JUDGMENT T.P. Naik, J. 1. This is an appeal by the Defendant No. 2 Appellant Hazarilal against whom a decree for damages in tort has been passed by the Additional District Judge, Sagar in the sum of Rs. 10,100 with proportionate costs. The decree is joint and several against the two de- fendants, Hazarilal (Defendant No. 2 Appellant) and Lachhman Singh (Defendant No.1, Respondent No. 2). 2. The learned Additional District Judge has found: (1) That in pursuance of a plot hatched by the Defendants, Lachhman Singh and Hazarilal inter s(sic), the Appellant Hazarilal engaged the Plaintiff in conversation on 18th April 1954 at about 7 p. m. near the Petrol Supply Depot, Sagar when the Defendant No. 1 Respondent Lachhman Singh threw acid on the face of the Plaintiff; (2) That as a result of the aforesaid acid throwing the Plaintiff lost both his eyes and became completely blind; (3) that the Plaintiff was entitled to Rs. 10,100 as damages, consisting of the following items, against both the Defendants jointly and severally; Rs. 3.000 for physical and mental suffering, Rs. 500 for medical expenses, and Rs. 6600 for future loss of earnings. 3. The Defendant No. 1 Lachhmansingh has not come up in appeal against the judgment and decree passed against him. The appeal is on behalf of Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal only. 4. It is not disputed that Defendant No. 1 Lachhmansingh on the evening of 18th April 1954 at about 7 p. m. maliciously threw acid at the Plaintiff which completely injured both his eyes, making him blind totally. The only question that has been pressed in this appeal is that there was no evidence from which the complicity of the Appellant Defendant No. 2 in the act of Defendant No. 1 Respondent No. 2 could reasonably be inferred. 5. The only question that has been pressed in this appeal is that there was no evidence from which the complicity of the Appellant Defendant No. 2 in the act of Defendant No. 1 Respondent No. 2 could reasonably be inferred. 5. The trial Court has inferred a conspiracy between the Defendant Lachhmansingh and Hazarilal for the purpose of maliciously throwing acid on the face of the Plaintiff in order to cause personal injury to him, on the following facts and circumstances: (a) that the Defendant No. 1 Lachhmansing suspected that there was criminal intimacy between the Plaintiff and his (Defendant No. 1's) wife and consequently he bore a grudge against him; (b) that the Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal effected close friendship with the Defendant No. 1 Lachhmansingh for a few days before the incident; (c) that the Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal had been cultivating friendship with the Plaintiff with a view to win his confidence; (d) that on the day of the incident, i.e. , on 18th April, 1954, at about 7 p. m. the Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal decoyed the Plaintiff to a comparatively lonely spot near the petrol Supply Depot on a false pretext that he had some urgent business with him, when in fact he had none, presumably in order to facilitate the commission of the crime; (e) that there he engaged the Plaintiff in conversation and pursuaded him to stay on till Lachhmansingh could accomplish his nefarious purpose and at the crucial moment when acid was thrown at him by Lachhmansingh he had pulled away his cycle, to facilitate the acid throwing at the Plaintiff; (f) that earlier while he (Hazarilal) had gone to the house of the Plaintiff, he had avoided going to him in the house and having a talk with him there; (g) that in the respective positions in which they stood the Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal could and did see the Defendant No. 1 Lachhmansingh coming and rushing towards the Plaintiff but he did not care to warn the Plaintiff of his (Defendant No. 1's) approach; (h) that immediately after the acid had been thrown at the face of the Plaintiff, the Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal also ran away from the spot, practically simultaneously with the Defendant No. 1 Lachhmansingh; (i) that the Defendant No. 2 Hazarilal, instead of pursuing and apprehending the culprit, especially as he had a bicycle with him or instead of reporting the incident to the nearest police station naming the assailant therein, first made good his escape from the place of the incident and then later in an attempt to show his bona fides made a report of the incident at about 8.15 p. m. at the Cantonment police station where he not only did not name the Defendant No. 1 as the assailant but deliberately gave a false and misleading description of the alleged assailant to put the police off the scent in order to shield the Defendant No. 1 ,i.e. he described him fair when Defendant No. 1 was dark and he called him a young man of 22 when the Defendant No. 1 was a grown up adult of about 30; (j) that the Defendant No. 2 did not go to the Doctor for the examination of certain injuries on him alleged to have been Caused to him at the relevant time probably by Defendant No. 1's acid throwing at the Plaintiff, even when asked to do so; (k) that in his evidence in the suit, he supported the defence of mistaken identity when in fact there could be no such mistake and the Plaintiff had been consistently naming him (Defendant No. 1) as his assailant from the very beginning: (1) that the Defendant No. 2 in order to support the aforesaid defence even attempted to shift the venue of the incident from the petrol supply depot where a bright light was burning, to a spot very close to the Plaintiff's house which was comparatively darker. 6. All the aforesaid facts and circumstances have been found to be fully proved mainly on the evidence of the Plaintiff and his witnesses whose evidence commended itself to the trial Court. Their evidence has been very lucidly discussed by it in paras 7 to 29. The learned Judge has further recorded that he was greatly impressed by the evidence of the Plaintiff (P. W. 1) who also stood the test of a minute cross-examination very well. On the other hand, according to him, the evidence of the Defendants and their witnesses was false, perjured and stood self condemned. Consequently the learned trial Judge held that he had no hesitation in disbelieving the witnesses for both the Defendants. This evidence has been discussed by the trial Court in paras 30 to 48 and we agree with his appreciation of this evidence. 7. if the evidence of the Plaintiff and his witnesses is believed, there is no doubt that all the circumstances detailed by us in para No. 5 above are amply proved and on those facts and circumstances we have no hesitation in holding that the complicity of the Defendant Appellant Hazarilal in the malicious act of the Defendant No. 1 is fully established. 8. When there is an irreconcilable difference between the evidence of the parties and the trial Court has accepted the evidence of the Plaintiff and rejected the Defendants in so far as it was in conflict with the evidence of the Plaintiff, the principle which should govern the appellate Court in reviewing the evidence is stated by the Privy Council in Arthur Wijetilaka v. Don Edmund Ranasinghe, AIR 1931 PC 265 & 266, thus: In such circumstances a Court of review should be slow to differ from the opinion of the trial Judge as to credibility, in respect that he has seen and heard the witnesses, and should not differ without convincing reasons . Again in Bhojraj v. Suaram and others. 1936 PC 60 at 61-62. Lord Roche stated the principle thus: Their Lordships do not doubt that it is open to an appellate Court to differ from the Court which heard the evidence where it is manifest that the evidence accepted by such Court of first instance is contradictory or is so improbable as to be unbelievable of is for other sufficient reasons unworthy of acceptance. But in the opinion of their Lordships no grounds exist here justifying a conclusion as to credibility opposed to that of the Judge who had the very great advantage of both seeing and hearing the witnesses. The evidence was not contradictory or in any substantial degree shaken in cross-examination nor was it in the opinion of their Lordships inherently improbable or unworthy to be accepted. The aforesaid principle was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sarju Pershead Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and others, AIR 1951 SC 120 at 121, in the following words: The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interefere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact vide Lord Alkine observations in W. C. Macdonald v. Fred Latimer, AIR 1929 PC 15 at p. 18. 9. In the instant case the evidence was read over to us and having perused the discussion of the evidence by the trial Court and its criticism by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, we do not think that any adequate reason exists for disturbing his conclusion or for justifying a conclusion as to credibility opposed to that of the trial Judge who had the advantage of both seeing and hearing the witnesses. 10. It is then contended that the assessment of damages was improper. 11. 10. It is then contended that the assessment of damages was improper. 11. Cockbrun C.J. in Phillips v. The Souther Western Railway Company (1879) 4 QBD 406, referring to heads of damages to be taken into account by jury in such cases said: These are the bodily injury sustained; the pain undergone; the effect on the health of the sufferer, according to its degree and its probable duration as likely to be temporary or permanent; the expenses incidental to attempts to effect a cure, or to lessen the amount of injury; the pecuniary loss sustained through inability to attend to a profession or business as to which again, the injury may be of a temporary character, or may be such as to incapacitate the party for the remainder of his life. The principle on which damages are awarded in tort is to compensate the person wronged, so far as money can compensate for the wrongful act of the Defendant and for all its direct and natural consequences. If the tort is in relation to property, assessment of damage is comparatively easy because the damages then are measured by the actual pecuniary loss suffered but when injury is to a person or his reputation, damages are difficult to assess because it is not possible to assess in money value the pain and suffering of a person or the effect of damages to reputation. 12. Damages, however, must not be too remote. All consequences which are intended, which are reasonable and probable and which are the direct result of the unlawful act will not be too remote. It has also been held that where the tort is accompanied by malicious intent, such malice may be taken into consideration in assessing damages. 13. In the instant case, the wrongful act of the Defendants was accompanied with a malicious intent so that higher damages would be quite in order. The first head of damages was for mental and physical suffering. For mental suffering alone unaccompanied by physical injury, no damages can be claimed. See Lynch Vs. Knight, (1861) 9 HL (sic) P. 598, but where damages are due for physical injury, the sum awarded may include something by way of compensation for mental suffering also See Rochdale Canal Company v. Ridcliffe, (1852) 18 QB. 111, The award of Rs. 3,000 for physical and mental suffering thus needs no interference. See Lynch Vs. Knight, (1861) 9 HL (sic) P. 598, but where damages are due for physical injury, the sum awarded may include something by way of compensation for mental suffering also See Rochdale Canal Company v. Ridcliffe, (1852) 18 QB. 111, The award of Rs. 3,000 for physical and mental suffering thus needs no interference. As pointed out by trial Court, an award of damages of Rs. 15,000, where the Plaintiff had lost both the eyes was upheld by the Lahore High Court in Gurdit Singh and Ors. v. Fakir Chand, AIR 1933 Lah 761, and in Rustom v. National Coal Board, (1933) 1 QB 495, 7,000 were awarded to a man of 36 for loss of his right arm, because loss of some amenities of life, the fact that the injured person will require help during his life, the loss of expectations of life and the loss of earning which are likely to occur in the future, have all to be taken into account in assessing damages. By the very nature of things the assessments of damages under the head of mental suffering has to be on an adhoc basis and is consequently at large but in our opinion the sum of Rs. 3,000 cannot be said to be unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. No exception can be taken to the other items also. The sum of Rs. 500 for expenses in procuring medical aid cannot be said to be excessive in view of the evidence on record and as regards Rs. 6,600, the basis taken by the trial Court is loss of future earnings by the Plaintiff for the period till he reached the age of 55 years (i.e, for about 33 years) as the rate of about Rs. 200 per annum, and to say the least, the assessment is very modest. By the loss of both the eyes, the Plaintiff would be a liability to his father rather than an asset and it would be hazardous to say what his earning capacity would be. In any case it cannot be denied that his earning capacity must have been considerably impaired if not destroyed. In the Lahore case it was held that the entire earning capacity was lost by the loss of the eyes. 14. In any case it cannot be denied that his earning capacity must have been considerably impaired if not destroyed. In the Lahore case it was held that the entire earning capacity was lost by the loss of the eyes. 14. In the result we hold that the assessment of damages was quite proper and did not require any interference in appeal. 15. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed