JUDGMENT B. Mukerji, J. - This is an application in revision against an order of the Courts below, in effect, holding that a suit had abated in its entirety. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision, shortly stated, were these. A suit was filed for declaration, with an alternative prayer to the effect that in the event of the Court finding the Plaintiff out of possession in respect of any of the suit properties, the Court may grant the Plaintiff a decree for possession also. There were six Defendants to the suit. The case of the Plaintiff, in very brief, was that the Defendants had surreptitiously and without any right got their names mutated in the village records and had thereby cast a cloud on the Plaintiff's title and therefore, he wanted the necessary declaration to remove that cloud on his title. 3. On 24-10-1951 Moti Singh, one of the Defendants, died. The legal representatives of Moti Singh were not brought on the record within ninety days, that is to say, up to 22-1-1952. An application, however, was made on behalf of the Plaintiff on the 1st of April 1952 for setting aside of the automatic abatement that had taken place. 1 he trial Court by its order dated the 31st of July 1952, held that there was no sufficient cause for setting aside of the abatement and therefore, it dismissed the application of the Plaintiff. The trial Court further held that because of the abatement of the suit as against Moti Singh's heirs, the entire suit had abated. 4. An appeal was preferred by the Plaintiff against the order of the trial Court abating the entire suit and refusing to proceed with the trial of the suit in respect of the other five Defendants than Moti Singh, who had died. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court in holding that the suit had abated in its entirety. Somehow, the lower appellate Court entertained the view that the only question that fell for determination before it in the appeal was whether the application of the Plaintiff for the setting aside of the abatement could be treated as Within time and further, whether the Plaintiff could get the benefit of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. Somehow, the lower appellate Court entertained the view that the only question that fell for determination before it in the appeal was whether the application of the Plaintiff for the setting aside of the abatement could be treated as Within time and further, whether the Plaintiff could get the benefit of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The question whether the suit abated as a whole or it abated as against Moti Singh alone was not pointedly considered by the lower appellate Court, although it said in passing that the suit abated as a whole. The only reason which could, possibly, be held to be the basis for the lower appellate Court's view that the suit abated in its entirety was that according to the Court below the suit having been for possession of land, which was in the joint possession of the Defendants, the abatement of the suit as against one led to the abatement of the suit as against all the Defendants. 5. Order 22, Rule 4(3), Code of Criminal Procedure says this: Where within the time limited by law no application is made under Sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased Defendant. 6. There is no rule under Order 22 or any where else in the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes for the abatement or which enjoins the abating of a suit against all the Defendants incase the suit abates against one or more than one of the Defendants under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 4 Sub-rule (3) Courts have, how-ever, held that where by abatement of a suit two contradictory decrees come into existence then such an abatement would affect the entire suit, for Courts cannot permit two contradictory decrees to be in existence in respect of the same cause of action. One of the questions, therefore, which must arise for consideration when a question ariseses as to whether the entire suit abates or not is whether there would be two conttadictory decrees in existence. 7. No authority has been shown to me on which I could say that abatement of a suit amounts to a decree. It is, no doubt, true that in the case of Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram ILR 45 Cal. 7. No authority has been shown to me on which I could say that abatement of a suit amounts to a decree. It is, no doubt, true that in the case of Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram ILR 45 Cal. 94 their Lordships of the Privy Council said that an order abating a suit was "tanta mount to a judgment" in favour of the Defendant, but, nevertheless, that observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council could not be taken to mean that the abatement of a suit as against a Defendant amounts to a decree of dismissal as against that Defendant. When their Lordships made the aforementioned observation they were considering the disirability or otherwise of making orders of abatement without notice to a party against whom such an order was to operate : it cannot be denied that an order of abatement did affect some rights of the parties, but even then it cannot be said that it affected all the rights of all the parties to a suit or that it was a formal adjudication of the rights of the parties or a conclusive determination of the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. It could not, therefore, amount to a decree within the meaning of that term in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. The position of the death of a party in an appeal may be different, for in an appeal there is already a decree in existence, namely the decree of the trial Court which has been made the subject of the appeal. In such a case, therefore, if one of the parties dies and there is an abatement as against his heirs, then in such a case the decree in his favour by the trial Court would remain and there would be, in certain cases at any rate, a danger of there being another decree and that a conflicting one with the trial Court's decree: where such a position obtains, there, as I have pointed out above, Courts have held that the entire suit must be taken to have abated, for as I again may point out, Courts cannot permit two contradictory decrees coming into existence in the same cause. 9. 9. The suit out of which this revision has arisen was against six persons, who had their names entered, according to the Plaintiff, without any just cause in the revenue records. The Plaintiff could, without much risk to his suit, leave out one or more of the Defendants and seek his declaration and his alternative reliefs of possession as against the others. If that were so, then there could be no obvious bar to the suit proceeding as against the five remaining Defendants and not proceeding against the heirs of the deceased Moti Singh. 10. A similar question arose in this Court in the case of Shibban and Others Vs. Allah Mehar and Another , where Chief Justice Sulaiman and Mukerji, J. held that in a suit for possession and injunction against trespassers the mere fact that one of the trespassers had died and his heirs had not been brought on the record does not make it impossible to pass a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs against the trespassers who were before the Court. Their Lordships pointed QUI that if the suit had been brought against some of the trespassers, without impleading some other trespassers, then the suit could not be dismissed on that ground and they reasoned from this that an abatement in respect of some of the trespassers would not mean an abatement as against the others. 11. Certain cases of abatement in appeal were relied upon. But, as I pointed out already, the cases of abatement in appeal cannot be cases in point for our present purposes. 12. For the reasons given above, I allow this application in revision, set aside the orders of the Courts below and send back the case to the trial Court for proceeding against the remaining Defendants other than Moti Singh deceased in accordance with law. Costs of this revision would be costs in the cause.