Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This appeal by defendant No. 4 arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent for declaration of her title to 1/4th share in the properties mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint and for partition. The plaintiff brought her suit in forma pauperis, and, it has been decreed, and, her title has been declared, and, a preliminary decree for partition has also been passed. 2. The sole question, for determination in the present appeal, is, whether the adoption of defendant No. 4 appellant, by the plaintiffs mother Sheobarat Katwain, as alleged by the appellant, has been proved? 3. In order to decide the above question, it is necessary to know the pedigree of the plaintiff, and, defendants 1 to 3, which is as follows: BHAGELU SINGH Widow = Sheobarat Katwin Died 1947.48 _____________|__________ | | Son Daughters Ganesh Singh (deceased) | ______________________|_______________________________ | | | | Bhikhni Jini Bankumari Lachhmania Plaintiff Defdt. 1 Defdt. 2 Defdt. 3 (P. W. 1) (D. W. 1 for (Widow of (D. W. 1 for defdt. 1) Ratan Singh) Defdt. 3). 4. The plaintiffs case was this: That her father Bhagelu Singh died leaving behind his widow; a son, named Ganesh; and, four daughters, namely, the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3; that her brother, Ganesh, died after the death of her father; and, it was false to say that her brother pre-deceased her father; that her father never gave permission to her mother to adopt a son, much less defendant No. 4; and, that defendant No. 4 was never adopted by her mother. 5. The plaintiff, therefore, completely denied the authority of her mother to adopt and the fact of adoption of the appellant, and, accordingly, she claimed that, after the death of her mother, she and her three sisters, defendants 1 to 3, were only entitled to the estate of her father, being his only legal heirs. 6. Defendant No. 1, the first sister of the plaintiff, supported defendant 4-appellant, and, also examined herself, as D. W. 1 on her own behalf, in support of the adoption of the appellant. She, however, claimed certain raiyati lands in village Sundarpahari, out of the lands in suit, as her exclusive property by virtue of a registered gift dated 24-11-1943 (Ext. A-1), executed by her mother in her favour. 7. She, however, claimed certain raiyati lands in village Sundarpahari, out of the lands in suit, as her exclusive property by virtue of a registered gift dated 24-11-1943 (Ext. A-1), executed by her mother in her favour. 7. Defendant No. 2, the second sister of the plaintiff, did not appear, nor did she either file a written statement or contest the suit or examine herself as a witness, obviously because her husband Ratan Lal Singh, described as Ratan Singh in the plaint, had attested the alleged deed of adoption (Ext. H-3) executed by her mother in favour of the appellant. 8. Defendant No. 3, the third sister of the plaintiff, however, filed a written statement supporting her sister, the plaintiff, and, denying the authority of her mother to adopt the appellant, and, the latters adoption. She however, claimed the lands in village Jealgora, out of the lands in suit, to be her stridhan and exclusive property, by virtue of a registered gift (Ext. A-2) executed by her mother in her favour on 24-11-1943, the same day on which the other deed of gift (Ext. A-1) in favour of her sister, defendant 1, was executed. 9. Defendant No. 4, the appellant, who was the main contesting defendant, filed his written statement, claiming to be the adopted son of Bhagelu Singh, and, as such, entitled to all the properties in suit belonging to Bhagelu Singh, or acquired out of his funds, to the exclusion of his admitted four daughters, His case was that all the sons of Bhagelu Singh died, one after another, and, the last son, named Ganesh, also pre-deceased his father, and, therefore, Bhagelu Singh authorised his wife Sheo Barat Katwain to adopt a son to him, and, accordingly, by virtue of that authority, Sheobarat Katwain, after the death of her husband, under a registered deed of adoption dated 13-7-1924 (Ext. H-3), adopted defendant No. 4, who was gifted to her by his father Hari Singh on 11-7-1924, by a registered deed of gift (Ext. H/1-3"). The appellant, therefore, claimed to be in possession of all the properties of Bhagelu Singh after the death of her adoptive mother, Sheobarat Khatwain. 10. Defendant No. 5, who was examined as D. W. 4 for defendant No. 4, was not a member of the family. H/1-3"). The appellant, therefore, claimed to be in possession of all the properties of Bhagelu Singh after the death of her adoptive mother, Sheobarat Khatwain. 10. Defendant No. 5, who was examined as D. W. 4 for defendant No. 4, was not a member of the family. His case was that he had no title or claim to the disputed properties, but he had been made a defendant deliberately, as otherwise he would have been a very important and material witness for the defendants because of his being a very old and trusted servant of Bhagelu Singh and his widow. 11. The learned Subordinate Judge, after a consideration of the evidence of both sides, held that: (1) Ganesh died after the death of his father, as alleged by the plaintiff; (2) that the authority, alleged to be given by Bhagelu to his wife for adopting a son to him, had not been proved; (3) that no adoption, in fact, was made; (4) that Hari Singh the father of the appellant, in collusion with some persons brought into existence the two documents (Exts. H/-1-3 and H-3) in order to grab the property of Bhagelu Singh; and, (5) that the lands claimed by defendants 1 and 3 were acquired by Bhagelus widow out of the funds left by Bhagelu himself, and, therefore, the properties claimed by defendants 1 to 3 were not their exclusive properties, and as such, they were liable to be partitioned, and, the plaintiff was entitled to 1/4th share in these properties also. On the above main findings, the plaintiffs suit was decreed. 12. On the argument presented on behalf of the appellant, three questions arise for decision, namely, (1) Did Ganesh predecease his father, an alleged by the appellant, or did he the after the death of his father, as alleged by the plaintiff? (2) Did Bhagelu give authority to his wife Sheobarat Katwain to adopt the appellant, as alleged by him, and, (3) if, in fact, the appellant was adopted by Sheobarat Katwain as alleged by him? 13. It was conceded by Mr. Gorakh Nath Singh, who appeared for the appellant, that if the first question just mentioned, is answered against the appellant by holding that Ganesh died after the death of his father, then the other two questions are not necessary to be decided. 13. It was conceded by Mr. Gorakh Nath Singh, who appeared for the appellant, that if the first question just mentioned, is answered against the appellant by holding that Ganesh died after the death of his father, then the other two questions are not necessary to be decided. He further conceded that even if the first question is answered in favour of the appellant by holding that Ganesh predeceased his father, even then, unless the second question also is decided in favour of the appellant by holding that Bhagelu gave authority to his wife Sheobarat Katwain to adopt, the alleged adoption of the appellant would be invalid in law, even if, in fact, it had taken place. 14. The first two questions are no doubt subsidiary to the principal question, posed by me, but are basic, and necessary steps to the decision of it. As all the three points, mentioned above, have been argued in detail on behalf of the appellant, I propose to deal with each of them in order in which they have been stated above. 15. It is necesssary, at the outset, however, to notice the argument of Mr. Singh on the question of burden of proof in the case of an old adoption. In my opinion, however, it is not necessary to deal with the several decisions relied upon by him, individually, as the principles which apply to such a ease are not and cannot be disputed. The principles, which can be extracted from the authorities, may be re-stated as below: It is established rule of law that a very grave and serious onus rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural succession of property by alleging an adoption. In such a case the proof requires strict and almost severe scrutiny, and the longer the time goes back from the date when the power was given to the time when it comes to be examined, the more necessary it is, having regard to the fallibility of human memory and the uncertainty of evidence given after the lapse of such time, to see that the evidence is sufficient and strong. An oral authority by the husband to the wife has to be strictly proved and if the authority is conditional, the condition must be strictly followed: Dal Bahadur Singh V/s. Bijai Bahadur Singh, AIR 1930 PC 79: 57 Ind App 14, which was followed by Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Mt. Sumantrabai V/s. Rishabhkumar, AIR 1052 Nag 295. 16. It is equally well settled that if a person gives his authority to adopt to his wife under a written document and in pursuance of such an authority a son is adopted, and, there is sufficient and reliable evidence of long recognition of an adopted son, then in such a case although the defendant was bound to prove his title as adopted son, as a fact, yet from the long period during which he had been received as adopted son, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact was to be favourably entertained, and in the case of a Hindu, long recognised as an adopted son, raised even a stronger presumption in favour of the validity of his adoption, arising from the possibility of the loss of his rights in his own family by being adopted in another family. In respect of an old adoption strict proof of the performance of the ceremonies cannot be demanded. An adoption acquiesced in and recognised for a number of years by the person making the adoption and a long course of recognition on the part of that person and by the brotherhood who were best acquainted with the circumstances gives rise to the inference that the conditions relating to the adoption were fulfilled: Rajendra Nath V/s. Jogendra Nath, 14 Moo Ind Apo 67 and Panna Lal V/s. Chiman Parkash, AIR 1947 Lah 54. 17. 17. As observed by the Privy Council, in Sootrugun Sutputty V/s. Sabitra Dye, (1834) 2 Knapp 287, which was quoted with approval in Diwakar Rao V/s. Chandan Lal Rao, AIR 1916 PC 81, "Although neither written acknowledgements nor the performance of any religious ceremonial are essential to the validity of adoptions, such acknowledgements are usually given, and such ceremonies observed, and notices given of the time when adoption are to take place, in all families of distinction as those of Zamindars or opulent Brahmins, that wherever these have been omitted, it behaves this Court to regard with extreme suspicion the proof offered in support of adoption. I would say, that in no case should the rights of wives and daughters be transferred to strangers or more remote relations, unless the proof of adoption, by which that transfer "is effected, be proved by evidence free from all suspicion of fraud, and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubt of its truth." 18. In the light of the above principles, I will now proceed to decide the three questions pressed in the appeal. Re. (1): Whether Ganesh predeceased his father? 19. ****************** 20. ****************** 21. ****************** 22. ****************** 23. ****************** 24. ****************** 25. ****************** 26. ****************** 27. ****************** 28. ****************** 29. ****************** 30. ****************** 31. ****************** 32. ****************** 33. **************** 34. On a consideration of the above evidence, oral and documentary, and, the facts and circumstances of the case, mentioned before, and the judgment in appeal, I have no hesitation in holding, in agreement with the Court below, that Ganesh died after the death of his father and not during the life time of his father. The appellant, therefore, had failed to prove that Ganesh predeceased his father. The question posed by me, as such, must be answered in the negative, Re.: (2): If Bhagelu authorised his wife Sheobarat Katwain, to adopt a son? 35. ****************** 36. ****************** 37. *************** 38. As observed by Sir Madhavan Nair of the Privy Council, in Mahadeva Royal V/s. Virabasava Chikka Royal, AIR 1948 PC 114, even mere assertion made by a widow that she had an authority of her husband to adopt without making any effective endeavour to support it, except by carrying out the adoption, is not sufficient evidence to establish that the widow had the authority of her husband to adopt and therefore to establish the validity of adoption. In the instant case, as discussed before, there is no such definite and unequivocal assertion even of her authority to adopt in Ext. H-3. It is quite conceivable as observed further by his Lordship, that notwithstanding the absence of authority to adopt, assertions that it does exist might well be made by an unscrupulous person and the actual adoption also might be carried out with success. In the present case, similar was the position. As Sheobarat Katwain was made to execute Ext. H-3 at the instance of the appellants father, to effectuate it she was bound to allege authority from her husband to adopt. 39. As pointed out further in the just mentioned Privy Council case, very grave and serious onus rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural succession of property by alleging an adoption, and, in such a case the proof requires strict and almost severe scrutiny. 40. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances, mentioned above, there is no doubt that the appellant had failed to establish the authority of Sheobarat Katwain from her husband to adopt the appellant. I also, therefore, hold in agreement with the Court below, that Bhagelu never gave any authority to his wife for adopting a son, much less the appellant, and, that there could be no such occasion for it, because Bhagelu died leaving behind his son Ganesh, who died three years after his fathers death. The second question posed by me must also, accordingly, be answered in the negative. Re: (3). Was the appellant adopted by Sheobarat Katwain? 41. ****************** 42. ****************** 43. There are, however, certain other strong circumstances to negative the fact of adoption. On the evidence of P. W. 1, one of the four daughters of Sheobarat Khatwain, she had a son by Barau Sahu, who was her first husband, and, who came from Azamgarh. She was remarried thereafter to Suku Sahu 30 years ago, that is near about 924. Is it probable that Sheobarat Khatwain, in spite of having four daughters and a daughters son from his daughter, the plaintiff, would execute a deed of adoption in favour of the appellant thereby completely shutting out her four daughters and her daughters son from inheritance of the properties of her husband after her death, who were the legal and natural heirs? This circumstance, in my opinion, is very much against the appellant. This circumstance, in my opinion, is very much against the appellant. It is most unnatural to expect that a mother would by depriving her daughters and her daughters son transfer their rights to agnatic relations, as observed by the Privy Council in Diwakar Raos case AIR 1916 PC 81 (supra). 44. Mr. Singh relied very strongly on a decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Seetharama Chandra Row V/s. Kanchumarthi Raju, AIR 1925 PC 201, in which it was held that the burden resting, altogether apart from the law of limitation, upon any litigant who challenges the authority of an adoption that has been recognised as valid during a long course of years is of the heaviest order. Relying on the above decision, it was urged that in the present case as the adoption took place in 1924, that is, 28 years prior to the institution of the suit, a heavy burden lay on the plaintiff to disprove the authority to adopt and the adoption itself, and, in the present case, on the evidence the plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus. The above case, however, does not apply to the present case. In that case, the adoption was recognised as valid for more than forty years by all the parties concerned including the plaintiff of that suit, and, the conduct of the adopting widow had no element of usurpation in it but simply the element of carrying out her husbands dying wish, and, the adoptee had lived in the adopted home as a member all his life, and, the plaintiff of that suit had also acted with the adopted son acknowleging in the course of the proceeding his right, and, in those circumstances, it was held that on the documents and evidence produced it must be held that they proved not only the fact of adoption but of the authority to adopt, In the present case, however that is not the position, a own before. 45. Mr. Singh then relying on Diwakar Raos case AIR 1916 PC 81 (supra) argued that in the present case there was a registered acknowledgment in the shape of Ext. H-3 by Sheobarat Khatwain, widow of Bhagelu, of the adoption and the performance of necessary ceremonies, etc. and, as such, unless the plaintiff displaced the evidence and proved the contrary, the authority to adopt end the adoption itself must be upheld. 46. H-3 by Sheobarat Khatwain, widow of Bhagelu, of the adoption and the performance of necessary ceremonies, etc. and, as such, unless the plaintiff displaced the evidence and proved the contrary, the authority to adopt end the adoption itself must be upheld. 46. He, further, relied particularly on the observation of Mahajan, J,, as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the Court, and, with whom Abdur Rahman, J. agreed, at page 67, in Panna Lals case AIR 1947 Lah 54 (supra), to the effect that: "It was not necessary for the widow to divest herself of the estate immediately when she effected the adoption of defendant 2. From her conduct it is obvious that she intended to retain the property for her life time and wanted the adopted son to take the property on her death." 47. The principles laid down in the above cases, do not apply to the present case, and, even if they are applied here, I do not think the appellant is in a better position. In the instant case, except the two registered deeds (Exts. H-3 and H/1-3), there is absolutely no reliable evidence, as discussed before, to prove the fact of adoption or the performance of the ceremonies or the like, or even of the fact that defendant No. 4 was recognised as an adopted son of Bhagelu Singh since after 1924 till the date of the suit by the brotherhood of Bhagelu Singh, As said before, not a single independent relation or any kinsman, ox, neighbour, or even those persons who were admittedly connected with Ext. H-3 and the alleged adoption and who were alive had been examined to prove either the authority of Sheobarat Khatwain to adopt, or, the fact of adoption by her. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, in the suit, which Bhagelus widow Sheobarat brought in 1931, she brought it in her own name and right and she did not mention therein about the alleged adoption of the appellant. Admittedly, in spite of the alleged adoption in 1924, all the properties of Bhagelu remained in possession of his widow; and the appellant, defendant No. 4, admitted in his evidence that all the properties were in the name of his adoptive mother till her death, and, that the Chaukidari and rent receipts were also granted in the name of Sheobarat, his alleged adoptive mother, during her life-time. This circumstance was tried to be explained by relying on the just mentioned observation of Mahajan, J., in Parma Lals case AIR 1947 Lah 54 (supra). But, in my opinion, that case docs not apply here, because in that case there was clear evidence to show that the widow intended to retain the property for her life-time and wanted the adopted son to take the property on her death. In that case, the, adoption was acquiesced in and recognised for a number of years by the person making the adoption, and also there was evidence of a long course of recognition not only on the part of that person but also by the brotherhood who were best acquainted with the circumstances, giving rise to the inference that the conditions relating to adoption were fulfilled. Those circumstances are completely absent in the present case. 48. As observed by Sip Tames W. Colvile of the Privy Council in Chowdhry Pudum Singh V/s. Koer Oddey Singh, 12 Moo Ind App 350, adoption, being a matter of fact, must be strictly proved, and, the party who claims as adopted son, in order to establish the validity of the adoption, must prove, first, the authority given by the husband to the widow to adopt a son to him, and, second, his actual adoption by the widow as the son of her husband. 49. Ext. H-3, which only, and strongly, was relied upon for the fact of adoption, cannot be of any assistance to the appellant also for another reason. The alleged admissions of the appellants adoption by the alleged adoptive mother (illiterate) contained in Ext. H-3, on which she was alleged to have put her thumb-marks, could not be relied upon in the absence of satisfactory evidence that recitals therein to that effect had been specifically brought to her knowledge and their effect explained to her. 50. The alleged admissions of the appellants adoption by the alleged adoptive mother (illiterate) contained in Ext. H-3, on which she was alleged to have put her thumb-marks, could not be relied upon in the absence of satisfactory evidence that recitals therein to that effect had been specifically brought to her knowledge and their effect explained to her. 50. The fact that the appellant admittedly never exercised, after his alleged adoption in 1924, the rights of ownership over the lands in suit till the death of his alleged adoptive mother in 1947-48, any time during the period of about 24 years, although there was no evidence in the case that She intended that the appellant should come in possession on her death, coupled with the absence of the appellants description of himself as the adopted son of his adoptive father in any document before the present suit, along with Sheobarat Katwains course of conduct mentioned before, which can only be describe ed as equivocal, in my opinion, are not sufficient to establish the fact of the validity of the adoption. The appellant, therefore, must be held to have failed to discharge the onus probandi and as such his case was not proved. 51. For the reasons given above, therefore, I hold, in agreement with the Court below, that the appellant was never adopted by Sheobarat Katwain, after the death of her husband, and, that Exts. H/1-3 and H-3 are collusive and sham transactions. 52. It was then urged by Mr. Singh that the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 118 of the Limitation Act. This question, however, does not need any elaborate discussion, because it is obvious that in the present case the only Article of Limitation Act which has application to the facts of the case is Article 141 of the Limitation Act. Article 118 provides a period of six years for instituting a suit to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place, from the date when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff. Here, the plaintiffs suit is not of that nature, and, as such, Article 118 cannot possibly apply. The question of adoption was raised by the appellant in his defence. Here, the plaintiffs suit is not of that nature, and, as such, Article 118 cannot possibly apply. The question of adoption was raised by the appellant in his defence. Article 141, however, provides a period of twelve years for instituting a suit, like the present, when a Hindu becomes entitled to possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu female, from the time when the female dies. In the present case, Sheobarat having died in 1947, the present suit was brought in 1952, and, therefore, the suit is within time, and, there is no question of limitation. 53. Lastly, it was argued that admittedly defendant No. 4, the appellant, is in possession of all the properties of Bhagelu minus the two properties gifted to defendants 1 and 3, under Exts. A-1 and A-2, and, as such, unless the plaintiff asks for possession, her relief for partition cannot be allowed. It appears from the records of the case, however, that the plaintiff paid ad valorem court-fee on the valuation of the suit as demanded by the Court below. After the payment of the ad valorem court-fee, it is obvious that the only thing which the plaintiff had to do was to ask for joint possession, and, then for partition, and, thereafter separate possession. The fact, therefore, that the plaintiff has not done so does not entail a dismissal of her suit. Rule 7 of Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while providing that every plaint shall state specially the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, further provides in express terms that it shall not be necessary for the plaintiff to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff, in paragraph 14 of her plaint, besides claiming specific reliefs, also claimed in Clause (e) of paragraph 14, that a decree be passed in her favour against the defendants for any other or further relief to which she may be found entitled, although such a general or further relief was not necessary. 54. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff, in paragraph 14 of her plaint, besides claiming specific reliefs, also claimed in Clause (e) of paragraph 14, that a decree be passed in her favour against the defendants for any other or further relief to which she may be found entitled, although such a general or further relief was not necessary. 54. The plaintiff in paragraph 9 of her plaint averred that since the death of Sheobarat Katwain, the defendants have illegally and wrongfully kept the plaintiff dispossessed from the lands of Schedule A of the plaint." It has been found that the defences set up separately by defendants 1 and 4 were false and that they had not been proved. It is obvious, therefore, that the said defendants were trespassers and in wrongful possession of the lands in suit and as such their possession must in law be deemed to be on behalf of the rightful owners thereof amongst whom was the plaintiff. In this view also, the plaintiff was entitled to joint possession with her three sisters. 55. It is true that in a suit for partition there must be unity of title and possession both in the plaintiff seeking partition. On the finding of the Court below, which is being affirmed by this Court the plaintiff has title and, therefore, she is entitled to possession over her undivided one fourth share in the lands in suit jointly with her sisters, defendants 1 to 3. 56. For the reasons given above, therefore, in my opinion, this Court is not precluded from granting such further relief which it thinks proper to the plaintiff. It is, therefore, declared that the plaintiff is entitled, not only to get 1/4th share in all the properties left by Bhagelu which passed on to the hands of Ganesh and then to Sheobarat, which are all mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint, as held by the Court below, but also to joint possession with her three sisters defendants 1 to 3, and, thereafter, to partition and separate possession. There will be, therefore, a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff in respect of her 1/4th share in Schedule A properties as against the defendants, who claimed to be in possession as against the plaintiff. The preliminary decree for partition is, accordingly confirmed. 57. There will be, therefore, a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff in respect of her 1/4th share in Schedule A properties as against the defendants, who claimed to be in possession as against the plaintiff. The preliminary decree for partition is, accordingly confirmed. 57. In the result, subject to the above modifications, the judgment and decree of the Court, below are affirmed, and, the appeal is dismissed with costs. U.N.Sinha, J. 58 I agree.