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1960 DIGILAW 52 (GAU)

Bachaspatimayum Thambou Sarma v. Angom Nandagopal Singh

1960-12-03

T.N.R.TIRUMALPAD

body1960
JUDGMENT :- This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1958, by which he confirmed the dismissal of the suit filed by the appellant for declaration of title and possession of the suit property. 2. The appellants case in the plaint was that he was the owner of the property having purchased it from respondent 2 by the sale deed Ext. 2 dated 20-6-1949 for Rs. 400/-, that thereafter ho let it on lease to respondent 1, that in 1951 be took a mortgage loan of Rs. 250/- from respondent 1 as per a written deed, that he repaid the loan later, but did not get back the deed as respondent 1 stated that it was lost, that respondent 1, who continued in possession as lessee did not pay any loushal from 17-4-1952 and even got the land mutated in his name and hence the appellant had to come forward with the suit. Respondent 1 contended that the alleged lease in his favour was false, that he had purchased the land from the appellant by two sale deeds, which were not registered ; that he got possession as per the said sale deeds and he got the land mutated in his name with the knowledge of the appellant all that he has been in possession in his own right and was not liable to be evicted from the property. 3. Both the lower Courts found that the story of the lease in favour of respondent 1 was utterly false. They also found that the story of the mortgage and the alleged repayment of the mortgage by the appellant was equally false. Respondent 1 had produced the two unregistered sale deeds executed in his favour by the appellant as Exts. A/2 and A/3 dated 12-12-1949 and 21-1-1951 respectively. They were admitted in evidence though they were unregistered for consideration of the question whether the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the T. P. Act would apply to the present case. Both the lower Courts held that the doctrine of part performance would apply even though the T. P. Act was extended to the Union, Territory of Manipur only in 1957 while the suit as well as the transactions took place before the extension of the T. P. Act to this territory. 4. Both the lower Courts held that the doctrine of part performance would apply even though the T. P. Act was extended to the Union, Territory of Manipur only in 1957 while the suit as well as the transactions took place before the extension of the T. P. Act to this territory. 4. With regard to the pleas raised by the appellant about the tenancy and about the mortgage and repayment thereof, both the lower Courts came to concurrent findings of fact and rejected the said pleas as totally false. There is no doubt that the appellants case about the alleged tenancy and the mortgage and its repayment were utterly false. His case as set up in the plaint and as sought to be proved by oral evidence were quite different and they were rightly rejected by the lower Courts. 5. The only question which arises for decision in this second appeal is whether the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the T. P. Act could be applied in this case when the T. P. Act had not been made applicable to this part of Indian Territory, at the time of these transactions, though the Registration Act had been made applicable and the deed of sale to be valid had to be registered. Now the appellant executed the wale deed - Ext. A/2 in favour of respondent 1 on 12-12-1949 regarding one lourak of land for Rs. 175/- of which Rs. 55/- had still to be paid. This document was not registered, but possession of the land was given. This document is not referred to in the plaint at all. Later, the appellant executed Ext. A/3 another sale deed on 20-1-1951. in respect of the entire land including the land sold under Ext. A-2 for a sum of Rs. 350/- and put respondent 1 in possession of the entire property. Even this document is not referred to in the plain it and it was simply mentioned that Rs. 250/- was taken as loan and a document executed. In this evidence however the appellant admitted that ho had taken Rs. 350/-, but according to him, it was only on mortgage and not on the strength of the sale. He also said that out of Rs. 350/-, Rs. 300/- was repaid and the balance of Rs. 50/- remained to be paid. In this evidence however the appellant admitted that ho had taken Rs. 350/-, but according to him, it was only on mortgage and not on the strength of the sale. He also said that out of Rs. 350/-, Rs. 300/- was repaid and the balance of Rs. 50/- remained to be paid. This case was rightly disbelieved by both the lower Courts and it was held that Exts. A/2 and A/3, in fact, evidenced sale deeds and possession also was given as per the sale deeds. 6. It was however pointed out for the appellant that if Ext. A/2 was a sale deed, then the same land under Ext. A/2 would not have been included and sold again under Ext. A/3 and that this fact showed both Exts. A/2 and A/3 were really only mortgage deeds as contended by the appellant. But Ext. A/2, as I said, was not referred to at all in the plaint and even Ext. A/3 was not correctly set out, Bodi the documents clearly appeared to the deeds of sale, though they were defective for want of registration. But respondent 1 was put in possession of the property and the plaint itself admits that even in 1952, respondent 1 got the land mutated in his name. Now when the land was admittedly mutated in the name of the appellant after his purchase from respondent 2 and the said mutation was changed in 1952 in the name of respondent 1, it is clear that it must have been done after due notice to the appellant. It is also clear that at that stage the appellant did not deem it fit to question the mutation or rather that he consented to the mutation accepting thereby that he has ceased to-be the owner of the land and that respondent 1 had become its owner. It was due to an afterthought that in 1955 he filed the suit for declaration of title and possession setting up the false case of tenancy and mortgage evidently taking advantage of the fact that the sale deeds in favour of respondent 1 had not been registered. It is to such a case that respondent 1 now pleads by way of defence the equitable doctrine of part performance. It is to such a case that respondent 1 now pleads by way of defence the equitable doctrine of part performance. The appellant seeks to counter that defence by saying that the T. P. Act was extended to Manipur only during the pendency of the suit and that the defence of part performance will not avail respondent 1. 7. Now, the doctrine of part performance is an equitable doctrine and it was intended to protect persons whose title to the property is defective. The doctrine which was applicable under English law was sought to be applied to India also in certain decisions. But it was held by the Privy Council in 1931 in the decision, G.H.C. Ariff v. Jadunath Mazumdar, ILR 58 Cal 1235 : (AIR 1931 PC 79), that the said doctrine could not be applied so as to override the express provision of a statute, like the Registration Act or the T.P. Act. It was then that Section 53-A was enacted in 1930 in the T.P. Act extending the said doctrine to India, thereby giving statutory authority for the said doctrine. 8. After Manipur became part of India in 1949, Indian statutes began to be extended to Manipur at various times. Thus the Registration Act was made applicable in April, 1950, Thorny documents of sale became compulsorily registrable. But the T.P. Act was made applicable only in 1957. What the appellant now seeks to do is to take advantage of this state of affairs. But it seems to me that if the appellant can take advantage of the extension of the Registration Act to Manipur and of the non-extension of the T.P. Act at the time when lie filed the suit, respondent 1 can also take advantage of the extension of the T. P. Act to this Territory during the pendency of the suit. There is nothing in Section 53-A of the T.P. Act which shows that it is not retrospective in its application. Thus at the time when the Court sought to give relief to the party, Section 53-A of the T.P. Act applied to this Territory and it can certainly be made use of by respondent 1 as a defence to the suit. Thus at the time when the Court sought to give relief to the party, Section 53-A of the T.P. Act applied to this Territory and it can certainly be made use of by respondent 1 as a defence to the suit. The Indian Courts are not merely Courts of law, but also the Courts of equity and the Courts cannot shut their eyes to the fact of the extension of the T.P. Act to this Territory at the time when judgment had to be pronounced in a case. The lower Courts were certainly right in applying the provisions of Section 53-A to this case as all the conditions necessary for application of the doctrine of part performance were fully present. As pointed out by the learned District Judge in his judgment even if. Section 53-A was not applicable at the time when the suit was filed, the principle embodied in Section 53-A will be applicable in the case, as pointed out in the decision Mt. Shankri v. Milkha Singh, AIR 1941 Lah 407 (FB). 9. For all these reasons I hold that S. 53-A of the T.P. Act applies to this case as all the conditions mentioned therein are present. Respondent 1 is entitled to plead successfully that lie cannot be evicted from the land by virtue of the said doctrine of part performance. 10. I see no reason to interfere in the second appeal. It is dismissed with the costs of the respondent No. 1. Appeal dismissed.