ORDER K.L. Pandey, J. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is directed against an order of the State Government (Respondent No. 1) dated 15th October 1959 whereby, in exercise of the powers under Section 20(1)(c) of the Bhopal State Town Area Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act), the Petitioner was removed from the office of the President of the Town Area Committee, Ashta. In the year 1956, the Petitioner was duly elected to the office of the President of the Town Area Committee, Ashta, constituted under the Act and thereafter continued to function as such. It appears that there were several complaints against the Petitioner to the effect that he disregarded the provisions of the Act, contravened Nazul Rules and committed numerous other irregularities. A preliminary enquiry was also held to ascertain the truth of those complaints. Thereupon, on 20th December 1958, the Collector of Sehore (Respondent No. 2) served upon the Petitioner a charge-sheet framed by the State Government specifying twenty charges and calling upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of the President. The Collector further required the Petitioner to submit his reply within 15 days and also enquired whether he wanted an oral enquiry, wished to be heard in person and desired to give lists of witnesses and documents to be produced in support of his defence (Annexure 1). On 1st February 1959, the Petitioner submitted a detailed reply to each of the twenty charges, stated that he wanted an oral enquiry and a personal bearing and also gave his lists of witnesses and documents (Annexure 2). Thereupon, without holding any oral enquiry or without giving to the Petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing, the State Government passed the impugned order (Annexure 3). The grievance of the Petitioner is that he was not given any opportunity whatsoever to meet the charges levelled against him and there was in fact no enquiry about those charges. In these circumstances, the Petitioner contended that his removal from the office of the president was "illegal, ultra vires, without jurisdiction, ineffective and against the principles of natural justice. The grievance of the Petitioner is that he was not given any opportunity whatsoever to meet the charges levelled against him and there was in fact no enquiry about those charges. In these circumstances, the Petitioner contended that his removal from the office of the president was "illegal, ultra vires, without jurisdiction, ineffective and against the principles of natural justice. In answer the Respondents stated that, in the preliminary enquiry held by a Deputy Collector to ascertain the truth of the complaints received against the Petitioner from various quarters, he was given a full opportunity not only to cross-examine the witnesses but also to tender oral and documentary evidence. Since he referred to the same evidence in his explanation, it was not considered necessary to hold a further enquiry. It was conceded before us by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that he participated in the preliminary enquiry and cross-examined some of the witnesses. It was, however, urged that the Petitioner did not then have a full opportunity of meeting the charges subsequently formulated and that, in any event, it could not be regarded as "reasonable opportunity" within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. In the petition, there is no mention of the preliminary enquiry or the opportunity which the Petitioner had then been afforded to cross-examine witnesses and to adduce oral and documentary evidence to refute the complaints made against him. That is what he stated in paragraph 7 of the petition: That no opportunity of any kind was afforded to the Petitioner for being present at any enquiry that may have been held by the Enquiry Officer. The Petitioner received no intimation of any such enquiry and therefore he presumed that the enquiry was shelved. He was not supplied with any report of the Enquiry Officer nor was he given any dates on which the enquiry may have been held. Nothing was known about it till 23101959 when the Petitioner received an order dated 15(sic)-10-1959 signed by the Under Secretary in the name of the Respondent No. 1 removing the Petitioner from the office of President of the said Committee (Annexure 3). In our opinion, the Petitioner has not only made a misleading statement but he has also suppressed material facts. Thereby he has rendered himself ineligible to any assistance from the Court. In our opinion, the Petitioner has not only made a misleading statement but he has also suppressed material facts. Thereby he has rendered himself ineligible to any assistance from the Court. However, we do not propose to rest our decision only on this ground. The relevant provisions of the Act governing this matter are these: 20 (1), The Government may remove from a Town Committee any president, vice-president or any other non-official member who(c) who, in the opinion of the Government, has so flagrantly abused, in any manner, his position as a member of the Committee, as to render his continuance as a member detrimental to the public interest. (2) No order shall be passed under Sub-section (1), until reasonable opportunity has been given to the president, vice-president or member to furnish an explanation, and any such order shall record the reasons for the removal of the president, vice-president or member. It is urged that, in proceeding under Section 20(1) of the Act, the State Government has to act judicially because, before action can be taken thereunder, the following conditions must be fulfilled: (i) The person proceeded against had flagrantly(sic) abused, in any manner, his position as a member of a committee; (ii) In the opinion of the State Government, the abuse of the position rendered his continuance as a member of the committee detrimental to the public interest; (iii) A reasonable opportunity was given to him to furnish an explanation; and (iv) An order stating reasons therefor. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has strongly relied upon Municipal Committee, Kareli v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1958 MPLJ 531 : AIR 1958 MP 323 (FB) and Maursinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1960 MPLJ 559 : AIR 1958 MP 397 . The drastic orders questioned in these cases dealt with supersession of municipal committee under provisions corresponding to Section 91 of the Act. Further, while in the Full Bench case, there were no words in the relevant section to indicate a subjective approach, it was held in the second case that the words 'in the opinion of occurring in Section 208 of the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954, did not in the context in which they appeared imply a purely subjective determination of the matter. Even in the Full Bench case, the learned Judges observed: Whenever action has to be reasonable and the reason for the action to be recorded, the test is not entirely subjective unless the law says that it should be so: See Nakkuda Ali v. M. P(sic). De S. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66. Here, as we have shown, there is, in the words of the statute, some indication of a subjective approach. In the Division Bench case also, it was accepted that the significance of the words 'in the opinion of depended upon the context. Kapur J., referring to the decided cases bearing on the matter, pointed out in Radheshyam v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1959 SC 107 : The decision in these cases laying down the rule of application of natural justice must be confined to their own facts and the language of the particular statute they interpreted. No general rule can be deduced therefrom nor can they be applied to other statutes and other circumstances. (Page 130.) Relying upon the Full Bench case of Kareli Municipality (1), it is argued that since the reasons for the order had to be stated, it should be held that there was a duty to act judicially. This is what Kapur J. observed in Radheshyam's case (4): But it was contended that in its order the State Government has to state reasons for taking action under Section 53-A. In a democratic system of Government there is always the other party, the electors and citizens, who must know why the State Government takes one particular action rather than another. Besides the mere requirement of giving reasons would not change what was on administrative body into a judicial body or an administrative decision into a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. Even the provision for a reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation is not always a conclusive test of subjective approach. Kania C. J. observed in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani 1950 SCR 621 at p. 653 : AIR 1950 SC 222 : Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a prelimi-nary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. Kania C. J. observed in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani 1950 SCR 621 at p. 653 : AIR 1950 SC 222 : Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a prelimi-nary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character. In the instant case, the State Government had to form an opinion whether the abuse of his position by the Petitioner rendered his continuance in the Committee detrimental to the public interest. No doubt this opinion was to be based on certain objective facts determined after giving to the Petitioner a reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation, as a step preliminary to the forming of such an opinion. But it is doubtful if, only on this account, the opinion formed and the executive action taken in pursuance thereof cease to be matters of administrative character and therefore be subject to judicial review because the charges were either inadequately brought home or unreasonably accepted. Lord Greene M. R. observed in B. Johnson and Company (Builders) Ltd. v. Minister of Health 1947 1952 NLJ 682 : AIR 1953 Nag 125 : ILR 1953 Nag 245 : AllER 395 at p. 404: As I said, at the beginning of this judgment, if the Legislature chooses to mix, for the purpose of one essentially administrative process, a quasi-judicial element so as to make a sort of hybrid operation of it, one cannot expect lines of division to produce an entirely logical result. The quasi-judicial element must not be permitted to cause irruptions into a purely administrative sphere. Fortunately, we are relieved of the obligation to pronounce a concluded opinion on this aspect of the matter because the order of removal has been challenged before us only on the ground that the rules of natural justice were violated. It was also argued that even administrative orders were subject to judicial review. Fortunately, we are relieved of the obligation to pronounce a concluded opinion on this aspect of the matter because the order of removal has been challenged before us only on the ground that the rules of natural justice were violated. It was also argued that even administrative orders were subject to judicial review. In support of that contention, our attention was drawn to the following observations of Sinha C. J. and Mudholker J. in Bhikulal v. The State 1952 NLJ 682 : AIR 1953 Nag 125=ILR 1953 Nag 245: Then it is said the order is administrative and has been given finality by Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Municipalities Act and we cannot interfere with it. In our opinion, the mere fact that an order is administrative or that it is given finality by the provisions of the Municipalities Act cannot stand in the way of the Petitioner because the powers conferred on this Court by Article 226 are wide enough to enable interference in proper cases. In our opinion, this is no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Radheshyam's case AIR 1959 S C 107 where their Lordships referred to Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171, Rex v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly (1928) 1 KB 411 and Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66 and clearly laid down that administrative orders and actions were not amenable to writ of certiorari. Having regard to the facts of this case, we are of the view that the contention that there was an infraction of the rules of natural justice in determining the objective facts is not well-founded. The Respondents stated in paragraph 5 of their return as follows: It is admitted that it was not considered necessary to hold an oral enquiry or give any opportunity of personal hearing for the documents which he had produced in support of his contention were duly examined to find out the title, privilege or authority claimed to have been conferred upon him under those documents. During the original enquiry against each charge, the relevant documents referred to by the applicant were also examined and it was considered sufficient to arrive at a finding that the oral evidence cannot nullify the charges as the same were based on the documentary evidence referred to by the Applicant. During the original enquiry against each charge, the relevant documents referred to by the applicant were also examined and it was considered sufficient to arrive at a finding that the oral evidence cannot nullify the charges as the same were based on the documentary evidence referred to by the Applicant. In the course of the original enquiry, the applicant was given full opportunity to adduce his evidence both oral and documentary and also to cross-examine the witnesses which he did. The documents referred to by him in reply to the charges were the same as were cited by him in the original enquiry. No additional or new evidence was referred to by the applicant in his replies to the approved charges. The applicant had thus sufficient knowledge of the enquiry proceedings against him. The facts disclosed above, which were not controverted, show not only that he had a full opportunity of cross-examining witnesses produced in support of the complaints but also that he had a like opportunity of adducing evidence both oral and documentary. Also, when subsequently he was called upon to furnish an explanation, he referred to the same evidence. In the circumstances, it is idle for him to contend that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice only because, upon the formulation of charges against him, he was not afforded a fresh opportunity to meet those charges. Rules of natural justice vary with the varying provisions of statutes and the rules made thereunder: Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hill Division AIR 1959 SC 398. Where there is no provision in an Act or the rules made thereunder governing the procedure to be followed in the matter, a substantial compliance with the principles of natural justice should be regarded as sufficient. In our opinion, in a case like the one before us, it was enough if the Petitioner was given an opportunity to controvert the material sought to be used against him and then he was called upon to explain why action should not be taken against him on that material. We are of the view that the grievance that there was in this case a violation of the principles of natural justice is without substance. In the view that we have taken of this case, the petition fails and is dismissed. We are of the view that the grievance that there was in this case a violation of the principles of natural justice is without substance. In the view that we have taken of this case, the petition fails and is dismissed. The Petitioner shall bear his own costs and pay out of the security amount the costs of the Respondents. Hearing fee Rs. 100. The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the Petitioner. Petition dismissed