ORDER :- This is an application to revise the order of the District Judge, Manipur, dated 21-6-1960 by which he rejected the application of the petitioner to receive the court-fee and to condone the delay in payment of the same. 2. The facts giving rise to this application are briefly as follows : The petitioner filed Civil Appeal No. 43 of 1959 against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, dismissing his suit for declaration of title and possession of certain Properly. He paid only the court-fee for the declaration in the appeal. The matter of court-fee was posted for hearing before the District Judge and he passed an order on 4-5-1960 directing the petitioner to pay the deficit court-fee on ad valorem basis and he granted time till 17-5-1960 for payment of the deficit. On 14-5-1960 the petitioner filed another application stating that he was a poor man and could not make up the necessary amount within the specified time and that the time may be extended by about two months. On this, the learned District Judge passed an order On 14-5-1960 itself allowing the applicant one months time to pay the deficit court-fee and stating that in case of default the memorandum of appeal shall stand rejected. The petitioner evidently thought that he was given one months time from 17-5-1960 the date when the previous time expired and so he sought to pay the court-fee on 17-6-1960. But the Office objected stating that the time had expired on 14-6-1960 as the order giving one months time was passed on 14-5-1930. The petitioner thereupon filed another application stating that as no specific date was mentioned in the order giving one months time he through mistake thought that he had time till 17-6-1980 and that the court-fee may be accepted and the delay may be condoned. The said application was rejected by the District Judge stating that his previous order dated 14-5-1960 was a self contained one and as the court-fee was not paid within one month from 14-5-1960 the memorandum of appeal stood automatically rejected and that he could not extend the time for the deposit of the deficit court-tee. The said application was rejected by the District Judge stating that his previous order dated 14-5-1960 was a self contained one and as the court-fee was not paid within one month from 14-5-1960 the memorandum of appeal stood automatically rejected and that he could not extend the time for the deposit of the deficit court-tee. This order was passed on 21-6-1960 and on the same day an order was passed in the appeal staling that the petition filed by the appellant for paying deficit court-fee was rejected as per order on the back of the petition. 3. Thus the result was that the petitioners application for condoning the delay and receiving the court-fee filed on 17-8-1960 was not considered by the District Judge. On its merits as he thought that the order passed by him on 14-5-1960 was a final order which had worked itself out by 14-6-1960 when default was made in the payment of court-fee and that the appeal memorandum there by stood automatically rejected on that date and that on 17-6-1950 and 21-6-1960 when he passed the order rejecting the petitioners application, for receiving the court-fee, the learned District Judge had become functus officio and did not have the power either to extend the time for payment of the court-fee or for receiving the court-fee which was tendered on 17-6-1960. 4. Evidently the learned District Judge relied on the decisions Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad, AIR 1936 All 477, Ramlakhan Pandey v. Tribeni Das, 197 Ind Cas 433 : (AIR 1942 Pat 234) Banshi Dewan v. Majahar Uddin. 36 Cal WN 693 : (AIR 1933 Cal 83) Kshetra Mohon v. Gour Motion, 37 Cal WN 878 : (AIR 1934 Cal 21), Ra hubar Dayal v. Sankaliia Bakhsh, 156 Ind Cas 207 : (AIR 1936 Oudh 125) and Jagannath v. Bishwa Rattan, 145 Ind Cas 640 : (AIR 1933 Oudh 241). 5. It is Section 148 C.P.C. which gives the court power in its discretion to enlarge the period granted by the Court for the doing of any act and such power of extension is given even if the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. Section 149 C.P.C. gives power to the Court to grant time to pay deficit court-fee for any document including plaint and memorandum of appeal. Section 149 C.P.C. gives power to the Court to grant time to pay deficit court-fee for any document including plaint and memorandum of appeal. Perhaps, the learned District Judge is of the view that the power vested in him under Sections 148 and 149 C.P.C. cannot be applied in a case where he has made a conditional order in granting the time and the condition has not been satisfied within the period mentioned. 6. I cannot agree with that view. No doubt, where a period is fixed by a decree of Court, the said period cannot be extended under Section 148 C.P.C. as a decree is a final adjudication and under Order 20 Rule 3 C.P.C. the decree cannot be altered or added to when once it is signed save as provided under Section 152 C.P.C. or on review. The decisions AIR 1936 All 477, 197 Ind Cas 433 : (AIR 1942 Pat 234). 36 Cal WN 693 : (AIR 1933 Cal 83), 37 Cal WN 878 : (AIR 1934 Cal 21) and 145 Ind Cas 640 : (AIR 1933 Oudh 241), referred to the said principle that Section 148 will not apply to cases where time has been granted under a decree of Court and the decree is it final adjudication. This principle will not apply to decrees which are not final adjudications. Thus, where the decree is not a final adjudication, but is only a preliminary decree, as for an example, in cases where there is a preliminary decree on a mortgage for sale, redemption or force closure, the time for payment can be extended by Court. 7. In any case, the above decisions will not apply to the present case as the order passed by the learned District Judge giving out months time for the payment of the court fee will not have the force of a decree containing a final adjudication. It is merely an order passed under Sec. 149 C.P.C. granting time for the payment of the court-fee due on the memorandum of appeal. In the case of such an order Section 148 C.P.C. will certainly apply and the District Judge has got the discretionary power to extend the time. 8. It is merely an order passed under Sec. 149 C.P.C. granting time for the payment of the court-fee due on the memorandum of appeal. In the case of such an order Section 148 C.P.C. will certainly apply and the District Judge has got the discretionary power to extend the time. 8. But it was argued that the District Judge had passed a conditional order under Sections 148 and 149 C.P.C. stating that if the court-fee was not paid within the given time, the memorandum of appeal shall stand dismissed and that therefore he cannot give further time as the order has worked itself cut. But Sections 148 and 149 C.P.C. do not give the power to the Court to pass any such conditional order stating that the plaint or the memorandum of appeal shall stand dismissed on non-payment of court-fee within the given time. In cases where the C.P.C. allows the passing of such conditional orders, as for example, in the case of orders under Order 9 Rule 9 or Order 9 Rule 13 where orders restoring a suit or setting aside an ex parte decree could be passed upon such term as to costs or otherwise as the Court thought fit, the Court can no doubt pass such conditional orders. But where the C.P.C. does not permit such conditional orders, but requires specific orders giving reasons to be made, the Court cannot pass such conditional orders and even if such conditional orders are passed, the Court has still got control of the proceedings and will not become functus officio and if the condition is not satisfied within the time fixed by the Court, it will have to pass separate orders in the matter as contemplated under the C.P.C. 9. The decision 156 Ind Cas 207 : (AIR 1936 Oudh 125) deals with a case where a conditional order was passed under Order 9 Rule 13 that if a certain amount was paid within a certain time, the decree would be set aside and if not the application would stand automatically dismissed and it was held in that decision that where the payment was not made within the prescribed time, the order dismissing the application will not be a fresh order, but will merely be giving effect to the previous conditional order and the Court will have no power to restore the application. 10. 10. But that will not apply to cases of rejection of a plaint or memorandum of appeal for non-payment of court-fee within the time prescribed. Order 7 Rules 11 and 12 C.P.C. deal with the rejection of a plaint. Order 7 Rule 11(c) provides that the plaint shall be rejected where the plaint was written upon insufficiently stamped paper and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. Rule 12 provides that where a plaint is rejected, the Judge shall record an order to that effect with the reasons for such order. Thus where the plaintiff dotes not pay the insufficient court-fee within the time fixed by the Court, the Court will have to pass an order under Rule 12 rejecting the plaint giving reasons for such rejection. This will mean that a conditional order that the plaint shall stand rejected on non-payment of the court fee within the time given cannot be passed in advance, but that the Court will have to pass a separate order giving reasons if the court-fee is not paid within the time given. 11. There is a similar provision under O. 41 R. 3(2) that where the Court rejects a memorandum of appeal, it shall record the reasons for such rejection. This again shows that a conditional order, of rejection in advance cannot be passed, but that when the insufficient court-fee is not paid within the given time the Court shall take up the matter after the period is over and it may reject the memorandum of appeal stating the reasons for such rejection. This again shows that a conditional order, of rejection in advance cannot be passed, but that when the insufficient court-fee is not paid within the given time the Court shall take up the matter after the period is over and it may reject the memorandum of appeal stating the reasons for such rejection. In that connection the decision Kumaraswamiah v. Krishna Reddi, AIR 1947 Mad 84, is quite relevant, wherein it was held that the plaint did not become automatically rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 on the plaintiffs failure to pay the deficit court-fee within the time fixed by the Court and must be taken, to be in Court till an order rejecting it with reasons is passed under Order 7 Rule 12 and that an application for further extension of time after the expiry of the period allowed by the Court and before the order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 12 is passed is maintainable and cannot be thrown out on the ground that there was no plaint with regard to which an application for extension of time could be made. 12. Now coming to the present case, when the Court found on 14-6-1960 that the court-fee was not paid within the period of one month from 14-5-1960, it had to pass an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal giving its reasons. This has not been dome in the present case. The Court had not become functus officio and the memorandum of appeal cannot stand automatically rejected on the conditional order passed by the Court in the face of the provision in Order 41 Rule 3(2), C.P.C. It follows that until such rejection as required under Order 41 Rule 3(2), Section 148 C.P.C. will apply to the case and the Court has got the power to extend the time for payment. The learned District Judge was thus in error in not exercising the jurisdiction under Section 148 C.P.C. which was vested in him and in not considering the application filed by the petitioner on 17-6-1960 on its merits and in considering that he had become functus officio. 13. The order dated 21-6 1960 is, therefore, set aside and the District Judge is directed to consider the application dated 17-6-1960 on its merits. 13. The order dated 21-6 1960 is, therefore, set aside and the District Judge is directed to consider the application dated 17-6-1960 on its merits. I need only add that the petitioner had already time till 17-5-1960 when the District Judge granted him one months further time on 14-5-1960 to pay the deficit court-fee and that the petitioner had therefore every reason to think that he had time till 17-6-1960 to pay the court-fee. The deficit court-fee was also tendered on that date. The learned District Judge would do well to accept the court-fee and allow his prayer. Under the circumstances I direct parties to bear their own costs. Revision petition allowed.