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1960 DIGILAW 53 (GAU)

Ramoutar Mahawar v. Union of India

1960-12-06

T.N.R.TIRUMALPAD

body1960
JUDGMENT :- This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant and confirming the decree of the Subordinate Judge, by which he dismissed the suit filed by the appellant against the respondent claiming damages for non-delivery of certain goods consigned to him through the Railway. 2. The appellants case in the plaint was as follows : Three consignments of hand-loom cloth were sent to him through the Railway for delivery at Imphal O/A. One consignment worth Rs. 534/4/- was handed over to the Southern Railway on 24-2-1955 at Cannanore on the Southern Railway. Another consignment was on 5-4-1955 of Art Silk cloth worth Rs. 1,232/9/6 from Surat in the Western Railway to Imphal O/A. and the 3rd consignment on 19-4-1955, was again from Valapattanam in the Southern Railway to Imphal O/A. worth Rs. 402/5/. The respondent failed to deliver the said goods to the appellant and has lost them during transit. Due notices under Sec. 77, Railways Act and under Sec. 80 C.P.C. have been served on the Railway Authorities in respect of all the three items mentioned above. The appellant is unable to give full particulars as to why the non-delivery was occasioned as the reasons had not been disposed by the Railways who were in possession and control of the goods. The appellant stated that the cause of action arose when toe goods were expected to be delivered and were not delivered. He claimed interest at 121/2 per cent of the value of the goods. The plaint was presented on 29-3-1956. 3. The respondent filed written statement through the District Traffic Superintendent of the North-Eastern Railway, which is the destination Railway and had to deliver the goods to the appellant. He claimed interest at 121/2 per cent of the value of the goods. The plaint was presented on 29-3-1956. 3. The respondent filed written statement through the District Traffic Superintendent of the North-Eastern Railway, which is the destination Railway and had to deliver the goods to the appellant. The written statement was very brief and simply stated that the appellant had no cause of action or right to sue, that the suit was barred by limitation, that it was bad for want of requisite notice under Sec. 77, Indian Railways Act and Sec. 80 C.P.C., that it was not admitted that such notices were served, that there was no negligence or misconduct on the part of the Railway Administration in dealing with the consignments in suit, that the alleged non-delivery was due to causes beyond the control of the Railway Administration, that the respondent was therefore protected under Sec. 72 Indian Railways Act, and that the claim was highly inflated and consisted of claims for remote damages which were not recoverable in law. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge framed issues on the pleadings. He gave tradings that the Railway Administrations to which tie goods were consigned were also entitled to such notices and that therefore due notices as required under Sec. 77 of the Railways Act have not been given. He further held that a single notice under Sec. 80 C.P.C. to the North-Eastern Railway Administration was not sufficient for the appellant to claim compensation for goods delivered to the Southern Railway Administration and Western Railway Administration. He therefore held that the appellant did not have a cause of action or right to sue. He however held that the respondents plea that the Railway Administration was protected under Section 72 of the Railways Act cannot be upheld as they have not discharged the burden of proving, that they took care of the goods as required of them, tie held that in any case as far as the Art Silk articles were concerned the appellant ought to have insured them under Sec. 75 of the Railways Act and hence respondent was not liable for the loss of those goods. On the above findings he dismissed the suit. 5. On the above findings he dismissed the suit. 5. In the appeal filed by the appellant, the learned District Judge dealt with only one point as to whether due notice was given under Sec. 77 of the Indian Railways Act and he dismissed the appeal holding that notice under Sec. 77 was necessary even in the case of non-delivery of the goods and that such notice has not been given in the present case. It is against the dismissal of the appeal that the second appeal has been filed. 6. Before we go into the questions of law, it is necessary to deal shortly with, the facts to appreciate the points of law involved. The three consignments in this case were booked on 24-2-1955, 5-4-1955 and 19-4-1955 respectively at owners risk under the parcel way-bills Exts. 1, 8 and 15 respectively. The consignments under Exts. 1 and 15 respectively were booked in the Southern Railway from Cannore and Valapattanam, while the consignment under Ext. 8 was booked from Surat in the Western Railway. They were all to be delivered at Imphal O/A. which is within tie jurisdiction of the North-Eastern Railway. None of the consignments were delivered to the appellant at Imphal. 7. Thereupon the appellant sent the letters Exts. 2, 9 and 18 respectively by registered post in respect of each of the consignments on 19-5-1955 to the Chief Commercial Superintendent (Claims) of the North-Eastern Railway reporting that the consignments have not been received and to enquire into the matter and to let him know the result. In all the three letters, the appellant had mentioned the places of booking, the place of delivery, the parcel way-bill numbers with their dates, the articles booked as well as the names of the consignors. Replies were sent to these three letters by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent as per Exts. 7, 10 and 19 stating that unless certified copies of the way-bills (Railway Receipts) showing the full particulars of booking were submitted to the Office immediately, it will not be in a position for the Railway to enquire into the cases. Replies were sent to these three letters by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent as per Exts. 7, 10 and 19 stating that unless certified copies of the way-bills (Railway Receipts) showing the full particulars of booking were submitted to the Office immediately, it will not be in a position for the Railway to enquire into the cases. It has to be mentioned here that all the particulars of booking had already been mentioned in the letters sent to the North-Eastern Railway, from which the said Railways could easily have made the necessary enquiries and that the replies requiring full particulars of booking were only intended to further delay the making of enquiries. The appellant did not supply the full particulars or send certified copies of the Railway Receipts. To my mind, there was no warrant for the North-Eastern Railway to have asked for the certified copies of the Railway Receipts as they must be in the possession of the Railways wherein the goods were booked as per the Railway Receipt numbers given in the letters written by the appellant on the dates mentioned therein. 8. In the case of goods carried at owners risk as in the present instances, S. 74-C of the Indian Railways Act provides that the Railway Administration shall not be responsible for any loss, destruction or deterioration of or damage to such goods-from any cause whatsoever except upon proof that such delay, loss, destruction, deterioration or damage was due to the negligence or misconduct on the part of the Railway Administration or of any of its servants. 9. Section 74-D further provides that notwithstanding anything contained in S. 74-C where the consignment was not delivered to the consignee and such non-delivery was not proved by the Railway Administration to have been due to any accident in the train or to fire, the Railway Administration shall be bound to disclose to the consignor how the consignment or package was dealt with throughout the time it was in its possession or control, but if negligence or misconduct on the part of the Railway Administration or of any of its servant cannot be fairly inferred from such disclosure, the burden of proving such negligence or misconduct shall be on the consignor. Thus when the fact of the non-delivery was brought to the notice of the North-Eastern Railway Administration by Exts. Thus when the fact of the non-delivery was brought to the notice of the North-Eastern Railway Administration by Exts. 2, 9 and 18, it was the duty of the said Railway Administration to have given the information required under S. 74-D to the consignee. But no such thing was done in the present case and the Railway Administration merely asked for fuller particulars. 10. After this, the appellant sent the notices Exts. 3, 11 and 20 respectively under S. 80, C.P.C to the General Manager, N. E. Railways stating that he was going to file suits and giving the necessary particulars of the claims. In these notices, he stated that the goods were not delivered to him and that notices under S. 77 of the Railways Act were given to the Railway, but nothing further was done in the matter. 11. The appellant claimed throughout that he had sent the notices as required under Sec. 77 of the Railways Act. Evidently, he was referring to Exts. 2, 9 and 18 sent to the Chief Commercial Superintendent (Claims) N. E. Railway on 19-5-1955. Under S. 77, notification of claims to compensation for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods delivered to be carried has to be given to the Railway Administration, within 6 months from the date of the delivery. Exhibits 2, 9 and 18 certainly cannot be treated as notifications of the claims. No claims for compensation, have been made in them. All that the appellant has stated in those letters is frat the consignments have not been received though a considerable length of time had elapsed and he requested the Chief Commercial Superintendent to arrange for an early enquiry into the matter and to let him know the result. This certainly cannot be treated as claims for compensation for loss or destruction of the goods. He had not been intimated that the goods have been lost or destroyed. All that he knew at that stage was that the goods had not been delivered to him. For what reason they were not delivered to him and whether it wag due to the loss or destruction, neither he nor the Railway Administration knew at that stage. So, I agree with the lower Courts that Exts. 2, 9 and 18 cannot be treated as notices under S. 77. 12. For what reason they were not delivered to him and whether it wag due to the loss or destruction, neither he nor the Railway Administration knew at that stage. So, I agree with the lower Courts that Exts. 2, 9 and 18 cannot be treated as notices under S. 77. 12. But it was urged before me that in the present 3 instances, the appellants suits were not for compensation for the loss or destruction of the goods which were booked through various Railway Administrations for delivery at Imphal O/A, as contemplated under S. 80 of the Railways Act. Under the said Section, in the case of such through-booking over the Railways of two or more Railway Administrations, where the goods are lost or destroyed, the consignor or the consignee can file a suit for compensation either against the Railway Administration to which the goods were delivered for carriage by the consignor or against the Railway Administration on whose Railway, the loss or destruction occurred. Section 80 of the Railways Act thus referred to cases where the goods were lost. or destroyed in the course of transit. In such cases, notices under S. 77 will certainly be necessary.It was urged for the appellant that in these three instances, the suit was filed against the Railway Administration which was bound to deliver the goods to him at the destination and the cause of action for the suit was not the loss or destruction of the goods, but the fact of non-delivery of the goods. It was also pointed out that the reasons for the non-delivery were not intimated to him and so he was not is a position to say whether the goods were lost or destroyed. My attention was also drawn to the plaint allegation in paragraph 7 where the appellant has stated that he was unable to give full particulars as to why the goods were not delivered as the Railways had not disclosed to him the reason for such non-delivery of the goods which were in their possession and control. It was pointed out that in the case of such a suit for non-delivery of the goods as distinct from a suit for compensation for loss or destruction of the goods, S. 77 will not apply and no notice as contemplated in the said Section claiming compensation was at all necessary. 13. It was pointed out that in the case of such a suit for non-delivery of the goods as distinct from a suit for compensation for loss or destruction of the goods, S. 77 will not apply and no notice as contemplated in the said Section claiming compensation was at all necessary. 13. This is a somewhat ticklish question on which there is considerable divergence of judicial opinion. I have been referred by both sides to decisions of various High Courts, both for and against the proposition. In the case of some High Courts, like Allahabad and Calcutta there have been decisions both for and against the proposition, some cases taking the view that "loss" mentioned in S. 77 would mean loss of the goods as well as loss to the owner and loss due to whatever cause and hence non-delivery will be included in the word "loss" in S. 77 and hence notice under S. 77 would be required in a cane of non-delivery. The other set of rulings said that non-delivery is the genus which gave rise to the cause of action, but that it was only in cases where non-delivery was due to the loss or destruction of the goods that a notice would be required under S. 77, and further that where it was not proved that non-delivery was due to the loss or destruction of the goods, no notice under S. 77 would be required. In the face of such wide divergence of judicial opinion in the various High Courts and in some cases in the same High Court, it is not necessary for me to refer to these decisions. I have perused those decisions with a view to understand the different view points. It will be better for me to give my own reasons for the view which I am going to take. 14. I am certainly of the view that in the case of a suit for compensation for non-delivery of the goods, against the Union of India as representing the Railway Administration at the destination who ought to have delivered the goods, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that he has sent the notice of the claim under S. 77. Section 77 with apply only to cases of loss or destruction of the goods in the course of transit and not to a case of mere non-delivery. Section 77 with apply only to cases of loss or destruction of the goods in the course of transit and not to a case of mere non-delivery. Of course, when such a suit is brought, the Railway Administration can set up the defence that it was not a case of mere non-delivery, but that the goods were lost or destroyed in transit. The goods had to pass through and were under the control and possession of various Railway Administrations from the date of booking. So, it was for the Railway Administration to prove in Court in such a suit that the goods were actually lost or destroyed in the course of the transit. They could also prove in which Railway the loss or destruction occurred. If they prove it, the plaintiff will be non-suited as in that case in is Sec. 80 of the Railways Act, which would apply to the case and certainly Sec. 77 of the Railways, Act would then come in as it was a case of loss or destruction of goods and not a case of mere non-delivery. 15. I have already referred to Ss. 74C and 74D which provide that where goods are carried at owners risk rate as in the present cases and are not delivered to the consignee or are pilfered in transit, the Railway Administration shall be bound to disclose to the consignor how the consignment or package was dealt with throughout the time it was in its possession or control. It was thus the duty of the North-Eastern Railway on receipt of the letters Exts. 2, 9 and 18 in the present cases to disclose to the appellant the details as required under Sec. 74D. As they did not do so, the appellant was not in a position to know the causes for the non-delivery of the goods to him and he cannot bring a suit under Sec. 80 of the Railways. Act on the ground of loss or destruction of the goods as he did not know whether the goods w lost or destroyed in transit. His suit can therefore be only on the ground of non-delivery. Even, at that stage, the respondent could Lave non-suited him by proving that the goods were really lost or destroyed in transit. Act on the ground of loss or destruction of the goods as he did not know whether the goods w lost or destroyed in transit. His suit can therefore be only on the ground of non-delivery. Even, at that stage, the respondent could Lave non-suited him by proving that the goods were really lost or destroyed in transit. The allegation in the plaint in this case, as pointed out earlier, was that the goods were not delivered for reasons which the appellant did not know as the Railway Administration had not intimated to him the causes for non-delivery. Even in the written statement of the respondent the cause for the non-delivery has not been stated and no plea that the goods were lost or destroyed in transit was set up. Nor was any evidence let in for the defence to prove the alleged loss or destruction of the goods. Thus, all that we know is simply that the goods were not delivered to the appellant. In my opinion no| notice under Sec. 77 of the Railways Act was necessary in such a case and Sec. 77 would not apply at all. 16. It was, of course, strenuously argued for the respondent that "loss" mentioned in Sec. 77 would include non-delivery also. To appreciate this argument, it is better that I set out Sec. 77 below : "77. A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods-carried by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods-delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway". It will be noticed that the words used are "the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods delivered" to be carried". The words "of goods delivered to be carried" applied equally to loss, destruction or deterioration. The plain meaning of the clause is that the loss or destruction is of the goods and that too in the course of the transit after they were delivered to be carried. The loss or destruction is a thing which as a fact occurs in the course of transit. The plain meaning of the clause is that the loss or destruction is of the goods and that too in the course of the transit after they were delivered to be carried. The loss or destruction is a thing which as a fact occurs in the course of transit. It can never mean the loss of the goods to the owner as suggested in certain decisions placed before me thereby including cases of non-delivery within the word loss. 17. This will be clear if we read the other Sections of the Act, like Ss. 72, 74, 74-C(3), 74-D, 73 and 80. Section 80 particularly refers to the loss or destruction "occurring on the Railway" which cannot mean loss to the owner. Again, Section 74-D makes a clear distinction between non-delivery and loss. Where non-delivery occurs, it is for the Railway administration to prove that it was due to accident to the train or to fire or due to pilfering in transit. Thus, it is clear that "the loss" referred to in Section 77 is the actual or rather factual loss of the goods in the course of the transit and not loss of the goods to the owner. 18. Again, Section 76 relating to the burden of proof in a suit for compensation provides that it shall not be necessary for the person claiming the compensation to prove how the loss or destruction was caused. This means that it is for the Railway Administration to prove how the loss or destruction was caused. It presupposes that loss or destruction has actually occurred. 19. Thus it is for the Railway Administration in a suit filed against them for compensation by a consignor or consignee for non-delivery of the goods, to prove firstly the fact of the loss or destruction of the goods in the course of the transit and secondly, how the same was caused if they want to take advantage of the defences open to them under Ss. 72, 77 and 80 of the Indian Railways Act. Where therefore in a suit for compensation for non-delivery the Railway Administration does not set up the defence that there was loss or destruction of the goods and where no such evidence was let in by way of defence, Section 77 will not apply and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he had sent the notice under Section 77. 20. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit on the sole ground that notice under Section 77 was not sent. The learned Subordinate Judge has also referred to the face that notice under Section 77 has not been sent. The dismissal of the suit on that ground was not correct and it has to be set aside. 21. The learned Subordinate Judge has next referred to the fact that notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was not sent to all the Railway Administrations through which the goods were sent. The learned District Judge did not deal with this question at all in the appeal. That has also to be decided in this case. The learned Subordinate Judge failed to see that this was a suit against the Union of India representing the N. E. Railway alone, that is, the Railway Administration at the destination where the goods ought to have been delivered. In a suit for non-delivery, the proper Railway against whom notice under Section 80, has to be sent and the claim to be made is the destination Railway who are bound to deliver the goods, as distinguished from, a suit under Section 80 of the Railways Act which is for loss or destruction of the goods. In the latter case, the fact of loss or destruction is not in dispute and the fact must have been made known to the party, as required under Sec. 74-D(b) of the Act. In such a case the suit has to be brought either under Sec. 80 of the Act, against the Railway to whom the goods were delivered for transit or the Railway where the loss or destruction occurred. But in the case of suit for compensation for non-delivery, which is not a suit under Sec. 80 of the Act, it can be brought only against the destination Railway for their failure to deliver the goods. Thus in this case, and the notice under Section 80, sent to the destination Railway was a proper notice. In this connection may also refer to the decision Narayanaswami Iyer v. Union of India, AIR 1960 Mad 58 , where is has been held that it was not necessary under Sections 77 and 80 of the Railways Act to issue notices to all the Railway Administrations through which the goods had passed. 22. In this connection may also refer to the decision Narayanaswami Iyer v. Union of India, AIR 1960 Mad 58 , where is has been held that it was not necessary under Sections 77 and 80 of the Railways Act to issue notices to all the Railway Administrations through which the goods had passed. 22. It was however argued for the respondent that the appellant has not proved that notices under Section 80 were sent in the three cases before me. The appellant had produced the copies of the three notices as Exts. 3, 11 and 20 and he had produced the corresponding acknowledgments of the General Manager of the North-Eastern Railways as Exts. 4, 12 and 21. What was contended for the respondent was that he did not admit the copies produced as correct and that it was the duty of the appellant to have issued notice for production of the original to the respondent and only in case the originals were not produced could he prove the conies in the suit. The three acknowledgments clearly show that notices were sent and that they have been received by the respondent. In paragraph 4 of the written statement what was contended was that the service of such notices under Section 80 were not admitted. The appellant had filed a replication to the written statement stating that he was surprised at the denial of the service of the notices and that the acknowledgments proved the fact of such service. The appellant as P.W. 1 also proved that the copies produced by him were copies of the originals. If therefore the respondent contended that they were not correct copies he could rebut the same by producing the originals which were in his custody. Under the circumstances, the copies of the notices with the acknowledgments proved the fact that proper notice under Section 80 were sent and served on the respondent, I hold that proper notices Under S. 80 C.P.C. have been given. 23. The next question that arises is about limitation. The proper article which applies for the three suits is Article 31 of the Limitation Act and the plaintiff has to prove that he filed the suits within one year from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered to him. On this question I shall take up each of the three cases separately. 24. The proper article which applies for the three suits is Article 31 of the Limitation Act and the plaintiff has to prove that he filed the suits within one year from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered to him. On this question I shall take up each of the three cases separately. 24. Coming to the first consignment under Ext. 1 we find that it was consigned on 24-2-1955. The appellant has stated in the plaint that this consignment was expected to be delivered to him by the middle of March, 1955. This was not controverted in the written statement. So we may take it that the said goods ought to have been delivered to the appellant in the middle of March, 1955. But the suit was filed only on 29-3-1956, that is, after the middle of March, 1956. It is clear therefore that the suit for compensation as far as the first consignment under Ext. 1 was concerned is clearly barred by limitation. So the dismissal of the suit as far as this consignment was concerned has to stand. 25. With regard to the second consignment under Ext. 8, the suit is clearly within time as the goods were consigned only on 5-4-1955 and the suit was filed within one year even from the date of consignment. But it was pointed out that as far as the said goods were concerned Section 75 of the Railways Act would non-suit the appellant as they were Art Silk goods and the value and contents had to be declared in writing at the time of the delivery of the parcel for carriage by Railway. But here again that question would arise only where there is a claim on the ground of loss or destruction of the goods which is not the case here and not when a claim is made on the ground of non-delivery. Hence Section 75 will not help the respondent. 26. With regard to the 3rd consignment also the suit is within time as they were consigned only on 19-4-1935 less than a year before the date of suit. 27. Thus, the suit is within time as far as the second and third consignments under Exts. 8 and 15 are concerned. 28. Hence Section 75 will not help the respondent. 26. With regard to the 3rd consignment also the suit is within time as they were consigned only on 19-4-1935 less than a year before the date of suit. 27. Thus, the suit is within time as far as the second and third consignments under Exts. 8 and 15 are concerned. 28. It was next contended for the respondent that in any case the value of the said goods have not been properly proved before the Court. There is, of course, some substance in this contention. All that the appellant did to prove the value was to produce the bills Exts. 13 and 16 and the demand drafts - Exts. 14 and 17 from the consignor. The demand drafts were shown to have been cleared by him through the Manipur State Bank. But this is certainly not sufficient to prove the value of the goods. The burden of proof regarding the value thereof is on the person claiming the compensation whether it is a claim on the ground of loss or destruction or on the ground of non-delivery. It was necessary for the appellant to examine the consignor of the goods and to prove that the value mentioned in the bills was the proper value of the goods and not any inflated value. The suit has therefore to be remanded to the Subordinate Judge, for giving an opportunity to the appellant to prove the value of the goods consigned under Exts. 8 and 15. The evidence of the appellant is not sufficient in proof of the same as the appellant has no personal knowledge about the value. The appellant would, of course, be entitled to reasonable interest on the value of the goods, which I fix at 6 per cent per annum. 29. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed so far as the consignment under Ext. 1 is concerned but it is allowed in respect of the consignments under Exts. 8 and 15 and the suit is remanded to the lower court for giving an opportunity to the appellant to prove the value of the said two consignments. On proof of the value, the lower Court will give a decree to the appellant for such value with interest at 6 per cent per annum. Under the circumstances of this case I direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. On proof of the value, the lower Court will give a decree to the appellant for such value with interest at 6 per cent per annum. Under the circumstances of this case I direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. The lower Court will decide the question of costs in the first Court when passing a decree in the case. Appeal dismissed.