JUDGMENT 1. IN this rule, which arises out of a proceeding under Section 16 (3) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956, two points have been raised by the petitioner-landlady, namely, (1) that, there having been no notice given by the tenant under Section 16 (2) of the Act, the sub-tenant's present application under Sec. 16 (3) is not maintainable; (2) that the notice, given by the subtenant under Sec. 16 (2) to the landlady-petitioner, was not in accordance with law, it not being in or in accordance with the prescribed form and it was invalid, as one of the requisite particulars, namely, the date of creation of the said sub-tenancy, which is required to be given or mentioned therein under the relevant Rule 4 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy rules 1956, was inaccurate or incorrect. 2. THE relevant facts are all admitted and they stand as follows: opposite Party No. 2, the Netherlands Trading Society, also known as nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij n. V., Calcutta Agency, was the tenant :in respect of the disputed premises, comprising the middle flat on the first floor of Municipal Premises No. 7 Raja Santosh Road, Alipore, Calcutta, at a rental of Rs. 250/- per month, according to the English Calendar. On and from May 1 1954, the said demised premises appears to have been sub-let to the petitioner by the said tenant opposite Party No. 2, at the same rental and according to the same english Calendar. When the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, came into force, the sub-tenant opposite party No. 1, gave a notice to the petitioner-landlady of its aforesaid sub-tenancy. The notice purported to have been given under Sec. 16 (2) of the Act and it was ex facie in the prescribed form under the relevant rule 4. But it appears now, or more accurately, it became apparent later on, that one of the particulars, mentioned in the said notice, namely, as to the date of creation of the sub-tenancy, vide Clause (f) of Rule 4, was wrong or wrongly given in that, instead of the correct date, May 1, 1954, it was mentioned as October 1, 1954. This error or inaccuracy is admitted but the sub-tenants case is that it was due to a bona fide mistake. This error or inaccuracy is admitted but the sub-tenants case is that it was due to a bona fide mistake. This wrong date appears to have been repeated in the section 16 (3) application itself and there is little doubt that the error crept in, in both the notice and the application due to a bona fide mistake on the sub-tenant's part, as found by the lower Appellate Tribunal. The sub-tenant's application was rejected by the learned Rent Controller upon the view that the above inaccuracy, even if it was due to a bona fide mistake on the sub-tenant's part, was fatal to the validity of its notice under Sec. 16 (2) of the Act, as, according to the learned Rent Controller, the said Section and the connected Rule 4, should be strictly construed in the sense that the notice mentioned therein, must be accurately given in the prescribed form and any deviation or omission or inaccuracy, in the particulars given, would invalidate the same notice with the necessary consequence that no section 16 (3) application could be maintained upon it. 3. VON appeal by the sub-tenant, the lower Appellate Tribunal (the learned subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Alipore) took a different view and held that the above inaccuracy was not sufficient to invalidate the notice. The landlady's other plea that, in the absence of any notice by the tenant under Sec. 16 (2) of the Act, the subtenant's application under Sec. 16 (3)would be liable to rejection in limine, was also rejected by the said tribunal below. The present Rule was obtained by the landlady-petitioner against the above appellate order, allowing the sub-tenant's application under Sec. 116 (3), as aforesaid, and the two points, which have been urged in support thereof, have already been set out hereinbefore. 4. ON the first question, it is enough to say that the matter is concluded against the petitioner by a Bench decision of this Court reported in (1) Hari pada Bhowmick v. Krishna Chand arora and Ors, 64 C. W. N. 199. We need only point out that the same view has also been taken by Sen, J., in a subsequent decision of this Court in (2) Subodh Kumar Dalai v. Makhan Lal dutta and others, Civil Revision Case no. We need only point out that the same view has also been taken by Sen, J., in a subsequent decision of this Court in (2) Subodh Kumar Dalai v. Makhan Lal dutta and others, Civil Revision Case no. 164 of 1959, and that, to the reasons, given in 64 C. W. N. 199 supra, in support of the above view, no affective answers could be given by Mr. Sen Gupta. Indeed, as pointed out therein, the textual language of the different sub-sections of Sec. 16 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and the clear intention of the Legislature as expressed therein, would rule out any other construction of sub-section 3 of the said Section 16 and would, in particular, rule out the plea of restricting it to cases of sub-tenancies, admitted by the tenant also, which follows as a necessary corollary or a necessary logical deduction from the petitioner's above contention. The first point, unrged in support of the Rule, therefore, fails and it is rejected. As to the second also, we are inclined to think that, in the circumstances of this case, the sub-tenant's application was rightly allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge. Rule 4, undoubtedly, mentions the particulars, which would, ordinarily, be given or mentioned in a notice under Section 16 (2) of the Act. The Rule, however, does not provide either expressly or by implication, that any the least noncompliance with it in the matter of the above particulars would necessarily invalidate the notice, and the nature of the particulars and the form and manner, in which those particulars have been mentioned, vide in particular, clause (g), on the details where under opinions may well and reasonably differ make it absolutely clear that the Rule should not, at any rate, from the point of view of justice and convenience, and legislative intent (Vide in this connection, (3) Ajit kumar Sen v. The State of W. Bengal 57 C. W. N. 613 at p. 625, vide also (4) State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, 1957 S. C. A. 1022 at pp. 1031 and 1032, and Crawford on 'statutory construction,' as quoted there) be regarded as imperative, obligatory or mandatory, so far as those particulars are concerned, so that any deviation, inaccuracy or omission, however slight and/or important and however bonafide, would invalidate the notice. 1031 and 1032, and Crawford on 'statutory construction,' as quoted there) be regarded as imperative, obligatory or mandatory, so far as those particulars are concerned, so that any deviation, inaccuracy or omission, however slight and/or important and however bonafide, would invalidate the notice. At the most, the Rule and the particulars are directory and substantial compliance therewith would be clearly sufficient. We do not, of course, accept Mr. Laik's contention that these particulars are not at all necessary or relevant for a notice under Sec. 16 (2) and one or other of them may always, and, in all circumstances, be allowed to be omitted without making the notice materially defective or without the risk of the notice being rendered invalid. We do not accept that extreme contention, but, even though these particulars should, ordinarily, be given in a notice under Sec. 16 (2), we do not think that any unintentional omission or inaccuracy in the matter of any of these particulars would necessarily have the consequence of invalidating the notice. 5. AS we have said above, the particulars are really directory and not imperative, obligatory or mandatory and a substantial compliance with the Rule (Rule 4) in the matter of those particulars would be sufficient for the validity of the particular notice. In the above view, we are supported by the observation of the supreme Court in the recent case of (5) Thakur Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta and others, 1956 S. C. A. 366, and the theory of substance which was noticed and affirmed there by his lordship (Bose, J.) applied with equal force to a case of the present type. It is true that the Supreme court case cited, may be, otherwise, distinguishable, but, so far as the above observations are concerned, we think that they are relevant and pertinent and plainly opposite to the present or instant case and on the above point before us. 6. It is true that the Supreme court case cited, may be, otherwise, distinguishable, but, so far as the above observations are concerned, we think that they are relevant and pertinent and plainly opposite to the present or instant case and on the above point before us. 6. WE would, accordingly, hold that substantial compliance with the particulars, mentioned in Rule 4 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Rules 1956, would be sufficient for validating a notice under Sec. 16 (2) and, as, in this case, there has clearly been such substantial compliance, as aforesaid, and the error, which occurred, was due to a bonafide or unintentional mistake, we are inclined to hold that the view of the lower Appellate Tribunal, accepting the said notice as valid, is correct. For the foregoing reasons, we reject both the contentions, urged by the petitioner in support of this Rule, and we discharge it, though, having regard to the fact that the principal question was one of first impression, we would direct the parties to bear their own costs in the present proceeding throughout.