JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is an appeal by the complainant, Municipal Committee, Mandsaur, with special leave under Section 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure from the judgment of acquittal of the Respondent, himself, one of the three accused persons put up for trial in the case. The offence was of the violation of a condition about location with reference to a public street, in the sanction given for rebuilding his house imposed under Section 112(2) of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1964. The charge was under Section 112(7). Though the learned Magistrate accepted the facts alleged by the complainant, he acquitted all the accused. The gist of the offence was that while the municipality imposed the condition that the house-front should be beyond twenty-one and a half feet throughout, from the centre of the public street, the Respondent constructed it setting back only nineteen feet at the western end, though at the eastern end it was set back about the same distance as provided in the municipality's order: The order, that the accused should leave out without building a strip of land two and a half feet wide which belongs to them, was illegal and therefore it was unnecessary for the accused to comply with it. They are fully entitled under the Constitution of India to build on their own land as they have done. If in fact the municipality needed a strip of land two and a half feet wide belonging to the accused for the sake of the road, then it should have acquired it in accordance with the proceedings laid down in the Municipalities Act. The powers given to it under this Act are limited and the municipality could exercise them only in the manner provided in it. Every free citizen of India has got an absolute right to build on his own land and till it is shown that there has been contravention of any law a Court cannot interfere. Actually the Municipal Council has itself contravened the law and has acted irregularly and in an arbitrary manner. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the accused persons to comply. Actually the Municipal Council has itself contravened the law and has acted irregularly and in an arbitrary manner. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the accused persons to comply. However, the learned Magistrate has not set out in what respect the municipality "has contravened the law"; his impression seems to be that, it should either acquire the land or permit the owner to build on it just as he likes and cannot in any event order him to leave his own land unbuilt over. He seems also to be of the view that this right to build on one's own land, is a fundamental right that cannot be fettered by any regulation. The implication is that all statutes that enable a local authority to control the location of a building on one's own land are ultra vires; actually no reference has been made in this regard under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These far-reaching views may embarrass all local authorities in discharging their functions, it becomes necessary to discuss these dicta at some length. In addition, two other minor grounds have also been raised by the Respondent viz., that the appeal is time-barred and that the sanitary inspector was incompetent to file the complaint. The facts are mostly admitted. Within the Mandsaur Municipality, the Respondent's family have a piece of land by the side of a street on a part of which they seem to have had an old house. The family consists of two brothers and the mother, but it is common ground that the person who was in charge of the building-work was the elder of the two sons, that is, the present Respondent, though all the three members were proceeded against before the Magistrate. As required by Section 112(1), he applied for sanction and got it subject to the condition imposed under Section 112(2), that the house-front, which is about 35 feet long, should, at all points, be twenty-one and a half feet away from the middle-thread of the public street adjoining. It appears that at about that time there was a proposal to widen the road at that place; but we are not directly concerned with it. The strip of land twenty-one and a half feet wide between the middle-thread of the road and the permitted house-front was, in part existing road and, in part, land belonging to the Respondent. It appears that at about that time there was a proposal to widen the road at that place; but we are not directly concerned with it. The strip of land twenty-one and a half feet wide between the middle-thread of the road and the permitted house-front was, in part existing road and, in part, land belonging to the Respondent. It might even be that the municipality had plans for acquiring, for the purpose of road-widening, part of the Respondent's land in the manner provided in Section 108 of the Act; but the condition about location has, as such, nothing to do with the ownership. Whatever width of the intervening land belonged to the owner, the order of the Council was, that it should not be built over and must be left open. This is called a "set back" of the house. The Respondent built over the entirety of what he considered to be his land, but contravened the condition, because at one end the house front came to within nineteen feet of the middle-thread of the street. At the other end, however, the set-back was in accordance with the Committee's order. The surveyor as well as the other witnesses are clear about this, this is also shown on the map. It was not suggested to them that there had been a mistake in the measurement nor was a request made to have a re-measurement. Though the Respondent stated in his statement under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, that he obeyed with the order; he himself did not assert that he had left twenty-one and a half feet all along the house-front. There is no difficulty or uncertainty in the measurement; the parties as well as the Magistrate proceeded on the assumption, which I find is fully justified by the evidence, that the order has been contravened to the extent mentioned already. The Municipal Committee ordered the prosecution under Section 112(7), the complaint being filed by the sanitary inspector. The facts being virtually admitted, the defence was that the Respondent has built on bis own land and could not be legally ordered to leave out any part of it. As for the strip two and a half feet wide, the municipality had not acquired it, nor paid compensation to the Respondent, and therefore could not impose this condition. The facts being virtually admitted, the defence was that the Respondent has built on bis own land and could not be legally ordered to leave out any part of it. As for the strip two and a half feet wide, the municipality had not acquired it, nor paid compensation to the Respondent, and therefore could not impose this condition. As already noted, the learned Magistrate accepted this argument and acquitted all the accused. On behalf of the municipality, it is contended here that the powers under Section 112(2) had nothing to do with the right to acquire land for the purpose set out in Section 108 of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act. This section enables the municipality to widen any public street by removing the projecting structures and acquiring the land after payment of compensation. Once acquired, the land becomes part of the public street and vests in the municipality. But Section 112(2) gives general powers for the control of building operations, by imposing conditions, inter alia about "the location with reference to the public street", without actually acquiring the land. The Municipal Committee may consider it advisable to leave some width on either side of the road to enable drivers and pedestrians to see what is ahead. It may be for the purposes of visibility or broad ventilation of the locality, or drainage and can even be with regard to future road widening operations. This has no reference to the ownership of the land on which the building is to be located with reference to the public street. It is conceivable that a projected building governed by Section 108 may be one of the structures in regard to which notice to the municipal council is necessary under Section 112(1) ("..........or to construct or reconstruct a building in respect of which the municipal council is empowered by Section 108 to enforce a removal or set-back"). But this is only one of the many possibilities, the powers under Section 112 being much wider than those under Section 108 of the Act. The Respondent's contention that the municipality is incompetent to impose conditions about locality, restricting the owner's right to build on his own land will, if .accepted, nullify the provisions of Section 112(2) in regard to location with reference to a public street. Such provisions are found in every statute regarding municipalities. The Respondent's contention that the municipality is incompetent to impose conditions about locality, restricting the owner's right to build on his own land will, if .accepted, nullify the provisions of Section 112(2) in regard to location with reference to a public street. Such provisions are found in every statute regarding municipalities. There is nothing in these sections, or in any judicial pronouncement to show that the municipal council cannot order that an owner should not build just as he likes on his own land, unless it simultaneously acquires and pays compensation for that part of his land on which the council wants him not to build. It is one thing to say that a local authority can acquire land for widening a street and altogether another, and a wider, principle, to provide without acquiring the land, and letting it to remain the property of the private owner, it can still order him not to build as be likes. This is just what Section 112(2) enacts. The learned Magistrate has very unnecessarily referred to a "fundamental right" though he has not made any reference on the basis of an opinion that the powers given by Section 112(2) form an unreasonable restriction on a fundamental right of Article 19 (f). Still it is worth recording that laws like Section 112 of this Act are justified by Article 19 (5) as imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. If every owner is allowed to build as he likes, right upto the edge of his own land, in a congested municipal area, there will be end to sanitation, safety, ventilation and presentability of the town. It might even be worse as it would make it very difficult, costly and practically impossible, to widen the streets if it becomes necessary as it often does, later on when a town grows. Nor has the municipality exceeded the powers given by this section. There is no allegation of mala fides or an ulterior purpose. The Municipal Committee is sole authority competent to decide on the necessary width of the set-back and also whether and when it should at all acquire for the purposes of widening the public street, part or whole of the owner's land, on which it has banned the building operations. Stated thus, the main ground on which the learned Magistrate has acquitted the Respondent, fails. Stated thus, the main ground on which the learned Magistrate has acquitted the Respondent, fails. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has urged that the present appeal is time-barred. I have added up the dates, and I find, excluding the time taken in the proceeding for special leave, it is in time. Factually, this is admitted by the Respondent; but the argument advanced is that the Appellant has not made the appropriate prayer, presumably under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that this period should be condoned. I do not accept this. When, as here, the Appellant has, under statute, to take certain steps, the time actually spent in them has to be excluded by the Court itself in computing limitation, that being altogether outside his control. It is only where the party has on its own choice lost the time, has it to show sufficient cause and ask for condonation. Another argument advanced on behalf of the Respondent is that the sanitary inspector was not competent to file the complaint. Therefore, it is urged, the entire criminal proceedings were bad for want of jurisdiction. At best, this being a continuing breach, the municipality may start new case by complaint filed by a competent officer. Actually, this point was not raised in the trial Court. Section 193 (1) of the Act enables the Municipal Commissioner or any other officer that the Council may direct to start a prosecution. Such direction 120 may be general or with reference to a particular case. No doubt, the municipality has directed by a resolution that prosecutions for public nuisances may be started by sanitary Inspector, but this is not a prosecution for nuisance but one for a breach of one of the other provisions of this Act. We are dealing with a matter of ministerial or administrative power of the Municipal Committee which may direct this or that officer to file a complaint, and not with a statutory requirement that a particular authority alone can file the complaint, or sanction of a particular authority is a condition precedent for the prosecution. Rating this objection at the best, it is governed by Section 637, Criminal Procedure Code, being "an error or irregularity" in the complaint. This was not raised in the trial Court and has certainly caused no prejudice. Rating this objection at the best, it is governed by Section 637, Criminal Procedure Code, being "an error or irregularity" in the complaint. This was not raised in the trial Court and has certainly caused no prejudice. In the result the appeal is allowed and the Respondent is convicted under Section 112(7) of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 with simple imprisonment in default for two weeks. I would also impose an additional fine of Re. 1 a day in case of continuance of the breach after four months from the date of this order. The imprisonment in default for the additional fine, shall be one week for every Rs. 50 or part subject to a maximum of one fortnight. I agree. Appeal allowed