rs. 48-4-6 could not be but for arrears of rent. I am not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the reasoning on which the decree was passed. That judgment (Ex. D.1) was upheld by the appellate Court (Ex. It being a suit based only on the relationship of landlord and tenant, the decree for Rs. 48-4-6 could not be but for arrears of rent. I am not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the reasoning on which the decree was passed. That judgment (Ex. D.1) was upheld by the appellate Court (Ex. D. 2) and, in the result, the decree for arrears of rent against Bajranglal was affirmed. Thus it cannot be said that Bajranglal was not a tenant in the suit house. That being so, there can be no question of discontinuance of possession or dispossession within the meaning of Art. 142. I have already said that introducing a tenant is not 'discontinuance' under Art. 142, nor can it be called 'dispossession'. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this suit to proble deeper to trace out how Dhannalal and his sons entered into the suit house; be it by Bajranglal's permission, or be it in a manner hostile to him. The fact remains that they never alleged to have got into the suit house by dispossessing the plaintiff. Nor could their possession be called adverse to the plaintiff, atleast until they denied the plaintiff's title in the ejectment suit. A landlord is not entitled to possession of property let out to a tenant so long as the tenancy continues and, hence, during the currency of the lease, the landlord cannot sue for possession of the property. It follows that where a third party dispossesses the tenant, during the continuance of a lease, the possession of such a third party cannot be adverse to the landlord so long as the lease continues. This was held in Punjaram vs. Rumu ILR 1949 Nag 348 (F.B.), Rahim Bux vs. Usman Gani, AIR 1948 Cal. 71; and Ram Lakhan vs. Digvijai Naavain, AIR 1948 Pat. 274. Also see observations in Kathyani vs. Udey Kumar, 52 IA 160. 17. For all these reasons the suit has been rightly held as within time. 18. No other point is urged. 19. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed