S. T. DESAI, N. M. MIABHOY, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition raises a question of some importance and interest relating to the interpretation of section 88c (5) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act which rules that the decision of the Mamlatdar. . . . subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final and the controversy is whether any such decision is subject to correction by the Revenue Tribunal under the powers of revision conferred on it by section 76 of the Act. The petitioner is the tenant of the parcel of land of which opponent No. 1 is the owner. Opponent No. 1 applied to the Mamlatdar for obtaining a certificate under section 88c on the ground that her income was below Rs. 1500. 00. Sec. 88c grants an exemption from certain provisions of the Act to lands leased by persons whose annual income does not exceed Rs. 1500. 00. Two conditions are postulated by that section before any such exemption can be granted. Firstly the land must not exceed an economic holding and secondly the total annual income of the person who has leased out the land including the rent of such land must not exceed Rs. 1500. 00. One of the contentions sought to be urged before us on behalf of the petitioner relates to the aspect of economic holding but we have not allowed it to be raised since it was not urged or even indicated before the Tribunal. The other contention which was raised in the Courts below and before the Revenue Tribunal relates to the condition about annual income of the lessor and in our judgment there is substance in that contention. ( 2 ) THE application of opponent No. 1 for a certificate under section 88 was dismissed by the Mamlatdar as he was of the view that income of the opponent to be taken into consideration exceed Rs. 1500. 00. An appeal to the Deputy Collector by the lessor-owner was dismissed. She carried the matter in revision to the Revenue Tribunal and the Revenue Tribunal reversed the decisions of the Deputy Collector and the Mamlatdar on the ground that in computing the amount of Rs. 1500/the Deputy Collector and the Mamlatdar had taken into consideration the income of opponent No. 1 as well as of her son on the ground that they were members of a joint Hindu family. 1500/the Deputy Collector and the Mamlatdar had taken into consideration the income of opponent No. 1 as well as of her son on the ground that they were members of a joint Hindu family. The Tribunal pointed out in its judgment that no such plea had been raised by the tenant and the Deputy Collector and the Mamlatdar were in error in holding that the income of the lessor-owner exceeded Rs. 1500. 00. ( 3 ) IN the present petition befo0re us the petitioner has raised a contention of bar in limine which had not been urged before the Tribunal and the contention is that the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction to exercise its power of revision in a matter determined under sec. 88c. It will be convenient to set out here the provisions of that section 88 c:-1) Nothing in sections 32 to 32r (both inclusive) shall apply to lands leased by any person if such land does not exceed and economic holding and the total annual income of such person including the rent of such land does not exceed Rs. 1 500 Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to any person who holds such land as a permanent tenant or who has leased such land on permanent tenancy to any other person. 2) Every person eligible to the exemption provided in sub-section (1) shall make an application in the prescribed form to the Mamlatdar; within whose jurisdiction all or most of the pieces of land leased by him are situate within the prescribed period for a certificate that is entitled to such exemption. 3) On receipt of such application the Mamlatdar shall after giving. notice to the tenant or tenants of the land hold inquiry and decide whether the land leased by such person is exempt under sub-section (1) from the provisions of sections 32 to 32 R. 4) If the Mamlatdar decides that the land is so exempt he shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to such person. 5) The decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final. ( 4 ) THE crucial argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the decision of the Mamlatdar which in appeal was upheld by the Deputy Collector acquired finality by operation of sub-section (5) of the section 88 (c) and Mr. 5) The decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final. ( 4 ) THE crucial argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the decision of the Mamlatdar which in appeal was upheld by the Deputy Collector acquired finality by operation of sub-section (5) of the section 88 (c) and Mr. S. H. Sheth who appears for the petitioner has strongly relied on the language of sub-section (5 ). He has also drawn our attention to certain other provisions of the Act where the expression final has been used by the Legislature. The expression for instance appears in section 27 (E) and section 66d. ( 5 ) SECTION 76 of the Act lays down the powers of the Revenue Tribunal to revise orders passed by the Collector on grounds therein stated. The material part of that section is as under ; 761) Notwithstanding anything contained in Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act 1939 an application for revision may be made to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector on the following grounds only :- a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law; b) that the Collector ailed to determine some material issue of law; or c) that there was a substantial defect in the following the procedure provided by this Act which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. The argument of Mr. Sheth is that although section 76 empowers the Revenue Tribunal to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in case of an order of the Collector that section cannot cover an order passed by the Collector in an appeal against an order passed by the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) of section 88c because sub-section (5) terms expressly rules that the decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final. ( 6 ) IT is argued on the other hand by Mr. A. H. Mehta on behalf of opponent No. 1 that section 76 covers any and every order passed by the Collector under the Act and sub-section (5) of section 88c does not create any exception to the applicability of section 76. The further argument of Mr. ( 6 ) IT is argued on the other hand by Mr. A. H. Mehta on behalf of opponent No. 1 that section 76 covers any and every order passed by the Collector under the Act and sub-section (5) of section 88c does not create any exception to the applicability of section 76. The further argument of Mr. Mehta is that if the language of sub-section (5) is compared with the language of the analogous provision contained in section 88c prior to its amendment in 1957 it will appear that the Legislature which had ruled that an order of the Collector in a case under section 88c should be final has now made a deliberate departure from that rule and expressed the intention that an order of the Collector should be subject to revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal. Prior to its amendment in 1957 the relevant part of section 88c (2) was as under :-The decision of the Mamlatdar or in appeal that of the Collector shall be final. There is some other difference in the provisions of section 88c prior to amendment and the provision now contained in section 88c after the amendment of 1957 It is not necessary however to discuss those changes made in 1957 in section 88c as nothing in this petition turn on those changes and what we have already set out above is sufficient to enable us to examine the argument of Mr. Mehta. Mr. Mehta agrees that words the decision of the Mamlatdar or in appeal that of the Collector shall be final could only mean that prior to the amendment the order of the Collector under section 88c was not subject to revision by the Tribunal. But the effect of using the words the decision of the Mamlatdar subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final says Mr. Mehta is that if there is appeal to the Collector against a decision of the Mamlatdar there is no finality and if there is no appeal to the Collector there is finality. We are unable to accede to this argument which seems untenable. ( 7 ) RELIANCE has also been placed by Mr. Mehta on the provisions contained in section 74. That section enumerates a catena of cases where appeal lies to the Collector. We are unable to accede to this argument which seems untenable. ( 7 ) RELIANCE has also been placed by Mr. Mehta on the provisions contained in section 74. That section enumerates a catena of cases where appeal lies to the Collector. The argument is that Clause (1) (W) of the section mentions that an order of the Mamlatdar under section 88c as an appealable order and it is said that every order of the Collector being subject to revision under section 76 an order of the Collector under section 88c is also subject to revision. The argument asks us to attach scant importance to and take no notice of the language of sub-section (5) of section 88c. In terms sub-section (5) rules that the decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final. There is nothing obscure or uncertain about the meaning of this sub-section. It speaks of finality of a decision. That finality is to attach a decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) but the decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) being an appealable one sub-section (5) be final. express and explicit goes on to state that the decision of the Mamlatdar under sub-section (3) shall be final subject to appeal to the Collector. The plain grammatical and ordinary meaning of this sub-section in our Judgment is that the decision of the Mamlatdar is to be final when there is no appeal and when there is appeal to the Collector against a decision of the Mamlatdar the decision of the Collector is also to be final. ( 8 ) THIS expression final has come up for consideration in the context of some other enactments but it seems unnecessary to us to refer to those enactments. Speaking generally when it is said in an enactment that the decision shall be final it must mean that the decision is not open to weal or revision by any Court of correction. In its ordinary signification the expression final means last or that it absolutely puts an end to or concludes a matter. The use of that expression would cannot that further controversy on the question is precluded. Or to put the same thing somewhat differently it connotes that there is to be finality to the proceeding. In its ordinary signification the expression final means last or that it absolutely puts an end to or concludes a matter. The use of that expression would cannot that further controversy on the question is precluded. Or to put the same thing somewhat differently it connotes that there is to be finality to the proceeding. Whether regarded in any ordinary sense or in a technical sense the expression in the present context must in our judgment mean that the legislature has ruled that the subject matter of the decision is to terminate with the decision of the Mamlatdar and in case there is an appeal then with the decision of the Collector in appeal. The matter is to be agitated any more before any authority constituted under the Act. In our opinion therefore the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the revisional application and was patently in error in assuming it. ( 9 ) THE petition succeeds and the rule will be made absolute. There will be no order for costs. Rule Made Absolute. .