Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. The plaintiff-opposite party filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Chapra against the petitioner as also against Opposite Party No. 2. The latter, it seems never appeared in the suit or at any other stage and, therefore, in this judgment hereinafter the petitioner would be referred to as the defendant. According to the allegations in the twelfth paragraph of the plaint, the cause of action for the suit arose at Mohalla Salempur, Pergana Manjhi, P. S. Chapra Town, P. O. Chapra, District Saran where the agreement was entered into and the agreement deed was executed within the jurisdiction of the Chapra Court. This fact was denied by the defendant in his written statement and it was further pleaded that the Chapra Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the defendant was a resident of Supaul in the district of Saharsa as also because no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Chapra Court. According to the defendants case in his written statement, the agreement had been entered into and executed at Supaul. During the pendency of the case in the Chapra Court, the parties filed a joint petition to refer the suit to arbitration. The Court accepted the prayer for reference and accordingly the dispute between the parties in the suit was referred to arbitration. The defendant acquiesced in the order of reference and appeared and put his case before the arbitrators. Ultimately, they gave an award and filed it in Court. The petitioner raised various objections to the award. One of the objections which was pressed for a preliminary decision of the Court was that the Chapra Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and, therefore, the reference to arbitration by that Court was void and the award given on such a reference was a nullity. This issue has been decided against the petitioner by the learned Subordinate Judge as a preliminary point in the case and the defendant has come up to this Court in revision against that order. 2. In my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge has taken a correct view of the law in this regard. It is clear, on reference to the pleadings of the parties in the suit that there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Chapra Court. 2. In my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge has taken a correct view of the law in this regard. It is clear, on reference to the pleadings of the parties in the suit that there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Chapra Court. Its jurisdiction was challenged by pleading a question of fact by the defendant, namely, that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Chapra Court as the agreement had been executed at Supaul and nothing was to take place under the agreement within the jurisdiction of the Chapra Court. This point of jurisdiction depending upon the determination of this contentious question of fact between the parties, it is manifest, was given a go by by the defendant by joining in the petition to the Court asking it to make a reference to arbitration and further by taking part in the proceedings before the arbitrators. Thereafter, it is not open to the defendant to turn round and say that the Court has no jurisdiction or that the question of jurisdiction must be determined first by the Court on investigation of the disputed question of fact as to where the agreement was entered into and was executed. 3. Mr. B. C. Ghosh appearing in support of this application placed reliance upon the case of Chidambaram Chettiar V/s. Suhramanian Chettiar, AIR 1953 Mad 492 . The decision was affirmed in Nachiappa Chettiar V/s. Subramaniam Chettiar. AIR 1960 SC 307 . On reference to the facts of that case, it would be noticed that there a suit had been filed in regard to immovable properties which were situate both in British India and outside it. In that view of the matter, there was inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Court to proceed with such a suit. No amount of acquiescence or agreement between the parties could confer jurisdiction on a Court to entertain either the suit or to pass an order of reference. As a result of that, the award which was said to have dealt with both kinds of properties was a nullity and in that situation it was pointed out that in regard to the question of jurisdiction it made no difference if the award had been obtained without the intervention of the Court or through its intervention. On the particular facts of the case the decision was, however, otherwise. 4. On the particular facts of the case the decision was, however, otherwise. 4. Mr. Ghosh then placed reliance upon the case of Meenakshi Naidoo V/s. Subramaniya Sastri, 14 Ind App 160. In appreciating that case it is important to bear in mind the distinction between inherent incompetency of a Court to deal with a question before it and the lack of jurisdiction in a Court depending upon the determination of a certain contentious question of fact. An earlier decision of the Board was referred to wherein it was said: "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbitrator, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him," The next sentence at p. 167 of the volume points out the distinction like this: "But there are numerous authorities which establish that when in a cause which the Judge is competent to try the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the ground that there were irregularities in the initial procedure which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit". Next reliance was placed upon the case of M. Venkatasamiappa V/s. Srinidhi Ltd., (1950) 1 Mad LJ 709. In that case, a Bench of the Madras High Court has given a limited meaning to the word "Court". There, the award was obtained without the intervention of the Court and when the award was filed in the Madras Court, where the defendant resided, the objection taken was that the Madras Court had no jurisdiction to deal with that matter as the entire cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bangalore Court. There, the award was obtained without the intervention of the Court and when the award was filed in the Madras Court, where the defendant resided, the objection taken was that the Madras Court had no jurisdiction to deal with that matter as the entire cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bangalore Court. The High Court upheld this objection on the ground that reading the definition of the word "Court" in Sec.2 (c) of the Arbitration Act along with Sec.31 (1) of the Act, it would be clear that all Courts which would have jurisdiction to deal with suits under the C. P. C., cannot have jurisdiction to deal with the award as the statute, namely, the Arbitration Act, does not provide that a Court which can entertain a suit against a defendant on the ground of his residence can also entertain the matters relating to the awards on that ground. In the instant case the award was obtained through the intervention of the Court and that, in my opinion, makes the difference. It a suit has been filed in a Court within the jurisdiction of which the defendant resides, then that Court and that Court alone will have jurisdiction to deal with the arbitration matters and the award obtained through the intervention of the Court. That is perfectly clear to me on reading sec. 25 of the Act which makes the provisions of the other Chapters of the Act applicable to arbitration through the intervention of the Court as far as practicable and it further finds support from the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Sec.31 of the Act. 5 In my opinion, the present case is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Chapra Court and, therefore, is covered by the principles of law decided in Chowdhri Murtaza Hossein V/s. Mt. Bibi Bechunnissa, 3 Ind App 209 (PC); Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Barh V/s. Dasrath Pandey, AIR 1940 Pat 406 and National Coal Co. Ltd. V/s. L. P. Dave, AIR 1956 Pat 294 . I accordingly hold that the point has been rightly answered against the defendant by the learned Subordinate Judge. There is no merit in this application in revision which accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 32/.