JUDGMENT V.R. Newaskar, J. This is a tenant's appeal and is directed against the order refusing to record a compromise particularly in respect of the relief of ejectment. The circumstances which led to the present appeal are as follows: On 3-8-1957 Plaintiff Sardar Virendrasing Buley, who had filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profits, obtained a decree for the aforesaid reliefs together with the reliefs of future interest and costs. The arrears which were awarded under the decree were for a sum of Rs. 343-4-6. Mesne profits were awarded at the rate of Rs. 10 p. m. from 1-2-1952 upto the date of ejectment. The coats awarded under the decree were to the extent of Rs. 62-10-0. The Defendant preferred appeal against that decree on 6-9-1957, While the appeal was still pending the Plaintiff sold the house in question to one Babubhai by means of a registered deed of sale. It was provided under the terms of the sale deed that Sardar Virendrasingh would be entitled to arrears of rent awarded under the decree as also to mesne profits upto the date of sale i.e. 10-2-1958. A couple of months subsequent to the sale an application was submitted by Babubhai in the pending appeal for substitution of his name in place of Sardar Virendrasingh as the Respondent. Notice of this application was issued to the Plaintiff as well as to the Defendant Sardar Virendrasingh submitted a reply on 20-4-58 admitting the fact of sale and not opposing Babubhai's application for the substitution of his name. On 19-1-1959 an adjustment was arrived at between Sardar Virendrasingh and the Defendant the terms of which are the subject-matter of controversy between the parties and falls to be considered in this appeal. On 20-2-1959 an application was submitted by the Defendant before the appellate Court purporting to be one under Order 21, Rule 2, Order 23, Rule 3 and Section 15, Code of Civil Procedure praying for recording of the adjustment or compromise arrived at between the parties on 19-1-1959 and for passing a decree in terms of the compromise. On the same date a reply was submitted to the application of Babubhai for his being substituted in place of the Plaintiff denying the knowledge on the part of the Defendant as regards the sale of the house by Sardar Virendrasing to Babubhai. On the same date a reply was submitted to the application of Babubhai for his being substituted in place of the Plaintiff denying the knowledge on the part of the Defendant as regards the sale of the house by Sardar Virendrasing to Babubhai. The reply seems to have been typed on 21-2-1959. The application for recording the compromise in accordance with the terms suggested on behalf of the Defendant was not accepted by the appellate Court. It found that the adjustment only intended to effect a compromise, as regards the rights, which Sardar Virendrasingh had for arrears of rent and mesne profits, and had no bearing on the question of ejectment or mesne profits subsequent to the date of sale namely 10-2-1958. The application was accordingly rejected. The present appeal is directed against that order. The contentions are raised on behalf of the Appellant. (1) On a fair construction of the terms of the compromise-agreement dated 19-1-1959 it should have been held that the suit with reference to the relief of ejectment as well compromised in appeal and that it had been agreed that the appeal should be allowed and Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. (2) Even assuming that the compromise provided for adjustment of the claim of Sardar Virendrasingh for arrears of rent and mesne profits upto 10-2-1958, there should have been an order for recording compromise at least to that extent and the application for recording the compromise should not have been wholly dismissed. As regards the second contention it was conceded before me by the Learned Counsel for Sardar Virendrasingh as well as for Babubhai that they would have no objection for direction to record the compromise in respect of the relief arrears of rent and mesne profits upto 10-2-1958 and to entire satisfaction of the decree of the trial Court to that extent. Both the Learned Counsel however do not accept the contention of the Appellant that Sardar Virendrasingh did in fact compromise the claim even in respect of the relief of ejectment or that he could do so on 19-1-1959 when he had already parted with his title to and consequently right of possession in respect of the house in question, only a portion of which is in the occupation of the Appellant. They challenge the correctness of the interpretation which is sought to be placed upon the terms of the compromise-agreement relied upon by the Appellant. In order to appreciate the contentions raised before me as regards the interpretation of the compromise-agreement it will be useful to bear in mind the principle as approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal AIR 1951 SC 139 and Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat(sic) Ali AIR 1954 SC 345 . In the latter case their Lordships observed: The first is that the intention of the parties is the determining factor: see' Balkishen Das v. Legge' 22 Indian Appls. 58 (PC) A 115. But there is nothing special about that in this class of cases and here, as in every other case, where a document has to be construed, the intention must be gathered, in the first place, from the document itself, if the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however, there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended. Now on a fair reading of the compromise agreement dated 19-1-1959 and the circumstances in which the same was reached there is not the slightest doubt about the fact that Sardar Virendrasingh did not in fact agree to deal with the relief of ejectment under the agreement and did not agree that the appeal should be allowed and the suit so far as it refers to the relief of ejectment should be dismissed. There are in the first place no words in the compromise-agreement that the appeal should be allowed as regards the decree for ejectment and the suit in so far as that relief is concerned should be dismissed. On behalf of the Appellant reliance is sought to be placed upon certain expressions in the compromise-agreement namely (1) These expressions could not be construed apart from the context and the circumstances in which the document was executed and the payment of Rs. 800 was made. On behalf of the Appellant reliance is sought to be placed upon certain expressions in the compromise-agreement namely (1) These expressions could not be construed apart from the context and the circumstances in which the document was executed and the payment of Rs. 800 was made. It is undeniable that about a year before the date of the agreement Sardar Virendrasingh had sold the house in question including the portion in the occupation of the Appellant to Babubhai under a registered deed of sale dated 10-2-1958 and Babubhai had later submitted an application for substitution of his name in place of that of Sardar Virendrasingh as the Respondent. This application of Babubhai was not opposed by Virendrasingh who admitted to have sold away the house. The Appellant had knowledge of this sale as he had received notice of the Appellant's application for substitution of his name. It also appears from the Appellant's reply to that application, which was drafted on 21-7-1958 but filed on 20-2-1959, that long before the date of the alleged compromise he had notice of the execution of sale deed by Virendrasingh in favour of Babubhai. The objections which are raised on behalf of the Appellant to this sale are that the sale deed is not duly executed and attested. The original sale deed appears to have been produced. At any rate the certified copy was on record. The terms of the sale deed clearly indicate that Sardar Virendrasingh had agreed that in the pending litigation Babubhai could get his name substituted in his place and have the house vacated and that Sardar Virendrasingh would be entitled to recover from the Appellant arrears and mesne profits upto the date of the sale deed. It is well established that the law does not require any attestation for legal validity of a sale deed and the executant having admitted the execution, his erstwhile tenant is not entitled to contest its execution. No particular formalities arc needed for the execution of the sale deed. The objection regarding want of due execution and attestation of the sale deed was on the face of it untenable. No particular formalities arc needed for the execution of the sale deed. The objection regarding want of due execution and attestation of the sale deed was on the face of it untenable. The factual position, therefore, on the date of the compromise was that Sardar Virendrasingh had sold away the house of which premises in Defendant's occupation only formed a small part and had also parted with his right under the decree to seek ejectment in favour of Babubhai and the only right which in law as well as by the terms of the sale deed, left with him was for the arrears and mesne profits upto 10-2-1958. These facts had been fully known to the Defendant. Moreover the claim of Sardar Virendrasingh for arrears of rent and mesne profits upto 10-2-58 amounted to Rs. 1063-4-6 consisting of Rs. 343-4-6 as arrears of rent and Rs. 720-0-0 for mesne profits from the date of the suit i. e. 1-2-1952 upto 10-2-1958 at Rs. 10 p. m. Plaintiff Sardar Virendrasingh was further entitled to costs of Rs. 62-10 0 under the decree. The com-promise was for Rs. 800. If then the terms of compromise-agreement are read in this context it will be clear beyond doubt that Sardar Virendrasingh only effected compromise in respect of that portion of the claim to which he was entitled, namely arrears of rent and mesne profits upto 10-2-1958 and did not seek to give up the right secured under the decree for the ejectment of the Defendant. Although the words were used in the agreement. They were clarified by what followed namely, The words have to be read ejusdem generis and could not be taken to include a relief of kind different from the claim for money consisting of arrears of rent, mesne profits, interest and costs. The expression could only mean what had been clarified in the expression immediately preceding. The concluding words also has a reference to claim for money and nothing else. It is not without significance that the document speaks not a word about ejectment nor about what is to happen to the pending appeal and the suit out of which it arose. Mr. The concluding words also has a reference to claim for money and nothing else. It is not without significance that the document speaks not a word about ejectment nor about what is to happen to the pending appeal and the suit out of which it arose. Mr. Nrayanlal Shingal for the Appellant sought to rely upon the principles of interpretation of instruments or documents and contended that in accordance with them no term in a document can be taken to be a mere surplusage and that meaning ought to be attached to every word that is used. The learned counsel specifically referred to the word and and contended that these expressions leave no room for doubt that the whole of the claim including the claim for ejectment was intended to be settled and had been settled. As I have discussed above these expressions are quite consistent with the interpretation that only the money, part of the claim to which Sardar Virendrasingh was entitled as a result of the transaction of sale in favour of Babubhai, was intended to be settled and had been settled. It is well established that in interpreting documents the same are to be read as a whole and in light of the surrounding circumstances. Mr. Shingal's contention also is that as long as the name of Babubhai was not brought on record it was competent for Sardar Virendrasingh to enter into compromise with the Defendant and that the Defendant was legally competent to settle the entire claim including that of ejectment under an agreement with the Plaintiff on record. The Learned Counsel in this connection referred to the decisions reported in Mathurapur Company Ltd, v. Bhasaram AIR 1924 Cal 661 and Lekshmi Pillai v. Yacob Nadar AIR 1952 Trav Coch 254. These decisions have no bearing as they deal with the question regarding the right of a transferee of a decree to execute the decree and the necessity of following the procedure under Order 21, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure before permitting the transferee to execute the decree and not with the case of substitution of the name of transferee under Order 22, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure during the pendency of the suit or appeal. On the interpretation put by the lower Court upon the compromise-agreement, with which I agree, no question of right of Sardar Virendrasingh to settle the claim even in respect of ejectment arises. But it is plain that the Defendant was fully aware of the fact of Bale and the pending application of the vendee for his substitution which was later allowed. The Appellant in these circumstances cannot be reasonably taken to have settled with Sardar Virendrasingh who had parted with his rights in favour of the vendee. Reliance was also sought to be placed upon the decision in Jhuna v. Tara Chand 6 IC 168, that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the compromise entered into by the transferor with the opposite party. But the principle of that case is inapplicable as in the present case on the view taken of the terms of the compromise the transferor did not seek to affect the rights of the transferee by the compromise nor did the Appellant understand the compromise in that light. Moreover the facts of this case are different. In the present case the alleged compromise was entered into after the Appellant was made aware not only of the transfer but also of transferee's application for his being made a party lest he might be adversely affected by what takes place in the litigation. Merely by the delay in filing the reply to that application the Appellant cannot justify his alleged act of compromise so as to affect the transferee. As far as I can see the order, recognising the transferee in such cases, when passed, should prima facie be taken to operate from the date of his application for his being impleaded or substituted. But about this I will not express my final opinion as no arguments were advanced before me in detail over this aspect of the case. On the whole the view expressed by the Court below as regards the interpretation of the compromise agreement dated 19-1-1959, relied upon on behalf of the Appellant, is correct. The order refusing to record even that part of the compromise about which the parties are at one, however needs modification. On the whole the view expressed by the Court below as regards the interpretation of the compromise agreement dated 19-1-1959, relied upon on behalf of the Appellant, is correct. The order refusing to record even that part of the compromise about which the parties are at one, however needs modification. Appeal is therefore partially allowed and it is ordered that the compromise between Respondent Sardar Virendrasingh and the Defendant-Appellant, in so far as it deals with the claim for money including arrears of rent, mesne profits upto 10-2-1958 and costs and interest, be recorded and that claim should be taken as satisfied. In other respects and particularly with respect to the liability of the Appellant to ejectment the appeal is dismissed. As the Respondents have substantially succeeded they will be entitled to full costs of the present appeal from the Appellant. Appeal dismissed.