ORDER P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. In a suit instituted in 1943 and disposed of in June, 1944, the petitioner herein obtained a decree for redemption of a kanom and for possession of the land covered thereby on the ground that he required it for his own cultivation, a ground which, since the transaction was a kanom, fell within caluse (5) of section 20 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, as it originally stood. The 1st defendant in that suit was the kanomdar while the remaining defendants were tenants under him. In January 1957, the 2nd defendant in the suit, who is the respondent herein, came forward with an application for restoration of her holding relying upon section 52 of the Malabar Tenancy (amendment) Act, XXXIII of 1951 and section 5(2) of the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act XXII of 1956. The petitioner thereupon came forward with an application for the reception of further evidence and, that application having been dismissed by the court below, he has come up in revision. 2. The respondent's application really falls under section 5(2) of Act XXII of 1956 which has the effect of superseding section 52 of Act XXXIII of 1951, and the relevant portion of that section runs as follows: (2) Where before the commencement of the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1954 (Madras Act VII of 1954), a landlord has obtained possession of a holding in execution of a decree passed by a Court on or after the 1st July 1942, under clause (5) or clause (6) of section 14 or under clause (5) or clause (6) of section 20 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 (Madras Act XIV of 1930), and such decree would not have been passed if the principal Act as amended by the Malabar Tenancy (2nd Amendment)Act, 1945 (Madras Act XXIV of 1945), the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1951 (Madras Act XXXIII of 1951), and this Act had been in force at that time the tenant shall be entitled to be restored to the possession of the holding with all the rights and subject to all the liabilities of a tenant if the makes an application in that behalf in the Court which passes the decree within twelve months of the commencement of this Act. The question is whether, under the terms of this section, the petitioner is entitled to show by further evidence that, applying the law as it now stands as if it then obtained, the court would nevertheless have passed the decree for possession in his favour, or whether in deciding this question the court has to confine itself to the pleadings and the evidence already on record in the suit. 3. It seems to have been argued in the court below that, on the law as it now stands, the petitioner's suit could not have been maintained in view of the third proviso to section 25 of the present Act by which a suit for recovery for bona fide need can be instituted only within certain stated periods, the petitioner's suit apparently not having been brought within any of those periods. This is an argument really foreign to the question that fell for consideration which was merely whether the petitioner's application for adducing further evidence should or should not be allowed. But, I might observe that it is quite clear from the wording of the proviso, clause (a) thereof providing that in cases where the lease has expired before the commencement of Act XXXIII of 1951 the suit should be brought within certain stated periods after the commencement of the Act and clause (b) providing for cases where the lease has expired after the commencement of that Act, that the proviso can apply only to suits instituted after the commencement of that Act and not to suits like the present instituted before that Act. 4. To appreciate the true meaning of section5 (2) of Act XXII of 1956 it might be necessary to trace the history of the provisions relating to eviction on the ground of need. 4. To appreciate the true meaning of section5 (2) of Act XXII of 1956 it might be necessary to trace the history of the provisions relating to eviction on the ground of need. And this I think had best be done in the words of Govinda Menon J. in Abdur Rahiman v Ussan Kutti (I. M. L. J. page 527 to page 528); As the Act originally stood sub-section 5 of section 20 was in part material with sub-section 5 of section 14 of the Malabar Tenancy Act which is in the following terms:- The period of the verumpattom, kanam, kanam-kushikanam, or kuzhikanam as the case may be has expired and there has been no renewal and the landlord requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation or for that of any member of his family or tarwad or travazhi who has a proprietory and beneficial interest therein.t The important words in the sub-section were requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation. In second appeal No. 42 of 1938 Venkatarmana Rao J. held that a mere desire on the part of the landlord to have the land for his own cultivation even if bona fide is not enough. It must be shown that the landlord really needed the land for his own cultivation. The question to be decided was whether without evicting the tenant and getting possession of the land it would be impossible for the landlord or the member of his tavazhi or tarwad to sustain themselves. Though the words used were requires bona fide the same were interpreted to mean necessity or need to the landlord. This view if Venkataramana Rao J., was not accepted by King J., in second appeal No. 538 of 1938 wherein he held that the expression bona fide cannot apply to a state of circumstances but only to statements or intentions or actions of a human being. Therefore all that is necessary for the court is to decide whether when the landlord demands or asks for or sues for any land on the ground that he wishes to cultivate it himself is the statement made bona fide. Therefore all that is necessary for the court is to decide whether when the landlord demands or asks for or sues for any land on the ground that he wishes to cultivate it himself is the statement made bona fide. In the view of King J., the need or necessity of the landlord does not arise for consideration in construing the expression requires the holding bona fide.t In this state of conflict of decisions a Bench of this Court, Leach C. J., and Chandrasekhara Ayyar J., in Narikkal Chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942) Madras 133) held that the words requires the holding bona fide mean only a genuine intention on the part of the landlord to cultivate and that it is not necessary that he should show the real need to do so. The learned Judges went further and held that the fact that the landlord has sufficient land under cultivation elsewhere to provide for the needs of himself and his family does not matter. In this state of case law the Legislature intervened and sub-section 5 and 6 of section 20 along with sub-section 5 and 6 of section 14 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1930, were amended and for the words stood in the Act XIV of 1930 namely. The landlord requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation or for that of any member of his family or tarwad or tavazhi who has a proprietory and beneficial interest therein The following words came to be substituted:- The landlord needs the holding bona fide for the purpose of raising crops or other produce for his own maintenance or for that of any other member of his tarwad or tavazhi who has a prorietory and beneficial interest in the holding. The result of this amendment was that the need or necessity which Venkataramana Rao J. held was essential, was restored and the view expressed in Narikkal chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942) Madras 133) was negative. By Act VII of 1954 to sub-clause 6 of section 14 and 20 an explanation was added in the following terms: In considering the requirements for maintenance regard shall be had only to primary needs. 5. By Act VII of 1954 to sub-clause 6 of section 14 and 20 an explanation was added in the following terms: In considering the requirements for maintenance regard shall be had only to primary needs. 5. There have been no further changes, but I might mention that the section of the Act as it now stands corresponding to section 20 (5) of the original Act is section 25(4). 6. We might turn back to section 5(2) of Act XXII of 1956 and see whether it contemplates the reception of fresh evidence or a decision on the record as it stands. On a literal construction of the section it seems to me that the interpretation placed upon it by the lower court is correct and that no further evidence is permissible. The sole inquiry directed by the section is whether or not the court would have passed the decree of the law in force at the time of the decree was the law in force now. It is no doubt true that an application under the section is in the nature of an original application, and that section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code makes the procedure in regard to suits applicable to the application. But, even so, evidence can be permitted only on a matter in issue, and, as I have explained the only matter in issue here is whether or not, if at the time it passed the decree for eviction the law had been what it now is, the court would have passed the decree. Section 5 (2) does not take the matter to any point of time anterior to the passing of the decree, and raises no question as to whether if the law even earlier had been what it is now, the plaintiff would have framed his plaint differently, or, whether the court would have allowed him, after the closing of the case, to amend his pleadings and to adduce further evidence to show that he was entitled to possession. It seems to me that all that the court has to decide under section 5(2) is whether, on the material already on record, but applying the new law, it would still have passed the old decree. It seems to me that all that the court has to decide under section 5(2) is whether, on the material already on record, but applying the new law, it would still have passed the old decree. The section does not contemplate a re-opening of the suit and a fresh decision based on the new law after allowing the parties to amend their pleadings and adduce fresh evidence. What it in fact does is to leave the decree in the suit untouched, but to reverse its effect by a new and independent order of restoration giving the holding back to the tenant with all his old rights. The only matter for inquiry before making such an order is whether on the new law the old decree would have been passed, and the argument that fairness requires that the landlord should be given opportunity to bring his suit within the requirements of the new law by adducing fresh evidence and amending his plaint if necessary seems to me irrelevant. If the intention of the Legislature was that a tenant could, on application, have a decree for eviction re-opened and the suit decided afresh in accordance with the new law after such amendment of pleadings and such further evidence as the court may think fir to allow, nothing would have been simpler for it than to say so; and, that the Legislature knew how to say so, if it meant so, is apparent from section 25(3) of Act VII of 1954 where in the case of a decree for eviction obtained under the old law but not yet executed because of statutory stays, it provided for the re-opening of the suit, the reception of additional pleadings and further evidence, and the passing of a fresh decree in accordance with the new law, on application made by the tenant. 7. It would appear that until the contrary was said by King J. in Second Appeal No. 538 of 1939 of the Madras High Court, the generally accepted interpretation of the old section was that placed upon it by Venkataramana Rao J. in Second Appeal No. 42 of 1938, namely, that the question was whether without evicting the tenant and getting possession of the land, it would be impossible for the land-lord or the members of his tavazhi or tarwad to sustain themselves. This seems to have been what the legislature itself intended although the language it used was defective, and it lost no time in making its meaning clear when Narikkal Chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942) Madras 133) explained the true meaning of the words it had used. It came forward with an amendment, introduced by Act XXIV of 1945, which has not been substantially altered by the subsequent amendments, restoring the view expressed by Venkataraman Rao J. and negativing that taken in Narikkal Chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942) Madras 133). Then the question arose whether it was fair that those tenants who were not really liable to eviction but had suffered eviction owing to the defective language used by the legislature, should be deprived of their holdings, and hence the provision for restoration first introduced by section 52 of Act XXXIII of 1951 and reiterated by section 5(2) of Act XXII of 1956. It seems apparent that the purpose of the legislature was to ensure, as far as may be that all suits for eviction instituted under the provisions of the old Act should be decided in accordance with the view taken by Venkataramana Rao J and the machinery it adopted for the purpose, so far decrees for eviction already executed were concerned, was an application on which the court would restore his holding to the tenant if in accordance with that view the landlord was not entitled to eviction. If the landlord is entitled to eviction even under the new law it is open to him to bring a fresh suit for the purpose, but he cannot be allowed to keep what he got as a result of the wrong language used by the Legislature. The wording of section 5(2) of Act XXII of 1956 seems therefore to be in keeping with the legislature's intention. 8. It is argued that if that were its intention, the legislature could straight-away have provided for restoration in all cases, leaving the landlords to institute fresh suits if they were entitled to eviction under the new law. This argument forgets that the generally accepted view of the provisions for eviction in the old Act was, until that view was upset by Narikkal Chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942). This argument forgets that the generally accepted view of the provisions for eviction in the old Act was, until that view was upset by Narikkal Chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942). Madras 133), what is said in the present Act; and, obviously, where a landlord had brought as suit in that view and had also succeeded in making out his claim accordingly, the Legislature did not want that there should be a restoration when, even on the materials on record, the decree was in accord with the present law. It might be that section 5(2) of Act XXII of 1956 causes some hardship to those who, relying on Narikkal Chathan v Kesavan Nambudiri (I. L. R. (1942) Madras 133), were content to plead and prove bona fide requirements and did not go further to plead and prove primary need. But that I suppose cannot be helped. The language of the section and the intention thereof seem to be clear, and so long as the vires of the section itself is not assailed, it must prevail. 9. I dismiss the petition with costs.