Chhangani, J.—This is an appeal by the State against the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sirohi dated 10th of April, 1958 acquitting the respondent Tejraj of an offence under sec 16 read with sec. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act No. XXXVII of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The prosecution case may be briefly stated as follows:— The respondent Tejraj carries on business as a commission agent at Sheoganj. He got some tins of ghee from Heeralal Pyarelal Agarwal for sale through his agency. On 5th of May, 1956, Dharam Singh, the Food Inspector went to his shop and made a test purchase of ghee worth As. -/8/-. The ghee was taken in 3 bottles which were duly sealed. Out of these 3 bottles, one was given to the accused and the other was sent to the Public Analyst at Jodhpur for examination. The Public Analyst at Jodhpur having reported that the ghee was adulterated and did not conform to the standard of genuine ghee, prescribed by the rules made under the Marwar Pure Food Act No. XVI of 1946, a complaint was filed against the respondent under sec. 16 of the Act. The accused admitted that he carries on business as commission agent and that he had received 10 tins of ghee from Heeralal Pyarelal of Ratanpur along with other commodities. Out of 10 tins of ghee, he had sold 2 tins and at the relevant time, the remaining 8 tins were with" him. It was also admitted that a test purchase of ghee worth As.-/8/- was made from him by the Food Inspector. He, however, pleaded that the ghee had not been purchased by him and that he had received it sealed from Heeralal Pyarelal and that he had no knowledge that it was adulterated. In these circumstances, he did not plead guilty to the charge. 3. The prosecution examined Dharam Singh and Achaldass in support of the prosecution. The accused, however, led no defence. The trial Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused was entitled to any share in the profits on the sale of ghee ; that the accused was only entitled to receive commission and that there was no proof that the accused had any knowledge that the ghee was adulterated. The accused, however, led no defence. The trial Magistrate found that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused was entitled to any share in the profits on the sale of ghee ; that the accused was only entitled to receive commission and that there was no proof that the accused had any knowledge that the ghee was adulterated. Relying upon some observations in Municipal Board, Bareilly vs. Ramgopal (1), the trial Magistrate held that as a commission agent, the accused could not be liable without proof that he had knowledge that the ghee was adulterated. 4. The State has come up in appeal and it has been contended on its behalf that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been enacted in the interest of public health to prevent adulteration of food stuffs and that it imposes qualified duties upon vendors and creates absolute penal liability irrespective of mens rea; and that on any other view, a very wide door will be open to the evils which the Act was intended to guard against. It is urged that since the respondent having exposed ghee for sale, had sold ghee to the Food Inspector, the offence against him stood proved and it was wholly unnecessary to go into the question of miens rea. 5. The answer on behalf of the respondent is that on the language of secs. 7 and 16 of the Act, an absolute liability has been fastened only upon persons selling goods owned by them for their benefit who have been described as primary sellers and that it cannot be extended to servants and commission agents selling goods belonging to others, who are described as secondary sellers. It is, however, conceded that they can be liable under the general law for abetment provided mens rea or guilty knowledge is proved against them. 6. There are diverse views on the matter and we may observe that the question is not altogether free from difficulty and merits a very careful scrutiny. 7. A similar question in connection with the interpretation of sec. 6 of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act, 1919 which was worded similarly, came up for consideration before Rankin C. J. and Patterson J. in Peary Mohan Saha vs. Harendra Nath Roy (2). The material words of sec. 7. A similar question in connection with the interpretation of sec. 6 of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act, 1919 which was worded similarly, came up for consideration before Rankin C. J. and Patterson J. in Peary Mohan Saha vs. Harendra Nath Roy (2). The material words of sec. 6 on which the controversy centered were as follows— "No person shall directly or indirectly himself or by any other person on his behalf sell, expose for sale or manufacture or store for sale any of the following articles etc." 8. It will be obvious that both the sections contain the expression, "himself or by any other person ton his behalf", which is relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention. It was contended before their lordships, "that the opening words of the first clause of sec. 6 are designed to constitute the sale......in contravention of the provisions of the section, an offence on the part of the master or principal on whose behalf the sale is made, but that the servant or other person selling on behalf of the principal is not guilty by reason of his act." It was also contended that, "the section should not be construed in the light of the interpretation put by the English decisions upon similar but somewhat different, words in sec. 6 of the sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875." The prosecution in that case contended that, "the opening words of the section cannot and are not intended to cut down the effect of the words "no person shall sell", that the acts which are made offences by the section are physical acts, that the question of the party who is responsible as a matter of contract to the purchaser is irrelevant and that the servant in such a case as in the present, is a person who does the prohibited act himself and that the effect of the words in a case like the present is to make both the servant and the master liable as offenders against the section." "The words merely elaborate and emphasize the prohibition against certain classes of acts being done at all." Rankin C.J. overruled the defence contention and held that the agent Of servant is within the prohibition of the words "no person shall sell." He observed that, "the legislature is not necessarily contemplating a person who has a choice to sell at his own hand or by any other person on his behalf. It is concerned to make the act of selling an act which is imputable both to the person with whose hand it is committed and to any other person, if such there be, on whose behalf it is committed. 9. In Emperor vs. Ramgopal (3) interpreting the U.P. Prevention of Adulteration Act No. VI of 1912, it was held that a shop-keeper who as a commission agent allows another person to sell ghee at his shop on payment of commission and charges his commission fee must be deemed to be interested in the sale to the extent of the commission and so he could be said to have taken part in the sale when the goods were sold in his presence and would be guilty with the actual seller. 10. In another Allahabad case, Municipal Board, Bareilly vs. Ramgopal (1) relied upon by the Magistrate, the facts were very peculiar. There, the accused did not sell himself ghee on behalf of the owner but allowed to the owner to sell it on the premises of his shop, the consideration for such license being a commission fixed by reference to a percentage of the sale price. There, the accused did not sell himself ghee on behalf of the owner but allowed to the owner to sell it on the premises of his shop, the consideration for such license being a commission fixed by reference to a percentage of the sale price. In these circumstances, it was held that he was not commission agent in the ordinary sense, although described as such, and that he could not be said to have taken part in the sale. He was treated as a mere licensor of a right to sell ghee on his premises. The learned Judges, however, made some observations regarding the necessity of establishing mens rea in case of persons "exposing goods for sale, which are, however, immaterial for the purposes of the present case. 11. So far as the earlier State Acts are concerned, it may safely be observed that they were interpreted to impose absolute liability upon masters, principals, servants ana commission agents. Recently, however, secs. 7 and 16 of the present Act have been differently interpreted, so as to exclude the fastening of absolute liability on servants. 12. In re S. Moses (4), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court emphasized the words, "either by himself or any person on his behalf" and made the following observations— "The clear language of sec. 7 is to" the effect that a person should himself sell or sell through any other person on his behalf, in order to be brought within the mischief of that section, and the provision cannot be extended to include what has not been actually, intended by the legislature, viz. that a person who sells on behalf of another should also be made liable to the penalties prescribed. Some meaning or significance has to be attached to the word "himself" and to the words "by any other person on his behalf occurring in the Indian statute. They cannot by any means be ignored when the true intention of the legislature is to be found out." 13. In support of their conclusion, the learned judges referred to the differences in the scheme, language and the extent of punishments in the English and the Indian statutes. They cannot by any means be ignored when the true intention of the legislature is to be found out." 13. In support of their conclusion, the learned judges referred to the differences in the scheme, language and the extent of punishments in the English and the Indian statutes. They expressed their inability to agree with the interpretation adopted by Rankin C.J. in Peary Mohan Saha vs. Harendra Nath Roy (2) with an observation that it went largely on the English ruling, without considering the fact that the English ruling related to the English Food and Drugs Act which is far wider in its scope in fixing absolute liability than the Indian Act and much more lenient in the punishment for the first and subsequent offences. 14. A similar view has been taken in State vs. Kunchu (5), where the reasoning of the Madras High Court referred to above has been adopted. 15. Examining the Madras case (4) a little critically; one finds that the main distinction pointed our between the English and the Indian law was that under the English law, the persons who are merely in possession of adulterated food stuffs are liable to conviction, but under the English law, mere possession of adulterated food for the purposes of sale is not made an offence except in the case of manufacture of food stuffs under sec. 16(1) of the Act. The difference in the two Acts is with regard to the head of the liability and cannot be a conclusive consideration for distinguishing the cases of masters and servants. 16. Secondly, the learned judges in support of their conclusion referred to the fact that, "England is a rightly educated country where there is 100 percent literacy and the population is accustomed to enlightened public health rules for more than two centuries, whereas India is a very backward country, with 15 per cent, literacy and 85 per cent, illiteracy, and people plunged in dark ignorance regarding scientific matters and public health rules and even elementary things like the consequences of food adulteration." 17. On this premise, it was observed that, "The provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has deliberately refrained from enacting the wide provisions of the Food and Drugs Act of England, and has restricted the fixation of absolute liability to persons like masters, the primary sellers, who are expected to be more educated than the servants or secondary sellers and to know the consequences of the sale of adulterated food stuffs better." 18. These considerations also, in our judgment, have little relevance. The correct approach in interpreting such statutes is firstly to interpret the language and in case of an ambiguous expression to consider the object of the statute and the existence of the prevalent evil and the necessity of checking the same. The extent of education, to say the least, is a very remote consideration. It is well-known that the evil of adulteration of food stuffs in India is of a serious magnitude and the legislature should be imputed an intention to check it by absolutely prohibiting sales of adulterated articles by persons in order to safeguard public health. Similarly, the severity of the punishment in India and the corresponding leniency in England need not weigh in interpreting the section for the purposes of determining the question of absolute liability, for the severity is equally compatible with the absolute liability for eradicating the evil. 19. Lastly, we must point out that the decision of Rankin C. J. in Peary Mohan Saba vs. Harendra Nath Roy (2) has not been given the consideration, it really deserves. Rankin C. J. was quite conscious of the difference in the language of the English and the Indian statutes. In fact, he refers to an argument based upon this language. It was in spite of the difference in language that Rankin C. J. on giving due weight and effect to the words "no person shall sell" held the servant also absolutely liable and we are not prepared to agree that his decision proceeded largely on a consideration of the English cases only. , 20. On a very careful and anxious consideration of the Madras case (4) and the Calcutta case (2), we have no hesitation in preferring and accepting the Calcutta view and holding that under sec. 7 and 16 of the Act, no distinction can be drawn between the master, the principal, the servant and the commission agent. , 20. On a very careful and anxious consideration of the Madras case (4) and the Calcutta case (2), we have no hesitation in preferring and accepting the Calcutta view and holding that under sec. 7 and 16 of the Act, no distinction can be drawn between the master, the principal, the servant and the commission agent. We hold that the expression "himself or by any other person on his behalf" is not intended to cut down the effect or the words "no person shall sell" and that these words merely elaborate and emphasize the prohibition against certain classes of acts being done at all. The legislature is concerned to make the act of selling an act which is imputable both to the person with whose hand it is committed and to any other person, if such there be, on whose behalf it is committed. 21. We have dealt with these cases at some length out of deference to the great reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the above cases, although for the present case, it may not be necessary to go to the extent of dissenting from them because it is not a case of mere servant selling on behalf of the master. In the case before us, the respondent is a commission agent, himself selling the goods. There is an obvious distinction between the case of a mere servant and a commission agent selling on behalf of the principal. The commission agent owns a shop, himself exposes the goods for sale and effects sales and to all prospective purchases, he is the owner of goods. We also cannot forget that the commission agents may sell goods on behalf of owners belonging to other places which may even be outside the State or even outside India ; and it will be indeed opening a wide door to the evil to be guarded against, if it is held that a commission agent should be treated differently from the owner and should not be held absolutely liable, but liable only on proof of mens rea. In these circumstances, we are wholly unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. 22. In these circumstances, we are wholly unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. 22. It will be also proper to refer to the fact that during the course of arguments, the Deputy Government Advocate had brought to our notice that the Public Analyst had adopted the standard prescribed by the rules framed under the Marwar Pure Food Act, 1946 and a doubt was expressed whether the Marwar Pure Food Act, 1946 and the Rules framed thereunder could govern cases in the Sirohi district, which was not a part of Marwar. The case was accordingly adjourned and it was subsequently brought to our notice that the Marwar Pure Food Act, 1946 had been amended to extend to Sirohi and Jaisalmer Districts, vide the Marwar Pure Food (Amendment) Act, 1953 (Act No. I of 1953). The doubt thus once raised was resolved and nothing was pointed out to show that the rules framed under the Marwar Act and continued by sec. 25 of the Central Act had become ineffective on account of any inconsistency or repugnancy with the Act or Rules subsequently framed under the Act. The respondent, therefore, cannot have any grievance on this ground. 23. Next, it was urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that the quantity sent by the Food Inspector for analysis was not in accordance with R. 22 of the Rules framed by the Central Government. The rule requires that the quantity of ghee to be sent for analysis should be 4 oz.; whereas in the present case, the quantity was about 1-1/2 oz. only. This point was never raised at any stage in the trial court and even before us, it was urged at a very late stage when the case came up before us a second time to resolve our doubts on the points brought to our notice by the Deputy Government Advocate. In our opinion, at the best, it is a case of mere irregularity and in the absence of any allegation of prejudice to the accused, the accused cannot escape the consequences of his wrongful acts by reference to this irregularity. 24. Further, it was urged that the accused was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the Public Analyst. Dattappa Mahadappa vs. Secretary, Municipal Board, Buldana (6) was relied upon in support of this argument. We are not prepared to accept this argument. 24. Further, it was urged that the accused was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the Public Analyst. Dattappa Mahadappa vs. Secretary, Municipal Board, Buldana (6) was relied upon in support of this argument. We are not prepared to accept this argument. In the Nagpur case (6), the accused wanted an opportunity but was denied. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the accused ever wanted to cross-examine the Public Analyst. 25. Lastly, it was pointed out that although the Food Inspector purchased ghee on 5th of May, 1956, he did not send it to the Public Analyst before 1st June, 1956 and that the ghee was actually examined by the Public Analyst on12th of June, 1956. Although, we do not approve of the dilatoriness on the part of the Food Inspector, but we do not see how the accused can be benefited by the delay,especially when he did not make any grievance of it at the trial stage and did not cross-examine the witness on this point. The phials were immediately sealed by the Food Inspector after making the purchase. 26. As a result of the above discussions, the conclusion to which we come to is that the contention of the State is justified and must prevail. The respondent has been wrongly acquitted by the trial court and deserves to be convicted. 27. We, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court and convict him. As regards sentence, the learned counsel having brought it to our notice that the respondent is a first offender, we will leniently view his case and will sentence him to a fine of Rs. 200/- only. We further direct that in case of default of payment of fine, the respondent shall have to undergo three months simple imprisonment.