JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is an application in revision by a person convicted by a 1st Class Magistrate under Sections 3 and 4 of the Madhya Bharat Gambling Act, and sentenced under each of the two sections to suffer simple imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 with further imprisonment in default for one month under each count. His appeal has also been dismissed. Among other points, he has urged that the entire proceeding of search under Section 5 of the Act is vitiated by the fact that the search was without jurisdiction, there being no "credible information" before the police officer, that the particular place (the applicant's betel shop) was being used as a common gaming house. Secondly, that certain papers have been read as "betting slips" (Exhs. B, C and D), though they were in code, and the police officer's key to the code was itself based on hearsay information. Thirdly, that a conviction under Section 3 was in any case, uncalled for, because there is no element of repetition, this alleged incident being the only one act of gambling even according to the prosecution. Finally, it is prayed that the sentence of imprisonment is not called for, especially, as the Madhya Bharat Act which provides for a minimum sentence of imprisonment even on the first conviction, was repealed while the case was pending, and was replaced by the Central Provinces Public Gaming Act, which does not provide for a minimum sentence of imprisonment on first conviction, though, otherwise the provisions are quite similar. The facts of the case are the following. The applicant is the owner of a betel shop in Indore. On 25th November, 1959, the officer-in-charge of the local police station got information that this shop was being used as a gaming house. He made a record of this in his diary, and further sent his assistant Kantilal to verify it. The latter went to the shop, returned, and gave a report, after which the officer, now confirmed in his suspicions, arranged for a trap, of the usual type, with Rehman P. W. 1 as the bogus punter, and two othersBrijmohan and Mohommad Shafias witnesses. The latter went to the shop, returned, and gave a report, after which the officer, now confirmed in his suspicions, arranged for a trap, of the usual type, with Rehman P. W. 1 as the bogus punter, and two othersBrijmohan and Mohommad Shafias witnesses. The reported form of gambling was what in this part is known as "American futures", and consists of a bet on the chances of a particular digit, that is any of 0 to 9 being the last figure of the quotation of cotton at New York, at the end of the particular day, signaled late in the evening, on the wireless. A refinement is that it is open to the better to play for a multiple of the bet. The manager of the business of gaming receives the bet, notes the better's name, the value of the stake the figure staked upon and the multiple, if any, often, the particulars (all but the better's name) are in code, letters being used for the figures in a particular order. Rehman was given a marked one-rupee note and according to him, he went and gave the note to Ramnarayanthe applicantand asked him to treat it as a bet on the digit 3 in that day's American Future, Ramnarayan agreed and accepting the amount, made a note on the slip with Rehman's name and certain letters. Therefore, Rehman gave the agreed signal, by lighting a bidi in the usual manner. The police party walked in, recovered the marked note and three slips (marked B, C and D) mentioning names, ostensibly, of the betters and certain letters noted against each of them, whose meaning can be deciphered only if we know the code. One of the slips was Rehman Tanga The usual panchanama was prepared which was signed by the applicant also, though he said later on in his defence, that he did so under pressure. On these materials, the applicant was put up on trial for keeping a gaming house and having the management of the business of such house, and of being present in it and unable to prove that he was not there for the purpose of gaming. On these materials, the applicant was put up on trial for keeping a gaming house and having the management of the business of such house, and of being present in it and unable to prove that he was not there for the purpose of gaming. His defence was that he did not know anything about the allegation of gaming and that the money and the three slips were not recovered from him, and, in any case, the decoy witness Rehman, should not be believed without corroboration and that corroboration was not forthcoming. The police officer interpreted the three Blips stating that the letters noted against the names indicated the amount, the digit on which the bet had been staked, and the multiple; but that was on the basis of what somebody had told him, who, in his turn, had gathered from others, According to the prosecution, each of the three slips indicated a separate act of gambling; so, there was repetition and the trial Court held that the requirements of Section 3 were proved. The appellate Court substantially agreed with the finding of the lower Court. The first objection raised on behalf of the applicant is that the officer could only conduct a search if he had got "credible information". He has himself, given his reasons as it is urged on behalf of the applicant that this does not amount to credible information. Kantilal P. W. 3, who is an Assistant Sub-Inspector, says that on being deputed by the Sub-Inspector, Tehsildarsingh P. W. 6, he went to the place of the applicant "and saw people coming to gamble". Tehsildarsingh says that P. W. 3 returned and reported to him that "people were gambling there". It is argued that what Kantilal saw was not actual gambling but the coming of the people as he understood, with a view to gambling, and so, there was no credible information; and as there was no credible information, the entire proceedings are vitiated. With due respect to the ingenuity of this argument, it ignores that what is called "oredible information" or "having reason to believe" is essentially a subjective attitude. Nobody is punished because the police officer has got credible information or reasonable suspicion against him, but such credible information or reasonable suspicion is a justification for the police officer's taking certain steps towards detection. Nobody is punished because the police officer has got credible information or reasonable suspicion against him, but such credible information or reasonable suspicion is a justification for the police officer's taking certain steps towards detection. All that can be expected is, there should be due caution, good faith and a general regard for the normal probabilities of events. If the officer suddenly goes and searches without any information at all, then the Court could call upon him to justify his procedure. If, on the other hand, he makes a record of the information, whatever it is, that he has received, and has acted as a person of ordinary prudence and caution, then Courts will not examine whether that information has been proved or, whether it was sufficient to appeal its own credulity. Ultimately, it is the state of the officer's mind, before he takes the steps authorised by law. In the present case, for example, he did have information, and his record in the diary was before the Court. While it was not evidence in the proper sense of the term, it could be looked into to see whether there was any bad faith or rashness on the officer's part. Here, if anything, the officer was overcautious. He sent his assistant to find out what was actually going on at the betel shop of the applicant. This was not necessary; but it shows that the officer was proceeding with circumspection. His assistant went and returned with some information. Whether it was that people were actually gambling, or that people were collecting in a manner which indicated to him was for gambling, this confirmed the senior officer's suspicion. It is not for this Court to say that he should not have confirmed it. Kantilal's impression that the people were collecting there for gambling will not be sufficient for convicting any of them for gambling; but this itself does amount to credible information for his superior. Thus there is no force in the argument that there was no credible information in this case. The next question is in regard to gambling by Rehman, and further, in regard to the evidence of repetition. Thus there is no force in the argument that there was no credible information in this case. The next question is in regard to gambling by Rehman, and further, in regard to the evidence of repetition. In all such cases, the primary evidence is that of the person who goes and offers the money and makes his conditions, be then deposes that his bet and conditions were accepted and the money was taken, and a note made either in the books of the person conducting the business, or on a separate Blip of paper. But since such a person may be, and in the case like the present one, actually is, an agent taking part in a trap to catch the alleged manager of the gaming house, his evidence has to be corroborated by independent material. It is evidence all right; but even if it is theoretically conceivable that such evidence by itself can support a conviction, the rule of prudence is that sufficient independent corroboration should be sought, as the very fact of his taking part in a trap with or without the incentive of profit, is likely to make him overzealons. In the present case, the agent (Rehman) is clear and categorical that he had told the applicant of his intention that the one-rupee note he was giving, should be placed as a bet on digit 3, in that day's American future and, that he should get a certain multiple. He further asserts that the Petitioner agreed, took his money and made a note on a slip of paper. Immediately after, there is a raid and the currency note and three slips of paper are found with the applicant. He has himself signed the panchanama and this is further supported by the police officer in the witness-box. Whatever the merits of the other allegations, there is no doubt that shortly after Rehman'a going to the shop, the officer and the other witnesses went there and found that the applicant had in his possession the marked one-rupee note and the slips of paper. Thus, it is corroboration of the fact that Rehman gave the one-rupee note to the applicant. Thus, it is corroboration of the fact that Rehman gave the one-rupee note to the applicant. Certainly, gambling is not the only reason why a person should give a rupee note to another; but then when the giver asserts he gave it for gambling, and the money is found with the other, the latter should explain for what other ostensible purpose it was given and taken. Here, we do not have any explanation; there is a total denial, which is false. This itself is a corroboration of the fact that the money was offered and taken as a bet. On behalf of the applicant, the ruling, Hormazdyar v. Emperor AIR 1948 Bom 250, has been cited. I accept the principle contained there, especially, in the passage The evidence of bogus punter......must be corroborated by independent evidence before it is accepted...... The seizure of other documents along with the marked currency notes, when their contents cannot be deciphered, can hardly be used to corroborate the evidence of these punters. There is no doubt that in certain cases, the recovery of the note itself may not be sufficient corroboration. That would depend upon the circumstances of each case. But in a case like the present one, where the punter categorically asserts that his money was accepted as a bet in gambling and it is immediately found that the accused, who, for his part, has altogether no explanation of how he got it, the corroborative value of that discovery is very considerable. That takes us to the next question of the corroborative value of the three slips. For the moment we are concerned with only one of them, namely, the slip that was marked B. Unlike in the Bombay case, here it is at least in part decipherable, because there is the name "Rehman Tanga". As a matter of fact, Rehman is a "Tangawala". This shows that at all events, a note with his name was made at the time, Rehman's money was accepted. Here again, the applicant by his refusal to give any explanation, is really failing to help himself. It is not his allegation that this Rehman is some other Rehman, or the written note was made for some other purpose. This shows that at all events, a note with his name was made at the time, Rehman's money was accepted. Here again, the applicant by his refusal to give any explanation, is really failing to help himself. It is not his allegation that this Rehman is some other Rehman, or the written note was made for some other purpose. His silence by itself, cannot become an ingredient of offence; but it shows that when the money was given, a record with the giver's name was made, obviously, with a view to future reference. Rehman's evidence is that it was as a bet, and we have no explanation against it. Then there are some digits like and which form a code. In the interpretation of the code, both the parties have gone beyond the limits of admissibility. The police officer has no first hand knowledge of the code among managers of gaming houses at Indore; so, whatever be says as to the meaning of these letters, is merely hearsay and as such inadmissible. But the fact remains that the slip of paper with Rehman's name as well as the currency note itself, corroborate Rehman's state-ment that he gave the money with the purpose he has mentioned. The case would have been different either if the identity of the note is not established, or if the slip was completely undecipherable, and could not he connected with Rehman. I find as a fact that Rehman's evidence which is the primary evidence in this case, is corroborated by the discovery of the currency note, and the slip with his name. Then comes the question of repetition. Though Section 3 both in the Madhya Bharat and the Central Provinces Acts, is worded very generally, case-law has been to the effect that to make the place a gaming house, there should be repetition. A single act of gaming may not constitute a business of gaming. Here again, one has to fall upon the discovery of the three slips. The slip B in the name of Rehman, undoubtedly refers to a bet by him and this independently of the interpretation of the code letters put by the side of his name. In fact, we can read the code backwards. Here again, one has to fall upon the discovery of the three slips. The slip B in the name of Rehman, undoubtedly refers to a bet by him and this independently of the interpretation of the code letters put by the side of his name. In fact, we can read the code backwards. We know what Rehman says and we also find that part of Mb evidence is independently corroborated; but whether we read the code backwards or not, the two other slips of similar nature found along with the money can properly be found to be connected with gaming by two other persons. In the case reported in Bapulal, In re, AIR 1930 Nag. 78 it has been held A person who is simply caught on one occasion gambling on public road cannot be said to use the same as a common gaming house. Section 3 contemplates a more serious offence than Section 4 as the respective punishments will show, and it is evidently aimed at the keeper of a gaming house or other persons who habitually come within the same category. In the case of a public place, such as a road used as a gaming house, Section 3 would apply to a man who habitually uses that spot, has his regular beat or stand there, but not to a casual gambler whether he hands over or accepts the money staked. There, the question was, as to whether the accused was a habitual user of a gaming house or a casual gambler, and the place was a public road. Here, the place is the shop of the applicant himself and not a public road. Again, the discovery of two more slips exactly like the one which was undoubtedly connected with gambling shows that there were two more acts of a similar nature. Thus there is evidence of repetition and therefore definite proof that the applicant was managing the business of gaming house. Considerable emphasis has been laid on the fact that the letters put after the name of persons on these slips are in code and there is no acceptable evidence on the key. The question before us is not whether these figures or letters mean 1, 2 and 3, but whether these Blips are connected with gambling, so that they may come under the description "instruments of gaming". The question before us is not whether these figures or letters mean 1, 2 and 3, but whether these Blips are connected with gambling, so that they may come under the description "instruments of gaming". But in this regard, we have got definite clue that one of these relates to no other than Rehman, and he did nothing else on that occasion than to give the money to the applicant for a purpose which be gives as gambling and which, the applicant does not account for. The mere fact that the prosecution has not been able to produce anybody to decipher this code is not of assistance to the applicant, I have gone through the rulings in Harilal v. Emperor AIR 1937 Bom 385 and Hormazdyar v. Emperor AIR 1948 Bom 250, which has already been referred to. There is no doubt about the correctness of the principles in those rulings, namely, that the agent of the police should not be believed straightway unless there is corroboration, and further, that unintelligible slips found in possession of the accused can be interpreted only upon evidence based on long experience among such people supported by instances. In these cases, the slips were found to be quite unintelligible and not purporting to be records of gambling transactions. Further, the interpretation sought to be put on the slip concerned in the case of AIR 1937 Bom 385, was belied by the evidence itself. In the present case, on the other hand, one of the slips clearly shows that Rehman went and did something, and we know independently what Rehman did. Rehman gave the money which too has been recovered and he gave the money for a particular purpose which fits in with the discovery and has not been explained otherwise by the accused-applicant. All things considered, I find that the evidence has stood the test of the closest scrutiny(sic). I hold in principle that short terms of imprisonment are not desirable, and need not be imposed unless there is a mandatory provision of law. The record does not show that there has been a previous conviction. The Madhya Bharat provision for a minimum sentence even on first conviction has been repealed before the judgment was delivered, and the Central Provinces provision had taken its place. So, I modify the sentence to a total fine under both the sections of Rs. The record does not show that there has been a previous conviction. The Madhya Bharat provision for a minimum sentence even on first conviction has been repealed before the judgment was delivered, and the Central Provinces provision had taken its place. So, I modify the sentence to a total fine under both the sections of Rs. 400 (four hundred), with imprisonment in default for two months. With this modification, in sentence, the application is dismissed.