JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a buyer plaintiff's appeal from the judgment and decree of G. K. Mitter, J. dismissing the plaintiff's suit against the seller defendant for damages claiming Rs. 87,000/- on the ground that the contract between the parties was void under the West Bengal Ordinance No. XVII of 1950 being the Raw Jute (Central Jute Board and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, 1950 and on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove damages. 2. APART from these two questions, there was another issue which will be material for the purpose of this appeal and that was whether the plaint disclosed any cause of action. On the issue of cause of action, the learned trial Judge found against the respondents. The respondents asked our leave, which we granted, to urge that ground although no cross-objection had been taken by them. This point about the cause of action can be disposed of shortly at the outset. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Das, the learned counsel, contends that the pleading in the plaint proceeds on the wrongful repudiation of the contract in suit and does not proceed on the cancellation of the contract. The wrongful repudiation of the contract is pleaded in the plaint to have taken place on the 7th March, 1951 which was before the date on which the plaintiff had the right to cancel under clause 6 (b) of the contract in suit. It is urged that acceptance of the wrongful repudiation was not pleaded in the plaint. It is also contended that if the wrongful repudiation took place on the 7th March, 1951 then the damage that was claimed as on the 6th April, 1951 was wrongly claimed. 3. IN support of this contention, the learned counsel for the respondents relied particularly on paragraph 6 of the plaint where the plaintiff pleads that by reason of wrongful repudiation of the contract by the first defendant firm Manickchand Durgaprosad, the plaintiff suffered damage amounting to Rs. 87,000/- particulars of which will appear from the copy of the bill dated the 6th April 1951 submitted to the first defendant and annexed to the plaint. The bill is numbered 159, dated the 6th April, 1951. It claims the market rate as on the 6th April, 1951 at the rate of Rs. 96/- per maund. 4. 87,000/- particulars of which will appear from the copy of the bill dated the 6th April 1951 submitted to the first defendant and annexed to the plaint. The bill is numbered 159, dated the 6th April, 1951. It claims the market rate as on the 6th April, 1951 at the rate of Rs. 96/- per maund. 4. WE are unable to uphold the respondents' plea that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action on the above ground. We shall state our reasons briefly. It is true that the plaint does not formally and technically plead in express terms that the plaintiff was exercising his right to cancel the contract under clause 6 (b) thereof. Clause 6 (b) of the contract provides:- "Non-delivery of documents- In case of default by sellers, buyers have the right to exercise any of the following options:- (b) Canceling the contract on the fifth working day after due date (or earlier at the request of the sellers), and charging the difference between the contract rate and the market rate on date of cancellation of contract. " Contemporaneously with the bill and on the same date the plaintiff wrote to the first defendant inter alia as follows:- "Referring to the above contract as you have failed to deliver documents to us bearing due date of shipment of the above goods we hereby exercise option of clause 6 (b) of the contract and our bill charging you difference in value between the contract rate and the market rate will be sent to you in due course for payment. " 5. TAKING the bill which is annexed to the plaint as its part, and specially taking into consideration the market rate claimed there in the bill as on the 6th April, 1951 and reading the contemporaneous letter dated 6th April. 1951 where it is expressly stated that the plaintiff exercised option under clause 6 (b) of the contract to cancel the contract, we consider the fact of exercise of option to be sufficiently indicated in the plaint as it stands. Although the language of paragraph 6 of the plaint says that the wrongful repudiation has caused the damage, yet it does not say that the damage was being claimed as on the date of the wrongful repudiation. Although the language of paragraph 6 of the plaint says that the wrongful repudiation has caused the damage, yet it does not say that the damage was being claimed as on the date of the wrongful repudiation. It claims damage according to the bill annexed to the plaint which clearly says that the damage was claimed as on the 6th April, 1951 which under clause 6 (b) of the contract was the date for cancellation of the contract and charging the difference between the contract rate and the market rate as on the 6th April, 1951. 6. WE therefore hold that on the facts in this case, there is sufficient pleading in the plaint to disclose a cause of action. Even if we could hold that the plaint was technically defective, that technical defect could not have been allowed to make the plaintiff's suit bad because on the facts here the trial was not prejudiced thereby. It is necessary refer to some authorities and case-laws on this point. On behalf of the respondents, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Messrs. Trojan and Company v. Nagappa Chettiar (1) A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 235. It laid down the well-known principles that the decision of a case could not be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. There the question arose whether there was any alternative ground pleaded to the cause of action for the failure of consideration. That case has no application to the present point urged in this appeal. It is well-settled law that the parties must be confined to their pleadings. The point here is: Is the pleading, in fact, sufficient? We have endeavored to show that it is so. 6. The decision which is more relevant on the point under consideration and which supports the view that we are taking is the decision of S. R. Das, J. in Haroon Tar Mohammed and Company v. Bengal Distilleries Company Limited (2) reported in I. L. R. (1948) 2, Calcutta. In that case this very question of repudiation and acceptance of repudiation arose. There also there was no averment even of the acceptance of repudiation in that plaint and the very same contention as in this appeal was raised there that the plaint disclosed no cause of action for that reason. In that case this very question of repudiation and acceptance of repudiation arose. There also there was no averment even of the acceptance of repudiation in that plaint and the very same contention as in this appeal was raised there that the plaint disclosed no cause of action for that reason. Das, J. at page 47 of that report came to the definite conclusion that acceptance of repudiation was not required to be specifically pleaded and observed as follows:- "A reference to Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleadings, 7th Edition, p. 218, also supports the view that acceptance of repudiation need not be specifically pleaded. . . . . ." We therefore overrule the respondents' contention that the plaint in this case discloses no cause of action. The two essential points in the appeal now remaining for determination are (1) whether the contract in suit is void under the Ordinance and (2) whether the plaintiff has proved damage. 7. On the first question, the main point of attack on the judgment rests on the observation of the learned trial Judge construing the Ordinance where the learned trial Judge says:- "This, to my mind, clearly shows that delivery could not be made to the owner of a mill anywhere, be at his residence, at his press or elsewhere. Otherwise an unscrupulous owner of a mill could easily steer clear of the Ordinance by providing for delivery at the place other than the mill. He could easily provide for delivery at a railway siding. Could it then be suggested that because the contract did not contain a term as to delivery at a mill siding or jetty or guddy it was without the pale of the Act? A contract for sale or delivery of raw jute to the owner of a mill would also come within the mischief of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act." Before proceeding to discuss the construction and interpretation of the Ordinance and its relevant sections it will be useful to state the relevant and material facts on which this question of construction arises in this appeal. 8. 8. The plaintiff Pratabmull Rameswar is a partnership firm which is not only the owner of two mills by the name of Mahadeo Jute Mill and Ambica Jute Mill but is also the owner of many other different businesses including the business of a jute press called Ocean Jute Press whose work is bailing of jute. The contract in suit was dated the 5th January, 1951. It was put through by the second defendant Joy-narain Pasari who was the broker of the first defendant. Under this contract, the defendant Manickchand Durgaprosad firm, agreed to sell to the plaintiff 1500 maunds of middle jute at Rs. 38/- per maund with delivery to the Ocean Jute Press during February and/or March, 1951. This contract was made in the usual form of Indian Jute Mills Association Jute Contract which was current since the 1st December, 1947, long before the Ordinance. The contract in clause 2 expressly says that delivery was to be made to Ocean Jute Press and not to any jute mill. The words "ocean Jute Press" in clause 2 of the contract are put in ink by hand of the contracting parties. The rest excepting the details of the maunds and quality appear in the usual printed form of the contract. Section 5 of the Raw Jute (Central Jute Board and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, 1950 provides as follows:- "5 (1) No person shall sell or agree to sell raw jute to the owner of a jute-mill and no owner of a jute-mill shall buy or agree to buy raw jute save and except in pursuance of a contract for the sale or the supply of raw jute entered into in the manner provided in section 6. (2) Any contract entered into for the sale or the supply of raw jute with the owner of a jute-mill save and except in the manner provided in section 6 shall be void and of no effect. (3) Any person contravening the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be guilty of an offence under this Ordinance and shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. " 9. It is contended that the contract in suit is hit by section 5 of this Ordinance and is therefore void. The question is whether this is a contract within the meaning of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. " 9. It is contended that the contract in suit is hit by section 5 of this Ordinance and is therefore void. The question is whether this is a contract within the meaning of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. In order to be a contract within the operation of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance it has to be a contract to sell raw jute to the owner of a jute mill. The legal controversy centers round the expression "owner of a jute mill" in section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. It is stated that if 'x' is the owner of a jute mill, then section 5 (1) of the Ordinance disqualifies him in every respect and 'x' is debarred from buying any jute even if such purchase is not for the mill which he owns but for private purposes or purposes which have nothing to do with jute mill such as cleaning his car or repairing his roof or for any other work for which jute is used. It is an extensive construction, unmitigated in its effect and the question is whether such was the intention of this Ordinance. 7. THE expression, "owner of a jute mill", is defined in section 2 (6) of the Ordinance to mean the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of the jute mill provided that, where the affairs of a jute mill are entrusted to a managing agent, such agent shall be deemed to be the owner of the jute mill. The definition does not help on the point of the scope and ambit of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. A jute mill is defined in section 2 (5) of the Ordinance to mean a factory under the Factories Act, 1948, which is engaged wholly or in part in the manufacture of jute products. Section 2 (8) of the Ordinance defines "raw jute" to include inter alia, jute packed in bales and any fiber of jute which has not been subjected to any process of spinning or weaving. 8. Section 2 (8) of the Ordinance defines "raw jute" to include inter alia, jute packed in bales and any fiber of jute which has not been subjected to any process of spinning or weaving. 8. THE preamble to this Ordinance mentions the crisis in raw jute industry "on account of the owners of jute mills not being able to secure adequate supplies of raw jute at the maximum prices fixed under the West Bengal Jute (Control of Prices) Act, 1950." The preamble also recites the expediency of setting up a Central Jute Board in West Bengal "for ensuring equitable supply of raw jute to the owners of different jute mills." The preamble therefore indicates that one of the main purposes and objects of this legislation was to secure adequate and equitable supplies of raw jute to the jute mills. It has been argued that the preamble should not be taken as a guide in construing section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. The law relating to the purpose and scope of a preamble is well-settled by numerous decisions and it will be idle for us to set them out here and discuss. If the language of a section is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, then the language of that section must alone speak without the aid of a preamble or without the preamble being permitted to control such clear, unequivocal and unambiguous expressions. But the whole difficulty arises when the language of a section in the Statute is not clear. Language is rarely free from ambiguity so as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense and to adhere rigidly to its literal and primary meaning in all cases, may produce shocking and disastrous results. A number of telling illustrations are collected in Maxwell's well-known work on Interpretation of Statutes, the 10th Edition at pages 17 and 18. There an illustration is given that a statute preventing laymen to "lay their hands" on priests and punishing all who "drew blood in the street" would exclude the layman who wounded a priest with a weapon on the ground that he did not "lay his hands" but a weapon on the priest and would include the poor surgeon who bled a person in the street to save his life because the expression in the statute is punishing all who "drew blood in the street". The example illustrates to show that the language in a statute must be read in harmony with the subject of the enactment and in aid of the object which the legislature had in view. 9. MR. Das, the learned counsel for the respondents, has drawn our attention to the leading case of Powell v. The Kempton Park Racecourse Company Limited (3) 1899 A.C. 143. That case is no authority to support his contention for Lord Chancellor, Earl of halsbury at page 157 summarised the whole law relating to preamble in the following sentence:- "Two propositions are quite clear-one that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, and another that, if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment." 10. THE question here is the extent of the meaning of the expression "owner of a jute-mill" in section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. Does it mean the person who is acting in his capacity as owner of a jute mill? In other words, does the contract under section 5 (1) of the Ordinance mean a contract not so much with a person as such but a contract with an object. In other words, again, does it mean any and every contract by the owner of a jute mill or does it mean only such contract by the owner of a jute mill which is for the purpose of his jute mill. The Court is reminded that it must not introduce words into a statute, a familiar argument always on a question of construction. The other warning always given to Judges is that they must not legislate. Bearing this caution in mind, we still have to retain and exercise our duty, as being the only authority in the land, to interpret and construe statutes. We shall neither introduce words nor legislate but it is our duty to interpret the statute. What we have to interpret in this case is the meaning of the expression "the owner of a jute mill" and the kind of contract hit by section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. The text can never be divorced from the context. We shall neither introduce words nor legislate but it is our duty to interpret the statute. What we have to interpret in this case is the meaning of the expression "the owner of a jute mill" and the kind of contract hit by section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. The text can never be divorced from the context. To extend the scope of the contract under section 5 (1) of the Ordinance by including any and every contract where the owner of a jute mill buys jute irrespective of the purpose of such purchase will be indefeasible first, on the ground that this section instead of affecting contracts of sale or purchase will affect status and secondly, an the ground that it will lead to most absurd and onerous burdens. Amplifying the first point, it is necessary to state that what was intended, having regard to the preamble of the Ordinance, was equitable and adequate supply of raw jute to the jute mills. The intention is to protect the supply to the jute mills and their business and not to disqualify or restrain or penalise the mere fact of ownership of a jute mill. This view is supported not only by the preamble here but also by the other provisions in sections 2, 6 and 7 of the Ordinance from which we draw the irresistible inference that the whole scheme of this legislation is directed to safeguard adequate supply of raw jute to the jute mills. Amplifying the second ground, it will appear that if the intention of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance and if the expression "the owner of a jute mill" in section 5 (1) of the Ordinance were to include every sale or purchase irrespective of the purpose of the jute mill, then "x" the owner of a jute mill could not walk into a shop to buy a little raw jute for the purpose of cleaning his car without going through the elaborate procedure mentioned in section 6 and through the Jute Board. I do not think such an absurd result was intended by this Ordinance. Mr. Das, for the respondents, has drawn our attention to the observation of Spens, C. J., in A.W. Meads v. Emperor (4) reported in A.I.R. (1945) P. C. 21 at page 23, where the learned. I do not think such an absurd result was intended by this Ordinance. Mr. Das, for the respondents, has drawn our attention to the observation of Spens, C. J., in A.W. Meads v. Emperor (4) reported in A.I.R. (1945) P. C. 21 at page 23, where the learned. Chief Justice said:- "If words are plain and can bear only one meaning in law, results are not a matter for this Court, and there is no doubt that in some contexts the phrase, "criminal proceedings" would be held to include court-martial proceedings. " 11. THIS observation again does not help Mr. Das because the whole question is whether the words are plain and can bear only one meaning alone. If that be so, then, certainly the court will not be interested in the results thereafter, however, absurd the result may be. But it is a well-known rule of construction of statutes that where words are not so plain and are not so clear and, in fact, are equivocal or ambiguous or capable of bearing more than one meaning, then the meaning that will not produce absurdity is the meaning to be preferred to the one that does. 12. INDEPENDENTLY of the absurd results indicated, there is one more aspect to this problem. A right to carry on business is a fundamental right under the Constitution and a right to enter into a contract is a statutory and common law right alike and restriction thereupon should not be so extended in its scope and ambit as to make it unreasonable. Section 5 (1) of the Ordinance was intended for the particular purpose to ensure adequate supplies of raw jute at maximum prices to the jute mills. Contravention of section 5 (1) makes the contract not only void but makes the persons contravening liable to punishment. It is penal in every sense. It penalises by voiding the contract and it penalises by punishing the offender with imprisonment or fine or with both. Therefore, no construction should be accorded to this section which will unnecessarily or unreasonably avoid or unjustifiably punish contracts or persons not intended by the Ordinance. It is penal in every sense. It penalises by voiding the contract and it penalises by punishing the offender with imprisonment or fine or with both. Therefore, no construction should be accorded to this section which will unnecessarily or unreasonably avoid or unjustifiably punish contracts or persons not intended by the Ordinance. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tolaram Relumal v. The State of Bombay (5) (1954) S.C.A. 965, where Mahajan, C. J., construing a penal provision in section 18 (1) of the Bombay Rent Restrictions Act, lays down the guiding principle at page 970 of the report:- "it may be here observed that the provision of section 18 (1) are penal in nature and it is a well settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be pat upon a penal provision, the court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature. As pointed out by Lord Macmillian in London and North Eastern Railway Company v. Berriman (1946) A. C 278 at page 295 where penalties for infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch the language of a rule, however beneficent its intention beyond the fair and ordinary meaning of its language." 13. A similar view was expressed by Bose, J. in the Supreme Court decision of Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay (6) A. I. R. (1953) S. C. 278, construing Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, at page 282 in the following words:- "In a penal statute of this kind, it is our duty to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they will not become traps for honest, unlearned (in the law) and unwary men." 14. THE trend of modern jurisprudence is not to draw so much today the distinction in principles of construction between a penal statute and a non-penal one or between a taxing statute and a non-taxing statute. The modern tendency is in favour of the view that principles of construction do not vary with statutes or their themes. THE trend of modern jurisprudence is not to draw so much today the distinction in principles of construction between a penal statute and a non-penal one or between a taxing statute and a non-taxing statute. The modern tendency is in favour of the view that principles of construction do not vary with statutes or their themes. The juristic parlance today uses the expression that a proper construction should be made whether the statute be penal or otherwise or fiscal or otherwise. If a proper construction leads to a certain result, then the result has to be included within the meaning of the statute. The test of liberal or strict construction is not in the modern age regarded as a proper test and the language on this subject very frequently used today is that a correct interpretation is to be achieved, no matter whether it is liberal or strict. But whatever the language of jurisprudence may be, the principle laid down, that a mischief should not be extended and in case of ambiguity, a penalty should not be enlarged, still remains firm in law, as a guide to what may be called today as the proper construction. The learned Editor of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes enunciates the present view succinctly at page 275 in the following terms:- "The paramount object, in construing penal as well as other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent, and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning or the more extensive meaning, when best effectuating the intention." 'This is the modern rule of construction as the rule of intention. Courts are expected to construe statutes according to their intention and not be strict or liberal with them. Charles P. Curties in his "a better theory of legal interpretation" at p. 155 of "jurisprudence in Action" 1953 Edition by the New Work City Bar Association, advances the modern rule of interpretation by saying:- "Words are but delegations of the right to interpret them: in the first instance by the person addressed, and in the second and ultimate instance by the Courts who determine whether the person ad dressed has interpreted them with their authority." 15. THE learned trial Judge gave only one reason for holding that delivery to the owner of a mill irrespective of the purpose of the mill was included within the mischief of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance by saying that otherwise an unscrupulous owner of a mill could easily steer clear of the Ordinance by providing for delivery at a place other than the mill. That is always a question of fact and it is the duty and within the power of the court to prevent an evasion of statute or a fraud upon a statute. If it be found on the examination of the facts of a particular case that a place of delivery was deliberately put in a contract only to avoid the Statute, or as a fraud or screen to evade the Act, concealing the actual place of delivery, the Court can always find the real fact of the contract and hold that the delivery in the particular case is for the mill even though the apparent contract expresses itself differently with a view to practice fraud. Many indeed are cases on contracts and transfers where the court has to hold that the apparent is not the real and that in how courts examine the whole field of benami, or sham or colourable transactions and avoid them. But the possibility of the apparent not being real in a particular or individual case, cannot furnish a rule of construction of an ordinance or statute. 16. THIS subject includes the famous controversy about evasion of a statute. Judges from time to time have spoken strongly on the question of construction to prevent evasion. Lord Cranworth L. C., in Edwards v. Hall (. 7) (1856) 6 Dc. G. M. and G. 74, 89 says:- "I never understand what is meant by an 'evasion' of an Act of Parliament: either you are within the Act or you are not. If you are not within it, you are right; if you are within it, the course is clear." The view that we are taking of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance to mean that the prohibition or restriction there is directed to selling or buying of raw jute in respect of a jute mill and not for other purposes, can be supported, apart from the reasons we have advanced, by two comparable decisions of the English Courts on the principle of construction. It was held in R. v. Bateman (8) reported in 112 Revised Reports 705 that section 18 of the English Quarter Sessions Act, 1849, which enacted that "any order" of Quarter Sessions might be removed to the Queen's Bench for enforcement, was confined to orders in appeal cases because the preamble there recited that it was expedient that the law should be made uniform in cases of appeal, and hence the preamble showed the limited scope of the Act. Similarly in Belasco v. Hannant (9) 8 Jur. (N. S.) 1226, the Court holds that section 32 of the Refreshment Houses Act, 1860, which made it penal for a publican to allow bad characters "to assemble and meet together" in his house, would not be broken by his permitting such persons to enter for taking refreshment and to remain there as long as was reasonably necessary for that purpose, because the preamble showed that the object of the statute was the repression of disorderly conduct, not the absolute denial of all hospitality to persons of bad character. 17. IN coming to the conclusion on this question of construction, we adopt with respect the following observations of Lord Dunedin in Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Reed (10) (1914) A. C. 587 (P. C.) at pages 595-96:- "in all eases where something not ipsa natura unlawful is prohibited by statute, the words of prohibition must be taken as they stand; they must not be amplified in order to meet a supposed evil or restricted in order to protect a natural freedom. In other words, the evil that was to be checked can only be considered so far as necessary for the interpretation of the words, but must not be used for an independent determination of the scope of the remedy." 18. FEAR, therefore, that a construction will help evasion by practicing fraud upon the statute, is not a ground for construing the statute differently, for after all a fraud can always be checked in individual cases by the court when it comes to its notice but the mischief of permanently extending a penalty not intended by the statute is far too great and irremediable by courts to be pursued for fear of evasion because of the particular construction. In this case, on the facts we are satisfied that there was no evasion of statute. In this case, on the facts we are satisfied that there was no evasion of statute. The contract specially and expressly stated that the delivery of the jute was to be at the Ocean Jute Press. The evidence shows that this Jute Press only does the work of assorting and packing the raw jute into bales (Haripratap Hawlani Q. 21-26). Purchase or sale of raw jute or even bales of jute which are regarded as raw jute within the definition of raw jute, does not come within section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. It is only when the jute baler sells the baled jute, which is also raw jute by definition to the mill that section 5 (1) of the Ordinance operates. In fact, Haripratap Hawlani in answer to question 216 makes this position clear. There, he was asked in cross-examination whether he made any application to the Central Jute Board specifying the quantity, quality and description of the jute, they were buying. His answer was definite in asserting that it was not necessary for a jute baler to get the permission of the Central Jute Board. There was no cross-examination on this point. This Ocean Jute Press maintains separate books of account and is a different institution independent and separate from the jute mills. This witness Hawlani also says in answer to Q. 133 that the Contract Register of the Mahadeo Jute Mill, which is Exhibit F, is entirely separate from the books of the Jute Press. In Exhibit E/1, which is an entry in the Transaction Register, page 44, mentioning the contract in suit, the endorsement appears clear, "to be delivered to Ocean Jute Press. " An attempt was made at the trial and also here to show that there was some interrelation between the Ocean Jute Press and Mahadeo Jute Mills. Reference was made to Exhibit 5 (a), showing another contract, not the contract in suit, where the endorsement is "to be delivered to Shri Mahadeo Jute Mills." It was, therefore, contended that the Ocean Jute Press book contained entries for Mahadeo Jute Mills. Even if it is so, it does not prove the respondents' contention because supply by the Jute Press to the Jute Mill or vice versa is not improbable and will not make the supply of raw jute to the Press equivalent to the supply of raw jute to the Mill. Even if it is so, it does not prove the respondents' contention because supply by the Jute Press to the Jute Mill or vice versa is not improbable and will not make the supply of raw jute to the Press equivalent to the supply of raw jute to the Mill. That will depend on further facts which are not proved here. It is in fact disproved having regard to the entries appearing at pages 218-221 of the paper book in part II, in Exhibit F. 19. THEN again, the contemporaneous letter of confirmation dated the 9th January, 1951, marked Ex. 1, clearly and expressly indicates that the delivery is to be made at the Ocean Jute Press. The evidence of Jainarain Pasari, who is incidentally a close relation of the partners of the first defendant Manickchand Durgadas, being in fact a brother, definitely says in answer to question 22 that these 1500 maunds were purchased for the Ocean Jute Press and not for the two mills, namely, the Mahadeo Jute Mill and the Ambika Jute Mill (Q. 23 ). He was not challenged in cross-examination at all on this point. Therefore, the question that the jute was intended for the Jute Press and not for the Jute Mill must be taken as proved. It cannot therefore be even suggested that it was only for the purpose of evading the Ordinance. 20. MR. Das, learned counsel for the respondents then submits that the contract in suit contains internal evidence that the jute was intended for the plaintiff's jute mill. His first submission on this point is the form in which the contract was made. I have already indicated earlier in the judgment, that the form used was the form of the Indian Jute Mills Association Jute contract. It is a printed form and used ordinarily for mills. In Clause 1 of the form the words "buyers' mill-siding or ghat" appear. Similarly, in Clause 9 relating to claims, the words "mill" and "buyers' mill" appear frequently. But Clause 2 relating to delivery makes it expressly clear beyond doubt that in the facts of this case the delivery was not to the mill but to the Ocean Jute Press. Therefore the expression here in the ordinary standard printed clause mentioning "buyers' mill" can only be understood with reference to the Ocean Jute Press and not the mill. But Clause 2 relating to delivery makes it expressly clear beyond doubt that in the facts of this case the delivery was not to the mill but to the Ocean Jute Press. Therefore the expression here in the ordinary standard printed clause mentioning "buyers' mill" can only be understood with reference to the Ocean Jute Press and not the mill. In fact, the printed forms used in Clause 1 are for "jutes packed in bales" which are the usual forms in which the mills take the jute. But here it is not contested by the respondent that the jute was not packed in bales but loose jute to be delivered to the Jute Press for the purpose of being baled. The form used for this contract therefore must on the facts of the case be read in that context. While discussing the question of the form of the contract, it may not be out of place here to refer to the rules and forms prescribed under the Ordinance to which our attention has been drawn at great length by Mr. G. P. Kar, learned counsel for the appellant. The forms prescribed under the rules use the words "buyers' mill-siding or ghat" including short weight certificates by mills, all going to show that the contract within the mischief of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance was intended to be a contract for the purchase or sale of jute in respect of a jute mill. 21. MR. Das's second submission on this point is that there is no evidence led by the appellant to show what was the purpose of baling jute by the Ocean Jute Press. His suggestion in argument is that jute was baled for the purpose of being supplied to the mills. The evidence on record shows that this Ocean Jute Press baled jute in different kinds and types of bales and pressed them into such bales either for the purpose of export or for the purpose of selling to mills. So far as export is concerned, at the material time such export was prohibited. The question then is that if the ultimate purpose of this Ocean Jute Press was to press this jute into bales for supplying to the mills, then the present sale should come under the restriction and prohibition of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. 22. THIS last argument requires careful consideration. The question then is that if the ultimate purpose of this Ocean Jute Press was to press this jute into bales for supplying to the mills, then the present sale should come under the restriction and prohibition of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. 22. THIS last argument requires careful consideration. So far as the seller is concerned in this case, he was not supplying this jute to a mill. So far as the buyer in respect of this contract is concerned, he was not buying it for a mill at any rate in the first instance. The fact that after such contract in suit and when the buyer has pressed the jute into bales the buyer would thereafter enter into a further transaction for disposing such baled jute to mills cannot bring this contract of the seller to supply jute to the Ocean Jute Press within the mischief of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance. Indeed this was exactly the point on which evidence was led and on which Hawlani spoke and to which reference has already been made by me earlier in this judgment. In question 216 he said that for jute balers no application to the Central Jute Board was necessary. When they do sell the jute to other mills then in that case certainly section 5 (1) of the Ordinance will operate and the Ocean Jute Press will at that point of time have to go through the procedure laid down in section 6 of the Ordinance. But that stage is not reached in this case. To use the language of Lord Halsbury which we have quoted before in (10) Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Leed, (1914) A. C. 587 (P. C.) at pp. 595-6, to rope in such a possible future disposition of this jute within the meaning of section 5 (1) of the Ordinance, would be to amplify the Ordinance to meet a supposed evil and such supposed evil cannot be used for determination of the extent of the scope of the Ordinance. Lastly, Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent, urged that this was an emergency legislation and we must be liberal in construing emergency legislation. Lastly, Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent, urged that this was an emergency legislation and we must be liberal in construing emergency legislation. He referred to the well-known case in the House of Lords of Liversidge v. Anderson (11) in (1942) A. C. 206 and the Supreme Court decision (12) In re the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, reported in 1951 S. C. R. 747 at 780-781. So far as principles of construction of a statute are concerned, I do not think any distinction can be made that emergency legislation must be construed on different principles than those applicable to permanent legislation. I know of no case which has gone so far as to do that. Emergency legislation certainly must be construed within its own context and, wherever possible, interpreted to see that the legislation meets that particular emergency. I need only add that this was a temporary statute to meet a temporary emergency or crisis in jute industry to ensure adequate supplies of raw jute for the jute mills. After the Ordinance came the Act and the Act was ultimately repealed on the 5th August, 1952. For these reasons, we hold that the contract in suit is not void under section 3 (1) of the Raw Jute (Central Jute Board and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (17 of 1950). 23. THE remaining point is about damages. The learned Judge discarded the evidence of Jatish Chandra Aich of Messrs. M. Meyer and Co., an assistant under-broker in their employment for over thirty years. The firm of M. Meyer and Co. circularises market rates of jute to almost all the mills and Banks in Calcutta. (Aich question 5). The learned Judge says. ". . . . . . the testimony of Aich amounts to nothing more than what he and others had heard from dealers in raw jute. Clearly this is not legal evidence." he goes on further to say:- "according to the evidence of the plaintiff, the market rate on April 6 was Rs. 96/- but no attempt has been made to prove the actual rate on this date or on any date near about the 6th April, 1951. The plaintiff made no effort to adduce any evidence of any transaction which would throw any light on the question. No effort was made to Aich to elicit evidence of any actual transaction put through by M. Meyer and Co. The plaintiff made no effort to adduce any evidence of any transaction which would throw any light on the question. No effort was made to Aich to elicit evidence of any actual transaction put through by M. Meyer and Co. either on the 6th April, 1951 or before or after that date. Whatever the reason for such omission, I am clearly of opinion that the evidence adduced is not worthy of acceptance. " 24. THE learned Judge referred to the case of Sridhar Gopinath v. Gordhandas Gokuldas (13) reported in I. L. R, 26 Bom. 235 and tried to distinguish it on facts. We are satisfied that the learned trial judge has clearly gone wrong on the question of damage and in excluding the evidence of Aich as hearsay or as not being legal evidence. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the best evidence rule should be applied and there should have been evidence given of actual transaction. It appears to us that there is a great deal of confusion on this question. What is the best evidence of market rate? If a responsible person of long standing, employed by a well-known and established firm of brokers who circularises market rates to all the important banks and jute mills in the city, comes and gives evidence of his experience of market rate, I should have thought that his evidence would be the best evidence of market rate and there could be no better evidence. Actual transactions are not necessarily the best evidence of market rate because such individual transactions, either one or more than one, may be explained away by special features attending them. But the market rate which is based on a large series of transactions put through or carried on by a firm of brokers is, in my view, more reliable and more truly the best evidence on the point of market rate. 25. I feel that it is necessary that some part of the evidence of Aich should be quoted in order to show that his evidence was neither hearsay nor unreliable. In answer to question 8, Aich says: "q. Do you yourself take any rate from the sellers? A. Yes. " In answer to question 9 again he says: "q. Please look at this record and tell us what was the market rate in raw jute middle on the 6th April 1951. In answer to question 8, Aich says: "q. Do you yourself take any rate from the sellers? A. Yes. " In answer to question 9 again he says: "q. Please look at this record and tell us what was the market rate in raw jute middle on the 6th April 1951. What are you looking at? A. This is our daily market quotation." "q. 10. Now tell us the market rate on 6th April 1951 for raw jute middle of Assam. (Shown the contract). Find out for yourself the type of jute. A. This is Upper Assam jute." "q. 11. What is the market rate on 6th April, 1951. A. Rs. 96/- per maund middle." This Aich was definitely asked about the work that he did and his following answers to the questions are material on the point: "q. 12. Is it your duty as an Assistant Under-Broker in the employ of Messrs. M. Meyer and Co. to keep in touch with the market rate ? Yes. Q. 13. And that you have done ? Yes. Q. 14. Do you always keep in touch with the market rate? Yes, otherwise how could I do business ? Q. 15. On the 6th April. 1951 did you know what was the market rate? Yes, from the quotation. Q. 16. How did you arrive at this market rate on 6th April 1951 ? In the morning we attended the sellers and most of the sellers said, "my price is Rs. 96/- otherwise I will not sell". Q. 17. How many sellers on average per day you visited? About 15. Q. 18. And how many representatives of M. Meyer and Co. like you are there? 4 to 5. Q. 19. To your knowledge, do they also go to different people in the market? Yes. Q. 20. Is it your duty to bring in the sellers' offer and the rate? Yes" Finally, in cross-examination by Mr. Das, this witness definitely made the following statement: "q. 24 About the various rates that you have mentioned as to the price of jute on any particular day, it is really what others have told you the rate would be ? No, I used to go myself and have quotation. " This is also the witness who said that a large number of the contracts are put through by M. Meyer and Co. in answer to question 22. 26. No, I used to go myself and have quotation. " This is also the witness who said that a large number of the contracts are put through by M. Meyer and Co. in answer to question 22. 26. THE result is that this witness Aich was not merely giving the rates as hearsay but he was actually in the business. It was part of his duty to collect rates. It was part of his duty to enquire both from buyers and sellers the rates they were willing to offer and accept and to bring them together. He also proved his firm's office quotation which is circularised to all banks and mills in Calcutta. This document is marked Ex. C. It is all in printed form where the rates are quoted. The rate for Upper Assam Jute Middle is quoted at Rs. 96/- on the 6th April, 1951. It has not been correctly printed, however, in the Appeal Paper Book for us but we have seen the original exhibit and satisfied ourselves about it. The learned Judge therefore, in our view was wrong in rejecting the testimony of this witness as not legal evidence or as hearsay not worthy of acceptance. In Narain Chunder Dhur v. Cohen (14) I. L. R. 10 Cal. 565, Pigot, J. held that where the Court had the advantage of having in evidence before it a record of the market rate of any particular day made up by a broker of intelligence and experience, such a record should be received as evidence of the particular state of the market on that day. At pages 566-567 of that report, Pigot, J. observes as follows:- "the question is what was the rate prevailing in the market at the time the memorandum was prepared for what I may call sound business. The returns prepared by this gentleman are, as Mr. Delius states, records made by him at the time of what he knew, or believed he knew, to be the fact with regard to the market rate of such transactions. The facts which were then present to his mind were- (1) what within his knowledge buyers were willing to offer and what within his knowledge the producers or sellers were asking. The facts which were then present to his mind were- (1) what within his knowledge buyers were willing to offer and what within his knowledge the producers or sellers were asking. Along with that, there was the further fact, the transactions which were actually entered into, and upon these classes of facts, all of which are facts, he compiled this record. Now, the market rate of any day is nothing more than a compilation of the result of various facts connected with the trade of that day, and what I desire to do in ascertaining the particular state of the market on any day, is not to cast on the Court the duty of gathering rates from contracts and from them to strike for itself the market rate, but I desire to hold that when the Court has the advantage of having in evidence before it, a record of the rates made by a gentleman of intelligence and experience on that day, it should have that advantage, the advantage of having the rates made out in that way, in preference to computing the rate for itself. I therefore, admit the quotations." 27. WE think and consider that this represents the correct view of the matter. This view also has been adopted in a recent decision of the Nagpur High Court in Hasanali v. Dara Shah (15) reported in A. I. R. 1949 Nag. 282, where a Division Bench of Bose, A. C. J. and Mudholkar, J. at page 283 observed: "we have already dealt with the plaintiff's evidence and held that it is not shown to be hearsay. As regards the catalogue, it is not, in our opinion, hearsay. It is a statement put out by the sellers regarding the price at which they were prepared to sell. If "a" walks into a shop and asks the; shopkeeper the price at which he is prepared to sell a particular article, his answer to "a" is not hearsay and when "a" enters the box and tells us what the shop keeper told him, he gives direct evidence of a relevant fact. So also, if instead of giving an oral answer, the shopkeeper had replied in writing, his letter would not be hearsay and it could be proved by "a" who received it. So also, if instead of giving an oral answer, the shopkeeper had replied in writing, his letter would not be hearsay and it could be proved by "a" who received it. Similarly, when a firm broadcasts a catalogue of its prices that is only a variation of a letter and embodies the statement of the firm regarding the price at which it is prepared to sell its articles. Any person who receives the catalogue can prove it and thus prove the statement made by the firm regarding the prices at which it is prepared to sell. " 28. THEN again, in the same case, the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court observed at page 284:- "as regards the weight to be attached to this and to the evidence of P. W. 2 (plaintiff himself), as the learned Judges of the United States Supreme Court observed: 'evidence of this kind is far safer evidence than the evidence of witnesses called by a party to prove his case. Then also there is the fact that there is no counter-evidence, quite apart from the fact that the defendant has never specifically questioned the values given by the plaintiff." We need hardly say that there were no alternative rates given or suggested in evidence as being the ruling rate on the 6th April, 1951 nor was this rate of Rs. 96/- per maund seriously challenged on behalf of the respondent. 29. LASTLY, reference may be made to the decision of the American Supreme court mentioned in the Nagpur decision. This is the case of Common-wealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia (16) reported in 238 U. S Supreme Court Reports, 202-59 Lawyers' Edition 1272. Hughes, J. at page 212 in 238 U. S. 202 said: "it is unquestioned that, in proving the fact of market value, accredited price-current lists and market reports, including those published in trade journals or newspapers which are accepted as trustworthy, are admissible in evidence. " 30. FOR these reasons and on these authorities, we are satisfied that there is sufficient reliable and uncontradicted evidence to prove that the market rate for the jute in question was Rs. 96/-per maund on the 6th of April, 1951. " 30. FOR these reasons and on these authorities, we are satisfied that there is sufficient reliable and uncontradicted evidence to prove that the market rate for the jute in question was Rs. 96/-per maund on the 6th of April, 1951. We also hold, on the terms of the contract, that the breach occurred on the 31st March, 1951 and after giving the days of grace under clause 6 (b) of the contract, the plaintiff was entitled to cancel it on the 6th April, 1951. The date of breach for calculating damage, therefore, was the 6th April, 1951 under clause 6 (b) of the contract in suit. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the trial court's judgment. We hold that the contract in suit is not hit by section 5 (1) of the Ordinance and that the plaintiff has proved the damage which he has claimed, namely, Rs. 87,000/ -. There will, therefore, be a decree against the first defendant firm Manick Chand Durga Prosad for the sum of Rs. 87,000/- with interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit until realisation. The appellant will get the costs of this appeal and of the Court below. This appeal is certified for two counsel. The execution of the decree will be stayed for a fortnight after the filing of the decree. 31. BOSE, J.- The principal question raised in this appeal is as to the construction of certain provisions of the Raw Jute (Central Jute Board and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance of 1960. The relevant portion of the preamble to the Ordinance runs thus :-"whereas a crisis has arisen in the jute industry on account of the owners of jute-mills not being able to secure adequate supplies of raw jute at the maximum prices fixed under the West Bengal Jute (Control of Prices) Act, 1950; And whereas it is expedient to set up a Central Jute Board in West Bengal for ensuring equitable supply of raw jute to owners of different jute-mills; And whereas it is also expedient to make certain other miscellaneous provisions for the better regulation of the jute trade and for the protection of cultivators of jute. In section 2 of the Ordinance, certain expressions have been defined and the material expressions with which we are concerned are the definitions of "jute mill", "owner of a jute mill" and "raw jute". Section 3 of the Ordinance makes all contracts for sale or supply of raw jute entered into before the appointed day void and unenforceable to the extent that such contracts remain unperformed on the appointed day. This section is general in its nature and does not mention anything about the parties to the contract. Section 4 makes provision for the constitution of a body known as the Central Jute Board. Section 5 enjoins that sales or contracts for sale or supply of raw jute between the seller and the owner of a jute mill as the buyer have to take place or have to be entered into in the manner provided in section 6; otherwise they will be void and of no effect. Section 6 (1) requires that the seller who intends to enter into a contract for sale or supply of raw jute with the owner of a jute mill will have to make an application to the Jute Board getting out certain particulars. The Board will then after considering the application select an owner of a jute mill (who has signified in writing to the Board his intention to buy raw jute) with whom the seller will enter into a contract within a date specified by the Board [section 6 (2)]. The seller and buyer will then enter into a contract within the date specified on the terms and conditions agreed upon between them including a provision for arbitration and, in default of any such agreement, on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Rules [section 6 (3) (i)]; but the price is not to exceed the maximum price fixed by the West Bengal Jute (Control of Prices) Act, 1950. So the contract can be entered into on terms and conditions other than those prescribed by the Rules excepting as to the price which must not exceed the maximum fixed under the West Bengal Jute (Control of Prices) Act, 1950 and there must be a provision for arbitration in the contract. So the contract can be entered into on terms and conditions other than those prescribed by the Rules excepting as to the price which must not exceed the maximum fixed under the West Bengal Jute (Control of Prices) Act, 1950 and there must be a provision for arbitration in the contract. A seller or owner of a jute mill selected under sub-section (2) who refuses to comply in any manner with the provisions of clause (i) of section 6 (3) shall be guilty of an offence under this Ordinance and is punishable with imprisonment or fine or with both. Then follows an important sub-section which provides that in considering applications of the sellers and in selecting owners of jute mills under sub-section (2), the Board shall endeavor to ensure equitable supply of raw jute among owners of different mills and their selection shall be final and cannot be questioned in a Court of Law [section 6 (4)]. So the dominant consideration of the Board is to see that there is equitable distribution of raw jute made to the jute mills. So in the body of this section 6, the provisions of which are inter-linked with those of section 5, there is a reiteration of the policy and purpose of the Ordinance as indicated in the preamble of the Ordinance and it is clear that the main object of the legislation was to benefit the Jute Mills and to facilitate the carrying on or the working of the mills which were not getting adequate supplies of raw jute for the working of the mills at controlled prices. It was for this purpose that regulation and control of sale and supply of raw jute became necessary and it was to meet this crisis and emergency which became acute at this time that immediate action was called for and the Ordinance had to be promulgated. Sub-section (5) of section C provides for levying of a cess not exceeding one-eight per centum of the value of the raw jute on the seller who enters into a contract in pursuance of sub-section (3) (i ). Then section 7 prohibits delivery of raw jute to the owner of a jute mill except under a contract entered into in the manner provided by section 6 and makes contravention of this provision an offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine. Then section 7 prohibits delivery of raw jute to the owner of a jute mill except under a contract entered into in the manner provided by section 6 and makes contravention of this provision an offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine. Section 7 (3) provides that sections 5, 6 and 7 shall have effect from the appointed day and it appears that by a notification, the 30th of December, 1950 was fixed as the appointed day. So sections 5, 6 and 7 came into force on that day. Then follows other sections in the Ordinance which deal with stockists of raw jute and miscellaneous matters including provisions for effective carrying out of the purpose of the Ordinance. It may be noted at this stage that this Ordinance was replaced by an Act being Act VI of 1950 which contained substantially similar provisions with the addition of another provision contained in section 16 of the Act. It may also be noted that this Act was repealed on the 5th August, 1952. 32. SO, if we approach the substantive provisions of the Ordinance in the light of the policy and purpose deductible from the terms of the preamble and as indicated in sub-section (4) of section 6 of the Ordinance and construe the provisions of the Ordinance in such a way as will sub serve the said policy and purpose, it is quite clear that sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Ordinance were designed to apply to cases of contracts of sale or supply of raw jute where raw jute was required by the owner for purposes of utilization at a jute mill. I do not think that the Ordinance was intended to cover contracts for sale of jute which was required by a person genuinely and bonafide for purposes other than that of a jute mill even if such person happens to be the owner of a jute mill. If an owner of a jute mill requires a pound of jute for his motor car or requires some quantity of jute say for white-washing his residence or tenanted houses or for his other businesses unconnected with the jute mill business, he cannot be required to comply with the provisions of the Ordinance. If an owner of a jute mill requires a pound of jute for his motor car or requires some quantity of jute say for white-washing his residence or tenanted houses or for his other businesses unconnected with the jute mill business, he cannot be required to comply with the provisions of the Ordinance. The learned trial Judge in construing the relevant sections has referred to the decision of the House of Lords reported in 1899 A. C. 143 (Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Company) (3) in support of the proposition that if the provisions of an enactment are clear and unambiguous, the preamble cannot be called in aid of interpretation of those provisions. That proposition cannot be disputed but the whole question is whether the provisions of sections 5, 6 and 7 are such clear and unambiguous provisions as to exclude a legitimate reference to the preamble. I do not think so. What is the actual import or signification of the expression "owner of a jute mill", in the context in which it appears in the body of the Act, is a matter not free from ambiguity and there is room for more than one interpretation. In the case of Overseers of West Ham v. Iles (17) 8 A. C. 386, at page 388, Lord Blackburn made the following observation : "i quite agree with the argument which has been addressed to your Lordships, that in construing an Act of Parliament where the intention of the Legislature is declared by the preamble we are to give effect to that preamble to this extent, namely, that it shows us what the legislature are intending; and if the words of enactment have a meaning which does not go beyond that preamble, or which may come up to the preamble, in either case we prefer that meaning to one showing an intention of the Legislature which would not answer the purposes of the preamble or which would go beyond them. To that extent only is the preamble material. " 33. THE Supreme Court has also reiterated this very principle in the case of Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi (18) A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 907 following (19) 3 Coke's Report 8. To that extent only is the preamble material. " 33. THE Supreme Court has also reiterated this very principle in the case of Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi (18) A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 907 following (19) 3 Coke's Report 8. In a very recent decision of the House of Lords reported in (20) 1957 (1) A. E. R. 49, (Attorney General v. H. R. H. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover), Viscount Simonds, in dealing with this question, made the following observation:- "my Lords, the contention of the Attorney General was, in the first place, met by the bald general proposition that, where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be cut down by the preamble and a large part of the time which the hearing of this case occupied was spent in discussing authorities which were said to support that proposition. I wish, at the outset, to express my dissent from it, if it means that I cannot obtain assistance from the preamble in ascertaining the meaning of the relevant enacting part. For words and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation their colour and content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a Statute in its context, and I use context in its widest sense which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy. Since a large and ever increasing amount of time of the Courts has, during the last three hundred years been spent in the interpretation and exposition of statutes, it is natural enough that, in a matter so complex, the guiding principle should be stated in different language and with such varying emphasis on different aspects of the problem that support of high authority may be found for general and apparently irreconcilable propositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The single fact, therefore, that the enacting words are more general than the preamble would suggest is not enough. Something more is needed and here lies the heart of the problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The single fact, therefore, that the enacting words are more general than the preamble would suggest is not enough. Something more is needed and here lies the heart of the problem. On the one hand, the proposition can be accepted that "it is a settled rule that the preamble cannot be made use of to control the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. "I quote the words of Chity, L. J. which were cordially approved by Lord Davey in Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. (1899) A. C. 143 at page 185. On the other hand, it must often be difficult to say that any terms are clear and unambiguous until they have been studied in their context. That is not to say that the warning is to be disregarded against creating or imagining an ambiguity in order to bring in the aid of the preamble It means only that the elementary rule must be observed that no one should profess to understand any part of a statute or of any other document before he has read the whole of it. Until he has done so, he is not entitled to say that it, or any part of it, is clear and unambiguous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . I would suggest that it is better stated by saying that the context of the preamble is not to influence the meaning otherwise ascribable to the enacting part unless there is a compelling reason for it." 34. LORD Normand at the bottom of page 57 also made similar observations :- "when there is a preamble, it is generally in its recitals that the mischief to be remedied and the scope of the Act are described. It is, therefore, clearly permissible to have recourse to it as an aid to construing the enacting provisions. The preamble is not. however, of the same weight as an aid to construction of a section of the Act as are other relevant enacting words to be found elsewhere in the Act or even in related Acts. There may be no exact correspondence between preamble and enactment and the enactment may go beyond, or it may fall short of the indications that may be gathered from the preamble. There may be no exact correspondence between preamble and enactment and the enactment may go beyond, or it may fall short of the indications that may be gathered from the preamble. Again, the preamble cannot be of much, or any, assistance in construing provisions which embody qualifications or exceptions from the operation of the general purpose of the Act. It is only when it conveys a clear and definite meaning in comparison with relatively obscure or indefinite enacting words that the preamble may legitimately prevail. The Courts are concerned with the practical business of deciding a lis and when the plaintiff puts forward one construction of an enactment and the defendant another, it is the Court's business, in any case of some difficulty, after informing itself of what I have called the legal and factual context including the preamble, to consider in the light of this knowledge whether the enacting words admit of both the rival constructions put forward. If they admit of only one construction, that construction will receive effect even if it is inconsistent with the preamble, but if the enacting words are capable of either of the constructions offered by the parties, the construction which fits the preamble may be preferred." The question, however, is for what purpose the plaintiff required the jute in the case before us. It is submitted in the case before us that the plaintiff, though owner of two jute mills, required this raw jute for his Ocean Jute Press. The contract shows that delivery was to be at the Ocean Jute Press. The oral evidence also is to the same effect. (Haripratap Howlani Q. 72 and Jainarain Pasari, Q. 22 to 25). The letter of confirmation dated the 9th of January 1951 also makes that clear. There is no challenge in cross-examination that the ostensible purpose of the contract is not the real purpose or that the contract was a mere camouflage to evade the provisions of the Ordinance. No evidence hat been adduced by the defendant to contradict the evidence of Haripratap. It has, however, been elicited in course of cross-examination of Haripratap (Q. 150) that in the contract register alleged to be kept exclusively and separately for the purpose of Ocean Jute Press, there are entries of contracts where delivery was to be made to the jute mills belonging to the plaintiff. It has, however, been elicited in course of cross-examination of Haripratap (Q. 150) that in the contract register alleged to be kept exclusively and separately for the purpose of Ocean Jute Press, there are entries of contracts where delivery was to be made to the jute mills belonging to the plaintiff. Butt it is to be noted that such entries relate to a period before the date of the Ordinance. Moreover, those entries record transactions where Pratabmull Rameswar bought and supplied jute to jute mills including his own jute mill. The evidence further makes it clear that after the raw jute is pressed and packed in bales, (which obviously refer to Pucca bales and not Kutcha bales) they used to be sent to different mills as they could not be exported out of the country, export being prohibited at the material time. (Haripratap Qs. 79 to 84). The evidence is equally clear that before the sale or supply of the pressed bales of jute was effected to the different mills by the Jute Press, the procedure prescribed in the Ordinance, or the Act which replaced the Ordinance, was being followed. (Q. 29 and 216 of Haripratap). It is possible that in this particular case the Jute Press, if they had got delivery of the jute, would press the Kutcha bales into Pucca bales and would keep the whole quantity in stock for sometime, taking out a license as stockiest under section 8 of the Ordinance, and then they would sell or supply these bales to some different mills after complying with the provisions of the Ordinance. So it appears to me that it cannot be said that there has been any evasion of the Ordinance or the Act. If fraud on the Statute or evasion of the Statute is proved in any particular case, the contract will, of course, be hit by the Ordinance or the Act. 35. IT has also been argued that the form in which the contract has been entered into leads to the conclusion that the contract was for the jute mill. It is to be noted, however, that the form used is the usual Indian Jute Mills Association standard form which had been current for a long time before the Ordinance. 35. IT has also been argued that the form in which the contract has been entered into leads to the conclusion that the contract was for the jute mill. It is to be noted, however, that the form used is the usual Indian Jute Mills Association standard form which had been current for a long time before the Ordinance. It is pointed out that although the place of delivery is the Ocean Jute Press, the printed conditions in the contract have not been scored out and there are provisions which can be applicable only when the contract is for a jute mill. It is true that some of the clauses which are referable only to the case of a contract when delivery is to be made to a jute mill direct have not been deleted but the general principle of construction of contracts where the printed conditions come into conflict with handwritten or typed conditions has been laid down very clearly in Renton and Co. v. Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama (21) (1956) (1) A. E. R. 209 at 222 by Jenkins, L. J. in the following words:- "if any printed conditions are found to be inconsistent with or repugnant to the main object disclosed by the terms specially agreed and typed or written into a printed form, the court will limit or modify the conflicting printed conditions to the extent necessary to give effect to the main object or will reject the printed conditions to the extent necessary to give effect to the main object or will reject the printed conditions if they are clearly repugnant to the main object." 36. THE learned Lord Justice placed reliance on (22) Leduc v. Ward, 20 Q B. D. 475 and Glynn v. Margetson (23) (1893) A. C. 351, which affirm this principle of construction. For all these reasons and the additional reasons given by my learned brother, it must be held that the contract is not hit by the Ordinance and is not invalid. With regard to the other points raised in this appeal I would only like to add a few words to what has already been said by my learned brother. For all these reasons and the additional reasons given by my learned brother, it must be held that the contract is not hit by the Ordinance and is not invalid. With regard to the other points raised in this appeal I would only like to add a few words to what has already been said by my learned brother. It has been argued that the cause of action has not been sufficiently pleaded in the plaint and no foundation has been laid in the plaint for a claim for damages on the basis of clause 6 (b) of the contract. To this contention, the short answer is that the contract is annexed to the plaint and is thus made a part of the plaint and the bill dated April 6, 1951 which sets out the particulars of damage and is also annexed to the plaint, makes it quite clear that damage is claimed, in terms of the contract. So it is clear that the defendant respondent is not prejudiced in any way. The defendant understood the nature and the basis of the claim and was not taken by any surprise. It has been already pointed out by my learned brother with reference to the authorities on the point, that it is not necessary to plead acceptance of repudiation of a contract or rescission or cancellation of a contract, by the plaintiff in the plaint as a part of his cause of action. So the absence of averment of cancellation or rescission in the plaint does not make the plaint defective. I agree that the appeal should be allowed.