Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the tenant, whose writ petition to vacate concurrent orders by the authorities under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, No. XVI of 1959, hereafter referred to as the Act, been disallowed by a learned judge. The facts relevant for deciding the appeal are not in dispute, though the correctness of the grounds on which the eviction been ordered was challenged before the learned judge; and the challenge has been repeated before us. The appellant's learned advocate has urged several arguments for the appeal being allowed, three of which are against the constitutionality of the Act, and two about the application of the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. For better appreciation of the aforesaid grounds, we should now state the facts in the case. 2. The appellant was a teacher in the S. R.V. Government High School, Ernakulam from 1952 to July 1956, and has since been promoted as the Headmistress of the Government High School, Elamkunnapuzha. In November 1952 she was allotted the house in Ernakulam, which she has now been ordered to vacate and the ownership of the house has since changed hand, the landlord before us having purchased it from the owner who owned it when the Rent Controller allotted it to the appellant. A ground has been taken in the writ petition about the transfer not being bona fide because the relation between the parties had earlier become strained. It is averred that the stipulated rent being Rs. 75/- the appellant moved the Rent Controller for fixation of the fair rent, which in the middle of 1953 was fixed at Rs 60/-, that the reduction strained the relation between the owner and the appellant; and that because the former owned several houses and could not evict, he offered the house to the present owner, a practising lawyer, who purchased it on September 16,1957. The appellant's case is that the deal was with a view to get the appellant evicted and about two months later, the new landlord filed the petition before the Rent Controller for evicting the appellant on the ground of the house being required for the landlord's personal residence the building in which the new owner was then living on rent, being unsuitable. The aforesaid proceedings were begun under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, and the whole of the following year appears to have been taken up with determination of whether the petition should be allowed. No decision had been reached when the Act came into force on April 3, 1959, and it repealed the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, under which the proceedings been initiated. Among other things, S.11 (3) of the Act provides as follows: 11 (3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for this own occupation or the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him: Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building in his possession in the same City, Town or village, except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case, it will be just and proper to do so." xxx xxx xxx xxx Thereafter the landlord applied for his petition being amended in order to take advantage of the first proviso to S.11 (3), and assigned two grounds for the appellant being directed to vacate which were that the house, in which the landlord been living was in water-logged area and that the appellant been transferred as the Head Mistress to another place which is seven miles away. The Rent Controller allowed the amendment prayed for, and, on February 12,1960, held both the two grounds to have been made out. The appellant was therefore directed to vacate and that order has been sustained by the Appellate court, the revision petition against it being equally ineffective. The appellant then invoked Art.226 and having failed there as well, has come up in appeal before us. The appellant was therefore directed to vacate and that order has been sustained by the Appellate court, the revision petition against it being equally ineffective. The appellant then invoked Art.226 and having failed there as well, has come up in appeal before us. The five grounds on which the appellant's learned advocate has pressed his client's case are: (1) The aforesaid proviso to S.11 (3) of the Act is violative of Art.14, and, therefore void, (2)It interferes with the appellant's fundamental right of holding property under Art.19 (1)(f) and the restriction, is neither reasonable nor in the interest of the general public, (3) The proviso amounts to excessive delegation as no standard been laid, on which the authorities were to exercise their powers of directing the tenants to vacate, (4) The right of the purchaser cannot be higher and because the former landlord could not take advantage of the proviso, his successor in title was equally precluded from taking advantage of the proviso in the section of the Act, (5) The amendment to the petition for eviction has wrongly been allowed as the Act was not applicable to the proceedings pending when it has been enacted. 3. We would emphasise in the beginning that when exercising powers under Art.226, we do not act as though we were appellate authority deliberating on the correctness or otherwise of conclusion on facts by the lower tribunals. It follows that writ of certiorari would not be issued unless the decisions sought to be vacated be vitiated by error of jurisdiction, by legal error apparent on the face of the record, or by failure to observe principles of natural justice. Those being the grounds on which the aforesaid writ would be issued and we take the appellant in this case to be asking for such a writ. It further follows that the factual sufficiency of the ground, on which the lower tribunals have directed eviction, would not be scrutinised by us in this proceeding the correctness of such findings being justiciable by proper authorities in exercise of their appellate powers, which we are now exercising. 4. The next preliminary observation we wish to make is that constitutional issues should not be adjudicated unless their decisions be essential to decide the case, in which they are raised. 4. The next preliminary observation we wish to make is that constitutional issues should not be adjudicated unless their decisions be essential to decide the case, in which they are raised. Therefore the fourth and the fifth grounds be taken first and the remaining three constitutional arguments only when the decisions in the former be against the appellant. Taking up the fourth ground of attack it is clear that the rights asked to be enforced in this case is the statutory right of the person seeking the redress and any consideration of whether his predecessor in title would have enjoyed it is hardly relevant. That right arises on the claimant fulfilling certain conditions, which do not require the predecessor in title of the person seeking enforcement to be also so qualified and we would not be justified in thus circumscribing the right. It follows that whatever be the disqualification of the landlord's predecessor under the repealed Order that would not affect the right of the landlord under the new enactment. The fourth ground is, therefore, not of much assistance to the appellant, for, if the former landlord by transfer of his other houses could claim the benefit of the new Act, we do not see how the new landlord with no Other building cannot take advantage of the new right. Indeed, the Rent Control Act does not contemplate conditions extending beyond the date, on which the right is sought to be enforced, for, should a house be sold to the Government the tenant would continue to enjoy the benefit of the Act and the Government would be compelled to seek eviction only on the ground open to the previous owner. We therefore think the proper approach is to ascertain the rights of the claimant when he seeks his claims to be enforced. 5. That brings us to the fifth ground, which is equally untenable. It is not disputed that the appellate authorities must take note of the change in law in order to fairly, and finally decide, the rights of the parties before it and the tribunals trying original petitions cannot be treated as being exempt from such an obligation. Viewed from this angle, we feel the lower tribunal has not erred in permitting the pleadings to be amended, and deciding the dispute under the Act, whose benefits could be claimed by a fresh petition. Viewed from this angle, we feel the lower tribunal has not erred in permitting the pleadings to be amended, and deciding the dispute under the Act, whose benefits could be claimed by a fresh petition. The amendment has been ordered without causing prejudice to the tenant, and to avoid multiplicity of litigation. We are therefore satisfied that in these circumstances there has been no error of law or of jurisdiction and the objections to the provisions being not constitutional must now be adjudicated upon. 6. It is well settled that every inequality of treatment is not hit by Art.14, and the complaint of an enactment being discriminatory is not justified where the legislation rests on rational classification. There are series of decisions by the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts in this country and some such authorities have been collected in Kodasseri Kochunni Kartha v. State of Travancore-Cochin, O.P. No. 339/56 decided on November 7,1960 [1961 KLT. 84 FB.]. We would confine ourselves by merely stating what things establish the classification being rational, which are that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others that have been left out of the group, and that the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. We feel that the proviso satisfies both the conditions; for a landlord in bona fide need of the building for his occupation or for the occupation of a member of his family dependant on him, cannot be said to have been irrationally differentiated from the owners who are not in such need. Nor can owners, who for any special reasons be demanding possession of their building be treated to have been not rationally differentiated from those who have no special reasons for so claiming possession. It follows that one condition is satisfied, and coming to the next that also we feel is satisfied; for the object of the proviso is that persons owning buildings must not be unjustifiably prevented from entering into possession, and the restriction on getting possession should be relaxed where the landlords be in pressing need. There is therefore the nexus between the differentia and the object of the legislation. There is therefore the nexus between the differentia and the object of the legislation. In these circumstances the provision giving the ownership its legal operation cannot be held to be violative of Art.14, and the complaint of this Art. having been infringed fails. 7. Coming to the next head of the three constitutional objections we will assume that the possessory right of the tenant is covered by the word property under Art.19 and the question then is how far the limitation on the right of the tenant amounts to a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. The test for judging whether the restriction be reasonable and in the interests of the general public, is also well established and has been referred to in the Full Bench case cited earlier. We have there held that the restriction must be reasonably required for the object which the enactment seeks to achieve and should also be in the interests of the general public. Now the object of the enactment is to restrain unjustifiable evictions and where the landlord be justly in need the tenants right to continue possession should be circumscribed. The proviso in our opinion does nothing but state under what circumstances the claim for eviction is to be treated as justified, and this restraint on the rights of the tenant is in public interests; for if the landlord is to be always excluded from occupying his house, persons with money will never invest in houses. Therefore the second ground in this appeal also fails. 8. Coming to the third, we feel that there is fundamental difference between legislating and deciding. In exercise of the former power operative rules are laid whereas by the other, the rights already conferred are adjudicated. In view of the distinction, it is clear that the proviso is not a case of legislative delegation, and is entrustment of a quasi-judicial power of giving occupation to person in need of his house. In such a case the objection of the delegation to frame rules without any standard is hardly relevant, for that is available only where the legislation power is being delegated. Having taken the aforesaid view, we think no useful purpose would be served by discussing in detail the several cases cited by the appellant's learned counsel, for they decide when the complaint of proper legislative delegation is entertainable. 9. Having taken the aforesaid view, we think no useful purpose would be served by discussing in detail the several cases cited by the appellant's learned counsel, for they decide when the complaint of proper legislative delegation is entertainable. 9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs and two months' time is allowed to the appellant to carry out the direction to vacate. Dismissed.