MEHROTRA, J.: The petitioner Sri Haragovinda Sarma was ap­pointed as Superintendent of Taxes in May 1952 and was confirmed in his post in due course. By a letter dated 1st June 1957 Sri B. K. Bhuyan, De­puty Secretary to the Government of Assam, Finance Department informed the petitioner that he would be placed under suspension until further orders and another letter of the same date was issued to the petitioner informing him that departmental proceed­ings were started against him and he was asked to show cause on or before 17th June 1957 as to why he should not be dismissed from service. He was further directed to indicate if he desired to adduce oral evidence or to be heard in person. In that letter the charges against the petitioner are set out. They will be referred in detail later. These proceedings were drawn up by Sri E. H. Pakyntein, erstwhile Commissioner of Taxes, Assam. The petitioner submitted his written explanation on 27-6-1957. By letter D/- 2-7-1957 the Commissioner of Taxes intimated to him that he will hear him in person in his office in Shillong on 19-7-195,7 at 11 A. M. and he was also permitted to engage a lawyer to defend him in the proceedings and to adduce his evidence in support of the explanation. On the date of hearing he appeared with the lawyer but was informed by the Commissioner of Taxes that the pro­ceedings had to be adjourned as some additional charges were brought against him and that the right which had been conceded to him to be defended through a lawyer was withdrawn. The petitioner then approached the Govern­ment by a petition dated 23-7-1957 with a prayer that the order withdrawing the privilege to be re­presented through a counsel should be quashed. This petition was however rejected. The additional charges were drawn up on 16-9-1957 and a detail­ed explanation was then submitted by the petitioner on 27-11-1957. The petitioner in pursuance of the direction of the inquiring officer produced evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of his expla­nation. The Commissioner of Taxes submitted his report in due course to the Government. By a latter dated 16-6-1958 the petitioner was intimated by the Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Finance Department that the Govern­ment considered that the charges have been proved against him and he was unfit to be retained in ser­vice. The Commissioner of Taxes submitted his report in due course to the Government. By a latter dated 16-6-1958 the petitioner was intimated by the Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Finance Department that the Govern­ment considered that the charges have been proved against him and he was unfit to be retained in ser­vice. He was given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. The petitioner gave his written explanation on 30-6-1958. The mat­ter was considered then by the Chief Minister as the Finance Minister declined himself to deal with the matter and by an order dated 20-5-1959 passed by Sri S. C. Kagti, Secretary to the Government of As­sam. Finance Department the petitioner was dismiss­ed from service. The petitioner filed the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in this court for a writ of mandamus or certiorari or any other suitable direction quashing the order of dismissal passed by the authorities. It is further prayed that the oppo­site parties be directed to reinstate the petitioner in the post he was holding on the 1-6-1957 and not to give effect to the order dismissing the petitioner. (2) In response to the notice issued by this Court, a counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri S. C. Kagti, Secretary to the Government of Assam, Finance Department, who is opposite party No. 1. (3) The petitioner contends that he was hold­ing a civil post and the dismissal order had been passed in violation of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Mainly the counsel for the petitioner has made three submissions. Firstly he has contended that while making an inquiry, the inquiring officer acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and his findings can be examined by this court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. The finding according to the petitioner is based on no evidence. It is mainly based on presumptions unwarranted by the materials on the record and not justified by the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classifi­cation, Control and Appeal) Rules; 1957. Secondly he has contended that the petitioner had no reason­able opportunity to show cause against the charges and there has thus been a violation of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. His third con­tention is that the findings of the inquiring officer are illegal inasmuch as he was biassed. Secondly he has contended that the petitioner had no reason­able opportunity to show cause against the charges and there has thus been a violation of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. His third con­tention is that the findings of the inquiring officer are illegal inasmuch as he was biassed. (4) It is not disputed that the petitioner holds a civil post under the State and Article 311 of the Constitution is therefore, attracted. The petitioner has been dismissed by an order of the Governor communicated to him through the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Finance Department. Arti­cle 310 of the Constitution provides that except as expressly provided by the Constitution, every person who is a member of a civil service or holds any civil post under a State, holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. Article 310 is however, subject to the express provisions of the Constitution embodied in Article 311. The plea­sure of the Governor therefore, is subject to the express provisions contained in Article 311 of the Constitution. The petitioner can claim protection of Article 311. If the provisions of Art. 311 have been complied with, no further protection has been granted to the petitioner as against the pleasure of the Governor. The only material question there­fore, to be considered is whether in the present case there has been any violation of the provisions of Article 311. What is the content of the protec­tion granted under Article 311 is also a matter which will have to be examined as a good deal of the argument has been advanced on the question of the extent and the scope of the protection granted under article 311. (5) There are two express limitations on the exercise of the pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution (1) that any person shall not be dis­missed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and (2) that no person holding a civil post shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The first protection afforded to a civil servant does not arise in the present case. It is not a dis­missal by any departmental authority, the dismissal has been ordered by the Governor himself. The first protection afforded to a civil servant does not arise in the present case. It is not a dis­missal by any departmental authority, the dismissal has been ordered by the Governor himself. The only question therefore to be examined is whether it can be said in the circumstances of the present case that a reasonable opportunity has or has not been given to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed. The opportunity is not confined to showing cause against the proposed action. Before a civil servant can be dismissed, he has to be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the charges. But the opportunity to show cause does not to my mind mean that the petitioner is entitled to claim formalities of the procedure fol­lowed by courts of law; nor can it be said that if this court finds that the finding of the inquiring officer is not based on sufficient evidence or in its opinion it is not correct, it can be said that the petitioner had been denied a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the charges. The reasonable opportunity contemplated is obviously nothing but the observance of the fundamental principles of natural justice in the proceed­ings. If the petitioner has been condemned un­heard behind his back, he can say that the funda­mental principles of natural justice have not been observed 'and that no reasonable opportunity has been given to him to show that the charges were not correct. But if he has been given every op­portunity to be heard, to produce evidence, to cross examine witnesses and has not been condemned be­hind his back, he cannot say that there has been a denial of fair opportunity to him within the mean­ing of-Article 311 simply because he succeeds in establishing before this court that the view taken by the inquiring officer on the materials before him was not correct or that this court can reasonably take a different view from that taken by the in­quiring officer. (6) Reliance has been placed by the petitioner on the case of Khem Chand v. The Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080 : ( AIR 1958 SC 300 ). I do not think that this case is of any assistance to the petitioner. (6) Reliance has been placed by the petitioner on the case of Khem Chand v. The Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080 : ( AIR 1958 SC 300 ). I do not think that this case is of any assistance to the petitioner. This case summarises the 'reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provisions of Article 311 in the fol­lowing terms: "The reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes: (a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and estab­lish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in sup­port of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the com­petent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant ten­tatively proposes to inflict one of the three punish­ments and communicates the same to the govern­ment servant". (7) Mr. Medhi contends that the opportunity envisaged also includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence and that can only be done effectively if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. No objection can be taken to the contention as a proposition of law, but the opportunity to deny the guilt and establish the innocence does not mean that he can ask this court to come to its own conclusions whether the finding on the materials is correct or not and after having come to the conclusion that the finding is not correct, hold that there has been a denial of an opportunity to the petitioner to establish his innocen­ce. It only contemplates an opportunity to disprove his guilt and to establish his innocence. If he has been given every opportunity to prove his innocence or to disprove his guilt by producing evidence by being given personal hearing and submitting ela­borate explanations, it cannot be said that no op­portunity has been given to him within the meaning of Article 311. It only contemplates an opportunity to disprove his guilt and to establish his innocence. If he has been given every opportunity to prove his innocence or to disprove his guilt by producing evidence by being given personal hearing and submitting ela­borate explanations, it cannot be said that no op­portunity has been given to him within the meaning of Article 311. If the charges levelled against him are vague and the materials on which the charges are based are not brought to his notice, it may be argued that no reasonable opportunity has been given. The content and scope of the reasonable opportunity under Art. 311 has now been settled by a series of the decisions of the Supre­me Court and the facts of this case will have to be examined to see if it can be said that there has been a denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to establish his innocence. (8) On 1-6-1957 notice was sent to the peti­tioner to show cause against the charges. The notice contains the following charges: ''1. That being in employment in the Taxation Service under the Finance Department since 19-5-52 you have been found in possession of pecuniary resources of properties (as per statement 'A' enclos­ed) disproportionate to your known source of income and therefore it follows that you have acquired the same by dishonest means and thus under Rule ll(d) of the Assam Government Servants' Conduct Rules you are unlit to hold any job under Government. 2. That you have given a false statement of assets by omitting the properties acquired in the name of your wife (as per statement 'B' enclosed) in the declaration form dated 14-6-56 and thereby violated provision of the Rule H(a) of the Govern­ment Servants' Conduct Rules. 3. That you have taken active part in realising subscription for the 'Kirtan Char' at Barpeta without prior permission of your Head of Department as required under Rule 7(11) of the Assam Govern­ment Servants' Conduct Rules". By the notice he was also asked to intimate if he would desire to adduce oral evidence and to be heard in person. The notice also contained a state­ment showing the details of the properties acquired in his own name or in the name of his wife. By the notice he was also asked to intimate if he would desire to adduce oral evidence and to be heard in person. The notice also contained a state­ment showing the details of the properties acquired in his own name or in the name of his wife. By a letter dated 27-6-1957 the petitioner replied to the charges seriatim and stated that in case further pro­ceedings were to continue he would desire to be heard in person in the proceedings and would desire to adduce evidence in support of the explanation. He further prayed that he may be allowed to engage a counsel to defend himself. By a letter dated 2-7-1957 he was informed by the Commissioner of taxes that he would be heard in person in the office in Shillong on 19-7-1957 and also was permitted to engage a lawyer and to adduce all evidence in sup­port of the explanation given by him. It appears that on 16-7-1957 the Commissioner of Taxes sent the following orders to him by tele­gram:- "Regret rules do not allow you to engage counsel in your defence...." Thereafter he sent a letter to the Finance Minister on 23-7-1957 asking him to recall the order rescinding the permission granted to him to engage a counsel. On 21-9-1957 the Government replied to. the petitioner intimating the refusal to permit him to engage a counsel. On 27-11-1957 the petitioner submitted an explanation to the additional charges which were framed against him and of which notice was given to him earlier. In this explanation also he expressed his desire to be heard in person and to adduce evidence in sup­port of his explanation. Thereafter on 6-12-1957 the proceedings were held at Gauhati and all the witnesses required by the department as well as by the petitioner were examined and cross examined. The proceedings, were ad­journed to 14-12-1957, on which date further evidence was taken and arguments were also partly heard. The inquiring officer found some discre­pancy regarding the quantity of the land held by the father of the petitioner between the police report and the evidence given by the petitioner. The petitioner was given time to produce the documents till 26-12-1957, on which date he appear­ed and produced some documents and further argu­ments were heard. The petitioner also submitted a written argument on that date. The enquiring officer then submitted his finding to the Govern­ment. The petitioner was given time to produce the documents till 26-12-1957, on which date he appear­ed and produced some documents and further argu­ments were heard. The petitioner also submitted a written argument on that date. The enquiring officer then submitted his finding to the Govern­ment. On 16-6-1958 the Government issued a notice to the petitioner forwarding a copy of the report of the inquiring officer. The notice further stated that the Governor of Assam after considering the said report was of the opinion that - (1) the petitioner had failed to prove as required by rule ll(d) of the Assam Government Servants' Conduct Rules 1937 that the assets acquired by him and his wife and his pecuniary resources which were disproportion­ate to his known source of income were acquired by honest means and <(2) that he concealed material assets held by his wife in the shape of National Savings Certificate from the declaration of his assets in contravention of the provisions of rule ll(a) of the Assam Government Servants' Conduct Rules 1937. He was asked to show cause within fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the letter, why he should not be punished with dismissal from the ser­vice. By a letter dated 30-6-1958 the petitioner gave his explanation to the charges and the propos­ed punishment and also pointed out certain irregu­larities in the procedure. He further stated in his explanation that he should be allowed to make his final submissions through counsel on a date fixed by Government in the near future as he had been already subjected to more than enough of punishment for a period of a year and more. On 20-5-1959 the order of the Governor dismissing the petitioner from service was communicated to him by the Secretary to the Govern­ment of Assam, Finance Department. The order communicated to him reads as follows: "Charges 1 and 2 are proved. It is not consider­ed desirable to allow him to continue in public ser­vice as the charges proved reveal moral turpitude. He is therefore dismissed from service forthwith". (9) The facts set out above clearly establish that the petitioner was given every opportunity to adduce evidence, to cross examine witnesses and to offer explanation as against the proposed charges. It is not consider­ed desirable to allow him to continue in public ser­vice as the charges proved reveal moral turpitude. He is therefore dismissed from service forthwith". (9) The facts set out above clearly establish that the petitioner was given every opportunity to adduce evidence, to cross examine witnesses and to offer explanation as against the proposed charges. The charges were also duly intimated to him and he cannot be said to have been in any manner pre­judiced in his defence by the procedure adopted by the inquiring officer. The only grievance set out by the petitioner as regards the conduct of the proceed­ings is contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the petition. In paragraph 17 it is stated that although the Commissioner of Taxes was appointed the enquiring officer by Government to inquire into the charges brought against the petitioner and to conduct the proceedings against him, the two police officers respondents 3 and 4 Sri Subimal Chandra Das. Inspector of Police, Criminal Investigation Depart­ment and Sri Girindra Kumar Bhuyan, Deputy Sup­erintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Branch of the Police Department respectively - actually conduct­ed the entire proceedings in clear derogation of the rules or procedure in that behalf; while the mini­mum concession that was granted to the petitioner in the matter of engaging a counsel was withdrawn on the dictation of the authority. In paragraph 18 it was averred that on the- last date of hearing at Gauhati, that is, 6-12-1957 Sri Subimal Chandra Das respondent No. 3 who was also a prosecution witness, examined other prosecu­tion witnesses in spite of the petitioner's repeated protest and also actively intervened and interrupted in his cross examination of the prosecution witnesses. In fact while the defence witnesses were being cross examined by the respondent No. 3 without any law­ful authority, the inquiring officer asked the peti­tioner to move out of the room on each occasion of the cross examination of a defence witness. In paragraph 18 reference is also made to an applica­tion filed by him before the inquiring officer 011 9-12-1957. In paragraph 18 reference is also made to an applica­tion filed by him before the inquiring officer 011 9-12-1957. (10) The facts contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the petition make out broadly two complaints against the conduct of the proceedings-firstly that the proceedings in effect were conducted by the respondents No. 3 and 4 and secondly that when respondent No. 3 cross examined the defence witnes­ses the petitioner was asked to move out of the room. In the affidavit filed in support of the peti­tion paragraph 17 is verified as being true to the per­sonal knowledge and paragraph 18 as a matter of record true to the information of the petitioner. The petitioner takes no personal responsibility about the facts alleged in paragraph 18, although the fact must have been within his personal knowledge. The allega­tions in paragraph 17 are very vague. They do not set out the manner in which the respondents 3 and 4 conducted the proceedings. It has been admitted by the petitioner that the notices were issued by the inquiring officer. It is further admitted by him that the witnesses were examined in the presence of the inquiring officer, the petitioner and the opposite parties 3 and 4. It is admitted that the petitioner was permitted to cross examine the witnesses by the inquiring officer. The inquiring officer put certain questions by way of cross examination to the witnesses produced by the petitioner. After considering the entire materi­als on the record the inquiring officer submitted his report. In these circumstances it is difficult to under­stand what the petitioner means by saying that the proceedings were conducted by respondents 3 and 4. Obviously the department had to be represented by some one in the case and the mere assistance given by the opposite parties 3 and 4 to the inquir­ing officer in arriving at the conclusions cannot be said to be illegal and the petitioner cannot argue that it amounts to a denial of an opportunity to the petitioner to disprove the charges against him. In paragraph 18 it is stated that opposite party No. 3 actively intervened and interrupted in his cross •examination of the prosecution witnesses. This state­ment besides not being verified on personal know­ledge, is very vague. In paragraph 18 it is stated that opposite party No. 3 actively intervened and interrupted in his cross •examination of the prosecution witnesses. This state­ment besides not being verified on personal know­ledge, is very vague. In what manner opposite party No. 3 interrupted the petitioner in his cross examina­tion of the prosecution witnesses is not set out there­in; nor has it been shown to us that the petitioner was in any manner prejudiced in his cross examina­tion by the conduct of opposite party No. 3. As to the assertion that when the cross examination was going on the petitioner was asked to go out of the room, it is enough to point out that this statement is not verified on personal knowledge. (11) The petition filed by the petitioner on 9-12-1957 also points to the conclusion that the allega­tions were baseless. The inquiry was held on 6-12-1957. Three days after the actual date the petition was filed before the inquiring officer. In that peti­tion the only complaint made is that on the last date of hearing Sri Subimal Das, the inquiring offi­cer who was also a prosecution witness, examined the other prosecution witnesses in spite of repeated protests by the petitioner and also actively interven­ed and interrupted in his cross examination of the prosecution witnesses. It is further set out in that application that while Sri Subimal Das was going to cross examine the defence witness, on the petitioner's objection he was informed that as he was thoroughly acquainted with the papers his assistance was required by the Com­missioner of Taxes. On the petitioner's further pro­test and ultimately proposing to withdraw from the participation in the proceedings he was informed by the Commissioner that in that event he could be granted an adjournment for hearing only at Shillong. As it was not possible for him to bring eight or nine witnesses a second time at Shillong and further on the suggestion of the Commissioner that he would only consult opposite party No. 3 on points of cross examination, he consented to participate in the pro­ceedings. In that application it is further set out clearly that when the Commissioner had to consult Sri Das for the said points of cross examination in the case of defence witnesses, the petitioner was asked to move out of the court which he considered unfair and a matter of humiliation. In that application it is further set out clearly that when the Commissioner had to consult Sri Das for the said points of cross examination in the case of defence witnesses, the petitioner was asked to move out of the court which he considered unfair and a matter of humiliation. It was prayed by means of this petition that Sri Das should no more be allow­ed to participate in the proceeding. From this peti­tion it is clear that it was never pointed out that whenever the Commissioner put questions by way o£ cross examination to the defence witnesses, the peti­tioner was asked to move out of the room. It was only wjhen the Commissioner consulted opposite party No. 3 with regard to the questions which he would like to be put to the defence witnesses that the petitioner was asked to move out of the court. But the questions were put in presence of the peti­tioner to his witnesses. (12) The main grievance of the petitioner as disclosed in this petition is that Mr. Das was allow­ed to assist the inquiring officer in finding out the truth. It cannot be said that there was denial of an opportunity to the petitioner on that account. As has been pointed out in the counter-affidavit the petitioner objected to Sri Das who admittedly was in the know of facts, to cross examine the defence wit­nesses and he was agreeable to the Commissioner' putting certain questions to his witnesses by way of cross examination. The Commissioner naturally was not conversant with the facts of the case and conse­quently he had to take assistance from Sri Das in putting questions to the petitioner's witnesses. On matters of fact when he had to be informed by Mr. Das the petitioner was asked to move out of the room, but so long as the questions were put in the presence of the petitioner to his witnesses, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the procedure adopted by the conduct­ing officer and the petitioner was in any manner hampered in his prosecution of the defence. It should also be pointed out at this stage that the peti­tioner when he comes to this court for prerogative writs, has to set out his facts with full responsibility in his petition. It should also be pointed out at this stage that the peti­tioner when he comes to this court for prerogative writs, has to set out his facts with full responsibility in his petition. It is not proper to make vague allegations and without verifying them on personal knowledge al­though they are facts which are within his personal knowledge, make insinuations which are not borne out by facts. In a vague form in paragraph 18 the impression is sought to be created that the peti­tioner's witnesses were cross examined in his ab­sence, which is a patent falsehood as borne out by the application filed by the petitioner on 9-12-1957. (13) When the second notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punish­ment, the petitioner submitted a reply to the charges on 30-6-1958. The reply has been made Annexure 'L! to the petition. In the reply there is no sugges­tion made that the cross examination of the defence witnesses was done in his absence. It is better to quote the petitioner's own words: "I was dismayed to find that the whole enquiry was conducted by Shri Subimal Das, the Police En­quiring Officer who was also a prosecution witness. During the entire enquiry, but for the last two defence witnesses examined at Shillong- who were cross-examined by Shri G. Bhuyan, Deputy Superin­tendent of Police, all the defence witnesses were cross-examined by said Shri Subimal Das and all the prosecution witnesses were also examined by him. Unfortunately for me, I was required by the Enquir­ing Officer to leave the place of enquiry when said Subimal Das was engaged for cross-examination of my defence witnesses............ Although the Commissioner of Taxes functioned as Enquiring Officer, Shri Subimal Das, the Police Officer, functioned as the Conducting Officer with­out any valid authority of law .............. During the enquiry held at Shillong in the office room of the Commissioner of Taxes, the defence witnesses were actually cross-examined by Shri G. Bhuyan, Deputy Superintendent of Police and not by the Enquiring Officer. It is not known to me under what provision of law and/or procedure, the said officer functioned as the Conducting Officer in pre­sence and with the knowledge of the Conducting Officer duly appointed by Government". It is not known to me under what provision of law and/or procedure, the said officer functioned as the Conducting Officer in pre­sence and with the knowledge of the Conducting Officer duly appointed by Government". These passages will indicate that the petitioner never alleged that the cross examination of the witnesses was done either by the inquiring officer or by res­pondents No. 3 and 4 in his absence. It is difficult to understand what the petitioner means by saying that the petitioner was asked to move out when Shri Subimal Das was engaged for cross-examination. The whole grievance of the petitioner appears to be that the opposite parties No. 3 and 4 were per­mitted to cross examine the defence witnesses by the Inquiring officer and they were as if conducting the proceedings on behalf of the department without the authority of any law. There is no grievance at any stage made by the petitioner that he was hampered in his cross examination or that the cross examination was done behind his back. (14) In the case of Union of India v. T. R. Ver-ma, 1958 SCR 499 : ((S) AIR 1957 SC 882 ) one Shri T. R. Verma who was an assistant Controller of Commerce Department of the Union Government was dismissed from service by an order dated 16-9-]954. The order of dismissal was challenged by him by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground that it was in contravention of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The main ground taken was that he was not permitted to cross examine the witnesses who gave evidence against him. The High Court held on the facts that the res­pondent had been denied an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who gave evidence in support of the charge and further was not allowed to make his own statement but was merely cross examined by the inquiring officer and that his witnesses were merely cross examined by the officer without the respondent himself being allowed to examine them. On these findings the order of dismissal was set aside by the High Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court the decision of the High Court was reversed and it was held that there was no violation of the provision of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and the order of dismissal was perfectly valid. On these findings the order of dismissal was set aside by the High Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court the decision of the High Court was reversed and it was held that there was no violation of the provision of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and the order of dismissal was perfectly valid. It was observ­ed as follows: "At the very outset, we have to observe that a writ petition under Art. 226 is not the appropriate proceeding for adjudication of disputes like the present. Under the law, a person whose services have been wrongfully terminated, is entitled to institute an action to vindicate his rights, and in such an action, the Court will be competent to award all the reliefs to which he may be entitled, including some which would not be admissible in a writ petition. It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, (1950) S. C. R. 566: ( AIR 1950 SC 163 ), 'the existence of an adequ­ate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into con­sideration in the matter of granting writs.' **** On the other hand, the point for determination in this petition whether the resplendent was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case, turns mainly on the question whether he was prevented from cross-examining the witnesses, who gave evid­ence in support of the charge. That is a question on which there is 'a serious dispute, which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking evidence. It is not the practice of Courts to decide questions of that character in a writ petition, and it would have been a proper exercise of discretion in the present case if the learned Judges had referred the? respondent to a suit." In that case however, their Lordships of the Supreme Court preferred to go into the matter on the merits as the order of dismissal had been passed so far back as 16th September 1954. respondent to a suit." In that case however, their Lordships of the Supreme Court preferred to go into the matter on the merits as the order of dismissal had been passed so far back as 16th September 1954. At another place it was observed as follows: "The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry, and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of Law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adduc­ing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the op­portunity of cross-examining the witnesses examin­ed by that party, and that no materials should be relied On against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evid­ence Act for taking evidence was not strictly fol­lowed....... We have examined the record in the light of the above principles, and find that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. The witnesses have been examined at great length, and have spoken to all relevant facts bearing on the question, and it is not suggested that there is any other matter, on which they could have spoken. ___The findings of Mr. Bryne are based entirely on an appreciation of the oral evidence taken in the presence of the respondent. It should also be men­tioned that the respondent did not put forward these grounds of complaint in his explanation dated Sep­tember 11, 1953." The counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out anything in the statement of the witnesses examined to show that some answers were elicited from his witnesses against him due to his absence at the time of the cross examination. He has also not been able to point out anything in the record to show that the witnesses did not depose on all matters about which they could have been in a position to depose. He has also not been able to point out anything in the record to show that the witnesses did not depose on all matters about which they could have been in a position to depose. (15) The next contention of the petitioner is that the finding of the inquiring officer was based on presumption. There was no evidence to support the finding. It should be pointed out at the outset that the power exercised by the Governor dismissing a civil servant is an administrative power. It is an exercise of the pleasure under Article 310 of the Constitution and the only limitation placed on that power is contained in Article 311. It is not a judicial power where a writ of certiorari can be issued by this court on the finding that the report of the inquiring officer is based on no evidence. In the case of Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Hon. the Chief Justice of die Calcutta High Court, (1955) 2 S. C. R. 1331: ((S) AIR 1956 SC 285 ) the question which came up for determination before the Supreme Court was whether the order of dismissal passed by the Chief Justice was done in the exercise of the administrative power or judicial power. The ques­tion formulated for consideration was in the follow­ing term: "Even if the Chief Justice had such power whe­ther he could not delegate the enquiry into the charges to another Judge but should have made the enquiry himself." This question was answered in the following1 term: "This contention proceeds on a misapprehension of the nature of the power. As pointed out in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board, (1953) 2 Q. B. 18, at p. 40, it is true that no judicial tribunal can delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication. But the exercise of the power to appoint or dismiss an officer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power. It is nonetheless so, by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise thereof. It is well recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a res­ponsible and competent official to enquire and re­port. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. It is well recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a res­ponsible and competent official to enquire and re­port. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. What cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so provides - is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power. As pointed out by the House of Fords in Board of Education v. Rice, (1911) A. C. 179, a functionary who has to decide an administrative matter, of the nature involved in this case, can obtain the material on which he is to act in such manner as may be feasible and convenient, provid­ed only the affected party "has a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant and prejudicial material". " The principle therefore that a writ of certiorari can be issued on the ground of manifest error of law which includes a decision based on no evidence, cannot be invoked in the present case. (16) Mr. Medhi's contention however was that if the decision of the inquiring officer is based on no material and the enquiring officer has based his findings on presumptions which could not be legally available to him, the finding can be characterised to have been arrived at without giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. To my mind this argument is based on misconception. The protection granted to the petitioner under Article 311 of the Constitution is confined to an opportunity being given to him to disprove the charges and to establish his innocence. Whether the material is sufficient for the Governor to exercise his pleasure in a particular manner and whether the material can be said to be legally admissible evidence within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, are not matters which have any bearing on the question as to whether the petitioner had or had not a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Moreover the inquiring officer had only to in­vestigate certain facts and report to the Government and it was for the proper authority to draw its own conclusions whether in this set of circumstances the power to dismiss should or should not be exercised. Moreover the inquiring officer had only to in­vestigate certain facts and report to the Government and it was for the proper authority to draw its own conclusions whether in this set of circumstances the power to dismiss should or should not be exercised. The charge against the petitioner was that during his employment since 19th May 1952 he had been found in possession of pecuniary resources of pro­perty disproportionate to his known source of in­come and therefore there was a presumption that he acquired the same by dishonest means under rule ll(d) of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules and was thus unfit to hold any job under the Gov­ernment. Whether the properties were dispropor­tionate to his known source of income and whether the petitioner has proved that they were acquired by honest means are matters which could only be inferred from the circumstances of the case and any finding on these issues will naturally depend upon the circumstantial evidence. As will appear from the report according to the findings of the Commissioner of Taxes, between the period of 1st October 1953 and 18th October 1955 National Saving Certificates worth about Rs. 18,500/ -were purchased in the name of the petitioner's wife Srimati Prabhavati Devi and National Plan Certi­ficates to the value of Rs. 1,000/- were purchased tin his own name. The petitioner was asked to explain as to how he could, with his known source of income, have purchased the National Certificates of the value of Rs. 19,500/-. The explanation given by the petitioner was that petitioner's father who was a man of substance, had purchased National Certificates of the value of Rs. 18,500/- in the name of petitioner's wife. The petitioner or his wife had no control over these cer­tificates. Out of these, certificates of the value of Rs. 14,500/- were withdrawn by the petitioner's father and property was purchased for Rs. 10,000/-. The inquiring officer in view of the defence taken by the petitioner, had to investigate whether his father had means actually to invest such a large sum of money and secondly whether these National Certi­ficates were actually purchased by his father in the name of the petitioner's wife. After consideration of evidence the inquiring officer came to the con­clusion as follows: "It appears to me that the truth may lie some­where in the middle. After consideration of evidence the inquiring officer came to the con­clusion as follows: "It appears to me that the truth may lie some­where in the middle. The father of Shri H. G. Sarma may have some lands and income therefrom as well as some income from his disciples, but he had daugh­ters to marry and other sons to educate and be given chance in life besides the eldest son, Shri H. G. Sarma. If he really had all the money to invest as was made out to be, some amounts should have been invested in the same manner before Shri H. G. Sarma became Superintendent of Taxes, but there is no proof of that. It is therefore extraordinary how all the investments would be made by the father only through his daughter-in-law and that also only during the period during which Shri H. G. Sarma was a Superintendent of Taxes. It is also note­worthy that these investments were made from Tezpur and Jorhat where Shri H. G. Sarma served as Superintendent of Taxes. I therefore think that there is some truth in the allegation that the National Saving Certificates were purchased at least partially through the earning of Shri H. G. Sarma." The petitioner's contention that the National Certi­ficates were purchased by the father in the name of his wife was rejected. (17) It is contended by Mr. Medhi that the inquiring officer has presumed that the Certificates standing in the name of the petitioner's wife were actually purchased out of the income of the peti­tioner from unknown sources merely on the circums­tance that partially the defence of the petitioner was incorrect that these certificates were purchased by his father; this is not warranted by law. As I have already pointed out, it cannot be said that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice if the inquiring officer presumed that the wife who had no independent source of income must have purchased these Certificates out of the income of her husband, once the inquiring officer disbeliev­ed the case set up by the petitioner that it was his father who purchased these National Certificates in the name of his wife. (18) The second criticism of the petitioner's counsel is that the inquiring officer not having come to any definite finding as to the actual amount of National Certificates purchased out of the income of the petitioner, it was not possible to come to any conclusion as to whether the property of the peti­tioner was or was not disproportionate to his known source of income. The order of dismissal was passed after considering all the materials on the record and the report of the inquiring officer. It cannot be said that the circumstances were such that no rea­sonable man could have drawn such an inference. Moreover the reply submitted by the petitioner to the Commissioner of Taxes by his letter dated 27th November 1957 will clearly show that the petitioner was not in a position to invest any money in the pur­chase of National Certificates. In the reply he has given in detail his income from his known sources during the period under consideration and his ex­penses and it is clear from the examination of his report that he was never in a position to invest any money in the purchase of the National Certificates out of his known source of income. (19) It was further contended by Mr. Medhi that the order of dismissal is based on the ground that charges No. 1 and 2 were found to be proved against the petitioner, while the perusal of the inquiring officer's report will show that he did not find the said two charges proved against the petitioner. We have carefully gone through the report and we are not prepared to accept the contention of the peti­tioner's counsel that the inquiring officer did not find the charges established against the petitioner. (20) The point that the petitioner being denied representation through a counsel was prejudiced in his defence, has no substance. The petitioner could not claim representation through a counsel as a matter of right. The petitioner cross examined the witnesses, was given every opportunity to produce his own evidence and it cannot be said therefore that he was in any manner prejudiced in his defence. The denial of right to the petitioner to be represented through a counsel per se does not amount to denial of a reasonable opportunity. It was emphasised by Mr. The petitioner cross examined the witnesses, was given every opportunity to produce his own evidence and it cannot be said therefore that he was in any manner prejudiced in his defence. The denial of right to the petitioner to be represented through a counsel per se does not amount to denial of a reasonable opportunity. It was emphasised by Mr. Medhi that the department was represented through respondents No. 3 and 4 who were police officers and were conversant with the legal procedure, hut the petitioner had no such legal training and he was thus handicapped in his defence. That sugges­tion cannot be accepted. The petitioner is an educa­ted man and it cannot be said that he was in any manner less qualified to conduct his defence than opposite parties No. 3 and 4. (21) It was lastly contended that the finding of the inquiring officer should be set aside as it was biassed. Reliance was placed on two English, cases in support of this contention -- (1) The King v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 K. B. 256 and (2) The King v. Essex Justices - Ex parte Perkins, (1927) 2 K. B. 475. In 1927-2 K. B. 475 the matter arose on an application for issue of a writ of certiorari. Mr. W. J. A. Perkins the applicant stated that his wife called at the office of Mr. C. Cordon Jones the member of the firm of Jones and Son, solicitors, where she saw Mr. Dighton, from whom she wanted to have drafted a separation agreement between herself and her husband. On a later date Mr. Dighton saw a solicitor of Clacton and mentioned her business to him. Later at the instance of his wife summons was issued to Mr. J. Perkins to appear before Justices at Clacton. The summons was heard by the Justices when Mr. Tones acted as their clerk. The proceedings were held before the Justices and the Justices retired to con­sider their decision. On the next adjourned date of hearing Mr. Jones again acted as a clerk of the Jus­tices and a permanent separation order was passed by the Justices. On these facts a petition was moved. The petition was allowed on the ground that the petitioner was embarrassed before the Justices by feeling that their clerk was one who was adverse to him. Jones again acted as a clerk of the Jus­tices and a permanent separation order was passed by the Justices. On these facts a petition was moved. The petition was allowed on the ground that the petitioner was embarrassed before the Justices by feeling that their clerk was one who was adverse to him. The solicitor no doubt in that case stated that when he was acting as clerk to the Justices on the occasion, he had no knowledge that his firm had acted for the wife and that he was in no way adverse to the husband. But still the petition was allowed and it was observed as follows: "In considering whether justice appeared to the applicant to be done it is immaterial to inquire whe­ther or not the clerk knew that he had been in the position of solicitor to the applicant's wife, since the fact that the clerk had no knowledge of having been in that position could not affect the view of the applicant that justice was not being done. It is further submitted, however, that justice was not here in fact done, and that the case is not one in which the justices should have made a maintenance order." These two cases to my mind, do not support the con­tention of the petitioner. The rule that the bias vitiates the finding is a rule of natural justice. An inquiring officer who though not a court, has to objectively determine the facts and has to come to a finding on the materials before him and if he is in any manner biased, the principle of natural justice demands that he should not be entrusted with such an inquiry. It is essential not only that justice should be done, but it should appear to have been done. But this proposition cannot be so broadly put so as to give an opportunity to the litigants to fancy for themselves a supposed reason that they will not have a fair justice before the tribunal and then to make it a. ground for setting aside the finding of the said tribunal. There must be a reasonable basis for apprehending that the justice will not be done as the inquiring officer had a bias against the petitioner. Throughout the proceeding at no. stage the peti­tioner indicated that he apprehended any bias on the part of the inquiring officer. There must be a reasonable basis for apprehending that the justice will not be done as the inquiring officer had a bias against the petitioner. Throughout the proceeding at no. stage the peti­tioner indicated that he apprehended any bias on the part of the inquiring officer. In cases where the tribunal before passing a judgment or at the time of giving its decision consults any person interested against the petitioner, the decision may be likely to be influenced by the presence of such an interes­ted person and the litigant may reasonably apprehend that justice has not been done. But in the present case the only circumstance pointed out by the peti­tioner is that he was asked to walk out of the room when the inquiring officer consulted opposite party No. 3 before putting questions by way of cross exa­mination to his witnesses. That circumstance by itself does not suggest that the petitioner at any stage had the slightest apprehension that the decision of the inquiring offi­cer was in any manner influenced or was likely to be influenced by the consultation which the inquiring officer held with opposite party No. 3 in the absence of the petitioner. I have already dealt with this aspect of the matter when dealing with the question as to whether there was denial of any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case on that account. The ultimate cross examination was done in the presence of the petitioner and according to the petitioner's own submissions the inquiring officer gave a finding which supported the peti­tioner's case. It cannot therefore, be said that the finding of the inquiring officer was vitiated on acco­unt of any bias. (22) Reference may in this connection be made to the case of R. v. Camborne Justices - Ex parte Pearce, 1954-2 All ER 850. In this case it was held that to disqualify a person from acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity on the ground of interest (other than pecuniary or proprietary) in the subject-matter of the proceedings, a real likelihood of bias must be shown; and the real likelihood of bias must be made to appear having regard not only to the materials ascertained by the party complaining, but also to such further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the course of his inquiries. After referring to the two cases cited by the counsel for the petitioner in the present case it was observed as follows at p. 855 of the report: "While endorsing and fully maintaining the integrity of the principle reasserted by Ford Hewart, C. J., this court feels that the continued citation of it in cases to which it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that it should in fact be done." In the result therefore there is no force in this peti­tion and it is rejected. We make no order as to costs. (23) C. P. SINHA, C. J. : I agree. ED/K.S.B. Petition rejected.