JUDGMENT Mulla, J. - This is a Criminal Revision which was registered when the record of the Sessions statement of Hardoi came to this Court and a learned Judge, when he perused the judgment in this case, found that the sentence awarded to the opposite party was inadequate and he issued a notice to him as to why the sentence should not be enhanced. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows. Jang Bahadur opposite party and his brother Hukum Singh resided in village Mahadain, police station Harpalpur along with their mother Smt. Phul Kuar. The opposite party was married to Smt. Shanti Devi, daughter of Mulaim Singh, tome days before the incident the ornaments of Smt, Phul Kuar were stolen and the two brothers suspected each other, Some evidence has been produced that Hukum-Singh and some others suspected that it was Smt. Shanti Devi who had stolen these ornaments. The opposite party trusted his wife completely and considered her to be the soul of honour. He stoutly defended his wife and suspected his brother for committing this theft. This created bad blood between the two brothers and their relations were highly strained. A day before the incident Mulaim Singh, the father of Smt. Shanti Devi, came to Mahadain. On the date of the incident the opposite party as usual had gone out to his fields in the morning and while he was working there, his brother Hukum Singh came there and told him that the ornaments have been recovered from the Jhola of Mulaim Singh by Smt. Phul Kuar and now the complicity of Smt. Shanti Devi was established. The opposite party was greatly shocked on receiving this information and he came back to his house in an angry mood. He told his father-in-law Mulaim Singh to clear out immediately and he also behaved in an excited manner. The relations succeeded in persuading him to go back to his field and work there. The opposite party worked there for about 1.1/2 to 2 hours and then after coming back to his house, he killed his wife Smt. Shanti Devi with a Gandasa, No one saw him killing his wife and from the evidence produced it appears that when the relations and neighbours were attracted they found the opposite party with a blood-stained Gandasa in his hand. The opposite party told some of them that Smt. Shanti Devi had abused him and so he had killed her. The opposite party then proceeded to police station Harpalpur and lodged the first information report of this crime himself and he also deposited the blood-stained Gandasa. He was prosecuted after the investigation was completed. 3. We have presented the facts in as favourable a light as possible to the opposite party. Some parts of this narrative are open to grave doubts, for the witnesses are certainly interested in minimizing the conduct of the opposite party for affection for the living always wins against duty towards the deed. 4. We will, however, not discount their statements, but we will accept them at their face value. When the opposite party was prosecuted, perhaps his zeal to admit his crime became less and then he wanted to escape the punishment of his crime. The mood of repentance or the desire to justify his crime gave way to the primary urge for self-preservation which was but natural. He, therefore, made certain additions in his statement and when he was examined by the committing Magistrate, he gave the version that when he came back to the house after scraping the grass, he told his wife that she had brought disgrace to him by stealing the articles and handing them over to her father. On this Smt. Shanti Devi deceased abused him and caught hold of his neck and said that she would kill him also. Accidentally a Gandasa was lying nearby and losing his self control he killed her. 5. The trial court accepted the defence taken up by the opposite party and therefore, came to the conclusion that the opposite party had received a grave and sudden provocation and therefore, instead of convicting him u/s 302, IPC it convicted him u/s 304, IPC and sentenced him to eight year's rigorous imprisonment. 6. The trial court in its decision when discussing this point, observed: There is no eye-witness of the fact of murder. The accused had made a clear confession of his guilt from the very beginning upto the Sessions court. Learned defence counsel argued that the omission in the FIR regarding the abuses hurled by the wife of the accused could not be lost sight of because the statement of the accused-must be taken as a whole. The accused had made a clear confession of his guilt from the very beginning upto the Sessions court. Learned defence counsel argued that the omission in the FIR regarding the abuses hurled by the wife of the accused could not be lost sight of because the statement of the accused-must be taken as a whole. It is certainly true that the abuses are not mentioned in the FIU and CW 1, PW 3 and PW 6 had stated that the wife of Jang Bahadur had abused him. PW 7 has certainly denied that Jang Bahadur had told him that his wife had abused him and has clung to his neck. For the purpose of this case I find that this little omission would not affect the matter. 7. Progressing further the trial court observed: The submission of the learned defence counsel that the accused had received a grave and sudden provocation on the morning of December 31, 1957 is fully borne out from the facts and circumstances on the record of this case. 8. We will not comment upon the language of the trial court, though it has certainly been difficult for us to follow what the trial court meant. It appears that the trial court realized that the opposite party when he lodged the first information report had not claimed that his wife had abused him or tried to catch hold of his neck and this was added for the first time by the opposite party when he made his statement before the committing Magistrate. It was, however, inclined to ignore this omission in view of the testimony of certain witnesses which it accepted. 9. The counsel for the opposite party before us contended that the first information report was inadmissible in evidence as it amounted to a confession made to a police officer and was hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is not necessary for us to deal with this contention because we will not make any capital out of the omission of the opposite party in taking up this stand when he lodged the first information report. It is not necessary for us to deal with this contention because we will not make any capital out of the omission of the opposite party in taking up this stand when he lodged the first information report. We would, however, like to observe that the authorities placed before us in support of the contention have not considered the question whether an information given by an accused against himself is admissible or not if discovery follows it and the application of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act was not discussed at all. Perhaps the learned Judges who gave those decisions were of the opinion that when an accused presents himself and gives information against himself, he is not in custody at that, time and therefore, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act does not apply. As we are not deciding this question we would only like to observe that the word 'custody' has a wide meaning and there are some decisions to the effect that in such circumstances the informant should be deemed to be in custody. When an informant goes to the police station and lodges a report against himself, he voluntarily puts himself into the custody of the police and therefore, any information given by him is one given by an accused in custody. Once this conclusion is arrived at then we fail to see why Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which is an exception to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, should be ignored and should not apply. This cannot be denied that the opposite party in this case deposited the Gandasa and the dead body was recovered after this information was lodged by the opposite party. A discovery, therefore, followed the information given by the opposite party. We are, therefore, inclined to the view that; the first information report was admissible in evidence to that extent 10 which it can be connected with the actual discovery. As this omission has got nothing to do with that part of the statement of the opposite party which led to the discovery, we are not entitled to use this omission against the opposite party. However, this was a purely academic discussion and the matter cannot be decided without looking up the entire law on the subject. As this omission has got nothing to do with that part of the statement of the opposite party which led to the discovery, we are not entitled to use this omission against the opposite party. However, this was a purely academic discussion and the matter cannot be decided without looking up the entire law on the subject. We would, therefore, accept the statements made by the witnesses in favour of the opposite patty to the extent to which they are made. 10. But these statements fall far short of the stand taken up by the opposite party himself. The opposite party took up the stand that his wife abused him and even tried to catch hold of his neck and then threatened to kill him. Obviously this was a desperate effort to suggest those circumstances which would create a grave and sudden provocation and perhaps even some sort of right of private defence. A statement is discredited not only because there is reliable evidence against that statement, but also because that statement is inherently untrue and unbelievable. We cannot possibly conceive that Smt. Shanti Devi deceased after her crime was discovered would have any truculence left in her and she would abuse her husband and even if by any chance she was an extraordinary vicious woman and she was capable of extending these abuses, it is quite inconceivable that she would try to catch bold of the neck of her husband and then threaten to kill him. The statement has a clear ring of falsehood and therefore, when it is sought to be supported by the testimony of witnesses, who are highly interested in the opposite party and who want to minimize his guilt, it is not possible to accept these statements. 11. There is another flaw which is a legal flaw against the statements given by these witnesses. According to these witnesses when they rushed up, they saw the opposite party with a Gandasa in his hand and on interrogation the opposite party told them what the deceased had said at the time when he killed her. In the first place this is a statement of the opposite party in his own favour and secondly, this statement is not covered by Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, for it cannot be treated as res-gestas. In the first place this is a statement of the opposite party in his own favour and secondly, this statement is not covered by Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, for it cannot be treated as res-gestas. These statements appear to us to be inadmissible in evidence and therefore, there is only the statement of the opposite party before us, which is inherently defective. Still as we are out to take as favourable a view to the opposite party, as possible, we will accept that when the opposite party came and tried to be rough with his wife, the wife retaliated by using some abusive words. 12. The question really is whether on the facts proved this case falls u/s 302, IPC or Section 304 IPC. The State has not filed any appeal and therefore, the opposite party cannot be convicted u/s 302, IPC, but if the proved facts clearly establish an offence u/s 302. IPC it would be a good reason for enhancing the sentence awarded to the opposite party u/s 304, IPC. We have considered the case from this angle and we have come to the conclusion that there Can be no doubt that this was a case u/s 302, IPC and the trial court completely erred when it found that the opposite party acted under grave and sudden provocation. Before an accused can draw any benefit from Exception I to Section 300, IPC there should be some circumstance to indicate that the act of the accused was done in the same transaction in which he received the grave and sudden provocation. If there is an interval of time then the act of the accused ceases to be a part of the same transaction and it cannot be pleaded by him that it was his spontaneous reaction to the provocation which he had received. Interval of time is, therefore, extremely material and where the facts prove that the interval was about two hours, it is not possible to connect the conduct of the opposite party with the shock which he had received two hours earlier. On the facts proved, the opposite party came to Know that his wife had committed the theft and then he had gone to his field and scraped grass there for about two hours. On the facts proved, the opposite party came to Know that his wife had committed the theft and then he had gone to his field and scraped grass there for about two hours. The counsel for the opposite party, however, contended that the shock continued and the opposite party upto the lime when he committed this crime was suffering from the effects of this shock. It is not possible to accept this contention. The Exceptions given in Section 300, I P Code are not to be very loosely interpreted and a benefit of these exceptions are fulfilled. It would be a dangerous precedent to lay down that shock can continue for hours and a delayed action by an accused who has received the shock is also covered by this exception. If the opposite party had killed his wife before going to the field and remaining there for about two hours, perhaps it might have been possible to plead this exception, but the law presumes that the shock deadens by the laps of time and a period of two hours is more than sufficient for second thoughts. It is only that act which is not subjected to second thoughts which comes under the exception. But where there is time for thinking and yet an act is committed, it is not protected by this exception. The law does not permit that an accused should work up his passion and brood over his wrong and produce a mood in which he commits a crime. The facts of this case disclose that the opposite party went on brooding and after two hours he came and killed his wife. We, therefore, find that the provocation was not sudden. 13. Similarly we find that the provocation cannot be treated to be a grave provocation. There is hardly a family in whose cupboard there is not a skeleton and it would be an extremely dangerous precedent if we hold that when a person discovers that a close relation is not the soul of honour which one believed him or her to be, one is entitled to lose one's self control completely on making such a discovery. That the wife of the opposite party was discovered to be a thief might have been a shock to the opposite party, but it is not possible to treat it as a grave provocation. That the wife of the opposite party was discovered to be a thief might have been a shock to the opposite party, but it is not possible to treat it as a grave provocation. One has to judge these things in the light of reactions on normal human beings and not in the light of hypersensitive and unbalanced individuals. The reaction of the opposite party was not the normal reaction and even if his plea is to be accepted, it was the reaction of an extremely unbalanced person who was emotionally completely mal-adjusted. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provocation received by the opposite party was neither grave nor sudden and so he should have been convicted u/s 302, IPC. 14. The counsel for the opposite party has not advanced any other contention before us as to why we should nor enhance the punishment of the opposite party in this case. 15. We, therefore, uphold the conviction of the opposite party u/s 304 IPC and enhance the term of imprisonment to imprisonment for life. Revision allowed.