Chhangani, J—This is a defendants appeal under O. 43, R. 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure against the appellate order of the Additional District Judge of the former State of Ajmer dated 30.7.1956 reversing the decision of the original court on the point of limitation in a money suit. 2. The relevant facts, for the proper appreciation of controversy between the parties may be stated in a little detailed manner as follows :— The plaintiff Seth Ramswarup carries on business at Naya Nagar. The defendants entered into some transactions of purchase and sale of cotton-seeds, til, gur and makki and silver with the plaintiff in the year 1942. A sum of Rs. 1896/15/-was found due to the plaintiff from the defendants and was acknowledged by him on 25th of April, 1946. There were subsequent transactions between the parties ; some resulting in losses and others in gains. The defendants made some payments. In the end the plaintiff became entitled to recover Rs. 2,430/11/3 on 24.12.48. On 24th December, 1948, the plaintiff took steps to recover his amount through arbitration proceedings through the Chamber Sarafa, Naya Nagar. The arbitrators after enquiry gave an award in favour of the plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 2336/13/- on 22nd August, 1951 and informed the parties accordingly. An award was filed in the court of Sub Judge, Naya Nagar for passing a decree in terms of the award. But the Sub Judge, vide his order dated 13th May, 1952, set aside the award. An appeal by the plaintiff against the order of the Sub Judge setting aside the award was dismissed by the District Judge, Ajmer, on 8th of November, 1952, and further revision to the Judicial Commissioner met the same fate on 16th of February, 1953. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present suit claiming a decree for Rs. 2489/6/9. He pleaded that he was prosecuting his claim through the arbitrators and thereafter in the court where the award was filed and subsequently before the appellate and revisional court and claimed exclusion of the period taken before the arbitrators and in the court of the first instance, which set aside the award and thereafter, in the appellate and the revisional court. The defendant opposed the plaintiffs suit and, inter alia, pleaded the bar of limitation. The trial court framed a number of issues; issue; no. 8 being on the question of limitation. The defendant opposed the plaintiffs suit and, inter alia, pleaded the bar of limitation. The trial court framed a number of issues; issue; no. 8 being on the question of limitation. It was framed as follows : — "Is the suit within time ? " 3. The trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the exclusion of the period up to the date of the trial courts order setting aside the award but he is not entitled to the exclusion of the period taken in filing an appeal before the District Judge and a further revision before the Judicial Commissioner and in this view of the matter, he held the plaintiffs suit as barred by limitation and dismissed it. 4. On an appeal by the plaintiff, the Additional District Judge, Ajmer came to a contrary conclusion. He held that the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the period which was taken in prosecuting his appeal and revision against the order of the court of the first instance setting aside the award. He, consequently, reversed the decision of the trial court, but as the period taken in appeal and revision had to be ascertained, vide his order dated 3Q.7.1956, he remanded the case to the trial court for ascertaining that period and deciding the question of limitation after giving benefit to the plaintiff of the period taken in appeal and revision. 5. The defendants have filed the present appeal and challenged the order of the Additional District Judge. The plaintiff-respondent in spite of notice of appeal did not appear in this Court and the appeal was heard ex parte. 6. Shri C.L. Agrawal addressing on behalf of the appellant has very vehemently contended that the word court in Sec. 37 sub-sec. (5) can only mean the court of the first instance and cannot include an appellate court or a revisional court and, therefore, the period spent subsequent to the order of the original court setting aside an award in prosecuting an appeal or revision against the order of the court of the first instance cannot be excluded. He emphasised the definition of court in sec. 2(c) and cited some cases where the word has been given a narrow interpretation in discussing the provisions of the Arbitration Act. In Abani Bhusan Chakarvarty vs. Hemchandra Cbakravarty (1), the word court as appearing in sec. He emphasised the definition of court in sec. 2(c) and cited some cases where the word has been given a narrow interpretation in discussing the provisions of the Arbitration Act. In Abani Bhusan Chakarvarty vs. Hemchandra Cbakravarty (1), the word court as appearing in sec. 21, came up for interpretation in connection with a question whether the appellate court can refer the matter in dispute in appeal to an arbitration and the learned Judges held that the court in sec. 21 means the court of the first instance only and, therefore, an appellate court cannot make a reference to arbitration. In Mordhawaj vs. Bbudardas (2), the Allahabad High Court in dealing with the question of the competence of the appellate court to make references to arbitration, interpreted the word court in the same manner but it did not agree with the Calcutta High Court on the question of the competence of the appellate court to mate references to arbitration. Applying Sec. 107 C. P. C. with the help of Sec. 8 of General Clauses Act, it held that an appellate court can refer the matter in dispute to arbitration. As against the cases relied upon by Shri Agarwal, I may refer to Thakur Parsad vs. Baleshwar Ahir (3), where Jamuar, J. sitting with Ramaswami J. took a contrary view and observed as follows :— "I see, therefore, no reason why a restricted meaning should be gives to the word "suit" as used in S. 21, Arbitration Act. In my opinion, the term "suit" in that section ought not to be taken to exclude an appeal. I, for myself, find no good ground for the legislature, while giving power to the Court of original jurisdiction to make an order of reference under S. 21, Arbitration Act, to exclude an appellate Court from making such an order." The conclusion was reached on the important considerations (a) that under the law prior to the Act, an appellate court had the power to make an order of reference. (b) that the Act is a consolidating Act. (c) that in construing statutes consolidating laws there is a presumption that the law was not intended to be altered. 7.. (b) that the Act is a consolidating Act. (c) that in construing statutes consolidating laws there is a presumption that the law was not intended to be altered. 7.. This controversy relates to Sec. 21 and although I feel inclined to follow the Patna view, I do not express any final opinion, as in my judgment considerations relevant under sec.21 of the Act cannot be extended and invoked to limit the meaning of the word *court in sec. 37(5). Sec. 21 contemplates a question regarding the competence of the appellate court to discharge functions conferred upon the court of the first instance. No such question arises in connection with sec. 37(5). It cannot be denied that in view of a clear provision of appeal under sec. 39 against an order setting aside award or refusing to set aside an award, the appellate courts competence to reverse an order of the court of first instance and to set aside an award maintained by the court of first instance or to uphold an award set aside by the original court, cannot be doubted.. The question under sec. 37 simply is whether while the appellate court has jurisdiction to exercise functions, a suitor resorting to appeal can claim exclusion of time taken in appeal when admittedly he is entitled to the exclusion of time taken in the court of first instance. There is fundamental-difference in the two cases and an analogy of sec. 21 will be quite mislead-ing and the observations made for the interpretation of the word court in that context are of no help in interpreting sec. 37(5). A critical examination of the Calcutta case will show that the reasoning of that case cannot be applied to a case under sec. 37(5). The main consideration that prevailed with the Judges in that case was that the provisions of sec. 107 C. P. C. empowering the appellate court to exercise the powers of the original court could not be extended to the making of the references. It was pointed out that the only provision in the Arbitration Act for extending the Civil Procedure Code generally to arbitration matters are contained in sec. 41 of the Arbitration Act and therein it was provided that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings before the court and to all appeals under this Act. It was pointed out that the only provision in the Arbitration Act for extending the Civil Procedure Code generally to arbitration matters are contained in sec. 41 of the Arbitration Act and therein it was provided that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings before the court and to all appeals under this Act. An appeal in the kind of cases before the Calcutta High Court does not lie under the Arbitration Act but under the general law and, therefore, sec. 107 C. P. C. could not be invoked by the appellate court for making a reference. Under sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, an order setting or refusing to set aside an award has been made appealable and appeals against orders setting or refusing to set aside awards certainly will lie under the Arbitration Act and, therefore, sec. 107 C. P. C. must be attracted in case of this type, and the reasoning of the Calcutta case cannot be extended to this case. We must bear in mind that the appellate court and the revisional court in exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction is quite competent to set aside the awards, even though the original court may not have thought it proper to set aside and, therefore, if we interpret the word court in sec. 37 to mean only the origi-nat court, there will be a serious anomaly where an award is set aside by an appellate court. In that case on the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, there can be no case for exclusion of the period in terms of sec. 37 of the Arbitration Act. The legislature cannot be imputed to have intended such an absurd result. It appears, therefore, quite reasonable and fair in the context of sec. 37 to interpret the word court in sec. 37(5) so as to include the appellate and the revisional court, at any rate, when the award is set aside by an appellate or revisional court. This position could not be successfully met by the learned counsel for the appellant. He, however, urges that when an award is set aside by the original court, in that case a litigant should not be entitled to exclude the period taken in a further appeal or revision against the order setting aside the award. This position could not be successfully met by the learned counsel for the appellant. He, however, urges that when an award is set aside by the original court, in that case a litigant should not be entitled to exclude the period taken in a further appeal or revision against the order setting aside the award. The obvious short answer to this argument is that we cannot interpret the word court differently because of the variations in circumstances of individual cases. When for one purpose, discussed above, the word court must include the appellate or revisional court, there is obviously no adequate reason for interpreting it differently when the award is set aside by the original court. 8. The matter may be approached from another angle. Sec. 39 gives a suitor right of appeal against an order setting aside award and very naturally he must be allowed to pursue his right without any kind of restriction or risk. A view that in case of failure in appeal in any subsequent litigation he cannot claim exclusion of time taken in appeal cannot but seriously restrict, if not altogether deprive him of his right. This could never have been intended by the Legislature. It will be useful to point out at this stage that sec. 37 contains provisions relating to limitation, and sub-sec. (5) corresponds with sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. Under that section the time taken in conducting proceedings in appeal can be excluded on the wordings of the section itself. It is of course true that sec. .37(5) does not adopt the language of sec. 14 for appeal purposes but the difference in language need not be emphasised to infer a different legislative intent. The general principles of sec. 14 being well known the legislature very presumably remained content with general language only. I have no hesitation in holding that on the general principles of sec. 14, and on the obvious necessity of adequately recognising and safe-guarding the rights of parties under sec. 39 sec. 37(5) should be interpreted to entitle to a suit to claim exclusion of the period taken in appeal against an order setting aside sale and the same principle may in appropriate cases be extended to revisions also. 9. On a very careful consideration of the various aspects of the matter, I have no doubt that on a fair and reasonable construction of sec. 9. On a very careful consideration of the various aspects of the matter, I have no doubt that on a fair and reasonable construction of sec. 37, the word court should include the appellate and revisional court and that the plaintiff is entitled to the exclusion of the period taken by him in filing appeal and revision against the order of the court setting aside the award. The view taken by the lower court appears to be quite correct and calls for no interference. There is no merit in this appeal and it is consequently dismissed. The respondent having not appeared there will be no order as to costs. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has applied for leave to appeal. As an important question of law is involved, the leave is hereby granted.