JUDGMENT MIABHOY, J. : (After stating the facts, the prosecution version and the defence version and after discussing the evidence, His Lordship continues as under :-) 12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, our findings as to under what circumstances the dcceased (Kalu) received his injuries are as follows. When deceased came on the bicycle and saw the appellant, he abandoned the bicycle, rushed at the appellant, giving abuses and threats, caught hold of his 'Kafni' by the neck, which became torn, and, then, there was a grappling between the two, in the course of which Kalu whipped out a knife from his hip pocket. Then there was a struggle between Kalu and appellant, in the course of which appellant received an injury on his finger and on his knee and Kalu received an injury near the umbilicus. Then, appellant succeeded in depriving Kalu of the knife and caused one of the other three injuries on Kalu as a result of which Kalu staggered, dashed against the 'Thada' of Ramubhai and fell on the ground. There is no doubt that up to this stage the appellant had the right of private defence and the injury caused by him on Kalu was justified by the law of private defence. But, at the same time, it is also crystal clear that after Kalu fell down after receiving one of the other three injuries, the appellant went near the head and, bending over, gave the other two injuries, one of which was fatal and the other a serious one. The question for consideration in the present case is whether these other two injuries inflicted by the appellant were justified by the law of private defence or whether, in inflicting those injuries, as held by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, he had exceeded the right of private defence. It is true that, when applying the law of private defence, we must make all reasonable allowances in favour of the accused and not apply the law in such a manner that persons fighting for the heirs (Sic) (?) would become cowards. It is also true that, in deciding cases of this type, the mental condition of the assailant must be taken into account and not the views which are formed by the by-standers or in the cool atmosphere of the Court room. It is also true that, in deciding cases of this type, the mental condition of the assailant must be taken into account and not the views which are formed by the by-standers or in the cool atmosphere of the Court room. It is also true that the action of the accused must not be weighed in golden scales nor should we assess the actions of the accused step by step in the course of the struggle. We must bear in mind the fact that Kalu was an externee, reputed to be a 'goonda', and a very well built man. We must also bear in mind that he was armed with a dangerous weapon, that he had whipped it out, that he had not only threatened to make use of the same, but actually had made use of it. But, in applying all these principles and facts, the central point which must be borne in mind is, that the right of private defence continues only so long as a reasonable apprehension of the danger persists. Whenever a number of injuries come to be inflicted by an accused person in the exercise of the right of private defence, the important point which has got to be determined is as to whether in the circumstances in which the accused was placed, the apprehension had persisted in his mind when he inflicted a particular injury or injuries that his life was in danger and whether, under the circumstances in which he was placed, that apprehension was a reasonable one. In this connection. Mr. Shah relied upon a passage in Raju's Indian Penal Code at page 367. The passage is as follows: "In considering whether one is entitled to exercise right of private defence of his body, one has to place himself in the position of the accused in the midst of the circumstances in which he stood and to form his opinion whether, for him or her in those circumstances, it was not fairly wise to apprehend such an injury to the body as would entitle him or her to exercise the right that he or she claims to have done. Where, a defendant charged with murder asserts that he killed in self-defence, his state of mind at the time of the killing becomes material and an important element in determining his justification of his belief in an impending attack by the deceased. Where, a defendant charged with murder asserts that he killed in self-defence, his state of mind at the time of the killing becomes material and an important element in determining his justification of his belief in an impending attack by the deceased. The reputation of the deceased for a violent, dangerous, or turbulent disposition is thus a circumstance which would cause such a belief." We are in agreement with these observations. But, the question for consideration is, whether, bearing in mind the aforesaid tests and facts, when the appellant inflicted the further two knife blows, a reasonable apprehension was still in his mind that his life was in danger. The contention of Mr. Shah is that there was no time for reflection whatsoever, that the injuries were given on the spur of the moment, and that these injuries must be taken to have been inflicted under the impulse of self-preservation. He contended that there was no time for any other feelings to intervene. It is true that one of the tests which may be safely and usefully applied in circumstances of the present kind would be to discover whether the accused was still acting under the instinct of self-preservation or whether other feelings such as those of anger malice and reprisals had intervened. In the former case, the accused would be entitled to right of private defence, but not in the latter cases. The learned Government Pleader contended that, in view of the fact that one of the other three injuries inflicted on Kalu was a dangerous one, the appellant should have known that no further action was necessary and there was no likelihood of the deceased snatching back the knife from him. This may not be always a true or proper test. Though, on the evidence, we may be able to say that the injury was a fatal one, it is likely that, under a given set of circumstances, the accused may not know that the injury was a fatal one, The real point which has got to be ascertained is as to what was the state of the knowledge of the accused and what a reasonable man acting under the circumstances without any malice would reasonably come to know when he was righting to save his life. Now, in our judgment, on the facts of the present case, there is no doubt that, after Kalu received one of the other three injuries, he staggered and fell down on the ground. At that stage, there is no doubt that there was no interlocking between the appellant and Kalu, and the two were separated from each other. The knife was no longer in the hands of Kalu and it had come into the hands of the appellant. Kalu lay flat on the ground. Even if we proceed on the assumption that one of these three injuries was the thigh injury only, it is hardly probable that any movement could have been made by Kalu thereafter which would suggest that he was making an attempt to get up and to carry on the battle further. After the separatiton, the appellant went near Kalu, stood near his head, and caused the other injuries in a bending position whilst Kalu was lying flat on the ground. In our judgment, having regard to these facts, we are unable to hold that the appellant was acting under the instinct of self-preservation. In our judgment, the appellant was acting out of malice and anger and feeling of retribution and, therefore, the learned Judge was right in holding that the appellant had exceeded the right of private defence. Consequently, his conviction under Sec. 304, Part I, Indian Penal Code, was justified. 13. As regards the sentence, the learned Government Pleader states that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he had no objection if the sentence is suitably reduced. In awarding the sentence in a case of this type, we must bear in mind that the appellant was involved just a moment before he inflicted the impugned injuries in a mortal conflict with a dangerous character. We must also bear in mind that the appellant must have been in considerable excitement and the fact we are dealing with a citizen who, though he had right of private defence, had exceeded the same and not with a person who was out to commit a crime in the first instance. We must also take into account the tact that the appellant was an under-trial prisoner for a period of nearly one year before he was convicted. We must also take into account the tact that the appellant was an under-trial prisoner for a period of nearly one year before he was convicted. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, a sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment will meet the ends of justice. Therefore, we confirm the conviction of the appellant for the offence under section 304 Part I, Indian Penal Code, but reduce the sentence from four years' rigorous imprisonment to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Subject to this, the appeal is dismissed. Order accordingly.