BAI DAHI D/o. PATEL NATHABHAI TRIKAMBHAI v. BAI SADA W/o PATEL NATHABHAI TRIKAMBHAI
1960-09-05
N.M.MIABHOY, V.B.RAJU
body1960
DigiLaw.ai
N. M. MIABHOY, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal the main question which requires to be decided is whether the two plaintiffs-appellants are or are not entitled to challenge certain transactions entered into by Sada defendant No. 1 according to the Baroda Hindu Code. The present suit was instituted by plaintiffs for a declaration that the transactions entered into by Sada were null and void against there interest and not binding on them. The impugned transactions are a compromise entered into on 11-11-1952 between Sada defendant No. 1 on the one hand and Gujarat defendant No. 2 and Sharda defendant No. 3 on the other gift made by Sada on 13-6-1953 in favour of defendant No. 4 and a sale made on 20-6-1953 in favour of defendant No. 5. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit from which this appeal arises on the ground that plaintiffs were not the next reversioners of their father Nathabhai Trikambhai or the next reversioners of their Brother Punjabhai Nathabhai and that as such according to the Baroda Hindu Code they were not entitled to bring the present suit for challenging the transactions effected by Bai Sada. ( 2 ) THE suit was dismissed on a preliminary ground without taking any evidence in the matter. Therefore the question which requires to be decided in this appeal will have to be decided on the basis that the allegations made in the plaint are true. ( 3 ) THE fact on the basis of which the point requires to be decided may shortly be stated as follows:--ONE Nathabhai Trikambhai and his son Punjabhai constituted a joint Hindu family. Nathabhai had two wives named Ratu and Sada who is defendant No. 1 Ratu predeceased Nathabhai and by Ratu Nathabhai had two daughters Dahi and Son who are plaintiffs in the suit. By Sada Natha bhai had a son named Punjabhai. Nathabhai died on 3-7-1924 leaving behind him surviving Sada Punja and Dahi and Son. Plaintiffs admit that on as such he became the owner of the joint family properties. Punjabhai also died on 19-12-1942. Plaintiffs allege that by Gajara defendant No. 2 Punjabhai had a daughter named Sharda defendant No. 3. But they allege that Sharda was not the legitimated daughter of Punjabhai. They allege this on the ground that there was no valid marriage between Punjabhai and Gajara.
Punjabhai also died on 19-12-1942. Plaintiffs allege that by Gajara defendant No. 2 Punjabhai had a daughter named Sharda defendant No. 3. But they allege that Sharda was not the legitimated daughter of Punjabhai. They allege this on the ground that there was no valid marriage between Punjabhai and Gajara. Therefore according to plaintiffs on the death of Punjabhai his properties did not devolve on Gajara and Sharda is not his next reversioner. According to plaintiffs on the death of Punjabhai the properties in suit devolved on Sada defendant No. 1 as the mother of Punjabhai. It appears that in 1950 Sada filed a Special Civil Suit No. 126 of 1950 against Gajara and Sharda for recovering possession of the properties owned by Punjabhai. In that suit a compromise was made between the parties and under the compromise Sada got some of the properties held by Punja. The compromise is one of the transactions which the plaintiffs are challenging in this suit as not binding on them. It also appears that after the compromise was made Sada made a gift in favour of defendant No. 4 on 13-6-1953 of some of the properties which she got under the compromise and by a deed about a week thereafter she sold to defendant No. 1 the rest of the properties acquired under the compromise. These are the other two transactions which the plaintiffs challenge in the suit. ( 4 ) IN the plaint plaintiffs contended that they were the next reversioners of Nathabhai Trikambhai as such they were entitled to challenge the aforesaid transactions. Subsequently they sought to amend the plaint and challenged the transactions on the ground that they were the heirs of Nathabhai Trikambhai. That application was rejected by the Trial Court and a application for revision against that order was summarily rejected by the High Court It appears that amongst other contentions the defendants resisted the claim for declaration on the ground that plaintiff were not the next reversioners of Nathabhai Trikambhai. In answer to this the plaintiffs contented that they were also the next reversioners of Punjabhai Nathabhai and sought to support their claim for declaration the ground. The plaint as it stands to-day does not purport to support the claim for declaration on the ground that plaintiffs were next reversioners of Punjabhai Nathabhai.
In answer to this the plaintiffs contented that they were also the next reversioners of Punjabhai Nathabhai and sought to support their claim for declaration the ground. The plaint as it stands to-day does not purport to support the claim for declaration on the ground that plaintiffs were next reversioners of Punjabhai Nathabhai. But the matter has been considered by the learned Trial Judge on that basis also. ( 5 ) AS the learned Judge thought that aforesaid contentions of defendants went to the root of the matter he raised a preliminary issue embodying those contentions and proceeded to decide the same. He came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not the next reversioners of Nathabhai Trikambhai or the next reversioners of Punjabhai Nathabhai He also decided that that being so the plaintiffs were not entitled to bring the present suit and therefore as a result of his finding on the aforesaid preliminary issue the learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit of plaintiffs. The present appeal is directed against the decree passed as a result of the finding on the aforesaid preliminary issue. ( 6 ) IT is not disputed that the rights of the parties are governed by the Baroda Hindu Code It is also not disputed that the preliminary issue has got to be tried on the assumption that bai Gajara defendant No. 2 and Bai Sharda defendant No. 3 had no interest in the estate of the deceased Punjabhai. Mr. Oza learned advocate for the plaintiffs concedes that the true position in law is that the suit properties were last held by Punjabhai as the absolute owner and that on the allegations made in the plaint on the death of Punjabhai the properties devolved on Bai Sada defendant No. 1 as the heir of Punjabhai. It is also not disputed that according to Baroda Hindu Code. Sada would become the absolute owner of the estate of Punjabhai to the extent of Rs. 12 0 and that in respect of the rest of his estate she would be holding a widows estate. In the present suit we are not concerned with that part of the estate of Punjabhai the value of the which is Rs. 12 0 We are only concerned with the estate of Punjabhai which is in excess of Rs.
12 0 and that in respect of the rest of his estate she would be holding a widows estate. In the present suit we are not concerned with that part of the estate of Punjabhai the value of the which is Rs. 12 0 We are only concerned with the estate of Punjabhai which is in excess of Rs. 12 0 The contentions raised by the parties have got to be decided in this excess estate. ( 7 ) THE first contention of Mr. Oza is that according to the Baroda Hindu Code the plaintiffs are the successors to the estate of Punjabhai. Mr. Oza rests his contention on section 220 of the Baroda Hindu Code. That section occurs in Chapter XXXIII which deals with the heirs of a Hindu woman. Section 220 deals with succession to the estate held by a woman as a limited owner and that section states that in respect of such an estate on the death of the woman the estate would devolve upon her husbands heirs. The contention of Mr. Oza is that though the suit estate has been inherited by Bai Sada as the mother of Punjabhai according to section 220 Baroda Hindu Code the estate would devolve upon the present plaintiffs being the heirs of Sadas husband on the death of Bai Sada. In our judgment it is not necessary to decide this question in the present litigation at this stage. We will assume for the purposes of the present suit that the contention of Mr. Oza is right that in case Sada dies plaintiffs would be the heirs who would be entitled to the estate of Punjabhai. But the present suit has not been brought by plaintiffs as claiming succession to the estate of Punjabhai. In Law plaintiffs cannot bring such a suit during the life-time of Sada. Their claim would be a spes successionis. The present suit has been brought for the purpose of challenging certain transactions effected by the limited owner viz. Bai Sada and the question as to who are the heirs to that particular estate does not directly fall to be decided in the present suit.
Their claim would be a spes successionis. The present suit has been brought for the purpose of challenging certain transactions effected by the limited owner viz. Bai Sada and the question as to who are the heirs to that particular estate does not directly fall to be decided in the present suit. The question is whether the plaintiffs fall within the category of persons who are entitled to challenge the transactions made by Bai Sada and that question has got to the Baroda Hindu Code and it is this section which deals with the right of persons to challenge the transactions made by a Hindu woman. That section is in the following terms:-"right of a reversioner to sue for relief against misuse:- where a woman is found (a) to be misusing or wasting the property in which she has a limited estate or (b) committing any act detrimental to the interest of a reversioner in such property. The presumptive reversioner or in case he precludes himself from suing either fraudulently or for any other person or he is incapable of instituting a suit any other reversioner may sue for the following reliefs:- (a) on an occasion under clause (a) for obtaining an injunction for preventing such misuse or waste; (b) on an occasion under clause (b) for a declaration to the effect that the act is not binding on him. ( 8 ) IT will be noticed that this confers a right only on reversioners to challenge acts of mismanagement or acts harmful to the interest of reversioners. That right is conferred on reversioner and the section does not say in terms that the right is available to any other category of persons. The term reversioner itself has been defined in the Code and the definition is to be found in section 5 (kha) of the Code and that definition is as follows:-"reversioner means any of the following relations of a person whose property has devolved on his widow or the widow of his sagotra sapinda:- (1) daughter (2) daughters sons (3) father (4) mother (5) widow of the son (6) brother of the whole blood (7) son of brother of the whole blood (8) fathers mother (9) sisters of the whole blood and sons daughter (10) fathers father (11) son of the sister of the whole blood and daughters daughter.
" ( 9 ) ACCORDING to this definition a reversioner is one who is related to the propositus whose estate is held by the limited owner in the way mentioned in this section. The section gives a list of eleven such relatives. Therefore reading section 230 along with section 5 (kha) it is crystal clear that the persons who are entitled to bring a suit for declaration under section 230 are the eleven relatives mentioned in section 5 (kha ). As regards the last ten relatives whether their light is absolute or qualified is depend upon the fact as to whether at the date of the filing of the suit he or she does or does not happen to be the next reversioner of the deceased estate holder. If he or she is the next reversioner then he or she has the absolute right. But if that is not so then those other relatives must satisfy the conditions laid down in section 230 sub-section (b ). Mr. Ozas contention is that the plaintiffs fall within the purview of the class of reversioners mentioned in section 5 (kha ). One of the relatives mentioned as the reversioner is real sister. The contention of Mr. Oza is that the expression real sister includes a consanguine sister. We are unable to agree with this contention. Mr. Oza contended that the expression real was used to connote a legitimate relationship and was intended to describe a legitimate sister in contradistinction to an illegitimate one. We cannot accede to this argument. In our judgment the legislature did not intend to contract in this clause a legitimate and an illegitimate sister. The contrast was intended to be effected between a real sister and a step-sister. There are several sections in the Code in which the term real has been used in the Code in conjunction with a relative. That the legislature was also not unaware of the distinction between a real relative and a step-relative is also shown by at least one section of the Code wherein it has been specifically provided that the relatives mentioned therein include not only the real relative but the step sister also. Section 211 falls in Chapter XXXI which deals with the heirs outside the compact series.
Section 211 falls in Chapter XXXI which deals with the heirs outside the compact series. That section provides that in the absence of a daughters daughter or sisters son of a deceased male certain prescribed Sagotra Sapindas and in their absence the Samanodakas shall be the heirs of the deceased. Whilst so providing the section states in specific terms that in determining the heirs in accordance with the rules prescribed in section 211 no distinctions shall be made between a step relative and a real relative. As against this in Chapter XXX which deals with the compact series of heirs the term real has been used in more than one section such as sections 203 205 206 and 208. If the expression real is to be co-related with the expression legitimate in respect of these sections then it would lead to absurd results. For example in section 203 it will have to be held that the person who is mentioned as the heir therein is the legitimate mother which would be an absurd construction. Under the circumstances we are not satisfied that the plaintiffs come within the purview of section 5 sub-section (kha) clause (6) inasmuch as they are not real sisters but only step sisters of the deceased Punjabhai and consequently in our judgment plaintiff do not come within the purview of section 230 of the Baroda Hindu Code. ( 10 ) BUT Mr. Oza contended that the expression reversioner used in section 230 must be liberally construed. He submitted that that expression must be so construed as to include not only the specific heirs mentioned in section 5 sub-section (kha) but all the heirs of the propositus whose estate is being held by a woman as limited estate. He submitted that according to the Baroda Hindu Law the plaintiff being the heirs in respect of the limited estate would be the next reversioners there being no nearer relatives and under the Hindu Law as administered in the rest of India plaintiffs undoubtedly would have a right to maintain the present Suit. He contended that therefore the expression reversioner as used in section 5 sub-section (kha) ought not to be construed in such a manner as to be exhaustive of the list of heirs who were entitled to be described as reversioners.
He contended that therefore the expression reversioner as used in section 5 sub-section (kha) ought not to be construed in such a manner as to be exhaustive of the list of heirs who were entitled to be described as reversioners. He contended that that list was only an illustrative list and was not intended to exclude the other relatives who ordinarily according to the Mayukha or other brancher of Hindu Law would fall within the category of reversioners. In our judgment it would not be proper to construe the Code with any preconceived notions. The Baroda Code is a codifying price of legislation. In construing the Code the interpreter must primarily have regard to the language used in the Code and construe it in accordance with the ordinary principles of interpretation. The previous history of the law cannot be allowed to affect the interpretation if the construction does not require the previous history to be taken into account. In our judgment reading sections 230 220 and 5 (kha) together it is clear that Baroda Hindu Code divides the heirs to estate of a person held by a woman as a limited estate into two classes. The first class consists of those persons who are described as reversioners in section 5 sub-section (kha) and the second class consist of those who though they are heirs to the estate do not fall within the category of reversioners. The intention of the Legislature appears to confer a right to challenge the acts of a limited owner only on the eleven specific heirs mentioned in section 5 sub-section (kha) and not to confer such a right on the other relatives though they fall within the class of heirs. Mr. Oza contended that the Legislature could not have intended such a result specially in those cases such as the present where the nearest heir happens to be not within the class of eleven specific heirs described in section 5 sub-section (kha ). Mr. Oza is unable to point out any section or sections in the Code which would show that such was the object of the Legislature in enacting section 230 and section 5 sub-section (kha ). It is difficult to speculate as to why the Baroda Code made a distinction between heirs so as to divide them into reversioners and nonreversioners for the purpose of section 230 of the Code.
It is difficult to speculate as to why the Baroda Code made a distinction between heirs so as to divide them into reversioners and nonreversioners for the purpose of section 230 of the Code. One explanation which may be put forward is that Legislature though it proper not to allow a litigation of the type mentioned in section 230 to be started by heirs remoter than the heirs mentioned in section 5 sub-section (kha ). It may be that the Legislature might have thought that the remoter heirs though they would ultimately inherit the estate should not be given the right of challenging the acts during the life-time of the limited heir and must wait till the succession actually opens. In this connection it is important to bear in mind that it is difficult to say during the life-time of the limited owner as to who actually would become the heir to the estate of the deceased propositus. For aught we know the present plaintiffs may not survive defendant No. 1 and may not inherit the estate at all. Under the circumstances in our opinion no reasonable ground has been shown by Mr. Oza for departing from the salutary rule of construction which says that a statute must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning. As we have already pointed out we are not dealing with the question of heirship at all. We dealing with the question of the right to file a suit for claiming the reliefs mentioned in section 203 clauses (a) and (b) during the life-time of a limited owner. As to the scope and the amplitude of that right and the persons who are entitled to have that right the same must be answered with reference to the provisions contained in section 230 and not by notions of equity and justice or notions derived from the state of the general Hindu Law under which the immediate or the next reversioner though remoter than the eleven heirs mentioned above has the right to institute a suit of the present type. As already stated probably the Baroda Legislature intended to restrict the scope of this type of litigation by stopping short at a certain number in the list of heirs which probably it thought for all practical purposes would meet the needs of quite a large majority of cases.
As already stated probably the Baroda Legislature intended to restrict the scope of this type of litigation by stopping short at a certain number in the list of heirs which probably it thought for all practical purposes would meet the needs of quite a large majority of cases. It did not intend to leave the question at large and permit the heirs remoter than the last heir mentioned in section 5 sub-section (Kha) to undertake a litigation of this type. In this connection it is important to notice that the definition of the expression reversioner is not an inclusive definition. The definition states that the expression reversioner means the following kinds of heirs. ( 11 ) IT is also noteworthy that the expression reversioner has reference only to the last holder from whom the widow or the limited owner has inherited the estate and has no reference to the previous owners to whom the estate might have belonged at one or the other time. The definition states in specific terms that the reversioner means any of the relations mentioned therein of a person whose property had devolved on his widow or the widow of his sagotra sapinda. Having regard to this definition it is quite clear that the fact that plaintiffs stand related to the deceased Nathabhai Trikambhai a his daughters has no relevant whatsoever. The estate having been last held by Punjabhai and having been inherited by Sada from him as his mother the question of reversionship must be decided with reference to the relationship existing between Punjabhai and plaintiffs and not with reference to the relationship existing between plaintiffs and Nathabhai who at one time held the estate. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the learned Trial Judge that the plaintiffs do not fall within the purview of section 230 of the Baroda Hindu Code is correct as also the finding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to file the present suit for challenging the various transactions mentioned in the suit. ( 13 ) THE appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs in one set. Appeal dismissed. .