ORDER P.V. Dixit, C.J. This is an appeal from an order of Choudhuri J. rejecting summarily an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the Appellants for quashing an order of the Board of Revenue. The material facts are that in 1953 the Board of Revenue set aside an order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, made on 30 August 1952 in proceedings under Section 54(1) of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950. The matter then came up before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and on 3 November 1953 the order of the Board of Revenue was quashed, and the case was remanded for fresh disposal. After remand, the hearing of the case was resumed before the Nistar Officer, Raigarb. During the pendency of the proceedings, the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, came into force on 1 October 1955. Section 238 of the Code repealed the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act with the exception of Sections 38 to 70 excluding Sections 48, 52 and 64. Section 54 of the Act was thus repealed. The Appellants then raised an objection that as Section 54 of the Act had been repealed no further proceedings under that section could be taken by the Nistar Officer. This objection was overruled by the Nistar Officer, and his decision was upheld ultimately in appeal also by the Board of Revenue. The Board took the view that the repealed Section 54 did not affect the right which had accrued to the opponents under Section 54 on the date of the repeal. The Appellants then moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge took the view that proceedings under Section 54 had been started prior to the repeal of the section and that therefore they could be continued under Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 5 of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act read with Section 239 of the Code. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the repeal of Section 54 of the Act by Section 239 of the Code extinguished any vested right of the aforesaid opponents. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the repeal of Section 54 of the Act by Section 239 of the Code extinguished any vested right of the aforesaid opponents. Section 54 of the Act ran as follows: (1) Where any land not included in the home-farm was under the personal cultivation of a proprietor, the Deputy Commissioner may, in accordance with the rules made by the State Government in this behalf, reserve to such proprietor the rights of a raiyat in the whole or part of such land and shall determine the revenue thereon. Section 238 of the Code specifies in Schedule III the enactments repealed. Section 239 deals with savings of rules, assessments, appointments made, notifications issued, rights acquired, and liabilities incurred. Section 241 provides that all applications for conferral of malik-makbuza rights filed under Sections 41, 56 and 69 of the Act pending on the date of the coming into force of the Code shall notwithstanding the repeal of the Act be heard and decided in accordance with the provisions contained therein, as if the said Act had not been repealed. Learned Counsel for the Appellants did not dispute that Section 54(1) of the Act dealt with a vested right. He, however, argued that the vested right under section could accrue to a party only on the date of the making of an order by the Deputy Commissioner reserving to a proprietor the rights of a raiyat in land and not before, and that it could not therefore be said in the present case that any such vested right accrued to the opponents merely on the making of the application under Section 54. It was further said that Section 241 of the Code while providing for the continuance of applications under Sections 41, 56 and 69 of the Act did not say anything about the continuance of pending proceedings under Section 54 and this was a pointer to the fact that proceedings under Section 54 would terminate on the repeal of that section. Learned Counsel further submitted that Section 5 of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act, 1914, could not be applied in the present case as the repeal was followed by a fresh legislation. We are unable to accede to the contentions advanced on behalf of the Appellants. Learned Counsel further submitted that Section 5 of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act, 1914, could not be applied in the present case as the repeal was followed by a fresh legislation. We are unable to accede to the contentions advanced on behalf of the Appellants. There can be no doubt that Section 54(1) of the Act conferred on an ex-proprietor the right to acquire the rights of a raiyat in the whole or part of the land not included in the home-farm which was under his personal cultivation. That provision, no doubt, says that the Deputy Commissioner may in accordance with the rules reserve to the proprietor the rights of a raiyat in such land. But the use of the word 'may' does not confer discretionary power on the Deputy Commissioner as the provision is for the benefit of the ex-proprietors. The word 'may' has to be construed in the sense of 'shall'. In this connexion it would be sufficient to refer to the decisions of Julius v. Bishop of Oxford 5 ac 214 and Rex v. Bishop of Oxford (1879) 4 QBD 245, where it has been held that when a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised and the Court will require it to be exercised. A perusal of the rules framed under Section 54(1) of the Act also shows that when the conditions laid down in the rule are satisfied by any proprietor the Deputy Commissioner has no choice but to make an order reserving to the proprietor the rights of a raiyat in the whole or part of the land described in Section 54. The right of having the rights of a raiyat in land under their personal cultivation was conferred on proprietors on the date of vesting. Section 54 deals with the recognition of the right when the proprietor applies for reservation in the manner prescribed by the rules framed under this provision. The right of having the rights of a raiyat in land under their personal cultivation was conferred on proprietors on the date of vesting. Section 54 deals with the recognition of the right when the proprietor applies for reservation in the manner prescribed by the rules framed under this provision. The right accrues to the Petitioner not when an order is made by the Deputy Commissioner with regard to reservation but when the proprietor actively asserts the right by making an application under Section 64. As soon as the proprietor made an application under Section 54 he was entitled to have his claim investigated by the Deputy Commissioner and the right to have that investigation done in accordance with the rule was a right which accrued to the proprietor on the date of the making of the application. In support of the view that in this case the right accrued to the opponents on the date of their applying under Section 54 reference may be made to Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 KB 422. That was a case where the question arose as to when the tenant under Section 11 of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908, acquired a right to compensation. By the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1914, when the tenancy of a holding is determined by a notice to quit given in view of a sale of a holding the notice to quit is treated as an unreasonable disturbance within Section 11 of the Act of 1908 and the tenant is entitled to compensation upon certain terms and conditions. One of the conditions prescribed was that tenants should within two months after the receipt of the notice to quit give the landlord notice of their intention to claim compensation. Another condition was that he should make his claim for compensation within three months after quitting the holding. The tenant duly gave notice of his intention to claim compensation within the time so limited; but before the tenancy had expired, and therefore before he could satisfy the second condition, Section 11 of the Act of 1908 was repealed. The tenant subsequently made his claim within the three months' limitation. The tenant duly gave notice of his intention to claim compensation within the time so limited; but before the tenancy had expired, and therefore before he could satisfy the second condition, Section 11 of the Act of 1908 was repealed. The tenant subsequently made his claim within the three months' limitation. It was held that notwithstanding the repeal the tenant was entitled to claim compensation for the reason that since the landlord in view of the sale of the property gave the tenant notice to quit the tenant acquired a right to compensation for disturbance under Section 11, subject to this satisfying the conditions of that section. Another decision which supports the proposition that a right to take advantage of an enactment accrues to a party when he does something to avail himself of that right is Abbott v. Minister for Lands (1895) ac 425. In Abbott's case (1895) a. c. 425 the question was whether a man who had purchased certain land was entitled to exercise a right to make an additional purchase of the adjoining land under the powers conferred by a repealed Act which contained a saving clause. The Privy Council observed that the power to take advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed a right and that the mere right existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of the right cannot properly be deemed a right accrued within the meaning of the enactment. Abbott's case (1895) a. c. 425 bears out the proposition laid down in Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 KB 422. If then Section 54(1) of the Act conferred on the opponents the right to obtain raiyati rights in certain lands and that right accrued to them when they made an application under Section 54 for reservation of the rights, the right so accrued would clearly be saved by Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, and the investigation with regard to this accrued right had to be continued as if the repealing Act viz, the Code of 1954 had not been passed. The general rules of construction with regard to retrospective operation of statutes are well established. The general rules of construction with regard to retrospective operation of statutes are well established. One of the rules is that provisions which touch a right in existence on the passing of a statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. There is no express provision in the Code of 1954 taking away the right conferred by Section 54 of the Act. Learned Counsel sought to read Section 241 of the Code as a provision which did not keep alive pending proceedings under Section 54. We do not think that Section 241 has this effect. It only provides for a continuance of pending applications under Sections 41, 56 and 69. We are unable to see how the continuance of these applications necessarily implies that a pending proceeding or application under Section 54 is extinguished by the repeal. Section 241 cannot, in our opinion, be read as a provision which by necessary intendment affects the vested right given by Section 54. In these circumstances, Section 5 of the General Clauses Act would clearly be applicable, and the right which had already accrued to the opponents under section 54 on the date of the repeal would be saved. The argument of the Learned Counsel that Section 5 of the General Clauses Act could not be invoked as the repeal was followed by fresh legislation must be rejected in view of the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh AIR 1955 S C 84 and Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property AIR 1955 SC 84 . In these two cases the Supreme Court rejected the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation and observed that Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also, unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section and that such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law. There is nothing in the Code to indicate that the application of Section 5 of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act to saving of the rights under Section 54 was incompatible with the provisions of the Code itself. There is nothing in the Code to indicate that the application of Section 5 of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act to saving of the rights under Section 54 was incompatible with the provisions of the Code itself. For these reasons we are of opinion that the learned single Judge was right in taking the view that pending proceedings under Section 54 of the Act were in no way affected by the repeal of Section 54 and that they would continue notwithstanding the repeal of Section 54. In the result this appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed